The UK in Afghanistan

[JMA]

IMHO the Brits must use this opportunity to become realistic about what they will be able to achieve and afford militarily in the future.

The days of preparing for all possible scenarios is no longer possible or intelligent.

First, decommission Trident and associated navy infrastructure. It is noted with horror that Trident has been specifically excluded from the Defence Review.

I did speak about the value IMO of having 5 platoon companies and the same for rifle companies in a battalion with a corresponding increase in the Support Company strength. Worth consideration.

Then the Army Air Corps chopper strength must be radically increased for both attack and lift.

The problem is that there are insiders going to carry this out and the final decision will probably be taken on the basis of a compromise to keep sailors, soldiers and airmen least unhappy.

As has been discussed here (by me) is that the war productivity of the Brit army is very poor what with 18 month R&Rs between mere 6 month war tours. Change that and you can get a lot more bang for the buck.

Difficult choices lie ahead.

[William F. Owen]

IMHO the Brits must use this opportunity to become realistic about what they will be able to achieve and afford militarily in the future.

The days of preparing for all possible scenarios is no longer possible or intelligent.

Sorry, but that isn't the issue. The UK can generated an Armoured Division and has the resources to do so. That means we can conduct coalition warfare against regular threats. Irregular threats is just scaling down from that as concerns capability, IF the right capabilities are in place. Loose the ability to do regular Ops at the formation(+) level and you loose it forever.

First, decommission Trident and associated navy infrastructure. It is noted with horror that Trident has been specifically excluded from the Defence Review.

....because it had just been subject to a separate Review and which "Review" are you talking about.

I did speak about the value IMO of having 5 platoon companies and the same for rifle companies in a battalion with a corresponding increase in the Support Company strength. Worth consideration.

That would give you 25 platoons, which makes no sense to me. Any reasoning or data behind the idea? Why not have 6 Platoons in 6 Companies?

Then the Army Air Corps chopper strength must be radically increased for both attack and lift.

Why radically? What do you base that on?
Lift is the concern of the RAF and the AAC cannot recruit enough pilots to man the Attack helicopter fleet, which is 60+ aircraft. Why do you suggest more?
If you mean "deploy" more AH, then OK. Right now, that would mean using more RAF and RN crews and making the AH capability a de-facto, "Joint Unit."

As has been discussed here (by me) is that the war productivity of the Brit army is very poor what with 18 month R&Rs between mere 6 month war tours. Change that and you can get a lot more bang for the buck.

Again, missing the point. The issues are the tour cycle and the deployed capped numbers. These are two separate issues. If you are saying deploy more,(for a sensible mission) then I can agree. If you resort to a "year on, year off," you will simply risk breaking the Army. Volunteer Army - worth remembering on this issue.

[JMA]

On the 9th a retired general adds his comments:http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/10271619.stm

Gen Mackay is quoted as saying:

The issue is whether or not our politicians, diplomats, intelligence services, civil servants and senior military have done enough, adapted enough, been innovative enough or courageous enough to make tough, and more often than not, unpalatable choices.

I don't think (and I say this once again) that all the blame should be laid at the feet of the above mentioned and let the battalion commanders and below get off Scott free. It is too easy for the more junior officers to try to deflect blame for a poor campaign in the direction of the generals and the politicos.

On the 12th an admiral too: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/10300703.stm and commenting on the 2006 decision to deploy to Helmand:

This is a better quote from Admiral Parry I suggest:

...that those in charge of the mission had based their strategy on memories of missions in Borneo, Malaya and Northern Ireland and senior figures showed "considerable" resistance to "ditching the lessons from the past" rather than adopting the "radical and progressive ideas" which were needed.

This is why the military top structure needs a full overhaul.

[William F. Owen]

I don't think (and I say this once again) that all the blame should be laid at the feet of the above mentioned and let the battalion commanders and below get off Scott free. It is too easy for the more junior officers to try to deflect blame for a poor campaign in the direction of the generals and the politicos.

All true.
The issue is that you have to understand military operations and their precise context to make that criticism. Being informed on current military operations is not something that can be done using Google.

As I have said repeatedly, there are very good grounds to question some of the operational conduct, - based on examining specific events, and having talked to those involved - usually more than one.

"...that those in charge of the mission had based their strategy on memories of missions in Borneo, Malaya and Northern Ireland and senior figures showed "considerable" resistance to "ditching the lessons from the past" rather than adopting the "radical and progressive ideas" which were needed."

