How Close is 'Close Combat'?

[Red Rat]

And do we still need to do it?

As a young infantry officer I was trained that my job was the focused application of violence in order to impose my will on the enemy. That would involve a number of things, including, ultimately, the prospect of close combat - including the use of the bayonet if necessary. I was taught this because ultimately in order to impose my will on the enemy, the enemy needed to feel that I was better than him and that I could, man for man, beat him. It might not be a fair fight, but it would be a fairish fight. It was was about moral superiority not in the sense of the justness of the cause, but moral superiority in that there was no wriggle room to escape the fact that one had been beaten.

History often shows that when the other side does not feel itself beaten then it comes back again (the Germans were defeated in WW1, but did not feel that they had been beaten in the field for instance). The Afghans have never felt themselves bested.

The western way of war now appears, certainly from the reports I hear from Afghanistan, to be risk averse, casualty intolerant and reliant on firepower - often of the PGM type. We no longer seem to be willing or able to get close to the enemy.

If accordingly the enemy feels that man for man he is stronger, braver and better then us - can we ever hope to win?

So, how close is 'close combat' nowadays and how important is that we should get closer?

[tequila]

The many Iraq veterans on this board can likely tell stories of some very close contact. Certainly we imposed our will in the vast majority of those fights in an extremely violent way - the only way, in those circumstances.

I don't really see how this is all that relevant in the strategic context, though. Men can and will rationalize or excuse away defeat depending on the political context, not the bloodiness or 'closeness' of the defeat - certainly Israelis will recognize and have been frustrated by that ability on the part of Arab enemies, but it is present amongst most defeated foes to a certain extent. The American South was defeated as thoroughly as one can be on a military level in extremely bloody combat, but the political context of the postwar situation gave rise to rampant Lost Cause mythology, where the Confederacy was triumphant on the battlefield but simply submerged by the Union's greater resources.

[OfTheTroops]

I may have dinner with a guy and have to defend myself against him the next. I wish it were more bayonet and hand grenade style geez. All the way around the threat is constant and the use of force is split second and world changing http://www.army.mil/-news/2008/07/18...n-silver-star/

[John M]

I think you muddle the tactical/operational and strategic levels (or at least don't differentiate between the aspect of 'war' and 'warfare'). Tactically/operationally our Soldiers are engaged in close combat. I think what you are highlighting is the inherent problem with a conflict in which one side is engaging in limited war and the other in total war. We are tools of policy and that policy will dictate to what extent violence is applied. There are a myriad of reasons why ISAF are engaging in limited war, but I would not have any reservation in stating that US forces are both willing and able to unleash violence of action if called upon to do so (you may have a different vantage from the UK). Nor should we abandon the necessity of close combat as it would be our ultimate undoing as a military profession and 'managers of violence.'

[Schmedlap]

As late as 2005 there were hand grenade throwing contests and gunfights that occurred within the walls of one building. I'd say it was pretty close.

As for today, I think the enemy initiates his attacks from afar specifically because he knows that he will be killed quickly if the fight gets too close.

[Ken White]

There is no question that most Western forces are more than willing to engage in close combat and are doing so quite successfully on a daily basis. However, there is a question of whether or not Western policies are contributing to a perception by some that the foregoing statement is untrue...

The ability or desire to close with and kill the enemy is in one sense a macho myth -- it is far better strategically, operationally and tactically to kill more from afar than to have to close and possibly sustain greater own casualties. Most western forces subscribe to this view. Not everyone does so.

The counterpoint is that the perception of unwillingness, apparent or real, to engage in close combat can lead the opponent to believe or profess to believe that said opponent is 'superior' due to greater willingness to close and thus sacrifice. While actually quite specious it is believed by those who wish to think it so -- at least until they find out the hard way that it is in fact untrue. Regrettably, that will only apply to the spear throwers in the front -- the directing staff in the rear will ignore the reality.

That factor, while most obvious tactically can have operational and strategic impacts:

"...However, when tens of your solders were killed in minor battles and one American Pilot was dragged in the streets of Mogadishu you left the area carrying disappointment, humiliation, defeat and your dead with you.

LINK.

Most wars in which the US has been involved -- including the current set -- were at least in part triggered by a belief on the part of opponents that the US would not or could not fight. Stronger and better reactions to probes from the Mideast since 1972 by the west and by the US in particular almost certainly would have obviated our current wars. Thus there is a strategic quotient that derives from tactical actions and the perception of those actions.

Excessive bellicosity sends a bad message. Inadequate bellicosity sends a dangerous message. Risk aversion can be seen as wise, it can also be exploited as being cowardly -- and is being so exploited today.

