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Thread: Moving the Rhod. Fire Force concept to Afghanistan?

  1. #41
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    Quote Originally Posted by Starbuck View Post
    Question here for the peanut gallery: Does the difference between insurgents in Rhodesia and those in Afghanistan depend on scale? Are we picking the right battles?

    A typical Rhodesian TTP, from what I have seen, involved massing for raids against White settlements.
    Not the typical Rhodesian, rather the typical insurgent. They would gather a bunch together to take on lone homestead which were pretty well secured, seldom press home an attach and disappear to fight another day. They disappeared because they knew that by first light there would be trackers dropped to follow up put some distance between them and the contact area by morning.

    Questions:

    1.) How often were the insurgents detected and acted upon?
    The commanders had to analyse the intel and see where their best efforts were to deploy troops. If the Selous Scouts were in your area there was a certainty there would be intel coming on which deploy and kill.

    2.) What was the terrain like around these settlements? How close were they to villages?
    They lived close to the villages for food and sex. Moving around to spread the foot load across all the villages in the area. The distance depended on the lie of the land. 200, 300, 400m?

    3.) How does the "body count" compare to Taliban raids against, say, COP Keating and Wanat?
    I don't know these raids. Were they Taliban raids against your COPs?

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    Quote Originally Posted by Rex Brynen View Post
    The Soviets lost approximately a helicopter a week in Afghanistan, although I'm not sure what proportion of those were MANPADs versus other things. There's some discussion of both hiliborne operations and mujahiddin counters in Lester Grau et al, The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan and The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War.
    Worth a little in depth study I see what exactly went down there. Remember we are looking for strikes of low level flying and landing choppers.

    As I remember it, the RLI also suffered its largest single losses of the war when a SAAF Puma was hit--by an RPG 7, I think--in Mozambique in 1979, during Ops Uric/Bootlace.
    Well we don't know as it flew over a hitherto unknown camp and some of their mates on only found the crash site 30 years later. Probably just a likely small arms fire. 17 dead.

    None of this, of course, is a reason not to use a modified Fire Force technique in Afghanistan. However, as several have pointed out, it is important to identify how conditions may differ there from southern Africa (or, for that matter, Vietnam).
    Analyse, this is what soldiers do. What's with the terrain.: no real problem if you look at how it benefits them in terms of shooting at aircraft and with what. Won't take long before a group of pilots and gunners figure up the best way to handle this. Handle this effectively in terms of the current ROE is another thing though.
    Last edited by JMA; 06-28-2010 at 11:53 PM.

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    Quote Originally Posted by Fuchs View Post
    I've read about the "Fire Force" tactics again and again, but I simply don't get what's special about it.

    Enemies on foot are detected, airborne encircles the enemy (or blocks at least some escape routes), slow-movers do some air/ground attacks, airborne keeps fighting.

    So what's special? Didn't the same fail to meet the hopes thousands of times in VN?
    Simple it was indeed. Find, encircle, attack, kill.

    If you listen to those with VN experience that talk much about LZs because they were a problem there. There are those without Afghanistan experience who see to be greatly concerned about RPG7s. There are terrain concerns what for I not sure being more open than VN certainly assists the attacker.

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    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    Afghanistan is four times larger than Viet Nam with about twice the population and has about one fourth the number of friendly troops that were serving in VN at the peak. Populace attitudes are antithetical and the enemy contrasts in many respects. If all that weren't difference enough, the terrain is almost diametric and is far more troublesome for military purposes. The altitude alone has a significant impact on operations for humans, vehicles and especially for aviation...

    That said, many of the same TTP can still be and are being applied with environmental modifications.
    Rhodesia is the size of Montana while Afghanistan is the size of Texas.

    Afghanistan has over the 100,000 number of foreign troops while in Rhodesia while Rhodesia could put 1,500-2,500 properly trained soldiers in the field at any time.

    In both countries there increasing numbers of private contractors, militias, guards, local half a**ed army guys etc etc. Terrain remains a challenge only in so far as there is a refusal to deploy troops in country long enough to get near a level of where they even near matching the Taliban in therms of terrain knowledge and comfort.

