All matters MRAP JLTV (merged thread)

[Cole]

Excuse my attempt to roll TAH's comments about BCT reorganization into this thread because believe they are related.

Believe TAH has the right idea that going from two Armor companies per CAB to one larger one would save personnel in a zero sum gain force structure. But instead of diverting all the extra tanks to the Reconnaissance squadron, wonder if it would make more sense to use the personnel billpayer to add a stability ops, air-deployment, and counter-IED capability by including M-ATV in the CAB and Recon Squadron force structures. The result might look like this:

Combined Arms Battalion (CAB)
1 Armor Co: 4 platoons with 4 M1A2 tanks for 16 tanks + 2 in Co HQ (per TAH suggestion)
2 Infantry Co: 3 platoons with 3 GCVs (vs. 4 M2A3) AND 3 M-ATV each (leave 3 GCVs and 3 M-ATV in Co HQ for the Cdr, XO, and 1SG in case their GCV are required to back-up platoons with broke vehicles)

Reconnaissance Squadron
2 Recon Troops: Each with 1 M1A2, 3 M3A3, 4 M-ATV with LRAS3 on elevated masts

The M-ATV would add more organic equipment lift, fire team carry, and resupply capability to CABs in a more survivable vehicle than the LRAS3 HMMWVs. With one less GCV in the platoon and 3 extra M-ATVs, the platoon would be capable of splitting up fire teams between GCV amd M-ATV, or could carry additional light infantry. There would be additional maneuverable crew-served weapons in the M-ATVs with less fuel consumption than 4 GCVs despite 6 vehicles. For early air deployment, commanders/planners could always choose to deploy 5 M-ATV instead of 2 GCVs to increase vehicle coverage of an airfield perimeter overwatching light troops, either sea-deploying GCVs or sending them later in the TPFDL.

In noncontiguous distributed operations, it would help to use organic M-ATV to pick-up and deliver supplies to combat elements, or carry additional fuel and ammunition to extend time between resupply. M-ATV cargo beds also could carry small UAS and unmanned ground vehicles, unattended sensors, mast-mounted sensors, light mortars, and smoke generation/grenades, as well as IED jamming and detection gear to lead expensive GCVs and tanks.

Consider that the probability is far higher that our forces will encounter IEDs and normal RPGs that are more affordable to typical foes with lesser defense budgets. Heavily armored advance guards, while helpful on open terrain against Cold War era threats, are less likely to be as beneficial in future tight urban areas or on forested/mountainous trails limited to one (or none) lane traffic with little ability to traverse turrets or cross 3rd world bridges. Boulevards and 4-lane highways are the exception, not the rule in most urban areas.

Finally the resulting force structure would use less fuel than current CABs to enable support of longer lines of communication that Israelis don’t deal with and that expose logisticians to stay behind and guerilla elements. Believe there is insufficient armored threat (and many other assets can find/kill armor) justifying tank-like armor for GCVs and more tanks in recon squadrons. The fuel burden is too high. As "On Point" cited in Chapter 6 in its history of OIF 1:

"To understand the scale of this effort, CFLCC expected to consume 40 million gallons of fuel by D+20, or about 10 April. By comparison, the Allies in WW I consumed 40 million gallons of gasoline during the four years of the war, a war that Winston Churchill described as having been won "on a sea of oil." By contrast, during World War II, the Allied fuel reserves in Normandy reached 7.5 million gallons only on D+21."

So we want to go from a 2 mpg Bradley to a 2 gallon per mile Abrams fuel consumption for the entire HBCT maneuver fleet?

[jcustis]

Does anyone have experience with the various up-armor kits for MTVRs and FMTVs? How do they compare with dedicated MRAPs in terms of protection and mobility? The MTVR APK was supposed to handle detonations of 12lbs of Comp B (threshold), 16lbs (objective) and 7.62mm all around. I imagine this could be taken further with a custom cab and cargo bed designed to accept armor kits.

It seems like, if you have the option to up-armor your standard trucks to near MRAP protection, while retaining a significant degree of off-road performance, you can buy one vehicle and tailor your protection level to meet the METT-TC.

