The David Kilcullen Collection (merged thread)

[MikeF]

Mike, thanks for your reply. I don't mean to put you on the spot, I get the feeling that this is a topic without any easy answers. It seems odd to me as well, but it's not easy to judge what a superpower believes to be feasible. If Indonesia is seen as being the next hotspot, will converting the Kopassus to Christianity prevent a flare-up?

No worries. This is a continual debate that I have with my brother. As you probably figured out, I'm a Christian. But, as a commander, I had Jews, Muslims, Mormons, Athiests, and Goth dudes under my command. At work, I was a-religious. The only time that I prayed with my boys was when we lost four of our troop. That's the way that I saw it. Moreover, while working with my Iraqi counterparts, we'd discuss religion as a process of discovery to learning from each other- not looking to convert. Instead, it was a means to better establish our personal relationships through understanding each other's backgrounds.

My brother would tell me that I had a duty to preach. I disagreed. That's why I suggested that your point would be better discussed in a separate thread.

Otherwise, we'll slide into discussion of Armagedon and the end of times.

For this thread, I just want to discuss David Kilcullen, a man that I love to read and listen to and adamently disagree with at times.

[Backwards Observer]

My brother would tell me that I had a duty to preach. I disagreed. That's why I suggested that your point would be better discussed in a separate thread.

Otherwise, we'll slide into discussion of Armagedon and the end of times.

For this thread, I just want to discuss David Kilcullen, a man that I love to read and listen to and adamently disagree with at times.

Mike, thanks for your indulgence and sorry for the derailment. Your response is more than fair.

[MikeF]

Mike, thanks for your indulgence and sorry for the derailment. Your response is more than fair.

Well, I for one appreciate your thoughts. I just didn't think this was the appropriate thread. Your words are broad, deep, and wide.

I'm actually going to come back to them as I continue to dissect Dr. K. He talks of hearts and minds, the essence of the so-called pop-centric COIN. I think he missed an important element. I'm gonna talk hearts, minds, and soul of rebellion. To use Dr. K's model, small wars are an open, robust conflict ecosystem. In my interpretation reversed from IR principles, it gets back to the state and nature of man.

But, we're not there yet. I want to see what others consider on his initial research questions and my added ones.

[huskerguy7]

I recently just began this book. Dr. Kilcullen's "Accidental Guerrilla" provided a large amount of information regarding COIN; one of my favorites. Dr. Kilcullen is a great resource for not only COIN, but also both Iraq and Afghanistan. I had the chance to interview him for a piece I'm working on regarding the ANA, and we discussed some interesting ideas.

My bad if I placed it in the wrong section.

Okay, IMO, other questions to consider,

1. Do we intervene in third-country counterinsurgencies?

2. If so, to what degree? Ranging from one advisor to a million man army.

3. Whom do we send? Ranging from political advisors to occupation forces.

4. What do they do? Ranging from advising in safe, rear areas to taking charge of clearing denied guerrilla safehavens.

The discussion, debate, and answers to those questions define the crux of the current dillemma in A'stan.

These are good questions to consider. However, each country has its own characteristics, so the answers to these can vary. My answers will assume that the country is Afghanistan.

I strongly support the idea of advisers, known as Operational Mentor Liaison Teams (OMLTs) in Afghanistan, backed by air support (it doesn't matter if it's a couple of AFBs or CVGs). Basically, there is an OMLT for every "Kandak" or battalion. Each OMLT is about 20 troops.

In my mindset, this will work if there is a structured, organized army, if the OMLTs are trained to "Western" standards, and possess some knowledge of the local languages. They should also be educated on COIN.

Tasks and Responsibilities: OMLTs will be dug in with the forces they follow. They will train local soldiers, show them "tricks" (maintaining weapons, aiming properly, etc), fight with the local soldiers, and work with commanders. They would basically provide on site training and aid, and when things get bumpy, they would call in their air support. It would also be worth considering embedding an OMLT with a logistics unit, especially in a unit like the ANA.

As I mentioned before, there is no "standard" answer for these questions. In Afghanistan, you have an organized army that is also somewhat large (it must be big enough to have a presence, otherwise a full blown force is needed), not to corrupt (it's the ANP that's corrupt), and determined. In this case, I think advisers would be the best way to operate.

[MikeF]

I recently just began this book. Dr. Kilcullen's "Accidental Guerrilla" provided a large amount of information regarding COIN; one of my favorites. Dr. Kilcullen is a great resource for not only COIN, but also both Iraq and Afghanistan. I had the chance to interview him for a piece I'm working on regarding the ANA, and we discussed some interesting ideas.



These are good questions to consider. However, each country has its own characteristics, so the answers to these can vary. My answers will assume that the country is Afghanistan.