    Altitude issues for aircraft is an issue 9 years into the war in Afghanistan that should have been resolved.

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    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
    If you listen to those with VN experience that talk much about LZs because they were a problem there. There are those without Afghanistan experience who see to be greatly concerned about RPG7s. There are terrain concerns what for I not sure being more open than VN certainly assists the attacker.
    JMA, I think that one of the questions that is being asked is how frequently RLI Fire Force missions engaged ZIPRA/ZANLA forces armed almost solely with SKSs and AK47s, and how often a contact resulted in encounters with groups fielding (and using) anything heavier. I'm not thinking of missions outside Rhodesia (where presumably you ran into the occasional ZPU-2, etc), but the routine QRF-type missions inside the country.

    Were there any cases of FF being lured into AA or LZ ambushes, or similar? Or did terrain and ZIPRA/ZANLA competence make that unlikely?

    What was the comms status of ZIPRA/ZANLA units? Presumably, they didn't have advance warning of missions departing (which has sometimes been a problem in Iraq and Afghanistan, where it can be reasonably easy to put a spotter in communications eyes-on a FOB).

    I'm not raising this because I think it makes the FF/QRF model untenable, but rather because we need a much better sense of the threat profile associated with a typical RLI contact, and what would be expected in other theatres.
    They mostly come at night. Mostly.


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    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default LZs were a problem in Viet Nam? I sure missed that...

    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
    If you listen to those with VN experience that talk much about LZs because they were a problem there.
    Huh? not so -- I probably made somewhere betwen 40 and 60 combat assaults, only two were into hot LZs and only one was really bad. By far the vast majority of LZs were not hot, at a guess, I'd say 90+% were clean, a simple product of decent planning. More could've been with better planning and the trendline on hitting hot LZs was generally downward from 1962 until 1972 as we developed the process. Eagle Flights were often hot due to landing close to prevent an escape but they were opposing an enemy element that was generally trying to escape so LZ fire was usually not overpowering.

    Hot LZs are a problem anywhere and there are degrees of hot; AKs don't do as much damage as RPGs and they in turn aren't as dangerous as a Dushka or two, much less a ZSU 23. The Talibs have all those less the ZSU 23 (so far...).
    There are those without Afghanistan experience who see to be greatly concerned about RPG7s.
    Probably because most of the US helicopters downed in Afghanistan by enemy action were hit with RPGs and the reports make the US newspapers...
    There are terrain concerns what for I not sure being more open than VN certainly assists the attacker.
    You aren't sure why the terrain in Afghanistan is a problem?

    First, Viet Nam is mostly scrub and agricultural land, the real jungle isn't all that prevalent. It is generally open and the few mountains that exist are generally small, isolated and few in south topped 1,200 meters. Secondly, in Afghanistan, the vast open spaces aren't a problem, they're in the north and the southwest. The primary operational areas for most of ISAF is in the south and east -- dominated by the Hindu Kush where mountains typically run in the 3-6000 meter range and many ridges are 500 to 1,000 meters above their associated valleys. Look at the pictures below.

    Picture 1 is typical operational area. Open space for the birds -- but it is dominated by the high ground which is where the bad guys will be...

    Picture 2 is also typical, open area to land in but no sense in doing so because there's nothing there. The mountains are steep enough that few if any enemy will be there...

    Picture 3 offers lower hills -- but still dominating the open ground. If you believe that landing a helicopter in any of that open ground against a known enemy "favors the attacker" you and I fought in very different wars.

    Not to mention that if one landed far enough away to avoid being hit, one would have to walk or fight across a lot of open ground to get to the objective...
    Last edited by Ken White; 10-27-2011 at 01:20 AM.

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    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Uh, yes...

