Brilliant, useful
Interesting, perhaps useful
Of little utility, not practical
Delusional
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Robert C. Jones
Intellectus Supra Scientia
(Understanding is more important than Knowledge)
"The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)
Sorry Bob. I don't understand. COIN is a commonly written about subject. Moreover, it was well understood until recently.
I'm not talking about "Nation building." I am talking about defeating armed rebels so as political progress can take place - to paraphrase the Sultan of Oman.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
I have a wedding this weekend for one of my old platoon leaders. He's now a company commander in my old unit. Last night, we had the rehearsal dinner and festivities (so minimize my last three posts. It was a late night), and I surveyed the current officers in the squadron. Only half even knew what SWJ was, and none of them read regularly. That's been my experience in the Army.
Collectively, we're not this new generation of armed nation builders that sit around late at night reading about Malaya, Colombia, and the Phillipines. That is a myth. Instead, we'd rather hit the gym and the bar. In between deployments, the last thing that most guys want to talk about is war.
So, my point about Dr. K is that he's the only CURRENT one that has written coherently, and I know that I can only recommend one book for guys to read. After that, they zone out. That's another reason why I'm taking the time to critique this book. So, the guy who actually writes the next "COIN and Me" does it right.
From BW
Sir, one of the beautiful things about SWJ is that the people that come here regularly are seekihg truth and better understanding. You're working to find it now, and that means it will be different from how others think. That's okay, but you have to remember that you have to sell your idea.Some people have a special knack for telling people what they want to hear. Some of us don't. Sadly, when what one needs to do is difficult and requires a great deal of personal change, it is rarely also what one wants to hear.
Actually, I plan on comparing/contrasting your work with Dr. K's in a bit. It gets into hearts, minds, and soul or rebellion.
Short video from Brzezinski "easier to kill a million people, than to control a million people"
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lkOOB...re=grec_browse
I like that thought from Tequilla. It will only work for the short term. History has shown that we can get anywhere we want, but once we get there, things slow down and we don't make progress. I guess that's where the "mentor" idea comes in. Rather than keeping a big force there, bug out and leave some mentors and air support. This second part, hasn't been a big part of history, so my argument is all theory. As everyone knows, theory isn't always right.
I completely agree with this. Despite what you may expect with the engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan, the mentality of a large part of the population seems to be the same as it was in the 1990s: big conventional weapons will allow us to win everywhere. COIN is often misunderstood and interpreted as "surging."
I have several peers who are either part of the military, or are trying to obtain a competitive position in it (SF mainly). They know quite a bit about different conventional weapons, but when I bring up COIN, both their knowledge and optimism is limited. I then recommend "Accidental Guerrilla" or visiting SWJ, but they don't have the interest. I'm not sure of the causes, but it is to bad.
Like others, I am shocked by the fact that some portions of the US military continue to somewhat ignore COIN. Yes, I understand and agree that we should continue to develop and train for a large scale conventional engagement, but irregular warfare will continue to exist after Afghanistan and Iraq.
Mazal Tov. Salams etc.
....and no one should expect you to. Very few doctors read medical journals, on a regular basis, if at all. I have no quibble with the pure professional who just wants to do the job.Collectively, we're not this new generation of armed nation builders that sit around late at night reading about Malaya, Colombia, and the Phillipines. That is a myth. Instead, we'd rather hit the gym and the bar. In between deployments, the last thing that most guys want to talk about is war.
.....but you are NOT nation builders. You are soldiers.
Again, I concur. That book should have been FM3-24. IMO, it was not fit for purpose. Back when I knew Dave, I liked him. Good writer, smart man, but I would treat his COIN insights with extreme caution, as I would both Galula and Thompson.So, my point about Dr. K is that he's the only CURRENT one that has written coherently, and I know that I can only recommend one book for guys to read. After that, they zone out. That's another reason why I'm taking the time to critique this book. So, the guy who actually writes the next "COIN and Me" does it right.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
It's always difficult to be sure about some concept or theory before it proves itself in practice.
That is a major issue with COIN theory; it does not seem to win a war. The successes always seem to be stuck on the local or regional a.k.a. tactical level.
Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan - there's no strategic success to be attributed to COIN theory.
(Iraq had in my opinion only a coincidence of COIN tactics and "surge" with dominating Iraqi factors such as people getting fed up with AQI & civil war and finishing the ethnic cleansing).
Maybe we should understand COIN theory as tactical instead of pretending that it's a recipe for strategic success.