What "radical and progressive ideas?" Again, this is the pumping of "Influence Agenda."

This is why the military top structure needs a full overhaul.

That's a faith based assertion. Replacing the people at the top does not mean you get better people from below.

[JMA]

All true.
The issue is that you have to understand military operations and their precise context to make that criticism. Being informed on current military operations is not something that can be done using Google.

Don't assume that I have no sources of discussion and exchanges of ideas outside Google.

As I have said repeatedly, there are very good grounds to question some of the operational conduct, - based on examining specific events, and having talked to those involved - usually more than one.

Yes, if you need the excruciating detail you need to go on the ground itself... but it does not take a rocket scientist to hear and gain an understanding of how at sea without a rudder the whole operation is. It would be better to address the problems and deal with them rather than to just muddle on.

What "radical and progressive ideas?" Again, this is the pumping of "Influence Agenda."

Don't shoot the messenger. He may have an agenda but he does have a point. I see these Influence Ops as more of a passing gimmick than a strategic solution, but hey, when all else has failed I guess one like a terminally ill man will finally resort to snake oil.

That's a faith based assertion. Replacing the people at the top does not mean you get better people from below.

The problem at the top relates to a problem with the system. Not sure why the cry for officers to not get politicised only comes out now. Generations of officers have been destroyed by attachments to MoD/Foreign Office where they had whatever morality and ethics the started out with totally undermined. Duplicity is not a trait one wants to encourage among the officer corps. Officers should be protected from such contamination.

Fish rot from the head down. So the cull should start there. I suggest that the current Captain/Major level are sufficiently set in their ways to also need a good cull. The question should be asked... what kind of officer corps does the modern Brit army need... then let the cull begin.

I liked Richards' actions in Sierra Leone but a year at the MoD must surely count against him. Lets see what happens. I genuinely hope that the Brits get their act together.

[JMA]

Sorry, but that isn't the issue. The UK can generated an Armoured Division and has the resources to do so. That means we can conduct coalition warfare against regular threats. Irregular threats is just scaling down from that as concerns capability, IF the right capabilities are in place. Loose the ability to do regular Ops at the formation(+) level and you loose it forever.

If the requirement is for the Brit army to be able to deploy and supply an Armoured Div then I'm sure that ability will be retained.

....because it had just been subject to a separate Review and which "Review" are you talking about.

Trident is a relic of the cold war and should be scrapped so that the funds can be released for more urgent and more likely scenarios.

That would give you 25 platoons, which makes no sense to me. Any reasoning or data behind the idea? Why not have 6 Platoons in 6 Companies?

In the context of that discussion it was based on the idea of having sufficient strength at battalion/company level to retain a force at current establishments in the field (semi) permanently (with all the operational benefits that would accrue.

You can go to any number of platoons or companies you prefer but at a point that would lead to the bloating of HQs.

Why radically? What do you base that on?
Lift is the concern of the RAF and the AAC cannot recruit enough pilots to man the Attack helicopter fleet, which is 60+ aircraft. Why do you suggest more?
If you mean "deploy" more AH, then OK. Right now, that would mean using more RAF and RN crews and making the AH capability a de-facto, "Joint Unit."

The first contentious area will be where there is an overlap between the Air Force and the Army Air Corps. Is there a decisive leader out there who can cut to the chase on this one?

Then one needs to look at the lift requirements and belatedly learn that chopper lift is merely transport and like vehicle personnel carriers they must be able to deliver troops onto the objective. Once that long overdue paradigm shift has taken place the real work on the chopper establishments can be done.

Again, missing the point. The issues are the tour cycle and the deployed capped numbers. These are two separate issues. If you are saying deploy more,(for a sensible mission) then I can agree. If you resort to a "year on, year off," you will simply risk breaking the Army. Volunteer Army - worth remembering on this issue.

With respect it is not I who am missing the point it is the Brit military. I went through through this would range of deployment possibilities in my little war and have mentioned before (higher in this thread) where in a combat battalion combat fatigue strikes. I am not privy to the churn stats from the Brit army so I can't comment right now. Clearly this matter has not been fully thought through by the Brits.

[William F. Owen]

Don't assume that I have no sources of discussion and exchanges of ideas outside Google.

That being the case, I look forward to your suggestions are to the remedial action to be taken at the Battle Group level.

I see these Influence Ops as more of a passing gimmick than a strategic solution, but hey, when all else has failed I guess one like a terminally ill man will finally resort to snake oil.