The MTVR in up-armored config is a beast. It has a higher center of gravity and that has posed challenges with tip-overs as a result of blasts, but that machine can just go and go and go, and it can take bad hits as well, but then again it was already fairly resistant in its basic configuration. I have also been riding in the current M-ATV, and the improved ISS upgraded suspention MRAPs.

The ISS upgrade is a night and day improvement over the old rigid suspension, but still does not approach the mobility of the M-ATV. Serious shortfall remain with both platforms in terms of trafficability, visibility, and any ability to actually fight from it as well as conduct dismounted action.

The M-ATV does has a kick ass communications suite that can be employed and almost puts it on par with LAV-C2 variants. M-ATVs have been able to low-gear themselves out of sand that would swallow any other vehicle, and makes me wish I had bought stock in Oshkosh.

[TAH]

Ken:

BLUF, keep the counter-points coming. Healthly debate is good for the soul.

I agree with your points regarding manuever units and FOBs, but the Loggies got to live/operate from someplace. No reason a maneuver unit could/should not operate off-base for days/weeks at a time, depending on re-supply. Lots of infantry/armor/cav units in Viet Nam spent nights off their base in Night Defense Positions. Seems like we have lost that capability....

I see the issue here being the ability to conduct re-supply in the "non-linear, asymetric battlefield" of today/tomorrow. Our future opponents are watching. They will continue to attack this weakness until its no longer a weakness.

We can secure the LOCs, secure the convoys or try to do both. I like the navy's solution of secure the convoy, understanding that a certain amount of that effort will have to go into securing/clearing a ground route immediately in front of the convoy. If we can get use to flexible MSRs, and the terrain allows for it, then all we need is the unit organized, equipped, manned and trained to run the route ahead of the convoy and provide close-in defense. We could leave that all to the CSS units, but will create a higher degree of risk. What I am trying to do is create a force for Lines-of-Commuinication (LOC) security. The Combat Battalion in an MEB appears to be a good first choice for this. Don't need/want a tank/Bradley Combined Arms Battalion. Would love Stryker Infantry Battalion, if someone is buying more Strykers. Above the ones needed to transform the 3rd ACR and 1st BCT/1AD. A dismounted Infantry Bn does great securing fixed sites and clearing urban areas. Really lousy when they try to keep up with that moving convoy. So, why not create an Infantry Bn (LOC) equipped with MRAPs/JLTVs/M-ATVs?

Agree about a fuel guzzling tank, but until/if we get a new engine its the one we have. I have tried to get the CSS-types to take up this topic, not interested.

Wonder what a 1000 mile operating range for a tank, or APC or IFV would be. At the end, you will still need fuel, only 3 times more then from 300 miles. (bad at math, I know)

I'm pretty sure that most infantry types would prefer to traverl in a Bradley of Stryker, but I see these as over-kill of the MSR-Security/Convoy Escort role. I think we can all generally agree to get rid of add-on/up-armored HMWWVs ASAP. In all of their roles. bad idea for a vehicle that started life with a plastic fuel tank, a fiber glass hood and an aluminim frame.

Cole:

Not sure I understand your Recon Sqdrn. Is it Company Size or a Battalion? Are your Troops Company or platoon sized?

1 M1A1 is very bad Ju Ju.

Is you intent to re-create combined arms/CAV platoons? Personaly like combined arms Co/Troops better. Pushes the requirement to understand more complex operations to the more experinced CPT level vice the newbe LT. It also enables the ability to still task org based off the situation.

While your solution of foward delivery of supplies by M-ATV might be feasible, the MSRs run all the way back to an APOD or SPOD. Vulnerability starts a soon as any convoy departs that location.

[Cole]

I agree with your points regarding manuever units and FOBs, but the Loggies got to live/operate from someplace. No reason a maneuver unit could/should not operate off-base for days/weeks at a time, depending on re-supply. Lots of infantry/armor/cav units in Viet Nam spent nights off their base in Night Defense Positions. Seems like we have lost that capability....

But in Vietnam, there weren't lots of M1A2s burning 500 gallons every 8+ hours whether moving or not.

We can secure the LOCs, secure the convoys or try to do both. I like the navy's solution of secure the convoy, understanding that a certain amount of that effort will have to go into securing/clearing a ground route immediately in front of the convoy.

