Re-structuring the BCT

[Fuchs]

Not quite. Something with pre-, but neither preemptive nor preventive.

[swerve1]

Recce/scouts/whatever tied to Bn/Rgt/Bde can only cover a small radius around those units/formations adequately. They cannot scout ahead in a two-hour-march radius before the HQ has decided on the direction of the march.

The availability of eyes and fists ahead is important - and any such lack reduces the mobile warfare proficiency (especially the agility of command and formations). Stumbling around blindly is no fun when the pinata is aiming a gun at you.

Recce attached to divisions was OK in WW2 when recce had top speed of 60-80 km/h, tanks of 40 and infantry on foot ... well, you get the point.
Recce hasn't this speed advantage any more. We've used all-motorised forces since 1940 (UK), 1944 (U.S.) or 1955 (Germany). We need a new concept for recce.

Let me emphasis the recce-shall-already-be-in-place-before-a-formation-knows-it-want-to-move-to-that-place point.
This becomes as impractical for individual formations just as city walls have become impractical for city garrisons with ever-larger artillery ranges. They gave way for front lines (a higher level effort) that provided all cities with a defensive line that was shorter than the sum of city walls of a single province.
Defensive lines are about circumference; 2*pi*r. The area to be covered by recce is about circular area; r*r*pi. It grows much faster.
If nothing else, geometry and history tell us that we have a defect with our force structure.

Recce should be a corps-level job today (this is unlikely to become visible in our smallish training exercises). The combat units and formations use vanguard, security elements and if need be they can feel for a short range with a recce team. This is the "keep eyes open" part of the job. The real recce should be a Corps thing and should provide ~90% of the non-combat info on the enemy.
We should give the Corps several Cavalry Regiments of several autonomous companies ("squadrons" if you want) each and a LRS Bn or Rgt.

One more year and I might be finished with a 50-200 pages effort that's in part built on this assertion of mine.



It's actually not that obvious, but rather depends on assumptions.

This point can actually lead to another discussion of manoeuvre à priori/command push vs. manoeuvre à posteriori/recon pull.
Recce ahead loses some importance if you use the latter.

There's also the thing whose name I always forget; attacking an enemy ASAP to catch him unread to fight. Military history suggests that this can work extremely fine if you use the right forces.
Actually, Rommel drove over a French division on a road with a fraction of his Panzer-Division (about a third of it; he lead the vanguard, Vorausabteilung) simply because said division was resting along a road and didn't expect attackers, being 30+ km behind the front that was penetrated only a few hours before.

The quote from the study was actually rather context (NTC) specific and probably only right in ~80% of all cases.
A weak recce ahead (that needs to be sent ahead because it's not already in place!) can sometimes provide more early warning to the enemy than to yourself and waste your time.

I don't quite agree with your view of reconnaissance - recce. While precision fires will only become more common, making every scout with a radio much more lethal, I think future battlefields will still place a premium on recon forces at all echelons below corps. PGMs may not be a viable option in an area with sensitive infrastructure or civilians, weather may make delivery of PGMs impossible, and the mission make dictate a task other than 'destroy.' In these cases, scouts may need to maintain eyes on the target and battle handover to another unit. I think we also need to keep in mind the role of reconnaissance forces as an economy of force. The old model had a RGT (a US BDE) cover a corps, a SQDN cover a DIV, etc. In this context, the old forces were economies of force relative to their parent unit.

As a company commander in Iraq, I would routinely use a squad or fire team as a recon force; I found eyes forward to be valuable even at my low level. Reconnaissance at all levels can be decisive - same for counter-recon.

[Fuchs]

Your first disagreement is a misunderstnading. I separate the lareg area recce in armored cav squadrons and LRS. The LRS are meant for stealthy, slow work - especially observation.

The Cav would be agile, combat-worthy to some degree (against support/recce troops and against combat troops with the advantage of surprise/ambush) and fully capable of "maintain eyes on the target and battle handover to another unit. I think we also need to keep in mind the role of reconnaissance forces as an economy of force.".
I don't think that brigades need to be fully capable stand-alone forces, though. They should swim in an ocean of recce troops.

"As a company commander in Iraq, I would routinely use a squad or fire team as a recon force; I found eyes forward to be valuable even at my low level. Reconnaissance at all levels can be decisive - same for counter-recon."

