Quote Originally Posted by jcustis View Post
I hate to sound like a broken record with this, but the current ROE cannot facilitate the employment of firepower and supporting arms that made FF ops successful. Everything else is totally feasible, save that one issue. In fact, it isn't even so much a question about the ROE in total, but the element of positive identification (PID) that is required. We are fighting a population-centric fight, and I'll go out on a limb in doing so, but I think I can state unequivocally that the RSF were fighting a counterinsurgent fight. Means to the ends then would not nest with the options we are employing today. Unfortunately, FF was born out of that counterinsurgent strategy, and would have limited applicability if used by main force units.
Hi John perhaps you have pared the issue down to the basics.

It seems that the ROE as applied in terms of the pop-centric approach to operations in Afghanistan serves to prevent a quick, short, sharp military action being carried out. My assumption is that the restrictions are out of fear of the potential for civilian collateral damage, yes?

The assumption further then is that the efforts to separate the Taliban from the local population has not been a success as they remain intermingled and it is the ISAF forces who are then effectively separated from the local population, yes?

That all said are there any situations when the Taliban operate outside the protective cocoon of the local population footprint? If contact were to be made in these situations would the absence of civilians allow for a relative free-fire-Zone?

The example of an ambush of ISAF troops or vehicles is worth consideration. If gunship support was immediately available would their use be restricted? Restricted but able to be effective or restricted to the point of not being worth calling? The bottom line I guess is that would the air strikes be able to cause the Taliban to break off the ambush and attempt to withdraw from the scene?

Can we get to this point please.