Isn't IED route clearance at really slow speeds? If engineers do it multiple hours prior to the convoy, there is time to emplace new IEDs. If it is done immediately forward of the convoy, the entire convoy is reduced to a crawl and is vulnerable to ambush. Does that create a requirement for something to patrol the road behind the engineers and provide them security?

If a tank is involved in securing the convoy, it is generating a high logistical requirement for itself, is tearing up the road and tank without a HET, and may limit the convoy to roads with strong bridges. There are other manned and unmanned aircraft solutions that may be better than a tank escort.

If we can get use to flexible MSRs, and the terrain allows for it, then all we need is the unit organized, equipped, manned and trained to run the route ahead of the convoy and provide close-in defense. We could leave that all to the CSS units, but will create a higher degree of risk. What I am trying to do is create a force for Lines-of-Commuinication (LOC) security....Don't need/want a tank/Bradley Combined Arms Battalion. Would love Stryker Infantry Battalion, if someone is buying more Strykers.

Wonder if after early Stryker air deployment for deterrence, SBCTs will have less of a forward combat mission once sea-deployed HBCTs arrive. They can be task-organized with HBCTs to provide convoy escort, secure the engineer IED clearance teams and roads behind them, and can support AOs along convoy routes to provide full-time patrolling security and stationary surveillance.

A dismounted Infantry Bn does great securing fixed sites and clearing urban areas. Really lousy when they try to keep up with that moving convoy. So, why not create an Infantry Bn (LOC) equipped with MRAPs/JLTVs/M-ATVs?

101st and 82nd already had a LOC security mission during OIF I and secured bypassed cities. So perhaps let the early deployed light guys do it again in their JLTV/M-ATVs and the Strykers/ASVs perform the mobile escort.

Wonder what a 1000 mile operating range for a tank, or APC or IFV would be. At the end, you will still need fuel, only 3 times more then from 300 miles. (bad at math, I know)

About 2,000 gallons per Abrams (roughly one HEMTT tanker per tank) every 1,000 miles. Probably 1,000 gallons per 130K lbs diesel GCV or 600 gallons per 80,000 lb GCV every 1,000 miles. (I'm not too bad in math )

Cole:

Not sure I understand your Recon Sqdn. Is it Company Size or a Battalion? Are your Troops Company or platoon sized?

1 M1A1 is very bad Ju Ju.

I realized that was messed up last night but waited for other input. Left out the word "platoon" with 1 tank, 3 M3A3, and 4 M-ATVs...basically substituting a tank and 4 M-ATV for the current 5 HMMWVs. So the net addition of 4 tanks to the Recon Squadron could occur as a separate platoon, as well, realizing they would probably be task-organized all the time with other troops.

While your solution of foward delivery of supplies by M-ATV might be feasible, the MSRs run all the way back to an APOD or SPOD. Vulnerability starts a soon as any convoy departs that location.

Tractor trailers and commercial vehicles will bring many supplies most of the way. Forward Support Company HEMTT PLS trucks can cover the remaining distance but lack the off-road mobility of a M-ATV and are a bigger target close to dangerous AOs.

Guess you must push BSB HEMTT tankers all the way forward, but with fewer tanks you could get by with fewer HEMTT tankers. A more fuel-efficient infantry platoon with 3 GCVs/3 M-ATVs also reduces fuel requirements. You also could potentially carry 100 gallons (notional 750 lb of fuel + square rubber fuel drum) in the cargo bed of the M-ATV to resupply half of a 80K GCVs 200 gallon fuel tank. If it is a 140K pound GCV, you are probably only carrying 1/4th of a 400 gallon GCV tankful.

Let Strykers, Armored Security Vehicles, and M-ATV escort the HEMTT tankers and PLS racks forward and secure the dropped racks and fuel trucks until the CAB is ready to resupply.

[Ken White]

not cater to the other guy's capability to do that so we can predictably respond...

Seems like we have lost that capability...

True and it is a potentially costly mistake to have allowed that to happen. We had better get busy rebuilding the capability and the desire to stay away from FOB like locations.

I see the issue here being the ability to conduct re-supply in the "non-linear, asymetric battlefield" of today/tomorrow. Our future opponents are watching. They will continue to attack this weakness until its no longer a weakness.