    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
    Rhodesia is the size of Montana while Afghanistan is the size of Texas.
    Well if you dug that out of the CIA FactBook, you could also have noted that the former is about 391 sq km while the latter is about 652 sq m -- almost twice as big. And four times larger than South Viet Nam as I said in the first place.
    Afghanistan has over the 100,000 number of foreign troops while in Rhodesia while Rhodesia could put 1,500-2,500 properly trained soldiers in the field at any time.
    I did not mention Rhodesia, I mentioned Viet Nam because the post to which I was responding mentioned Viet Nam. There were over one and a quarter million Allied troops in Viet Nam -- and they could not control the country, small as it was. That was the point. Even 100K plus a like number of ANA are not going to be able to control Afghanistan; too big, too many people...

    I wasn't in Rhodesia and don't know enough to comment on the quality of your opposition and thus on what the Rhodesian strength might mean. I can comment on Afghans and on the VC / NVA qualitatively and quantitatively.
    In both countries there increasing numbers of private contractors, militias, guards, local half a**ed army guys etc etc. Terrain remains a challenge only in so far as there is a refusal to deploy troops in country long enough to get near a level of where they even near matching the Taliban in therms of terrain knowledge and comfort.
    You'll have to speak to the politicians about that. The armies involved agree with you but have little to no say in it.

    You'll also have to speak to those Politicians about their imposition of the requirement to wear armor, adding about 14kg to soldier load and depriving them of the agility required to fight properly as well as making operation in some large mountains physically difficult. Before you go on about that, search the threads here -- that subject has been beaten to death and there is no easy solution to the Political requirement.
    Altitude issues for aircraft is an issue 9 years into the war in Afghanistan that should have been resolved.
    Resolved? How? Lowering the land mass? Or perhaps you know a way we could change the laws of Physics. If you do, I'm sure the airplane drivers would be most appreciative. Or perhaps you meant buying more high altitude capable helicopters for a war that will likely end soon? A war that is not an existential war -- I find it difficult to believe you fail to comprehend the significant difference that one little fact makes....

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    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Taking the old T4 model of Tactics, Terrain, Threat and Technology, I'm finding it pretty hard to see the read across.
    Is an Airmobile reserve a good thing to have in Irregular Warfare? - probably better to have it than worse.
    After that I think we rapidly get into theatre specifics.

    - Can't speak for Ken's extensive experience, but having spend 2 years researching CCC/SOG, the NVA counter-air complex in Laos (not RVN) was scary. IIRC in 1968, a CCS team (RT Hammer?) went in on the back of B-52 strike. LZs were not a problem that day, but dust and smoke made it almost impossible to get in!!!
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    Quote Originally Posted by Rex Brynen View Post
    JMA, I think that one of the questions that is being asked is how frequently RLI Fire Force missions engaged ZIPRA/ZANLA forces armed almost solely with SKSs and AK47s, and how often a contact resulted in encounters with groups fielding (and using) anything heavier. I'm not thinking of missions outside Rhodesia (where presumably you ran into the occasional ZPU-2, etc), but the routine QRF-type missions inside the country.

    Were there any cases of FF being lured into AA or LZ ambushes, or similar? Or did terrain and ZIPRA/ZANLA competence make that unlikely?

    What was the comms status of ZIPRA/ZANLA units? Presumably, they didn't have advance warning of missions departing (which has sometimes been a problem in Iraq and Afghanistan, where it can be reasonably easy to put a spotter in communications eyes-on a FOB).

    I'm not raising this because I think it makes the FF/QRF model untenable, but rather because we need a much better sense of the threat profile associated with a typical RLI contact, and what would be expected in other theatres.
    We have one incident where it was assumed that a Lynx (Cessna 337) was lured into attacking a ground target running in parallel to a ridge line on which gooks were sitting and the aircraft was shot down. They have been given the benefit of the doubt on that one. Other problems we caused when one suddenly overflew a hitherto unknown camp and all hell broke out.

    In bush where the vegetation is head height and above the RPG is less of a problem to low flying choppers than one at first thinks. There were quite a few RPGs around but thanks to the high kill rates achieved in fire force actions not too many of them survived long enough to be start to reach a level of proficiency where they were shooting down aircraft. RPDs and RPKs were coming in and when we heard one of them start firing we targeted them for special attention. AAA was there outside the country as was SAM7-Strela. The Rhodesians defeated the Strela risk with special paint and exhaust modifications after loosing two small piston engined recce aircraft early on there after it was never a problem other than they shot down two civilian aircraft.