Of course, but the timely recce effort of an infantry company in a major war has an effective radius that equals maybe ten minutes of driving (unless we talk about very, very open and featureless terrain).
I expect a degree of agility and I fear that enemies might have a degree of agility that necessitates an early warning more on the order of at least an hour for you'd otherwise be surprised when relatively unfit to fight.

again: "The real recce should be a Corps thing and should provide ~90% of the non-combat info on the enemy."

[GI Zhou]

A little off topic, but as you are talking reconnaisance, is a vehicle like the small and agile British Scimitar, able to defeat light armour and soft skin vehicles, a good reconnaissance vehicle on the battlefield. I ask this because the People's Liberation Army have at least trialled their ZDB03 airborne combat vehicle as a reconnaissance vehicle. Besides having a 30mm automatic cannon, it can squeeze four paratroopers with small arms only in a rear compartment.

[swerve1]

I would often deploy recon assets up to 24 hours prior to an operation. Of course, I had a static zone I was responsible for, but I think the idea is the same. On a more fluid battlefield where larger maneuver is the norm, recon at the company level may not be as important since it won't fight in a vacuum. I still think scouts at the BN and BCT are still necessary.

I also think aviation can play a critical role. The Army doesn't have too many helicopters, but they aren't employed in the most effective manner. I would argue that the Army should view ATK AVN in the same way the USMC views its air wings - as fire support platforms. But the Army should take it step further and consider them as an extension of reconnaissance and security forces as well.

This is a great topic.

[Tukhachevskii]

General Purpose (GP -- precursor for the once ubiquitous 'Jeep') equipment rather than sensibly buying designed for purpose items.

The M3 Bradley was a political compromise purchased by the Armor and Cavalry folks to assure that the Infantry folks (who were buying the M2 Bradley) supported their buy of the M1 Tank. A part of the cost was cancellation of the XM8 Armored Gun system and of a dedicated Scout vehicle. The HMMWV is a lousy scout vehicle but is the standard, GP 'light' (???) wheeled vehicle.

IOW, there is no rationale. Both items were and are simply available and the best of many poor solutions given a refusal to buy dedicated equipment...

We do a lot of really dumb stuff.

We over-Armor our Recon elements because we do not have the patience to wait for effective, time consuming reconnaissance to be completed, we just load up on Armor and go out looking for trouble. Dumb...

We've identified a lack of effective Reconnaissance capability as a tactical and operational shortfall again and again -- we still haven't really fixed it, mostly because we're unwilling to buy dedicated equipment (or adequately train our people) and have impatient Staff Officers who are unwilling to wait for information...

Now you mention it I remember that the scout and MICV were melded for cost savings; I always had a soft spot for the XM-808 "Twister" (doable, IMO, with todays composite, hybrid drive, digital technology), although the XM-800T was probably more suitable. I only asked because I know the Danish army scout platoon had two tanks (tank section) and a light vehicle section (2 VW I think) and a single mortar vehicle. Apparently, they did very well at NATO training meets combining stealth with survivability (based on the firepower and protection of the tanks). Anyone who knows about the travils of Britain's FRES programme (essentially jumping on the US "medium weight" Stryker bandwagon) knows that the British Gov have just chosen a 30tonne MICV (that's pushing the "medium wieght" bit, IMO); personally I would have liked to have seen the UK go with the TRACER programme (which see half way down the article). I think the German/Dutch Fennek is probably one of the better light recon platforms.

[Tukhachevskii]

I think a large part of the problem is that the reconnaisance function/role tends to blur into the advance guard function/role which then confuses force design or, as in the case of Iraq, S/BCT recon elements are often used as a de-facto third manouvre element...so who's doing recon? Separating the two functions fully (stealth for the former and brawn for the latter) is probably going to the near impossible given actual rather than theoretical battle conditions and the fiscal and doctrinal problems of force design.

[Fuchs]

I think a large part of the problem is that the reconnaisance function/role tends to blur into the advance guard function/role which then confuses force design or, as in the case of Iraq, S/BCT recon elements are often used as a de-facto third manouvre element...so who's doing recon?

The "third manoeuvre element" thing is a consequence of designing cavalry as a de-facto brigade instead of as many small autonomous units (Coy).
That's one of the reasons why the ACR concept is strange.

German WW2 doctrine gave the fast division's recce detachment some combat tasks, too. They were only capable of small combat missions, though.
Standard doctrine was to send small teams of armoured cars ahead and to increase their density in areas of interest. Those armoured cars would avoid combat if possible.
The recce detachment was reinforced with a fast-moving infantry Bn (initially motorcycle troops), though. They were able to punch through screening lines or to grab an important hill or bridge if necessary. Organic artillery and AT guns helped them (they did later go for long 75mm cannons on lightly armoured AFV for both direct fire support and AT support).