In reverse order; True -- that's why we should be trying to get a step or two ahead of them. Not to be too critical but it seems you're proposing we keep doing the same thing and hope it can be done better...

Yep, they're watching. If I were them and read on a web site the US was doing what you propose, I'd be wringing my hands in glee; 'No sweat, they're still going to do convoys...'

Uh, today's battlefield may be 'asymmetric' but only because we ALLOWED it to be. As for tomorrow's, I'm reminded of Omar Bradley's October 1949 comment, "We'll never have any more amphibious operations." Boy, did Inchon screw that up...

Or Niels Bohr's "Prediction is very difficult, especially about the future." Unfortunately, the US Army has to be prepared for everything from MCO to humanitarian intervention and all that worldwide. Thus maximum flexibility in unit organization and training is required, the number of one job specialty elements has to be kept low.

We can secure the LOCs, secure the convoys or try to do both.

Or do without both...

What I am trying to do is create a force for Lines-of-Commuinication (LOC) security...The Combat Battalion in an MEB appears to be a good first choice for this... So, why not create an Infantry Bn (LOC) equipped with MRAPs/JLTVs/M-ATVs?

In order; Isn't LOC security an old MP function, augmented as required? The MEBs have been given the mission but other than in the ArNG, they theoretically do not have a "Combat Battalion." Rather they are assigned troop units as need for the task(s) assigned. Said Troops should be heavy on MPs with ASV or Strykers and should not include combined arms units unless they are REALLY needed (Really as in necessary, not desired by a vocal Commander). Your proposal of such a Battalion almost sounds like fishing for spaces and using MRAPS to ease the cost of standup...

Create an 'Inf Bn (LOC)' and you will have created a major morale problem for all the 11Bs in the world who would do back flips to avoid such an assignment. Trust me on that one. To get assigned as an Inf Bn to such duty temporarily is one thing, for an individual to be assigned to such a unit is quite another. Plus, you are creating a purpose designed outfit, predicting that the next war will resemble this one. History says that's not a good bet. Harsh reality says that MRAP are best as history...

I have tried to get the CSS-types to take up this topic, not interested.

Of course they aren't, that would be harmful to job security...

Wonder what a 1000 mile operating range for a tank, or APC or IFV would be. At the end, you will still need fuel, only 3 times more then from 300 miles.

Not necessarily, one could have fewer, lighter vehicles with better mileage. Even better, one could launch the vehicles for a 1 or 200 mile trip out, a few hours of combat and a 1 or 200 mile return to their start point...

I'm pretty sure that most infantry types would prefer to traverl in a Bradley of Stryker, but I see these as over-kill of the MSR-Security/Convoy Escort role. I think we can all generally agree to get rid of add-on/up-armored HMWWVs ASAP. In all of their roles. bad idea for a vehicle that started life with a plastic fuel tank, a fiber glass hood and an aluminim frame.

They might be overkill, OTOH, in some scenarios, they might be inadequate. In any case, I'm a Slim fan -- a standard infantry battalion, properly trained and equipped can do almost all combat tasks (though I'm not a Stryker fan, I doubt that it's overkill for much of anything).

Agree on the HMMWV, it was a poor idea for a military vehicle in the first place. Too big and too heavy for the utlity role, too large and damage sensitive for a scout vehicle. Bad idea all 'round...

So's the MRAP.

And on this:

Pushes the requirement to understand more complex operations to the more experinced CPT level vice the newbe LT. It also enables the ability to still task org based off the situation.

I strongly agree that, almost criminally, we do not adequately train our Lieutenants and that we do not adequately trust our NCOs.

[Rex Brynen]

Agree on the HMMWV, it was a poor idea for a military vehicle in the first place. Too big and too heavy for the utlity role, too large and damage sensitive for a scout vehicle. Bad idea all 'round...

And on that issue:

Senior U.S. commander restricts Humvee use in Afghanistan
By Barbara Starr, CNN Pentagon Correspondent
July 1, 2010 11:33 a.m. EDT

Washington (CNN) -- The once-ubiquitous Humvee may become a rare sight in some parts of Afghanistan following a decision by the senior U.S. commander in eastern Afghanistan to restrict the use of the vehicles in the field.