    As to ambushes. One has to learn to read the terrain. Pilots do because their lives depend upon it. Its where a contact has been staged ie vehicles ambushed where one needs to look for the bait and trap routine. While flying in look carefully at the maps and decided whether some threatening high ground needs to be cleared before the ambush business can be dealt with. You must remember that quite often the pilots would fly over a suspect area to try and draw fire. I was in the gunship one day when a chopper deliberately flew down a river line while we shadowed at 1,000 ft and when the opened up on him we returned the favour. So what I'm saying to you is that being fired on in an aircraft is not necessarily the end of the world. Not easy to hit aircraft on places that matter. At 1,000 ft when you see the tracer coming directly at you they will miss. Its when the tracer appears aimed in front of the chopper that its a different story. For example on Op Dingo there were 10 gunships up that day and every one was hit by small arms fire. These guys are trained to watch each others backs and deal with pockets of small arms and other fire. These guys also took out the AAA. No pilots resigned after that experience.

    Of course where the initiative lies with you and the call-out is based on intel that the insurgents don't know you are on the way then no such problem exists. Again this stuff is why proper interrogation of ALL prisoners is so necessary. What is their training, what are their tactics, what are their weapons?

    As to sign posting air activity as early warning. Yes one must consider deception if needed and vary the routes. We would also plan approach routes to each target based on hiding the sound of the approaching choppers for as long as possible. When your callsign on the ground says they can hear you then you assume the insurgents have too.

    I would say that a lot of the concerns getting raised seem to be about air vulnerability. I suggest that pilot perspective must be brought in to respond to these issues as there is a natural fear among soldiers that they could be shot in an aircraft or have their air craft shot down. As I have said repeatedly now what are raised as serious concerns would be dealt with quite simply by any competent combat pilot who as a team work through these issues most everyday in training, discussions and on ops.

    What do you mean by the threat profile?

    I would suggest you apply the same risks to this form of helicopter usage as you would to CASEVAC / MEDEVAC / AIR RESCUE choppers. The risk of a ambush of an CASEVAC chopper is probably the biggest there is. I believe some LZs have been IED'd (don't know for the troops or the chopper though). So speack to the CASEVAC pilots and ask them what their daily concerns are and find out how many of these choppers have been shot down in Afghanistan.

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    In relation to altitude issues for helos I said:"Altitude issues for aircraft is an issue 9 years into the war in Afghanistan that should have been resolved."

    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    Resolved? How? Lowering the land mass? Or perhaps you know a way we could change the laws of Physics. If you do, I'm sure the airplane drivers would be most appreciative. Or perhaps you meant buying more high altitude capable helicopters for a war that will likely end soon? A war that is not an existential war -- I find it difficult to believe you fail to comprehend the significant difference that one little fact makes....
    Ken, think Operating Ceilings, temperatures and densities, "hot and high". There are many changes that could have been made to address or partially address the altitude issue relating to for example helicopters. Some probably have been and now the Brits accept they will probably be there for 5 more years maybe they will be able to address some issues they been delaying for some time now.

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    Quote Originally Posted by Starbuck View Post
    According to James Corum, approximately 20-30 RLI troops would be dispatched at any given time against insurgent bands (numbering anywhere from 6-30 men). Their primary mission would be to defend white homesteads against insurgent attacks. Thus, they were to hold ground. Their air support would be a Alouette helicopters with aerial munitions.
    OK, we have a problem here. With respect to James Corum there was not "white homestead protection" as a primary mission. The primary role of the Fire Force was to kill the enemy. Farmhouses were in the main attacked at night the helos in Rhodesia had no night flying capability.

    Dropping paratroopers in to combat--sometimes at 300' AGL--was a risky proposition. Certainly, based on experience in airborne units, this would be about as dangerous as the enemy.
    The aim was to drop them at 90 knots from 500' and the ground height was normally measured by a touch landing by a helo and the tossing of a smoke generator. There were some accidents, not too many considering the number of jumps. There are chutes now available which make jumping at lower heights safe and should be used as it is in the air that the para is most vulnerable to enemy fire and wind etc. The injury statistics were not of the magnitude that gave rise to any concern so why your airborne contacts should be concerned is open to question. Maybe if you only have jumped at 800' with boots and not sneakers any other option seems a little risky, yes?