That wasn't enough to be misunderstood as an additional manoeuvre element. It was enough for small combat missions (especially against unprepared opposition) and was often mis-used as emergency reserves in times of crisis (this happened to everybody in uniform, though - engineers and recce troops were merely the first to be called upon).

[William F. Owen]

A little off topic, but as you are talking reconnaisance, is a vehicle like the small and agile British Scimitar, able to defeat light armour and soft skin vehicles, a good reconnaissance vehicle on the battlefield.

IMO, Scimitar is an abysmal recce vehicle. Spartan was far better. You could at least deploy 4 guys to actually clear corners, wood lines and ridges.

I would often deploy recon assets up to 24 hours prior to an operation.

What were you commanding and what were your recce assets?

I also think aviation can play a critical role. The Army doesn't have too many helicopters, but they aren't employed in the most effective manner. I would argue that the Army should view ATK AVN in the same way the USMC views its air wings - as fire support platforms. But the Army should take it step further and consider them as an extension of reconnaissance and security forces as well.

Concur, but I think the AVN community really needs to think long and hard about how to address this. The Aussies are using Tiger, in an Armed Reconnaissance Role, and I know there are some muttering about this.

This is a great topic.

There used to be more!

Personally, I think almost every aspect of reconnaissance needs scrutiny, because there is far too much hold over from horse mounted cavalry thinking, and almost nothing from men on horses can be read across into the proto-modern warfare.

[GI Zhou]

Bill,

Thank you for your reply. The ZDB03 was designed from the Russian BMD-3, and combines many of the features of the Spartan and Scimitar but no thermal imaging or small battlefield radars have been observed on this vehicle. They could of couse be shoehorned inside the vehicle.

[BriMac]

The engineers are scattered across the BCT. Sometimes this is good, sometimes bad, but the problem is that BFV-equipped engineers get looked at like just another maneuver element instead of engineers who can maneuver if need be. Also, lacking a BDE EN limits the real visibility on the engineer situation.

They have changed this in most of the HBCTs to include 2/4. While they have had a BDE EN (as well as a deputy and a terrain team) for a couple years, they just recently merged the two EN companies that were in the CABs and placed them in the STB.

[Tukhachevskii]

...…the following theses may be of interest regarding S/BCTs and the reconnaissance/third manoeuvre Bn conundrum;

Maj. C. D. Taylor, The Transformation of Reconnaissance: Who will Fight for Information on the Future Battlefield?, MMAS thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College, 2005;

This research seeks to determine if reconnaissance operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom required engaging the enemy in close combat in order to be effective. Qualitative examination of the interviews from the Operation Iraqi Freedom Study Group yielded seven consistent themes that impact on this primary research question. Those seven themes are summarized below:

1. Tempo drives reconnaissance

2. The movement to contact is the most common form of the offense

3. Adaptive enemies often do not fit doctrinal templates

4. Commanders required human intelligence more than imagery

5. Most useful intelligence is bottom up

6. Lightly armoured scouts cannot support high tempo operations

7. Divisional heavy cavalry squadrons tend to fight as independent manoeuvre units. (p.40)

Maj. D. Mark, Effective or Efficient: The Conundrum of the Armed Reconnaissance Squadron, MMAS thesis, USMC Command and General Staff College, 2009;

Brigade level reconnaissance units exist solely to allow the primary warfighting organization in the Army, the Brigade Combat Team, to have perfect Situational Awareness and Situational Understanding (SA/SU). However, much of the doctrine, organization, and technologies required to pursue RDO simply do not exist within the Army today. The Army's answer to the capability gap is the modular force and the centrepiece organization, the Brigade Combat Team. However, one of the primary failings of the modular
design was that the HBCT traded a manoeuvre battalion for a cavalry squadron. Although the ARS proves far more capable than the BRT it replaced, the ARS has lost its identity and has become a poorly resourced third manoeuvre element. As a result, the ARS does not even perform
reconnaissance missions well. Under the current construct, the ARS does not provide the brigade any unique capabilities (p. 23).