Maj. Gen. John Campbell, commander of Joint Task Force-101, ordered this week that the use of Humvee vehicles outside a military base would have to specifically be approved by a colonel -- one of the most senior field grade positions in the military.

Prior to this, the use of High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV, or Humvee) had to be approved by a lower-ranking officer, according to Task Force spokesman Maj. Patrick Seiber.

...

[William F. Owen]

In any case, I'm a Slim fan -- a standard infantry battalion, properly trained and equipped can do almost all combat tasks (though I'm not a Stryker fan, I doubt that it's overkill for much of anything).

I'm you're brother on that one Ken. One of most able, yet under-rated Officers the Empire ever produced. In May 1939, he was a Lieutenant Colonel, aged 37 - By March 42, he was a Corps Commander!

[Infanteer]

I'm you're brother on that one Ken. One of most able, yet under-rated Officers the Empire ever produced. In May 1939, he was a Lieutenant Colonel, aged 37 - By March 42, he was a Corps Commander!

I'll second that! Defeat into Victory is probably 1 of 5 books that I would say all leaders should read. For a book about an Army on operations, there are useful lessons for leaders at all level.

[Ken White]

(so far as I can recall) who never forgot the importance of the basics of the trade (Soldiering is a trade, not a profession...), his roots or what was really important -- as opposed to the many who spend much time on the seemingly important. Infanteer is right, IMO. Everyone who serves should at least read it. Owning a copy of "Defeat into Victory" is better, it merits re-reading from time to time...

Back to the thread. As he also wrote, you need specially trained folks for very long range strategic reconnaissance -- for everything else, a suitably trained and equipped Infantry Battalion can do the job. I would emphasize trained, equipage is important but good units can make do...

In more years than I care to recall, I've seen many varieties of infantry units from over a dozen nations in combat. Most of the 'specialized' units were not really successful.

[jcustis]

The MTVR in up-armored config is a beast. It has a higher center of gravity and that has posed challenges with tip-overs as a result of blasts, but that machine can just go and go and go, and it can take bad hits as well, but then again it was already fairly resistant in its basic configuration. I have also been riding in the current M-ATV, and the improved ISS upgraded suspention MRAPs.

The ISS upgrade is a night and day improvement over the old rigid suspension, but still does not approach the mobility of the M-ATV. Serious shortfall remain with both platforms in terms of trafficability, visibility, and any ability to actually fight from it as well as conduct dismounted action.

The M-ATV does has a kick ass communications suite that can be employed and almost puts it on par with LAV-C2 variants. M-ATVs have been able to low-gear themselves out of sand that would swallow any other vehicle, and makes me wish I had bought stock in Oshkosh.

After operating in them almost exclusively for the past four months (to my chagrin since I so do miss an LAV), I have gained a greater appreciation for the M-ATV, but also higher frustration with the procurement program.

Here are some issues I have with the platform:

-Visibility forward of the driver and vehicle commander sucks because of the size, and angle of the thick windows. The side windows are even worse, and only allow a passenger to peek out and see what is directly abreast of the vehicle. No way to conduct a "5 and 25" check of the ground without opening the suicide door. I know this limitation has to do with the blast resistance, but c'mon, can the engineering design take into account some functionality requirements too?

-There is no IR flood lamp on the vehicle. IR lamps have prooved indispensible on about every tactical vehicle we already use, because it facilitates the use of night vision devices, so why nothing on the M-ATV as a basic piece of equipment? The driver has a driver's viewer enhancer (DVE) that matches the thermal devices employed on tanks and LAVs to allow drivers to drive in all light conditions, but the vehicle commander does not have a similar capability. That means that under zero moonlight situations, it is very difficult to see through the thick windows, and try to guide a driver using a blackout drive light only.

-There are no AC electrical outlets in the vehicle. MRAPs have them, but the M-ATV is oddly left out. It is almost as if Oshkosh is saying, "well gents, we don't have that option on this model, but if you take the hallway past custromer service and go to our custom shop, you should be able to find that add-on." Huh? Was anyone at Oshkosh looking at how we employ massive amounts of devices (biometric, battery chargers, laptops, etc.) in the current environment?

It's like we went forward and back at the same time, and it is just so odd that these basic things are absent.