    The RLI's air units were often tipped off by the Selous Scouts or horse-mounted scouts, many of whom might perform the same roles as UAVs.
    Call-outs by Selous Scouts pseudo groups were responsible for 68% of all internal kills by the various Fire Forces. The Grey's Scouts (horse guys) played a small role in this regard.

    Modern QRFs might consist of a platoon on alert with some UH-60s and AH-64s for fire support--not at all unlike the RLI's concept. Indeed, it appears we have a very similar set of TTPS, at least superficially.
    The key would be under what ROE would this QRF deploy and the operational procedures once in combat.

    The difference might be in the kill ratios, which would be interesting to examine. The RLI killed over 1600 insugents, with minimal losses, according to Corham. Why might this be so? It's worth looking in to.
    The idea was to kill as many of each group contacted as possible. There were three tactical rules on the use of ground forces on such ops. 1) Never "sweep" uphill, 2) Never 'sweep' into the sun, 3) never 'sweep' from open ground into cover. (For others here: this probably accounts for my aversion for seeing toops moving over open ground.)

    It should also be noted that, despite the RLI's professionalism, they were ultimately voted out of power in the early 1980s, giving rise to modern Zimbabwe. Tactics are important, no doubt, but strategy and politics always win.
    Point taken but how this applies to the Fire Force concept and its TTPs is less obvious?

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    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    Huh? not so -- I probably made somewhere betwen 40 and 60 combat assaults, only two were into hot LZs and only one was really bad. By far the vast majority of LZs were not hot, at a guess, I'd say 90+% were clean, a simple product of decent planning. More could've been with better planning and the trendline on hitting hot LZs was generally downward from 1962 until 1972 as we developed the process. Eagle Flights were often hot due to landing close to prevent an escape but they were opposing an enemy element that was generally trying to escape so LZ fire was usually not overpowering.
    Glad you dispelled the myth that many believe about LZs in VN being a massive problem. I hope due note is taken.

    The fire force was very like how you explain Eagle Flights in the last four lines. On the arrival overhead of the fire force the insurgents would become disorientated by the noise and firing and be looking for a way out. Insurgent fire was then less about aimed shots and more about the actions of increasingly desperate men.

    Hot LZs are a problem anywhere and there are degrees of hot; AKs don't do as much damage as RPGs and they in turn aren't as dangerous as a Dushka or two, much less a ZSU 23. The Talibs have all those less the ZSU 23 (so far...).Probably because most of the US helicopters downed in Afghanistan by enemy action were hit with RPGs and the reports make the US newspapers...You aren't sure why the terrain in Afghanistan is a problem?
    Would you find enemy in any of those three photos? Discard the two where there are no soldiers. If you catch the enenmy out in the open there you don't need troops your just send out a few gunships to wrap that up.

    On the third photo I assume there would only be day sniping or night attacks, yes? Rule 1: never seep uphill. So if the enemy are on the slopes of the hills and they survive the bombing runs then you drop troops on top and they work their way down. as maybe required.

    First, Viet Nam is mostly scrub and agricultural land, the real jungle isn't all that prevalent. It is generally open and the few mountains that exist are generally small, isolated and few in south topped 1,200 meters. Secondly, in Afghanistan, the vast open spaces aren't a problem, they're in the north and the southwest. The primary operational areas for most of ISAF is in the south and east -- dominated by the Hindu Kush where mountains typically run in the 3-6000 meter range and many ridges are 500 to 1,000 meters above their associated valleys. Look at the pictures below.
    Thanks for posting those.

    Are there really insurgents out there (on terrain like the photos)? Where to the hide out? There is no cover. Thermal would pick them up at night, yes? If they are out there by day don't send the fire force send a shrink.