Maj. M. A. Dooley, Ignoring History: The Flawed Effort to Divorce Reconnaissance from Security in Modern Cavalry Formations, MMAS thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College, 2006;

For all of the optimistic discussion in the latest version of FM 3-20.96 about making contact with sensors and developing a situation out of direct fire contact, there is little difference now between the realities of brigade reconnaissance squadron techniques and the capabilities of World War II ground reconnaissance. Other than the fact that reconnaissance squadrons no longer have the organic helicopter assets or armoured firepower formerly common to division cavalry, cavalry scouts must still execute their reconnaissance and security missions much as they have for the past sixty-five years. As a result, the newest reconnaissance squadrons no longer possess the critical assets historically required to bail themselves out of trouble once it is encountered.[...]
It seems the sensor troops that were to have sufficed as a replacement for organic combat power in the original FCS proposals are not controlled by the very reconnaissance forces that were to depend upon them. So long as the sensor systems remain controlled by brigade headquarters, the concept of sensor-to-sensor target handover, in most cases, will require constant coordination through multiple echelons of command. Without physical possession or operational control of sensor assets at the reconnaissance squadron level, the new HBCT and IBCT reconnaissance organizations technically do not even qualify to be labelled as “RSTA,” because they have no ability to acquire targets beyond the short range capabilities of normal ground recon troop assets. The much vaunted application of joint and precision fires, proclaimed in the latest version of FM 3-20.96 as a substitute for organic combat power, is thus not likely to occur efficiently if at all. (p. 72-4)

Maj. M. R. Howell, A CRITIQUE OF THE U.S. ARMY FORCE REDESIGN OF CAVALRY FORMATIONS WITHIN THE BRIGADE COMBAT TEAMS MMAS thesis, USMC Command and General Staff College, 2009;

First, the new modular cavalry formations have severe flaws in their design. Second, the current mindset, doctrinal foundation and leader training focus of these cavalry formations have severe flaws in some of its key concepts. Finally, and most importantly, these new formations cannot perform the full spectrum of reconnaissance and security missions that cavalry formations doctrinally executed in the past. The combined effect of these flaws is likely to cause a serious capability gap to develop within BCT cavalry squadrons. These changes signalled a significant shift in the doctrinal roles and missions of the majority of current U.S. cavalry formations (excluding the 3d Armoured Cavalry Regiment). In sum, the transformation and modularization of the U.S. Army's BCT cavalry squadrons has had a negative impact on their effectiveness.(p. 1)

[gute]

What's the difference (if any) between armoured infantry and mechanised infantry?

[82redleg]

What's the difference (if any) between armoured infantry and mechanised infantry?

In US usage, mechanized infantry is mounted in Bradley IFVs. We no longer use armored infantry, that is a WW2 term for the 1/2track mounted infantry of the armored divisions.

My understanding of UK usage (I'm willing to be shown otherwise) is that armored infantry is mounted in Warrior IFVs (equivalent to US mechanized infantry), while mechanized infantry is mounted in wheeled Saxon APCs.

[swerve1]

IMO, Scimitar is an abysmal recce vehicle. Spartan was far better. You could at least deploy 4 guys to actually clear corners, wood lines and ridges.

What were you commanding and what were your recce assets?

Concur, but I think the AVN community really needs to think long and hard about how to address this. The Aussies are using Tiger, in an Armed Reconnaissance Role, and I know there are some muttering about this.

There used to be more!

Personally, I think almost every aspect of reconnaissance needs scrutiny, because there is far too much hold over from horse mounted cavalry thinking, and almost nothing from men on horses can be read across into the proto-modern warfare.

I commanded a tank co/tm with 2 tank PLTs and 1 mech PLT. For recon, I would typically use either one of the BN sniper teams or a section from the BN SCT PLT. Sometimes a combination of both if necessary.

[reed11b]

Of course, but the timely recce effort of an infantry company in a major war has an effective radius that equals maybe ten minutes of driving (unless we talk about very, very open and featureless terrain).
I expect a degree of agility and I fear that enemies might have a degree of agility that necessitates an early warning more on the order of at least an hour for you'd otherwise be surprised when relatively unfit to fight.

except that most light infantry has access to aviation and/or vehicular assets of some sort. Not sure what you are saying about LRS, and since I am a LRS scout, please clarify.
Reed

[Hacksaw]

I've popped in and out of this discussion for a couple of weeks...
I have heard several different rules of thumb regarding force ratio vis a vis security mission... Of course it is all METT-TC dependent (especially enemy, troops, and terrain), but...
Cover Guard Screen
Corps DIV Regiment/BDE+ Squadron/BN+
Div Regiment/BDE+ Squadron/BN+ Troop/CO+
BDE Squadron/BN+ Troop/CO+ PLT+

Source FM 17-95

[Fuchs]

except that most light infantry has access to aviation and/or vehicular assets of some sort. Not sure what you are saying about LRS, and since I am a LRS scout, please clarify.
Reed

My opinion is basically that recce results should be available before a commander even thinks about moving towards some grid coordinates.

