When I created a "COIN for Aviators" class, I used the example of the Rhodesian light infantry as a prime example of a rudimentary Quick Reaction Force. While some of the specifics seem to have changed (parachute drop vs. helicopter landing), the concept seems largely the same as a modern-day QRF.

It's important we put much of the RLI's tactics in perspective: their development of a parachute-in approach was the result of a lack of helicopter transports. The RLI's air assets would be dwarfed by a modern-day Army Combat Aviation Brigade, with seven C-47s (DC-3s) and eight Alouette helicopters (plus a few miscellaneous fighters and bombers) consisting of the entire air contingent. That was about it. The entire air lift portion would be dwarfed by a mere two companies in an assault helicopter battalion.

Thus, the concept of parachuting in was one of necessity. While it might sound attractive and novel, it was not without its shortfalls. A DC-3 can only travel at around 130 knots, which is roughly the cruise speed of a Black Hawk or Chinook. Each C-47 also had a payload of, at maximum, 26 paratroopers. According to James Corum, approximately 20-30 RLI troops would be dispatched at any given time against insurgent bands (numbering anywhere from 6-30 men). Their primary mission would be to defend white homesteads against insurgent attacks. Thus, they were to hold ground. Their air support would be a Alouette helicopters with aerial munitions.

Dropping paratroopers in to combat--sometimes at 300' AGL--was a risky proposition. Certainly, based on experience in airborne units, this would be about as dangerous as the enemy.

The RLI's air units were often tipped off by the Selous Scouts or horse-mounted scouts, many of whom might perform the same roles as UAVs.

Modern QRFs might consist of a platoon on alert with some UH-60s and AH-64s for fire support--not at all unlike the RLI's concept. Indeed, it appears we have a very similar set of TTPS, at least superficially.

The difference might be in the kill ratios, which would be interesting to examine. The RLI killed over 1600 insugents, with minimal losses, according to Corham. Why might this be so? It's worth looking in to.

It should also be noted that, despite the RLI's professionalism, they were ultimately voted out of power in the early 1980s, giving rise to modern Zimbabwe. Tactics are important, no doubt, but strategy and politics always win.