I strongly support the idea of advisers, known as Operational Mentor Liaison Teams (OMLTs) in Afghanistan, backed by air support (it doesn't matter if it's a couple of AFBs or CVGs). Basically, there is an OMLT for every "Kandak" or battalion. Each OMLT is about 20 troops.

In my mindset, this will work if there is a structured, organized army, if the OMLTs are trained to "Western" standards, and possess some knowledge of the local languages. They should also be educated on COIN.

Tasks and Responsibilities: OMLTs will be dug in with the forces they follow. They will train local soldiers, show them "tricks" (maintaining weapons, aiming properly, etc), fight with the local soldiers, and work with commanders. They would basically provide on site training and aid, and when things get bumpy, they would call in their air support. It would also be worth considering embedding an OMLT with a logistics unit, especially in a unit like the ANA.

As I mentioned before, there is no "standard" answer for these questions. In Afghanistan, you have an organized army that is also somewhat large (it must be big enough to have a presence, otherwise a full blown force is needed), not to corrupt (it's the ANP that's corrupt), and determined. In this case, I think advisers would be the best way to operate.

I like the way that you're thinking. What a concept- let the host nation take responsibility for their own country. BTW, it's also much cheaper in both US blood and treasure, and, in the long term, is typically more successful.

[huskerguy7]

I like the way that you're thinking. What a concept- let the host nation take responsibility for their own country. BTW, it's also much cheaper in both US blood and treasure, and, in the long term, is typically more successful.

It sounds good, but it really depends on the host nation's capabilities and motives. For example, in a country like Somalia where little organization exists, it won't work very well. Also, the size of the army matters. Fourtanetly, the ANA is over 100,000 and is growing.

However, one may argue, that you may need a "full force" initially. This may be necessary to restore immediate order and help set up the "right" partner.

I could see this working well in some scenarios. The OMLTs have been praised in Afghanistan (to bad there are many vacant spots).

Or, this may be a little out there, but consider hiring contractors to fulfill the jobs instead?

I just saw, but have yet to read an essay about the mentoring process.

Good comments.

[MikeF]

However, one may argue, that you may need a "full force" initially. This may be necessary to restore immediate order and help set up the "right" partner.

Argue away, just back it up with at least some historical examples of success. That argument is an assumption (the kind that make an ass out of u and me) hence my four additional questions. Tom Ricks labeled it appropriately as a Gamble with no historical basis of support. I would suggest that we got lucky in Iraq.

Tequilla dubs it control. I understand his position, but I would suggest that it is always an illusion of control- appropriate for securing ground in the short term, but irrelevant in the long run strategic success.

Recently, my small reconnaissance squadron was awarded the Presidential Unit Citation for our actions in taking down an Al Qaeda training camp during the Surge. I was the main effort. 80% of all actions were derived from my troop as a commander.

I also watched the aftermath of trying to control and change people.

I am well aware of the so-called necessity for us to interdict with mass, and I would suggest that it is rubbish.

As I consider Dr. K, I think his biggest shortcoming is his scope. He visited numerous units for short periods. In 3-4 day spurts, he tried to capture what each commander was facing. You never know truth without staying for at least three months with a unit. That remains his flaw. He heard what he wanted to hear and neatly packaged it into a book.

[Arnie]

Thanks for kicking this off Mike. Im trying to get my hands on a copy. Is it a "best of.." or is there some original thinking? Im particularly interested in understanding what insurgencies will look like in the future so we can begin planning how troops are trained so they are equipped for any future deployment. Do insurgencies always have the same fundamentals or will they morph into new strains? Maybe it just comes back to the simple drivers of life and death...im no expert just an insatiable appetite

[William F. Owen]

Is it a "best of.." or is there some original thinking?

It's his "original ideas" that I think are mostly wrong. The "Complex" and "Globalisation" stuff is mostly not good.

Im particularly interested in understanding what insurgencies will look like in the future so we can begin planning how troops are trained so they are equipped for any future deployment.

Dave Kilcullen cannot tell you because he can't tell the future. Neither can anyone else. Even if he could it wouldn't have much if any impact on training. Just do the stuff you've had to do in the past.

Do insurgencies always have the same fundamentals or will they morph into new strains? Maybe it just comes back to the simple drivers of life and death...im no expert just an insatiable appetite

War is war. Warfare changes but usually incredibly slowly.

I'm no expert either and share your appetite mate, but there is almost nothing worth eating from the "NEW-COIN" salad bar of nuts and mineral water.

[Arnie]

[QUOTE=William F. Owen;102233]
Dave Kilcullen cannot tell you because he can't tell the future. Neither can anyone else. Even if he could it wouldn't have much if any impact on training. Just do the stuff you've had to do in the past.