    Not to mention that if one landed far enough away to avoid being hit, one would have to walk or fight across a lot of open ground to get to the objective...
    As said elsewhere: Rule 3: Never sweep from open ground into cover. There is no chance in hell that I would land on the flat and then fight up the hill. And then Rule 1: Never 'sweep' uphill. Double no-no that.

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    Quote Originally Posted by jcustis View Post
    I hate to sound like a broken record with this, but the current ROE cannot facilitate the employment of firepower and supporting arms that made FF ops successful. Everything else is totally feasible, save that one issue. In fact, it isn't even so much a question about the ROE in total, but the element of positive identification (PID) that is required. We are fighting a population-centric fight, and I'll go out on a limb in doing so, but I think I can state unequivocally that the RSF were fighting a counterinsurgent fight. Means to the ends then would not nest with the options we are employing today. Unfortunately, FF was born out of that counterinsurgent strategy, and would have limited applicability if used by main force units.
    John as a matter of interest if you had for example a downed helo with life on board in the middle of Indian Territory what ROE apply to rescue ops on their behalf?

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    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    IMO, When and if you do not have an un-committed reserve, you have become "fixed." If that is a permanent state, you can do nothing which is effective.
    I agree. This is why all the FOBs and PBs serve in the main to restrict mobility and tie forces down.

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    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
    I agree. This is why all the FOBs and PBs serve in the main to restrict mobility and tie forces down.
    That is certainly true, IF the FOBs and PBs are under-manned, too widely dispersed and no higher reserve force is held.
    EG: Like the Mike Force Battalions held by each US Corps in RVN.
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    Quote Originally Posted by Red Rat View Post
    What was the balance between the FireForce being Proactive and Reactive? I have never done airmobile but the FireForce concept sounds like Combined Arms (Air) Manoeuvre in concept, I am intrigued by the tasking of it however. In UK doctrine a QRF or ARF (Airborne Reaction Force) is reactive, whereas I get the impression that that distinction was not necessarily the case with the FireForce.

    IMHO part of the problem, certainly for UK elements in AFG, is that they are essentially fixed in ground holding roles and have very little capability at BG and Bde level to manouevre. Whether it is done by air, land (or sea ) the ability to maintain an uncommitted reserve and manoeuvre force at the time and place of your chosing is one of the fundamentals.
    Suddenly there were three pages, sorry.

    I can say that somewhere between 80-90% were proactive if that means a fire force call out being initiated from a sighting from an OP, camp identification by air recce, or by pseudo gang all unbeknown to the insurgents. The balance would be responding to troops in contact, vehicles being ambushed etc.

    Are you familiar with the JOC system we used? Each Brigade HQ was a JOC (Joint Operations Command) which had Army, police, Air Force and Internal Affairs reps. These JOCs normally sat at airfields where the FF sat.

    Siren would sound and Officers and pilots to the Ops room. Briefing held (shorter or longer depending on the circumstances) and then tally-ho the fox.

    Sometimes when there was something brewing we would get called for regular updates until the word GO was given.

    Troops wise we used a RLI Commando (company strength in Rhodesia) on a fire force (normally) who based at the airfield. From this force certain patrolling tasks (mostly external) were given to best utilize the troops.

    IMHO opinion in a fire force type operation it is as important to train and special the troops as it is for same with the Airborne Commanders and pilots.

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    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
    Suddenly there were three pages, sorry.
    Why sorry? There is actually some useful stuff here.
    IMHO opinion in a fire force type operation it is as important to train and special the troops as it is for same with the Airborne Commanders and pilots.
    I can agree with that for parachuting but I don't see why if you are just using helicopters.
    I locked horns with Parachute Regiment Major a few years back who tried to convince me that working with helicopters "was not a pick-up and run game." I cannot see how?
    It takes about an hours to do an aircraft safety brief, and practice emplaning and deplaning. - and all infantry do it.
    IF needed:
    Fast roping can be done in a day. Ground to air signalling brief in another. - 2.5 days worth of skills and drills. Sound right?
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    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    Huh? not so -- I probably made somewhere betwen 40 and 60 combat assaults, only two were into hot LZs and only one was really bad. By far the vast majority of LZs were not hot, at a guess, I'd say 90+% were clean, a simple product of decent planning. More could've been with better planning and the trendline on hitting hot LZs was generally downward from 1962 until 1972 as we developed the process. Eagle Flights were often hot due to landing close to prevent an escape but they were opposing an enemy element that was generally trying to escape so LZ fire was usually not overpowering.

