The Afghanistan National Police (ANP)

[davidbfpo]

Found on a Afpak watcher's website: http://watandost.blogspot.com/2010/0...g-project.html that cites a NYT article on 2/2/10: http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/03/wo...l?pagewanted=1.

Opens with:

ABUL, Afghanistan — The NATO general in charge of training the Afghan police has some tongue-in-cheek career advice for the country’s recruits. “It’s better to join the Taliban; they pay more money,” said Brig. Gen. Carmelo Burgio, from Italy’s paramilitary Carabinieri force.

NYT article ends with:

These guys wear the uniform of a policeman, but that is all that is police about them.

No wonder there is caution about building up the ANP and the Afghan people themselves know far more what the ANP provides.

[Bill Moore]

How long will it take for our government to revamp the laws the govern security force assistance? Our SECDEF has stated this will be our primary effort and the means to a sustainable victory, yet almost 9 years into the fight we're still having turf battles over who should control the training and serious resource constraints. Based on the enclosed article the coalition does a poor job of training these forces (several factors involved, but maybe if we would stop trying to make them look like western police forces and train to their level we would make some progress?), we do a poor job of equipping the forces, we don't pay them well, and if you believe the article the only metric we value is the number trained.

We should either drop the security forces assistance myth and do it ourselves, or we should fix the security forces assistance process. The Cold War legacy method is not adequate. I hear the call for Gramm-Rudman Act to fix the interagency (would be nice), but most pressing is a Gramm-Rudman Act to fix our ability to build partner capacity (the 5 meter fight we're in today). If the consensus is this is the way to win, then we need to resource the winning strategy with the right authorities, funding, and apply the right approach to ensure it is done effectively.

[SWJED]

The Afghan National Police: Turning a Counterinsurgency Problem into a Solution – Naval Postgraduate School Master of Science thesis by Major David J. Haskell, U.S. Army.

[Sylvan]

Here is an article by Sean Naylor, also from this past summer.http://www.afji.com/2009/07/4231017/

90% of local complaints about police in my AO turned out to be false. Amazing how an Afghan will walk up and make a claim, and Westerners instantly assume its the god's honest truth.

[davidbfpo]

A wide ranging article, citing a UK infantry colonel and headlined so:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...nsurgency.html

He said that the local force was "the reason for the insurgency" in the Nad-e-Ali district of Helmand and that the corruption meant the local population was more distrustful of coalition troops and less likely to be loyal to the Afghan government.

But more worryingly incidents of police "bad behaviour" were encouraging young men to join the Taliban, said Lt Col Walker, the commanding officer of the Grenadier Guards. "They were most often cited by people as the reason why there was a problem or a reason why people joined the Taliban."

An accompanying article I missed (added 19/6):http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010...an-recruitment

[huskerguy7]

As we all have seen, the Afghan National Police (ANP) has undergone several issues and is not as effective as ISAF wants it to be. Issues include corruption, unwilling to fight, lack of proper training, and many others.

With the Taliban insurgency still at large, ISAF has primarily been training the ANP in paramilitary skills. This has resulted with military advisers showing ANP units how to patrol, how to detect roadside bombs, how to maneuver in firefights, and so on. There is no doubt that these skills are needed; the Taliban are a very skilled enemy. By obtaining this kind of training, the ANP are more capable of fulfilling the "hold" section in ISAF's "clear, hold, and build." Essentially, they possess the capacity to conduct minimal military operations, which is useful.

However, paramilitary training leaves out basic law enforcement skills. These include handling evidence, conducting an investigation properly, enforcing the law properly, and building the right ties with the community. If these skills are obtained and used properly, then in the long term, the judicial situation in Afghanistan is likely to be better. But, ANP that are more focused towards enforcing the law are more prone to attacks from insurgents.

Clearly, there is no right answer. Heck, trying to straighten up such a large police force is already a large enough task. What approach should the ANP take? Or is there another one that I missed?

[slapout9]

Huskerguy,
Just exactly what Law do they enforce? How is a population that is reported to be 80% illiterate become informed of the Law to be enforced? What do they use for a Criminal Code?

[huskerguy7]

Huskerguy,
Just exactly what Law do they enforce? How is a population that is reported to be 80% illiterate become informed of the Law to be enforced? What do they use for a Criminal Code?

I am no expert in law, but I'm sure some form of "custom" law exists. Custom law never gets complex, but its "strong" enough to identify theft, trespassing, murder, etc; basically main "popular" crimes. I am sure that the Afghans understand some of this, so the police could possibly enforce some of these basic laws.

