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Thread: Moving the Rhod. Fire Force concept to Afghanistan?

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  1. #11
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    Quote Originally Posted by Rex Brynen View Post
    JMA:

    At what distance from the (potential) contact were the LZs, typically? And how often did the LZs end up being hot?

    I ask because, as I remember ZANLA and ZIPRA, they had a relatively low ratio of RPG-2 and RPG-7s, and weren't terribly competent with mortars, heavier MGs, or RCL. I'm wondering how much adjustment might be necessary against a Taliban opponent who has a long history (dating back to the Soviet era) of using those weapons against helicopters LZs.
    Let me use a simple example (for ease of explanation without a diagram).

    Say a patrol has made contact with insurgents and are currently engaged in contact.

    The force deploys (maybe 30 minutes flying time maybe less). On the run in the Airborne commander gets what briefing he can from the commander on the ground and as he comes over target the troops mark FLOT and indicates the insurgent position with whatever (anything but mortars).

    The Airborne Comdr is now in command of the battle.

    (Note: As there is already a contact in progress the route of the aircraft to the target can be direct as opposed to a route where the sound of the approaching choppers is attempted to be hidden.)

    * The command chopper orbits the main contact area (+ 1,000 ft) to assess the situation and if not a gunship itself could instruct the attached gunship/gunships to engage the insurgent position.

    * The fixed wing goes into higher orbit and observes.

    * Trooping choppers are instructed to go into low level orbits over 'areas of interest' outside the main contact area to observe and await instructions to drop their troops. (These choppers served to either force insurgents under their orbit to go to ground or draw fire which would give away the insurgents position).

    Once the Airborne Cmdr had made his plan then he would instruct the trooping choppers where to drop their troops. The idea being to prevent the escape/withdrawal of the insurgents. The individual LZs would be as close to where the troops were needed as possible. Where it was necessary a gunship may provide suppressing fire to cover the landing.

    Once the trooping choppers have dropped their troops they may be instructed to stay in orbit over a particular area or to return to collect more troops.

    The LZs are individual to each chopper and not one large LZ to take all the choppers at the same time. If necessary the chopper itself can prep-fire the area around the LZ or get covered by a gunship when going in.

    If the troops are being dropped to block any flight down a river line they would drop the troops as close to the river line as possible then the Airborne Cmdr would give instructions to the callsign on what direction to move in to get into position.

    Should there be a need to redeploy troops they would be instructed to move to a LZ (if necessary the Airborne Cmdr may need to direct them (say "go 200m west and you will find an LZ, call when ready for uplift")

    OK, Rex thats about what we did. And yes we took a lot of fire in the air. And we managed it.

    I would suggest if you are looking for Afghan experience you find out what happened to the Soviets. This should be detailed research by intel guys who would try to speak to the old Mujahideen fighters, the Pakistanis who trained them the CIA who in trained trained them as to what the anti-air tactics were. Then get the Moscow embassy to speak to old soviet pilots as to their experiences and counter measures. For now though look at the site List of Soviet aircraft losses in Afghanistan

    Rex there are always counter measures and certainly any guy who fires a RPG should be turned into an instant martyr as all guns turn on him. That should be golden rule number one. This whole thing would be a journey or a process. Starting with baby steps and building up from there. Ken has touched on similar type ops in Vietnam, read up on them as well.

    As to RPGs. In our situation it was only the command chopper that was at 1,000 ft in the orbit which was vulnerable to this. The low level orbits were vulnerable to small arms fire but only for a few seconds if very close by.

    Again all you have to do is go a speak to the hundreds of old guys who flew choppers in Vietnam and other wars and they would be honoured to share their experiences with you and offer some advice. All the info you need is out there all you have to do is go and find it. So don't sweat the RPG risk, go ask the pilots how they would fly in that sort of terrain with that sort of risk. Its actually easier than you may think.

    (Rex, I don't know your military experience, you may well have flown choppers at some point for all I know. I write this like you haven't forgive me.)
    Last edited by JMA; 06-28-2010 at 08:32 AM.

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