The Afghanistan National Police (ANP)

[huskerguy7]

For years now I have heard the constant rhetoric regarding how corrupt the ANP are, and how many problems are associated with their buildup. But the information available from several independent polls over the last five years strongly differs. Polls regarding Afghan perceptions of ANP trustworthiness, corruption, professionalism etc. certainly lag ANA results, but are still as high as 80%. (I'm sure some of our own police forces would be similarly viewed in specific cities.) However this urban legend of a totally corrupt and untrustworthy ANP paints a much more pessimistic picture and is almost self-reinforcing. Allied soldiers almost universally decry ANP professionalism, and claim ANP corruption as significant problems. These same officers also universally reject poll results because they don't agree with their perceptions. The old adage, expectation leads performance, applies to this situation and supports the lack of priority and effort towards the ANP.

A main source of this problem, from my perspective, is the over emphasis on our (western) buid up of the ANA to the detriment of what should be the primary security force for Afghans, the ANP. The ANA provide a false sense of mission progress because of the potential to have them support our exit strategy. We blindingly pursue a goal of building an Afghan Army which can stand in for our forces, conduct a relief-in-place, and facilitate a transition to the GIROA becoming responsible for its own security. But soldiers' contribution to the Afghan mission are limited to security operations and even then fairly narrowly.

I often ask people who they would rely on to address security issues in their own country, and the universal answer is - police forces. It is the police which are required to address the broader security to establish, promote and sustain: rule-of-law, governance, justice, the economy and development.

Seahorse, I respect your opinion, but disagree. According to the reports I've seen and the polls that have been released, people are more confident with the ANA rather than the ANP. Also, I have had the chance to talk to some people very familiar with the conflict and they share the same opinion. Why? There are several factors, but there is one main point that I'm going to elaborate on. They (the ANA) focus on national interests rather than local (such as the ANP).

I know that is important to understand the local interests. However, when you have a soldier or police officer in an area that they are very familiar with, some problems can occur. They will be more prone to manipulation by the population in the district and will be more prone to corruption, especially in a country with an insecure environment like Afghanistan. So, when you bring in an outside force like the ANA, he's not going to know what's going on. However, he will know that he needs to accomplish _____ objective. Locals won't be able to threaten his home or his family because he's not from the area.

Do not get me wrong: it's important to have people familiar with the area to because of obvious reasons (intelligence, better understanding, etc). In fact, the ANP has been criticized for bringing in foreign Tajiks to Pashtun areas. It's just a matter of having a mix with local and outside forces; have enough to understand the situation.

Carl Eikenberry, when serving as the Commander CFC-A in Kabul, was even quoted as saying something to the effect, 'ten effective Afghan police were better than 100 Afghan soldiers, however one corrupt policeman was worse than ten insurgents.' So why do we focus on the soldiers and the insurgents? Is it simply because - that's what armies do?

We need to stop complaining about the problems with the ANP and address the real priorites in their recruitment, development, mentorship and establishment; and not just as a secondary effort to building the ANA.

The whole debate regarding the requirement for some form of tribal militia(s) is a symptom of the lack of ANP. Let's not neglect the ANP and continue to reinforce this urban legend.

Also, that quote from Eikenberry is incorrect. It is ""Ten good police are better than 100 corrupt police, and 10 corrupt police can do more damage to our success than one Taliban extremist." The main focus of his comments was on training strong leaders and how quality is better than quantity, which I agree with.

Recently, the ANP has encountered some success with "Combined Action" teams, so ISAF is currently pushing for that. However, I think the focus should be changed.

As mentioned in my earlier post, the ANP are being trained to act like a military force rather than law enforcement, which I don't agree with. I agree with you that it's important for police to establish a rule-of-law and justice system. Despite the lack of a strong justice system in Afghanistan, a very basic legal system does exist, and could possibly be enforced. The focus of the ANP should be shifted from combating the Taliban to enforcing the law. If this is done correctly, then the situation will hopefully improve.

Another thought: As I think about the ANP's difficult situation, they seem comparable to America's "Wild West" years. During this time in history, law enforcement in secluded small towns would be outnumbered by the gangs. As a result, they would either fight and die, do nothing, or join their efforts-just like the ANP today. How did these towns survive? I'm currently examining that and am curious if it could apply to Afghanistan.

Hopefully ISAF tackles the ANP issue in the future and corrects it.