[Pete]

If I understand the situation correctly the MRAP procurement happened mainly because of the insistence of SecDef Gates as an emergency measure to help to prevent the casualties being caused by IEDs. The standard DoD R&D life cycle model was short-circuited at the highest level because of the perceived urgency of the need.

During peacetime one of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command schools, probably Infantry or Armor, would have served as the "combat developer," performing studies and analyses to define system "requirements." Once those desired characteristics had been defined in a "requirements document" approved by the proper level within DoD or the service, the program would have been turned over to a "materiel developer" (such as whatever the U.S. Army Tank-Automotive Command is called these days). They in turn would release an RFP, conduct source selection, and then develop a prototype. Then testing of the product takes place. The problem with this system is it usually takes 12 to 20 years to put a new item of equipment in the hands of troops.

How Army Ordnance ever developed the M1 Carbine so quickly in 1940-42 doesn't happen very often these days, mainly because our own DoD and service regulations for the development of new systems don't allow us to go from Point A to Point B without performing 35 steps in between. Often many of the documents produced during a developmet program have to be distributed to numerous DoD or service offices, any of which can non-concur and prevent forward movement in the program.

[Pete]

They say a picture is worth a thousand words, which is about how many there are on this diagram of the DoD acquisition life cycle model, courtesy of Defense Acquisition University.

Regarding the site certificate warning, DAU is a DoD organization and as such not likely to have dangerous stuff online.

[Firn]

After operating in them almost exclusively for the past four months (to my chagrin since I so do miss an LAV), I have gained a greater appreciation for the M-ATV, but also higher frustration with the procurement program.

Here are some issues I have with the platform:

-Visibility forward of the driver and vehicle commander sucks because of the size, and angle of the thick windows. The side windows are even worse, and only allow a passenger to peek out and see what is directly abreast of the vehicle. No way to conduct a "5 and 25" check of the ground without opening the suicide door. I know this limitation has to do with the blast resistance, but c'mon, can the engineering design take into account some functionality requirements too?

-There is no IR flood lamp on the vehicle. IR lamps have prooved indispensible on about every tactical vehicle we already use, because it facilitates the use of night vision devices, so why nothing on the M-ATV as a basic piece of equipment? The driver has a driver's viewer enhancer (DVE) that matches the thermal devices employed on tanks and LAVs to allow drivers to drive in all light conditions, but the vehicle commander does not have a similar capability. That means that under zero moonlight situations, it is very difficult to see through the thick windows, and try to guide a driver using a blackout drive light only.

-There are no AC electrical outlets in the vehicle. MRAPs have them, but the M-ATV is oddly left out. It is almost as if Oshkosh is saying, "well gents, we don't have that option on this model, but if you take the hallway past custromer service and go to our custom shop, you should be able to find that add-on." Huh? Was anyone at Oshkosh looking at how we employ massive amounts of devices (biometric, battery chargers, laptops, etc.) in the current environment?

It's like we went forward and back at the same time, and it is just so odd that these basic things are absent.

The last part seems to be typical for organizations, projects and humans in general. Something can be seen widely as basic and logic, but that doesn't mean that the project addresses and includes that.

Said that I really wonder why Power take-offs are not more often found in military vehicles. Electric "PTOs" really should be standard with all that electronic stuff you have to power, especially as it so easy to provide. You have already a generator and a big battery in your vehicle powering all sorts of things, so why shoud you not make that energy source available by a simple standard outlet?

Hydraulic PTOs should also be standard for light and medium trucks, as it adds just little in cost and weight but gives potentially very wide utility for each vehicle with a very wide array of COTS available. With every member of that (transport) truck familiy provided like that you have at little cost a lot of redundancy.

On a side note: Independent suspensions have become better and better and although they will never match a live axle for simplicity and for specific uses like extreme rock crawling they are rightly becoming more popular even for offroad use. There are very rugged and proven designs, from the swing axle of the Kuebelwagens, Tatras and Steyrs to the more modern incarnations. Nowadays actively managed suspensions can greatly adjust their response automatically and according to the input of the driver, although it remains to be seen how they perform under difficult situations in the field.

Certainly for advancing at a moderate or rapid pace over bad roads or riverbeds an IS is the much more comfortable and less fatiguing option.