Apart from the Boer War - 1899-1902 (perhaps not a true counter-insurgency) what COIN war has not been settled through some sort of political action? I would say that the military aspect is merely a means of buying time to allow a political settlement rather than face a military solution.
True, you don't understand; and
True it is a realatively straight forward matter to employ the military to kill the armed rebelling element of one's populace.
The hard part is resolving the reasons why they were acting that way. Defeating insurgents is easy (relatively); defeating insurgency typically requires the government to change how it does business. Dave talks about how to change the popualce. Governments like to hear that.
I talk about changing the government. They don't like to hear that.
Robert C. Jones
Intellectus Supra Scientia
(Understanding is more important than Knowledge)
"The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)
I doubt MLK Jr. or Gandhi count as just small footnotes, unless the history book you're reading from is seriously defective.Another name for nonviolent revolutionaries is a (small) footnote in a history book.
Who says this, and where? I'd be curious about the supporting arguments, as I'm reasonably familiar with the situation and I don't see it that way at all.
Of course I also think the "global insurgency" construct is a deeply stretched idea that is more harmful than helpful, so perhaps I shouldn't be asking about it!
Well it takes a good deal of skill to do well, but I concur.
True but irrelevant. They can complain all they like once they give up their guns. Until they do that, political resolution is pointless and merely rewards their aggression.The hard part is resolving the reasons why they were acting that way. Defeating insurgents is easy (relatively); defeating insurgency typically requires the government to change how it does business.
The ONLY thing the military can do if force compliance and control, via use of armed force.
But Dave's off his reservation, and you risk undermining the policy of those you work for.Dave talks about how to change the popualce. Governments like to hear that.
I talk about changing the government. They don't like to hear that.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
I worked the Southeast Asia mission for over 4 years, and many kept trying to make Indonesia into a big problem. "Most populous Muslim nation," so must be a hotbed of insurgency, right? Send a tremendous number of workers to the Middle East, so must be a pipeline of terror, right? Home of the JI, etc.
But insurgency isn't about ideology or religion, it is about politics and the relationship between a populace and its government. Indonesia, like most Asian countries, worked through the big legitimacy of governance issues in the post WWII era of insurgency; so is not a real player in the post Cold War era of insurgency that is sweeping those (largely Muslim) nations still heavily under the influence of Colonial Illegitimacy.
Indonesia is not a problem. We need to work with them as they have a tremendous future that we want to be, need to be for our sake, a part of; but we don't need to "fix" them.
Robert C. Jones
Intellectus Supra Scientia
(Understanding is more important than Knowledge)
"The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
A country in insurgency is by definition one with a government that is inadequate to the task at hand, so the only excess governmental capacity available, the military, is typically brought in to help resolve the problem. This is not a problem of itself. The problems begin when the military takes the lead and naturally shifts the focus of the COIN campaign by doing exactly what Wilf accurately lays out as the military mission and focus: Identify a threat and defeat it.
I have no problem with any of that. My point is that the rebellion is a symptom of larger problems in the relationship between a populace and its government, and that the Civil authorities must retain lead and retain focus on the larger mission of adjusting their actions to better serve the people as a whole. That militant arm of the movement is typically just the tip of the proverbial populace iceberg that shares similar perspectives.
Classic COIN is to have a military led operation to shave the top off the iceberg. We all know what happens next, a new tip ultimately emerges. I don't say don't shave the top off, just understand that at best it is a supporting effort to do so, and if done excessively an even larger tip will emerge the next time.
Robert C. Jones
Intellectus Supra Scientia
(Understanding is more important than Knowledge)
"The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)
[QUOTE=William F. Owen;102233]
Dave Kilcullen cannot tell you because he can't tell the future. Neither can anyone else. Even if he could it wouldn't have much if any impact on training. Just do the stuff you've had to do in the past.
Crystal balls are hard to find I agree, but it seems in many facets of human endeavour we are always planning strategies and operations on the past in the hope we will avert a similar tragedy or event in the future.
Is COIN really any different to the "war" that has been waged in our cities between our social justice systems and a crime, drug and violence fuelled neighbourhood? This sector of our population can feel pretty isolated and lacking in representation so looks to other avenues. The Police, social workers, volunteers, NGOs and Government services try to set in a different levels to counter the criminal and gang activity that exploits this mess. May be we need to hire reformed gang leaders to help with COIN in Afghanistan?
Last edited by davidbfpo; 07-05-2010 at 07:30 AM. Reason: PM to author about what should be in the quote
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