Which is why you should not focus on the criticism provided by those pumping the gimmick

Generations of officers have been destroyed by attachments to MoD/Foreign Office where they had whatever morality and ethics the started out with totally undermined.

Sorry, I know plenty of good men who did both and came away un-scathed. Character is either something flexible or set.

I suggest that the current Captain/Major level are sufficiently set in their ways to also need a good cull. The question should be asked... what kind of officer corps does the modern Brit army need... then let the cull begin.

In all honesty, is that a serious suggestion? I know good men who could write books about the shortcomings of officer training and selection, but what you suggest is not a solution. Solutions do exist however.

I liked Richards' actions in Sierra Leone but a year at the MoD must surely count against him.

You mean OP "blood bath" Barras? How do you have CGS, who does not spend time in the MoD?

Trident is a relic of the cold war and should be scrapped so that the funds can be released for more urgent and more likely scenarios.

I might agree, but the devil is in the detail.

In the context of that discussion it was based on the idea of having sufficient strength at battalion/company level to retain a force at current establishments in the field (semi) permanently (with all the operational benefits that would accrue.

Well you go for BNs of 10 Companies and cycle the companies and BCRs through deployment. If Afghanistan is the only war you are ever going to fight. IMO, the answer lies in better organisation, not just bigger organisations.

The first contentious area will be where there is an overlap between the Air Force and the Army Air Corps. Is there a decisive leader out there who can cut to the chase on this one?

Where's the overlap in lift types? The debate as to what types you need and who operates them is endless. I have opinions, but they are just that.
....but yes, you need SH, and most of that should be CH-47. Go big or not at all!

[Red Rat]

If the requirement is for the Brit army to be able to deploy and supply an Armoured Div then I'm sure that ability will be retained.

The armoured div ('armoured div' is probably outmoded as a term, a division sized formation that is capable of major combat operations to include manouevre and high intensity warfighting) is the minimum we can deploy into the field and still expect to hold any sort of tactical significance or sway. It is what the US has made very clear to us, is the benchmark by which they judge other armies. It is also the minimum level by which we would see ourselves entering a failed or failing state initially.

Trident is a relic of the cold war and should be scrapped so that the funds can be released for more urgent and more likely scenarios.

I am not hot on 'Deterrence Theory', but when Iran, N. Korea and Burma all seem to be trying to build a capability it does seem somewhat strange that we should unilaterally give up ours. Personally I feel safer knowing that if Kim decides to wave a small stick at us we got a socking big cudgel to smack him down with!
The nuclear deterrent is a long term strategic issue and is a capability maintained by Defence for the nation, we (defence and especially the Navy) hold it because the govt tells us to hold it, but it sides outside our main tasks and capabilities and the budget for it has always been set aside from mainstream defence budgets. If the government decided that they felt they could do without it for the forseeable future and were willing to give up their seat on the UN Security Council then we would give it up but that is a political/strategic call, not a defence call per se.

The first contentious area will be where there is an overlap between the Air Force and the Army Air Corps. Is there a decisive leader out there who can cut to the chase on this one?

Then one needs to look at the lift requirements and belatedly learn that chopper lift is merely transport and like vehicle personnel carriers they must be able to deliver troops onto the objective. Once that long overdue paradigm shift has taken place the real work on the chopper establishments can be done.

No overlap that I am aware of. The RAF provides troop lift, the army air corps provides recce and attack. The training and supply chains are essentially joint now. There is overlap between Navy and the RAF in terms of support helicopter lift capacity, but the RAF do not want to go to sea and the Navy do not want to wear light blue.. On the ground (or in the air ) it matters little.

With respect it is not I who am missing the point it is the Brit military. I went through through this would range of deployment possibilities in my little war and have mentioned before (higher in this thread) where in a combat battalion combat fatigue strikes. I am not privy to the churn stats from the Brit army so I can't comment right now. Clearly this matter has not been fully thought through by the Brits.

But, looking at longer deployments there is an argument to say that they lead to increased levels of PTSD and general mental health problems. There are significantly more issues with the US military then with the UK, and although the subject is being researched currently what has been highlighted is the higher deployment intensity of the US Armed Forces.

Plus, if we went to year long tours then we could do the same in terms of operational effect with less (only deploying one brigade a year instead of two), so we are offering up 50% of the army as a cost saving (thats the way the treasury looks at it; use it or lose it). The point is we are not talking about just campaign effectiveness here, we are also talking about the Higher Management of Defence.