    First, Viet Nam is mostly scrub and agricultural land, the real jungle isn't all that prevalent. It is generally open and the few mountains that exist are generally small, isolated and few in south topped 1,200 meters. Secondly, in Afghanistan, the vast open spaces aren't a problem, they're in the north and the southwest. The primary operational areas for most of ISAF is in the south and east -- dominated by the Hindu Kush where mountains typically run in the 3-6000 meter range and many ridges are 500 to 1,000 meters above their associated valleys. Look at the pictures below.
    LZs weren't much of an issue in the III Corps and IV Corps areas, but they did become problematic in some parts of II Corps (especially the Central Highlands) and I Corps (mainly as you got away from the coast). Eagle Flight type stuff worked really well in the first two CTZs, but not so well in II Corps or I Corps (at least away from the coast and much of the DMZ).

    Not trying to quibble, but just pointing out how terrain can influence operational techniques.
    "On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
    T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War

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    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Good point. Terrain definitely impacts. It's notable that I and II CTZs were

    Quote Originally Posted by Steve Blair View Post
    LZs weren't much of an issue in the III Corps and IV Corps areas, but they did become problematic in some parts of II Corps (especially the Central Highlands) and I Corps (mainly as you got away from the coast). Eagle Flight type stuff worked really well in the first two CTZs, but not so well in II Corps or I Corps (at least away from the coast and much of the DMZ).
    the most Afghan-like. Both also offered far greater enemy force density than did the other two CTZs, mostly due to proximity to Laos and the narrowing of the country placing the Annamite Range of minor mountains into play and offering concealed route for movement of the NVA to the populated coastal areas. The generally rougher terrain also offered fewer hearts and minds for gathering and thus offered opposing forces more maneuver and fire capability for larger units. A lot of the I Corps problem CAs were incurred during the Khe Sanh and A Shau campaigns -- both of which were wars within a war...

    Problems with Eagle Flight success in those areas were range / time and available concealment...

    Proving that clean living pays, I spent most of '66 in II Corps, '68 in I Corps.

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    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    the most Afghan-like. Both also offered far greater enemy force density than did the other two CTZs, mostly due to proximity to Laos and the narrowing of the country placing the Annamite Range of minor mountains into play and offering concealed route for movement of the NVA to the populated coastal areas. The generally rougher terrain also offered fewer hearts and minds for gathering and thus offered opposing forces more maneuver and fire capability for larger units. A lot of the I Corps problem CAs were incurred during the Khe Sanh and A Shau campaigns -- both of which were wars within a war...

    Problems with Eagle Flight success in those areas were range / time and available concealment...

    Proving that clean living pays, I spent most of '66 in II Corps, '68 in I Corps.
    Good tour placement....

    That was why I pointed out the differences. The 101st had a fair amount of trouble finding good LZs when they hit I Corps, and the lack of suitable LZs also allowed the NVA to make good plans for dealing with any airmobile assault. II Corps had the same problems, coupled with a lack of organic lift on the part of the 4th ID (although in fairness they were better off that the Marines before 1969 and the 23rd ID/Americal in that regard). The 173rd had adequate lift, but still had trouble overcoming the lack of good LZs and ran into the same sort of ambushes that the 101st faced later on.

    And before anyone points out the 1st CD, I know the Cav operated in both CTZs, but there were important differences. The Cav's time in I Corps was relatively limited, and they conducted mostly raid-type operations as opposed to the sustained campaigns of the 101st during 1969. And their time in II CTZ was also somewhat limited and didn't face the level of NVA opposition that the 4th ID or 173rd Abn Bde did operating closer to the Cambodian border. And even with that said the Cav did have issues operating here. They were at their best in III Corps, where the terrain really favored their style of operations.
    "On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
    T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War

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