I also used to get hung up on the fact that many Afghans can't read; it makes the job difficult for us. However, I had a conversation with Dr. Kilcullen and my thinking change. Here's what he said:

We need to get more innovative and creative about the ways we train these guys...These guys aren’t stupid, they just can’t read

The last sentence is the biggest part: Afghan's aren't stupid, they just can't read. Therefore, it isn't impossible to teach them, but we just need to approach it a different way.

[slapout9]

I am no expert in law, but I'm sure some form of "custom" law exists. Custom law never gets complex, but its "strong" enough to identify theft, trespassing, murder, etc; basically main "popular" crimes. I am sure that the Afghans understand some of this, so the police could possibly enforce some of these basic laws.

I also used to get hung up on the fact that many Afghans can't read; it makes the job difficult for us. However, I had a conversation with Dr. Kilcullen and my thinking change. Here's what he said:



The last sentence is the biggest part: Afghan's aren't stupid, they just can't read. Therefore, it isn't impossible to teach them, but we just need to approach it a different way.

I see in your Bio you are a High School student and you took the trouble to talk to Dr. Killcullen about the ANP. For someone your age to even know who Killcullen is, is a major achievement. Keep up the good work, you will figure it out for all us someday.

[jcustis]

Amen.

[Seahorse]

For years now I have heard the constant rhetoric regarding how corrupt the ANP are, and how many problems are associated with their buildup. But the information available from several independent polls over the last five years strongly differs. Polls regarding Afghan perceptions of ANP trustworthiness, corruption, professionalism etc. certainly lag ANA results, but are still as high as 80%. (I'm sure some of our own police forces would be similarly viewed in specific cities.) However this urban legend of a totally corrupt and untrustworthy ANP paints a much more pessimistic picture and is almost self-reinforcing. Allied soldiers almost universally decry ANP professionalism, and claim ANP corruption as significant problems. These same officers also universally reject poll results because they don't agree with their perceptions. The old adage, expectation leads performance, applies to this situation and supports the lack of priority and effort towards the ANP.

A main source of this problem, from my perspective, is the over emphasis on our (western) buid up of the ANA to the detriment of what should be the primary security force for Afghans, the ANP. The ANA provide a false sense of mission progress because of the potential to have them support our exit strategy. We blindingly pursue a goal of building an Afghan Army which can stand in for our forces, conduct a relief-in-place, and facilitate a transition to the GIROA becoming responsible for its own security. But soldiers' contribution to the Afghan mission are limited to security operations and even then fairly narrowly.

I often ask people who they would rely on to address security issues in their own country, and the universal answer is - police forces. It is the police which are required to address the broader security to establish, promote and sustain: rule-of-law, governance, justice, the economy and development.

Carl Eikenberry, when serving as the Commander CFC-A in Kabul, was even quoted as saying something to the effect, 'ten effective Afghan police were better than 100 Afghan soldiers, however one corrupt policeman was worse than ten insurgents.' So why do we focus on the soldiers and the insurgents? Is it simply because - that's what armies do?

We need to stop complaining about the problems with the ANP and address the real priorites in their recruitment, development, mentorship and establishment; and not just as a secondary effort to building the ANA.

The whole debate regarding the requirement for some form of tribal militia(s) is a symptom of the lack of ANP. Let's not neglect the ANP and continue to reinforce this urban legend.

[IntelTrooper]

Seahorse -- I would go further and say that the ANP in most places should simply be dissolved. They are too few in number, too poorly equipped and supported, and too representative of an intrusive, victimizing government to be effective. One ANP station I visited claimed not to have received their pay for three months. How do you think they were making ends meet in the mean time?

[Rex Brynen]

And on this issue, another new report from the folks at CSIS:

Anthony H. Cordesman, Afghan National Security Forces: What It Will Take To Implement the ISAF Strategy, draft, 12 July 2010.

The report also covers the ANA.

[huskerguy7]

For years now I have heard the constant rhetoric regarding how corrupt the ANP are, and how many problems are associated with their buildup. But the information available from several independent polls over the last five years strongly differs. Polls regarding Afghan perceptions of ANP trustworthiness, corruption, professionalism etc. certainly lag ANA results, but are still as high as 80%. (I'm sure some of our own police forces would be similarly viewed in specific cities.) However this urban legend of a totally corrupt and untrustworthy ANP paints a much more pessimistic picture and is almost self-reinforcing. Allied soldiers almost universally decry ANP professionalism, and claim ANP corruption as significant problems. These same officers also universally reject poll results because they don't agree with their perceptions. The old adage, expectation leads performance, applies to this situation and supports the lack of priority and effort towards the ANP.