[JMA]

The armoured div ('armoured div' is probably outmoded as a term, a division sized formation that is capable of major combat operations to include manouevre and high intensity warfighting) is the minimum we can deploy into the field and still expect to hold any sort of tactical significance or sway. It is what the US has made very clear to us, is the benchmark by which they judge other armies. It is also the minimum level by which we would see ourselves entering a failed or failing state initially.

How many other countries can put such an armoured formation into the field?

What I'm trying to say (no matter how painful to some) is that maybe Britain is past it in terms of being on standby to support the US as the global policeman.

Think about it. What states (failed or failing) would see the Brits deploy their Armoured Div to save?

I am not hot on 'Deterrence Theory', but when Iran, N. Korea and Burma all seem to be trying to build a capability it does seem somewhat strange that we should unilaterally give up ours. Personally I feel safer knowing that if Kim decides to wave a small stick at us we got a socking big cudgel to smack him down with!
The nuclear deterrent is a long term strategic issue and is a capability maintained by Defence for the nation, we (defence and especially the Navy) hold it because the govt tells us to hold it, but it sides outside our main tasks and capabilities and the budget for it has always been set aside from mainstream defence budgets. If the government decided that they felt they could do without it for the forseeable future and were willing to give up their seat on the UN Security Council then we would give it up but that is a political/strategic call, not a defence call per se.

If Kim gets a bomb or Iran for that matter I don't believe they will aim it at Britain.

I think the problem will be for the UK to relinquish nuclear weapons while some minor nations of old now have them. Its like not walking away from Sangin etc... its more emotional than logical.

No overlap that I am aware of. The RAF provides troop lift, the army air corps provides recce and attack. The training and supply chains are essentially joint now. There is overlap between Navy and the RAF in terms of support helicopter lift capacity, but the RAF do not want to go to sea and the Navy do not want to wear light blue.. On the ground (or in the air ) it matters little.

The overlap is when as an infantry battalion you have both RAF and AAC involved in relatively simple operational lift and attack support.

Good so the training and supply chains are now joint... so whats the next logical step?

You do away with inter service rivalry if only one service provides the chopper support that a battalion would require, yes?

But, looking at longer deployments there is an argument to say that they lead to increased levels of PTSD and general mental health problems. There are significantly more issues with the US military then with the UK, and although the subject is being researched currently what has been highlighted is the higher deployment intensity of the US Armed Forces.

I'm looking into this very issue (PTSD) from my little war. Very strange that we seem to have had very little of that at the scale experienced by say the Falklands veterans. See here: Troops to get trauma help

So even in a one-off 74 day war like the Falklands there seems to be a problem? So is it the violent magnitude of the experience, the number of experiences or the period over which these experiences occurred?

I mentioned the word churn and would mean it to cover the more vulnerable elements in a company to combat fatigue. There needs to be some encouragement for some levels to move on.

Sadly it seems you have already put up an objection before actually thinking the whole thing through. So next time I will say don't ever think about increasing operational time for Brit soldiers and that might do the trick

Plus, if we went to year long tours then we could do the same in terms of operational effect with less (only deploying one brigade a year instead of two), so we are offering up 50% of the army as a cost saving (thats the way the treasury looks at it; use it or lose it). The point is we are not talking about just campaign effectiveness here, we are also talking about the Higher Management of Defence.

I would think that a battalion swanning around for 18 months between Afghan tours would constitute a "lose it" option.

I would say that you could take your Armoured Div and go play in some desert while the infantry get to maximise their time in Afghanistan. Sure you could sell the increased productivity to those clowns in the MoD.

Again I ask (with tears forming in my eyes) whether you or anyone have really given this option any honest thought?

[davidbfpo]

I am sure these articles have been missed, so Hat tip to KoW.

First on Afpak, with an opening line:

Britain's Conservative-led government of David Cameron is busy in London wrestling with the question: just what has been going wrong?

Link:http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts...f+War-Reading)

The article has a link to a series of articles in The Times (now behind a pay wall), so just a hint from this available link:http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/new...cle7146449.ece

Plus a link to an earlier article, with a ten point strategy, note with retired General Mackay as interviewee: http://www.stephengrey.com/2010/06/a...n-afghanistan/

Lots to read, enjoy.

[William F. Owen]

Link:http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts...f+War-Reading)

The article has a link to a series of articles in The Times (now behind a pay wall), so just a hint from this available link:http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/new...cle7146449.ece

Plus a link to an earlier article, with a ten point strategy, note with retired General Mackay as interviewee: http://www.stephengrey.com/2010/06/a...n-afghanistan/

OK, and.....?