Crystal balls are hard to find I agree, but it seems in many facets of human endeavour we are always planning strategies and operations on the past in the hope we will avert a similar tragedy or event in the future.

Is COIN really any different to the "war" that has been waged in our cities between our social justice systems and a crime, drug and violence fuelled neighbourhood? This sector of our population can feel pretty isolated and lacking in representation so looks to other avenues. The Police, social workers, volunteers, NGOs and Government services try to set in a different levels to counter the criminal and gang activity that exploits this mess. May be we need to hire reformed gang leaders to help with COIN in Afghanistan?

[Arnie]

[QUOTE=Arnie;102354][QUOTE=William F. Owen;102233]
Dave Kilcullen cannot tell you because he can't tell the future. Neither can anyone else. Even if he could it wouldn't have much if any impact on training. Just do the stuff you've had to do in the past.

Crystal balls are hard to find I agree, but it seems in many facets of human endeavour we are always planning strategies and operations on the past in the hope we will avert a similar tragedy or event in the future.

Is COIN really any different to the "war" that has been waged in our cities between our social justice systems and a crime, drug and violence fuelled neighbourhood? This sector of our population can feel pretty isolated and lacking in representation so looks to other avenues. The Police, social workers, volunteers, NGOs and Government services try to set in a different levels to counter the criminal and gang activity that exploits this mess. May be we need to hire reformed gang leaders to help with COIN in Afghanistan?

[William F. Owen]

Is COIN really any different to the "war" that has been waged in our cities between our social justice systems and a crime, drug and violence fuelled neighbourhood?

Maybe the form is similar but criminals are subject to the criminal justice system. War is generally something exempt from that. You can only have effective criminal justice, when you actual physical control. War is generally a competition for that physical control.

May be we need to hire reformed gang leaders to help with COIN in Afghanistan?

Personally I'd hire Gang leaders who have hunted down and killed their competition, and exert tight control and authority over their communities. The reformed ones tend to reject violence.

[MikeF]

Thanks for kicking this off Mike. Im trying to get my hands on a copy. Is it a "best of.." or is there some original thinking?

as it should be read by everyone.

Arnie,

Even though I'm gonna critique this book to death, Dr. K is the only willing person so far to have the balls (intestinal fortitude in army speak) to categorically write on this subject.

I have much respect.

[William F. Owen]

Even though I'm gonna critique this book to death, Dr. K is the only willing person so far to have the balls (intestinal fortitude in army speak) to categorically write on this subject.

What about Paret, Kitson, Samay Ram, Charters, Tugwell and O'Neil to name just a few of the authors on my COIN shelf?

[Bob's World]

What about Paret, Kitson, Samay Ram, Charters, Tugwell and O'Neil to name just a few of the authors on my COIN shelf?

Some of us don't.

Sadly, when what one needs to do is difficult and requires a great deal of personal change, it is rarely also what one wants to hear.

[William F. Owen]

Sadly, when what one needs to do is difficult and requires a great deal of personal change, it is rarely also what one wants to hear.

Sorry Bob. I don't understand. COIN is a commonly written about subject. Moreover, it was well understood until recently.

I'm not talking about "Nation building." I am talking about defeating armed rebels so as political progress can take place - to paraphrase the Sultan of Oman.

[MikeF]

What about Paret, Kitson, Samay Ram, Charters, Tugwell and O'Neil to name just a few of the authors on my COIN shelf?

I have a wedding this weekend for one of my old platoon leaders. He's now a company commander in my old unit. Last night, we had the rehearsal dinner and festivities (so minimize my last three posts. It was a late night), and I surveyed the current officers in the squadron. Only half even knew what SWJ was, and none of them read regularly. That's been my experience in the Army.

Collectively, we're not this new generation of armed nation builders that sit around late at night reading about Malaya, Colombia, and the Phillipines. That is a myth. Instead, we'd rather hit the gym and the bar. In between deployments, the last thing that most guys want to talk about is war.

So, my point about Dr. K is that he's the only CURRENT one that has written coherently, and I know that I can only recommend one book for guys to read. After that, they zone out. That's another reason why I'm taking the time to critique this book. So, the guy who actually writes the next "COIN and Me" does it right.

From BW

Some people have a special knack for telling people what they want to hear. Some of us don't. Sadly, when what one needs to do is difficult and requires a great deal of personal change, it is rarely also what one wants to hear.

Sir, one of the beautiful things about SWJ is that the people that come here regularly are seekihg truth and better understanding. You're working to find it now, and that means it will be different from how others think. That's okay, but you have to remember that you have to sell your idea.