A main source of this problem, from my perspective, is the over emphasis on our (western) buid up of the ANA to the detriment of what should be the primary security force for Afghans, the ANP. The ANA provide a false sense of mission progress because of the potential to have them support our exit strategy. We blindingly pursue a goal of building an Afghan Army which can stand in for our forces, conduct a relief-in-place, and facilitate a transition to the GIROA becoming responsible for its own security. But soldiers' contribution to the Afghan mission are limited to security operations and even then fairly narrowly.

I often ask people who they would rely on to address security issues in their own country, and the universal answer is - police forces. It is the police which are required to address the broader security to establish, promote and sustain: rule-of-law, governance, justice, the economy and development.

Seahorse, I respect your opinion, but disagree. According to the reports I've seen and the polls that have been released, people are more confident with the ANA rather than the ANP. Also, I have had the chance to talk to some people very familiar with the conflict and they share the same opinion. Why? There are several factors, but there is one main point that I'm going to elaborate on. They (the ANA) focus on national interests rather than local (such as the ANP).

I know that is important to understand the local interests. However, when you have a soldier or police officer in an area that they are very familiar with, some problems can occur. They will be more prone to manipulation by the population in the district and will be more prone to corruption, especially in a country with an insecure environment like Afghanistan. So, when you bring in an outside force like the ANA, he's not going to know what's going on. However, he will know that he needs to accomplish _____ objective. Locals won't be able to threaten his home or his family because he's not from the area.

Do not get me wrong: it's important to have people familiar with the area to because of obvious reasons (intelligence, better understanding, etc). In fact, the ANP has been criticized for bringing in foreign Tajiks to Pashtun areas. It's just a matter of having a mix with local and outside forces; have enough to understand the situation.

Carl Eikenberry, when serving as the Commander CFC-A in Kabul, was even quoted as saying something to the effect, 'ten effective Afghan police were better than 100 Afghan soldiers, however one corrupt policeman was worse than ten insurgents.' So why do we focus on the soldiers and the insurgents? Is it simply because - that's what armies do?

We need to stop complaining about the problems with the ANP and address the real priorites in their recruitment, development, mentorship and establishment; and not just as a secondary effort to building the ANA.

The whole debate regarding the requirement for some form of tribal militia(s) is a symptom of the lack of ANP. Let's not neglect the ANP and continue to reinforce this urban legend.

Also, that quote from Eikenberry is incorrect. It is ""Ten good police are better than 100 corrupt police, and 10 corrupt police can do more damage to our success than one Taliban extremist." The main focus of his comments was on training strong leaders and how quality is better than quantity, which I agree with.

Recently, the ANP has encountered some success with "Combined Action" teams, so ISAF is currently pushing for that. However, I think the focus should be changed.

As mentioned in my earlier post, the ANP are being trained to act like a military force rather than law enforcement, which I don't agree with. I agree with you that it's important for police to establish a rule-of-law and justice system. Despite the lack of a strong justice system in Afghanistan, a very basic legal system does exist, and could possibly be enforced. The focus of the ANP should be shifted from combating the Taliban to enforcing the law. If this is done correctly, then the situation will hopefully improve.

Another thought: As I think about the ANP's difficult situation, they seem comparable to America's "Wild West" years. During this time in history, law enforcement in secluded small towns would be outnumbered by the gangs. As a result, they would either fight and die, do nothing, or join their efforts-just like the ANP today. How did these towns survive? I'm currently examining that and am curious if it could apply to Afghanistan.

Hopefully ISAF tackles the ANP issue in the future and corrects it.

[slapout9]

Another thought: As I think about the ANP's difficult situation, they seem comparable to America's "Wild West" years. During this time in history, law enforcement in secluded small towns would be outnumbered by the gangs. As a result, they would either fight and die, do nothing, or join their efforts-just like the ANP today. How did these towns survive? I'm currently examining that and am curious if it could apply to Afghanistan.

You may be right. A Marshall Service may be more appropriate than a Police Service. We talked about such a thing a while back. Jedburgh our master Intel guy found a Rand Study that suggested the same thing. Use the search option and you may be able to find it. How they survived (The Marshalls) was by raising Posses...instant militias. A power they still hold to this day,so do some County Sheriff's in some states.

[Steve Blair]

You may be right. A Marshall Service may be more appropriate than a Police Service. We talked about such a thing a while back. Jedburgh our master Intel guy found a Rand Study that suggested the same thing. Use the search option and you may be able to find it. How they survived (The Marshalls) was by raising Posses...instant militias. A power they still hold to this day,so do some County Sheriff's in some states.

