Your scenario is predicated on the large increase in soldiers being out and about in the countryside, actually being visible to villagers on a daily basis --- rather than the actual reality of ISAF being concentrated in FOB-tastic clumps, with the majority never leaving the wire.
Yes, it works best with outposts.
Nevertheless, there ought to be some visibility any way. You just need to make the reinforcements visible.
At the very least, it should make clear to anyone that killing does not reduce, but increase numbers.
Do good and talk about it!
I think any positive effects from such a policy would be from the actual presence of the troops in the villages, in terms of security provided and resulting Taliban killed or deterred, rather than from any said influencing effect.
Unfortunately current NATO/ISAF policies would seem to prevent any such deployment.
Fuchs,
Your scenario simply does not reflect reality in Afghanistan.
If some coalition troops die to an IED on some isolated stretch of road, or in a sparsely populated agricultural area, or in the middle of an urban area, where do you parade these shiny new troops to impress the locals? How do you know you are showing them to the right people? "You just need to make the reinforcements visible." That is simply wishful thinking.
There are well over 30,000 settlements of various sizes in Afghanistan. Almost 2,000 of those are in Kandahar province alone. How many of those can we provide enough presence to generate the effects you cite? The answer is not very many, even if we get everyone off the FOBs.
Another problem is your assumption that the village elders will be able to negotiate with the Taliban. While that can happen in some instances, the vast majority of village elders don't have the pull to negotiate the Taliban into leaving foreign troops alone. In most cases there is no negotiation. The locals have nothing to bargain. Independent minded or pro-coalition leaders are likely to find themselves killed.
Most Afghans are very adept fence-sitters. If you think some new troops in shiny clean uniforms will get them off the fence you are mistaken.
Supporting "time-limited, scope limited military actions" for 20 years.
COIN Heresy:The More Troops We Have, the More Violence Grows
Hat tip to KoW and a provocative article by a completly unknown writer, with a very brief bio, with six embeds in Afghanistan and so IMHO the right to comment on COIN:http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/n...Violence_Grows
Taken from the start:Now is the right time to consider more radical points of view — including the most radical I know, that we ought to withdraw from Afghanistan precisely in order to enable the Afghans to defeat the Taliban.
This position used to be a fringe belief. It runs directly counter to the dogma of COIN that the more troops you put among the people, the more secure the people feel, and the more they will reject the insurgents. But it answers a doubt that has grown in my mind over the course of six embeds with American troops. I’ve observed that the more activity we undertake, the more SIGACTS (violent incidents) occur in a province or district. This in turn makes the locals doubtful about the benefits of an American presence.
davidbfpo
To quote the article,Originally Posted by davidbfpo
That is garbage. The job of an Army is to destroy the armed opponent. That may include conducting "Security Operations" and "good" Patrolling (as opposed to stupid) is essential to that.“I asked the commander when his men were getting hit by the enemy and he said, ‘When we go out on a patrol.’ And I said, ‘Well, if you stop patrolling, you won’t get hit.’ And he said, ‘But my job is to patrol, to show American presence, to find the bad guys, to interact with the locals.’ And I said, ‘No, that’s not your job. Your job is to increase security in Afghanistan. If your sending your men on patrol increases violence, you’re not doing your job.’”
Standing still, doing nothing, is always bad.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
You might want to look up the real, official mission of ISAF.
The whole concept of ISAF was Afghanisation from the beginning. The foreign forces are merely temporary substitutes till the Afghans take over. They shall provide security till the Afghans can do it, no victory over TB is required to declare mission success and leave (many seem to have forgotten this fact).
Standing still, doing nothing, is NOT always bad.
Exhibit A: Nukes.
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