Actually, I plan on comparing/contrasting your work with Dr. K's in a bit. It gets into hearts, minds, and soul or rebellion.

[slapout9]

Short video from Brzezinski "easier to kill a million people, than to control a million people"

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lkOOB...re=grec_browse

[huskerguy7]

Argue away, just back it up with at least some historical examples of success. That argument is an assumption (the kind that make an ass out of u and me) hence my four additional questions. Tom Ricks labeled it appropriately as a Gamble with no historical basis of support. I would suggest that we got lucky in Iraq.

Tequilla dubs it control. I understand his position, but I would suggest that it is always an illusion of control- appropriate for securing ground in the short term, but irrelevant in the long run strategic success.

Recently, my small reconnaissance squadron was awarded the Presidential Unit Citation for our actions in taking down an Al Qaeda training camp during the Surge. I was the main effort. 80% of all actions were derived from my troop as a commander.

I also watched the aftermath of trying to control and change people.

I am well aware of the so-called necessity for us to interdict with mass, and I would suggest that it is rubbish.

As I consider Dr. K, I think his biggest shortcoming is his scope. He visited numerous units for short periods. In 3-4 day spurts, he tried to capture what each commander was facing. You never know truth without staying for at least three months with a unit. That remains his flaw. He heard what he wanted to hear and neatly packaged it into a book.

I like that thought from Tequilla. It will only work for the short term. History has shown that we can get anywhere we want, but once we get there, things slow down and we don't make progress. I guess that's where the "mentor" idea comes in. Rather than keeping a big force there, bug out and leave some mentors and air support. This second part, hasn't been a big part of history, so my argument is all theory. As everyone knows, theory isn't always right.

I have a wedding this weekend for one of my old platoon leaders. He's now a company commander in my old unit. Last night, we had the rehearsal dinner and festivities (so minimize my last three posts. It was a late night), and I surveyed the current officers in the squadron. Only half even knew what SWJ was, and none of them read regularly. That's been my experience in the Army.

Collectively, we're not this new generation of armed nation builders that sit around late at night reading about Malaya, Colombia, and the Phillipines. That is a myth. Instead, we'd rather hit the gym and the bar. In between deployments, the last thing that most guys want to talk about is war.

So, my point about Dr. K is that he's the only CURRENT one that has written coherently, and I know that I can only recommend one book for guys to read. After that, they zone out. That's another reason why I'm taking the time to critique this book. So, the guy who actually writes the next "COIN and Me" does it right.

From BW


Sir, one of the beautiful things about SWJ is that the people that come here regularly are seekihg truth and better understanding. You're working to find it now, and that means it will be different from how others think. That's okay, but you have to remember that you have to sell your idea.

Actually, I plan on comparing/contrasting your work with Dr. K's in a bit. It gets into hearts, minds, and soul or rebellion.

I completely agree with this. Despite what you may expect with the engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan, the mentality of a large part of the population seems to be the same as it was in the 1990s: big conventional weapons will allow us to win everywhere. COIN is often misunderstood and interpreted as "surging."

I have several peers who are either part of the military, or are trying to obtain a competitive position in it (SF mainly). They know quite a bit about different conventional weapons, but when I bring up COIN, both their knowledge and optimism is limited. I then recommend "Accidental Guerrilla" or visiting SWJ, but they don't have the interest. I'm not sure of the causes, but it is to bad.

Like others, I am shocked by the fact that some portions of the US military continue to somewhat ignore COIN. Yes, I understand and agree that we should continue to develop and train for a large scale conventional engagement, but irregular warfare will continue to exist after Afghanistan and Iraq.

[William F. Owen]

I have a wedding this weekend for one of my old platoon leaders. He's now a company commander in my old unit. Last night, we had the rehearsal dinner and festivities (so minimize my last three posts.

Mazal Tov. Salams etc.

Collectively, we're not this new generation of armed nation builders that sit around late at night reading about Malaya, Colombia, and the Phillipines. That is a myth. Instead, we'd rather hit the gym and the bar. In between deployments, the last thing that most guys want to talk about is war.

....and no one should expect you to. Very few doctors read medical journals, on a regular basis, if at all. I have no quibble with the pure professional who just wants to do the job.
.....but you are NOT nation builders. You are soldiers.

So, my point about Dr. K is that he's the only CURRENT one that has written coherently, and I know that I can only recommend one book for guys to read. After that, they zone out. That's another reason why I'm taking the time to critique this book. So, the guy who actually writes the next "COIN and Me" does it right.

Again, I concur. That book should have been FM3-24. IMO, it was not fit for purpose. Back when I knew Dave, I liked him. Good writer, smart man, but I would treat his COIN insights with extreme caution, as I would both Galula and Thompson.