Wow, actual replies, and very thoughtful ones. I certainly wasn't expecting that...thanks to everyone, whether you disagreed or not, for the insightful input. I'll go ahead and just address Infanteer's strikes, since they all at least sound spot on to my untrained ear and he echoes almost everyone else.

An "Eastern Force"? Sounds like a bit of the H John Poole kool-aid. Victor Davis Hanson tried...but the Pathan has more in common with the Scottish Highlander than with the People's Liberation Army.
Hehe, always good to see I'm not the only avid reader and, in this case, I'm probably going to have to say that I jumped the gun early. Yes, reading Poole (Tactics of the Crescent Moon, to be specific) was a big influence in this since he painted such a grim picture, but offered little in the way of what I saw as true solutions. I wanted to see if I could think up at least the semblance of a practical response to this and other issues that have been raised.

From reading Poole and others, I define "Eastern Force" in this case as
*Operates in very small, independent cells with the same intent
*Does not depend on vehicles or non-organic supporting fires and is very light weight (EX: has kevlar vest like cops, not IBA variants)
*Stays out in terrain (I acknowledge that avoiding towns is probably very foolish) and relies heavily on ambush

My main thought is that this force is to be used to deny enemy access to the backcountry and be able to more effectively shut down their suspected ratlines and areas of travel. For example, we know they like to ambush a lot along a certain road. Well, a conventional infantry unit wouldn't be able to deny the insurgents the same amount of area as this one would simply because it would be more dispersed.

I think you're buying a little too much into the Quetta Shura's press releases. Afghan insurgents really are ####ty tactical fighters. They have three things going for them - they know their turf, their determined and they know kill zones. Other than that, I wouldn't put them on such a lofty "small unit fighter" plane as you do. They tend to die fast and hard if they haven't beat a hasty retreat once the initial surprise comes to an end.
Likely enough, I say, however, many more people than Poole acknowledge that the best of the insurgents are excellent tactical fighters. The thing is, unlike us, they're not all coming from the school house and don't have the luxury of NCO mentors. I believe that, in terms of "doctrine" (if you can really call it that), they're operating methods are superior, at least for certain situations.

On the patrolling comment: it is patrolling, I think I even said it was at some point. The difference is there would be even more emphasis on avoiding built up FOB's and the like + you break up the action down even further so that fire to buddy teams are the primary fighters, not squad and platoon level.

On marksmanship and loosing the enemy: very true I imagine. I like that that there is an increased emphasis in getting squad designated marksmen (I think that's the proper name...). I'd then add that we should properly outfit this hypothetical unit with more distance oriented weapons than the standard M4's or at least make excellent scopes the rule...no idea if ya'll have already been doing this in-country.

On uniforms: good points by all. My original was, at least, in the backcountry you wouldn't be operating with friendly fire risks. And while it's only a superficial veneer, I thought that it could at least fool the casual glance.

Who needs caches and air drops - just give them money.
Excellent points on the weaknesses of the cache. I do think it's still a viable method, but I no longer believe it can be a primary one. From what I've heard from a recent newsletter, using our money to "stimulate" the local economy works well so that's definitely a viable option.

If your unit can throw its weapons in the field and blend in with the locals, then I guess you can do it. How you could expect this to happen is beyond me.
Obviously throwing weapons isn't going to fly. However, as you pointed out, it's very easy to loose people in the terrain so trying to blend into the local population is necessary, nor would I expect us to be able to. Instead, I would either make the common to tactic to be a baited ambush where you retreat into a fire sack of some sort or you go back to your neighborhood conventional unit or you simply fade into the terrain.

Nice presentation with smooth flow, but I don't buy any of the assumptions you've based your proposal on. Have fun on Ranger Course though!
Hehe, well at least I know I'll be able to wow the fobbits with my PowerPoint. Not sure how much "fun" is possible to be had in Ranger School, but I'm definitely anxious to begin.

Again, thanks to everyone for the helpful comments. I had no idea about the old Marine Corp and Army operating methods so I'll definitely be checking those links out.