Sorry but most of this isn't helping because people want to be believe the problem is something other than it is.

a.) THERE IS NO MONEY! - to a very serious degree. It's now hitting training.
b.) There are too few troops deployed. - there is a need for at least double.

...and my respect for General MacKay is evaporating by the minute.
"Reform the Army" "Purge the chain of Command." - sorry but these are all easy things to say when you are playing to the cheap seats. Not things that are helpful.
Show me how you "Purge the chain of Command" - and who gets to do it? - and based on what?

I am certainly a strong critic, of the British Army, but there are also some very good critics of the British Army out there.
Flapping and quacking about Reform, purges and "oh the insanity" is not an answer.

[Red Rat]

How many other countries can put such an armoured formation into the field?

Not sure, but it is the bench mark our major strategic partner has asked us to maintain.

What I'm trying to say (no matter how painful to some) is that maybe Britain is past it in terms of being on standby to support the US as the global policeman.

Quite possibly, but this is not a question for the army or for defence. It is a question for the government and for the nation. Does Britain still see itself as a contributor on the world stage or does it want to slip into comfortable European obscurity? In part the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) is supposed to answer that. If we couldn't or shouldn't then we won't!

Think about it. What states (failed or failing) would see the Brits deploy their Armoured Div to save?

Who knows? Most wars seem to catch us by surprise. The issue is also one of timing - the SDSR is only in part about Afghanistan (the current crisis) and more about the longer terms threats and uncertainties.

If Kim gets a bomb or Iran for that matter I don't believe they will aim it at Britain.

Probably not, but if in 15 years time and Iran and Saudi both have nuclear weapons and we have a UK taskforce out there it might be nice to have a nuclear umbrella. The strategic deterrent is insurance against the unknown.

I think the problem will be for the UK to relinquish nuclear weapons while some minor nations of old now have them. Its like not walking away from Sangin etc... its more emotional than logical.

I think the only emotion in it links to what part we want to play in the world. Most UK citizens (less the immigrants) would want us to get rid of nukes; the government is going against public opinion on this.

The overlap is when as an infantry battalion you have both RAF and AAC involved in relatively simple operational lift and attack support.

Good so the training and supply chains are now joint... so whats the next logical step?

You do away with inter service rivalry if only one service provides the chopper support that a battalion would require, yes?

No disagreement and it is an option that has been repeatedly mooted, including by serving senior RAF officers. The army's favourite way of annoying the RAF is to suggest that the army takes all the rotary wing and tactical lift, the navy all the fast air and Virgin Atlantic takes all the strategic lift.

I'm looking into this very issue (PTSD) from my little war. Very strange that we seem to have had very little of that at the scale experienced by say the Falklands veterans.

So even in a one-off 74 day war like the Falklands there seems to be a problem? So is it the violent magnitude of the experience, the number of experiences or the period over which these experiences occurred?

The more we know about PTSD and TBI the more we know that we do not know. I know enough to know that I certainly don't know!

I mentioned the word churn and would mean it to cover the more vulnerable elements in a company to combat fatigue. There needs to be some encouragement for some levels to move on.

Sadly it seems you have already put up an objection before actually thinking the whole thing through. So next time I will say don't ever think about increasing operational time for Brit soldiers and that might do the trick

But I am in favour of increasing tour lengths!

I would think that a battalion swanning around for 18 months between Afghan tours would constitute a "lose it" option.

They tend to be pretty busy these swanning battalions

Again I ask (with tears forming in my eyes) whether you or anyone have really given this option any honest thought?

Yup we have! But you are focused on Afghanistan and short term operational effectiveness there, while many of the issues raised impinge on defence as a whole. No point in throwing the baby out with the bath water!

[Bob's World]

Brits are wrestling with the same problem in their military that the US is: As foreign policy falls farther out of touch with a changing world, more and more is expected of the military to somehow manage the products of the friction caused by said policies and somehow keep everything on track so that the political/policy types don't have to evolve.

At some point, this approach falls flat. We may be nearing that point. One can blame the generals for not being able to clean up the messes being created, or one can stop making such big, avoidable, messes in the first place.

This touches at the point the Gian Gentile get at quite often, that we are turning our military into something that takes it away from what we need a military to do, simply because the military is the only force in government flexible enough to change itself to manage these products of policy friction.