The only assets that can flood a theatre with observation & reporting capability at reasonable costs and effort and provide that kind of coverage are either aerial (SAR/GMTI radar, Sigint), orbital (electro-optical, IIR, SAR/GMTI, Sigint) or LRS.
Aerial and orbital sensors have limitations that cannot be overcome without scouts on the ground, therefore I believe that an appropriate share for LRS would be a strong battalion per corps (unless the terrain is too open or the warfare too static or force densities in the theatre too high).

[TAH]

In an era/organization of zero-sum, you are not going to be able to add something in one place without a corresponding reduction somewhere else.

From that, I propose the following organizational changes to the existing HBCT MTO&E

1. Consolidate all M3 CFVs into 6-vehicle recon/scout platoons. With 29 CFVs inside a HBCT there are enough for 4 platoons of 6 + 2 CFVs in Recon Sqdrn HQs + 1 (X2) in each of two Heavy Recon Troops. One CFV left (hold for now)

2a. Reduce number of tank companies in each CAB to one with 4 platoons of 4 tanks + 2 Co HQs tanks + 2 CAB HQs tanks for a total of 20 per CAB (down from 29). This also leaves 1 M2/M3 (S3 vehicle) from the CAB HQs left, Hold for now.

2b. Move remaining 9 tanks per CAB (total of 18) over into Heavy Recon Troops. I think you can see where this goes...

3a. Consolidate all recon HMMWVs for a total of 40. Re-org into four platoons of 6 HMWWVs (plus 4 reminder, hold for now). Assign four 6-HMWWV platoons to Light Recon Troop of Recon Sqdrn.

3b. Assign a 6-HMWWV scout platoon to each CAB.

4. "Re-organized" Recon Sqdrn now has two Heavy Troops and 1 Light Troop, all with four platoons.

5. Take reminder vehicles from above and create an "Escort and Security Company" under the STB. Create using personnel from eliminated Tank HQs and reduced need for FISTs in CABs. E&S Co gets: M2/M3 Co HQs with BFIST, HBCT MP PLT, NBC Recon PLT, the 4 remaining HMMWVs as Escort PLT, and a new/re-inforced Security PLT using the two left over M2/M3 and the 2 from the HBCT Security Section.

Some of the results:

Starting = 8 Companies manned, trained and equipped to conduct Full Spectrum Operations (FSO)
Re-org = 6 Companies and 2 Heavy Recon Troops manned, trained and equipped for FSO.

Start = 8 recon/scout platoons (3X5)
Re-org = 6 HMWWV scout platoons + 4 CFV scout platoons = 10

Increases the number of recon/scout platoons by two and moves towards standardizing Recon/scout platoons at 6 vehicles.

HBCT Recon Sqdrn should now be capable of acting as the 3rd maneuver element of the HBCT and still retain is primary role of recon. It can now guard, attack, defend, delay etc. By being able to occuplish thsse task/missions, it can also begin to address the enemy's INTENTIONS, a capability absent in the current organization.

Start = seperate/orphan platoons/sections 3 (MPs, NBC & Security)
Re-org = New Co HQs with 4 platoons (MPs, NBC, Security & Escort)

A company now resourced to enable the HBCT to begin to solve its area security concerns on its own. Also, addresses the issue of orphan platoons within the HBCT.

Down-side is a less capable recon/scout platoon in each CAB and smaller CABs (10 combat/maneuver platoons versus 12 in the original organization)

Comments?

TAH

[Tukhachevskii]

HBCT Recon Sqdrn should now be capable of acting as the 3rd maneuver element of the HBCT and still retain is primary role of recon.
TAH

So its really more of an ACAV Sqn (as per the ACAV regiments) than a recon outfit right? Can it manouvre and conduct recon or only accomplish one mission at a time; me thinks the latter. Although it could dominate a movement to contact pretty well while guiding in the other two true manouvre bns in for the kill-hunter-killer style. In non MW scenarios however, like, for instance in Iraq, you've already got rcon sqns being used in manoevre roles to make up for the short-fall but become so ensconsed in that mission that they often can't perform their primary one...i.e., recon. Still, I can see from the simple reorganisation you propose that one could get greater bang for ones buck without needing to drastically shake up the entire system. But you really need to address the above problem.