Dangerous analogies in some ways. You're right, Slap, with the suggestion about a marshal service (it also gave the Federal government a "hand in the game" in the territories, but was also subject to patronage appointments), but the law enforcement situation in the West was much more complex than "Marshal Dillon outnumbered by gangs." Often the local lawman found himself torn between political poles in a particular town or region (Tombstone - the region, not the move - is especially, and exaggeratedly, instructional here), and even the marshals found themselves undermanned and underpaid in most cases.

The typical Western small town wasn't quite as violent as the movies hint, and there was also the "Miners' Council" aspect to most of them. Most mining towns were established under somewhat collectivist principles, and part of that was the formation of the Council (usually any able-bodied male resident in the area). Such Councils served as 'police' and court, and could order banishment, forfeiture of a claim, and so on. Some of them took on very vigilante overtones (Virginia City, MT, is one example). There were pockets of wanton lawlessness to be sure, but it tended to come in cycles and was often controlled by local interests.

[slapout9]

Dangerous analogies in some ways. You're right, Slap, with the suggestion about a marshal service (it also gave the Federal government a "hand in the game" in the territories, but was also subject to patronage appointments).

It still is that way. All US Marshals are appointed. Most of the time when you see a Marshall he is a Deputy Marshal.

[huskerguy7]

I see in your Bio you are a High School student and you took the trouble to talk to Dr. Killcullen about the ANP. For someone your age to even know who Killcullen is, is a major achievement. Keep up the good work, you will figure it out for all us someday.

I just saw this and wanted to say thanks. However, I have a long ways to go and need to learn from others, which is why I participate at SWJ

You may be right. A Marshall Service may be more appropriate than a Police Service. We talked about such a thing a while back. Jedburgh our master Intel guy found a Rand Study that suggested the same thing. Use the search option and you may be able to find it. How they survived (The Marshalls) was by raising Posses...instant militias. A power they still hold to this day,so do some County Sheriff's in some states.

I've searched, and I don't think I found the report (I messaged Jedburgh though). However, I found some interesting stuff along the way that discussed a similar idea. Having someone with "popular support" in the area they are patrolling may work better and might possibly prevent some corruption.

Dangerous analogies in some ways. You're right, Slap, with the suggestion about a marshal service (it also gave the Federal government a "hand in the game" in the territories, but was also subject to patronage appointments), but the law enforcement situation in the West was much more complex than "Marshal Dillon outnumbered by gangs." Often the local lawman found himself torn between political poles in a particular town or region (Tombstone - the region, not the move - is especially, and exaggeratedly, instructional here), and even the marshals found themselves undermanned and underpaid in most cases.

The typical Western small town wasn't quite as violent as the movies hint, and there was also the "Miners' Council" aspect to most of them. Most mining towns were established under somewhat collectivist principles, and part of that was the formation of the Council (usually any able-bodied male resident in the area). Such Councils served as 'police' and court, and could order banishment, forfeiture of a claim, and so on. Some of them took on very vigilante overtones (Virginia City, MT, is one example). There were pockets of wanton lawlessness to be sure, but it tended to come in cycles and was often controlled by local interests.

It's good to hear from someone who is knowledgable on the Wild West. Having officers work with the tribal "councils" may yield better results. But will this decentralize the government to much?

[slapout9]

Huskerguy7, may want to check out Army FM 22-6 Guard Duty. Towards the back is small section on how critical Mobile Guard units are in what they called Counter Guerrilla Warfare in those days early 1970's.

[huskerguy7]

Huskerguy7, may want to check out Army FM 22-6 Guard Duty. Towards the back is small section on how critical Mobile Guard units are in what they called Counter Guerrilla Warfare in those days early 1970's.

Thanks for the idea; I found some interesting information on "Exterior Guards". I also examined FM 90-8 which discusses counter guerrila operations.

This really makes you wander how a police force could function in an insurgency environment against guerrillas. Reacting to an ambush, whether it's a lightly armed law enforcement agent or a heavily armed US Army Ranger, is very difficult. It's no surprise that you see ANP units taking casualties in many ambushes. It's a very difficult problem that needs to be solved.

I'm throwing it out there, but would having small "law enforcement" ANP patrols supplemented by a heavier paramilitary ANP quick reaction force work? Yes, ANP soldiers would still take losses, but they may possibly be able to enforce some law in the local area. It would be similar to a sheriff and his deputies with access to Federal Marshall assistance?