The coalition could not ask for a better commander in RC South in Afghanistan than MG Nick Carter, for what its worth. I worked closely with him these past 7 months or so, and am a fan. As to the feasibility of his mission, that is another matter all together.

[William F. Owen]

The more we know about PTSD and TBI the more we know that we do not know. I know enough to know that I certainly don't know!

Well I knew someone severely traumatised by 56-58 individual days of combat, spread over about 16 months.
You cannot predict who will fall, why or after how much.

But I am in favour of increasing tour lengths!

Well I'm in favour of asking the question. If the US can do 1 year tours, why not us, but why do we want to do this?
All I have seen in support is very simplistic stuff about "knowing the ground" and experience. This isn't stuff we can guess at. We have to have some very solid data on which to base opinions. How many US battalions have multiple tourists and over what time period?
OK, you'll have no problems getting the bayonets to do their 1 x 1 yr tour. You may have real issues getting 3rd tour seniors to ever come back to theatre, so the "experience" gets lost. Put all that into a 9 year cycle (1 on, 2 off) and the levels of experience in any given BG have eroded to nothing. IIRC come the Falklands 10th anniversary, there were only 14 men in 2 PARA who had deployed on Corporate.

[Red Rat]

All I have seen in support is very simplistic stuff about "knowing the ground" and experience. This isn't stuff we can guess at.

We have to have some very solid data on which to base opinions. How many US battalions have multiple tourists and over what time period?

Good question. Anyone have the answer? In my coy, having deployed in '05 and then again in '08 to Iraq 25% of my jocks had relevant experience. This was concentrated in senior jocks (pfc or spc level) and Corporals. My Warrior crew NCO contingent (who tend have very limited deployability outside of the battalion) all had experience from the ;past tour.
Most jocks get out, some get promoted. Most JNCOs get promoted and move to another company or a training establishment, this trend is exacerbated for SNCOs. None of my officers had been on ops.

OK, you'll have no problems getting the bayonets to do their 1 x 1 yr tour. You may have real issues getting 3rd tour seniors to ever come back to theatre,

Agree.

[davidbfpo]

The UK-based blogsite is back, it has been for a few weeks after a long break and I missed its return:http://defenceoftherealm.blogspot.com/

Worth dipping into and has some interesting links, including a few now behind The Times pay wall.

This link is rather controversial and concerns UK defence, not in Afg.:http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisf...antasy-enemies

[Pete]

Simon Jenkins, the author of the commentary piece David linked to in the message above, has never supported any foreign interventions during the several years I have been reading his articles. When he was writing commentary for The Times he'd say that conflicts around the world ought to be allowed smolder out on their own without any involvement by the West.

[JMA]

Simon Jenkins, the author of the commentary piece David linked to in the message above, has never supported any foreign interventions during the several years I have been reading his articles. When he was writing commentary for The Times he'd say that conflicts around the world ought to be allowed smolder out on their own without any involvement by the West.

Whatever he has said in other articles this one is an absolute masterpiece.

This is precisely the point I was trying to make to Red Rat and that is that the Trident certainly is merely a hangover from the old days of empire. Not worth bankrupting the nation over.

I (and many others) would have said that, yes, defence expenditure needs to be cut but Jenkins' approach is better in that he demands that all expenditure must be justified.

So perhaps it time for the UK to advise their "major strategic partner" that they will not be in a position to field an armoured div in the future?

[William F. Owen]

Whatever he has said in other articles this one is an absolute masterpiece.

It's a clever bit of sophistry, but it falls apart in daylight. With respect to Mr Jenkins, he does not understand a lot about warfare.

I (and many others) would have said that, yes, defence expenditure needs to be cut but Jenkins' approach is better in that he demands that all expenditure must be justified.

No one ever said anything different. It's always been a balancing act, and whose opinion do you take. No exam question, no point in talking.

So perhaps it time for the UK to advise their "major strategic partner" that they will not be in a position to field an armoured div in the future?

Why? Where is the justification in that? I believe/know the UK defence budget is a mess, but you just picked the one thing we/the UK, should undoubtedly keep. Combined Arms Armour is the core of any modern army, unless you want to run strategic risk based on opinion.

It's about better spending, not just slashing capabilities based on emotional reactions to the perceived need as to relevance or utility.

[Fuchs]

Combined Arms Armour is the core of any modern army, unless you want to run strategic risk based on opinion.

This depends on terrain, some nations cannot make good enough use of combined arms formations to justify their costs.