Reconciliation and COIN in Afghanistan

[AdamG]

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/37865973...new_york_times

Officers and enlisted soldiers and Marines, typically speaking on the condition of anonymity to protect their jobs, speak of “being handcuffed,” of not being trusted by their bosses and of being asked to battle a canny and vicious insurgency “in a fair fight.”

Some rules meant to enshrine counterinsurgency principles into daily practices, they say, do not merely transfer risks away from civilians. They transfer risks away from the Taliban.

[Rex Brynen]

C.I.A. Chief Sees Taliban Power-Sharing as Unlikely
By SCOTT SHANE
New York Times
Published: June 27, 2010

The director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Leon E. Panetta, expressed strong skepticism on Sunday about the prospects for an Afghanistan deal being pushed by Pakistan between the Afghan government and elements of the Taliban, saying militants do not yet have a reason to negotiate seriously.

“We have seen no evidence that they are truly interested in reconciliation, where they would surrender their arms, where they would denounce Al Qaida, where they would really try to become part of that society,” said Mr. Panetta in an interview on ABC’s news program “This Week.”

Mr. Panetta’s comments came amid reports, not yet confirmed by American officials, that Afghan President Hamid Karzai has met personally with Sirajuddin Haqqani, leader of the Haqqani network, a faction of the Afghan Taliban considered to be close to Al Qaeda.

Acknowledging that the American-led counterinsurgency effort is facing unexpected difficulty, Mr. Panetta said that the Taliban and its allies at this point have little motive to contemplate a power-sharing arrangement in Afghanistan.

“We’ve seen no evidence of that and, very frankly, my view is that with regards to reconciliation, unless they’re convinced that the United States is going to win and that they’re going to be defeated, I think it’s very difficult to proceed with a reconciliation that’s going to be meaningful,” he said.

...

Pretty much my view too, regarding the senior Taliban leadership. At the local level the prospects might be a little brighter--although not much more so if there is a sense of momentum being on the Taliban side.

[Jedburgh]

Century Foundation, 21 Jun 10: Negotiating With the Taliban: Issues and Prospects

....This report tries to lay out how the Taliban are structured and organized, with an eye to assessing the impact of their organization and modus operandi on their willingness to negotiate and to reach a political settlement. There is considerable controversy over the way the Taliban function, which is inevitable given the limited information available. The different points of view can be summarized (with some simplification) as follows:

• the Taliban operate as a “franchiser” business, allowing disparate groups of insurgents to display the Taliban brand while retaining complete autonomy on the ground;

• the Taliban are not organized to the same extent as the Marxist movements
that had been the main worry of Western counterinsurgents until the end of the cold war, but nonetheless have a discernible organizational structure (decentralized).

As the reader will realize while going through the paper, this author tends to follow the second line of thinking. One reason for the failure to understand the modus operandi of the Taliban is the lack of in-depth studies of the 1980s jihad in Afghanistan; if such studies had been carried out, understanding the Taliban would be much easier now....

[davidbfpo]

Adam Holloway, a Conservative MP and ex-UK Army officer, took part in a short radio discussion today on Afghanistan; he has been an advocate of an accommodation with the insurgents since 2008.

Link: http://www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/console/b00sw3sc (available for a week).

He made two particular comments:

The insurgents are hundreds of local groups united by a hatred of foreign troops and an unwanted corrupt central government....In Helmand 80% of bodies we recover after an engagement have died within twenty miles of where they live. That should tell you who we are really fighting here.

The second belongs better on 'The UK in Afghanistan' thread and will be posted there too:

The big threat (to the UK) is the video pictures on the websites of the global Jihad. Afghanistan is a massive driver of radicalisation across the region and in our northern mill towns.

I asked the head of the Afghan secret service a while back how many hard core AQ operatives were in Afghanistan, he said he didn't know it was less than the number of British citizens of Pakistani origin who were working with the Taliban...

(Commenting himself ) AQ are long gone from Afghanistan...

I know the Taliban this week decried negotiations, my question is how will the presence of non-Afghans fighting alongside the locals influence any accommodation?