Around two years ago, several articles and blog-posts appeared detailing the hard work of Gen. Douglas Stone, then the commander of Task Force 134 and in charge of detention operations in Iraq. The attention converged on the change of strategy within the Task Force, previously known mostly for its implication in various prisoner-abuse scandals. Under the command of Gen. Stone, the focus changed toward something more akin to the counterinsurgency principles of separating extremists from moderates, and of working with the latter to curb the influence of the former. To that end, each inmate was given an ‘initial assessment’ to determine his political orientation, religious beliefs and social concerns. The point was to engage with the prisoners’ motivation for violence, both within the prison and upon their release. It emerged that whereas some were hellbent on killing Americans, or other Iraqis for that matter, others were simply disillusioned, angry, acting out of revenge, or had no other prospect than to pick up a gun and become an insurgent.
Based on these assessments, Task Force 134 tailored a range of measures to deal with the inmates on the basis of their individual situation rather than as an undifferentiated whole. These measures included educational courses for those uneducated or of school age, vocational training for lower-risk inmates, religious courses (deradicalisation) for Islamist extremists, and psychological help for particularly traumatised inmates. The detention facilities held 140 reviews daily to assess inmates’ threat level. Those granted release were placed in front of an Iraqi judge to discuss their future and sign a binding pledge to renounce violence. While Gen. Stone said he did not envisage turning ‘radicals’ into ‘choir boys’, the Task Force apparently experienced a significantly reduced return rate (maybe 3-4%). Within the prisons, moderates had even launched a backlash against the extremist elements that had previously used the facilities as insurgency training grounds.
This astonishing work first gained my attention as part of some research I was doing on political reintegration in Iraq (the result of which will soon be released in paper-back). Since then, I admit to having lost the thread somewhat, so I was surprised and dismayed to read in The Guardian last week, that according to Iraqi Major General Ahmed Obeidi al-Saedi, a full ‘80% of prisoners released from US-run Camp Bucca have rejoined terrorists’ (H/T Jeff Michaels). Just a week earlier, another senior Iraq Army officer, Major General Qassim Atta, put forward a similar charge, noting that ‘the majority of the detainees who used to be inside US prisons went back to work in crimes and terrorism’ and that ‘many of them occupied leadership positions in Al-Qaeda’. (more in article, comments and links)
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