The fact is that most current contacts seem to be initiated by the opponents here and there because of their belief that western forces do not wish to fight. That is not true but the perception strongly fostered by our opponents is that it is so. Our risk averse policies tend to feed that. So does our poor Information Operations effort -- partly a policy problem; the two factors combine to provide a an operational problem and also likely more potential or future strategic problems.

Warfare is complex, there are no easy answers. To every decision there is a cost. In the case of excessive risk aversion as a deliberate policy, "Penny wise and Pound foolish" comes to mind..

[Patrick R Jennings]

It seems the to be the nature of soldiers to make their war the "tough one." Their combat was somehow...closer.

I've done three GWOT tours, all in the shooting arena. I have never had to pull my knife other than to peel an apple, I had a grenade but failed to use it, and the nearest I came to my enemies during a fire fight was perhaps 20 meters (although I did spend a good portion of 556 ammo).

My father was a fighter pilot in WWII and Korea and all his work was in CAS. He always joked that the only enemy fighter he ever saw during the war was in movies. His brother was killed in Italy, an infantry officer in the 36th Division, whose body was never found.

Their father, my grandfather, lost a leg in France in 1918 about ten days before the war ended...and so the family story goes.

According to my grandfather his wound was from artillery, the same weapon that took his youngest son. My grandfather had been in France less then six months, my uncle in Italy less than four. My father was in the South Pacific for roughly 14 months but admits to plenty of liberty. He also said strafing in Korea, he was off the coast there for seven months, was scary and he came back with plenty of holes in his craft but never a scratch. I got knocked around with a few IEDs but got away with little more than a headache, oh and I once got a nasty sunburn. All told, I have spent 30 months in a combat zone (roughly the total of all my relatives combined combat experience) and expect I will have to go one more time before I retire. If we could all get together the debate over whose war was toughest would be a riot.

Still, looking across this almost 92 year spectrum of a family at war it strikes me that close combat is far more rare than we think. Surely it happens and when it does it is intense and dirty but I imagine the "time in contact" numbers aren't as intense as we want to imagine. The reality is that we, and our enemies, prefer to kill from a decent range. We like aircraft, missiles and smart bombs and they like command detonated IEDs and suicide bombers.

Thus I don't think western powers have shifted away from close combat rather they have never really embraced it. Soldiers in a democracy are expensive and the bill for close combat is too high so naturally we lean toward other means.

[Infanteer]

That was a cool post - thanks for the interesting bio my friend.

[William F. Owen]

How Close is 'Close Combat'?
And do we still need to do it?

Close is 1m-25m in my book, and yes we still need to do it, but training soldiers to close with the bayonet is catastrophically stupid. The ability to post/throw a grenade into a trench/bunker or throw it into a room is also a required skill.

So, how close is 'close combat' nowadays and how important is that we should get closer?

Extremely - but unless the enemy has been effectively fixed, (FIND FIX STRIKE EXPLOIT) he will simply avoid being struck.
The whole art of platoon tactics is movement to gain greater proximity to the enemy, so as your fire is more effective. Done well, the enemy should be unable to run away, and be all dead or have given up, once you are within grenade range. Worked on the Imperial Japanese Army and Waffen-SS, and it will certainly work on the Taliban.

[Red Rat]

I think you muddle the tactical/operational and strategic levels (or at least don't differentiate between the aspect of 'war' and 'warfare').

I probably am muddled!

Tactically/operationally our Soldiers are engaged in close combat.

I agree.

I think what you are highlighting is the inherent problem with a conflict in which one side is engaging in limited war and the other in total war. We are tools of policy and that policy will dictate to what extent violence is applied.

I disagree. What is at issue is not the level or extent of violence brought to bear here, more how that violence is brought to bear and what that says about us. Warfare is a human endeavour involving passions and emotions, it is not merely a technical affair about what technical systems we use or not. It is not an issue of ROE, it is perhaps an issue of limited v unlimited (war) in how much political risk a government is prepared to accept vis a vis casualty rates. My gut feel remains that in small wars especially, there is a moral element where you have to demonstrate conclusively that it is impossible for the other side to win militarily. At the micro level that involves bringing the fight to the enemy in a way that the enemy recognises and respects; bringing the fight to the enemy and beating him.

It does link into limited versus unlimited warfare in that we are fighting a limited war where we are not only limiting the means we bring to bear, but also the risk we are prepared to take. I think there is a powerful message we are sending by not physically allowing our troops to close with the enemy(either because we weight them down with so much kit, constrain them with TTPs or make commanders casualty intolerant). IMHO we are saying that we are prepared to fight, but not fully. We are saying that we have a limited moral commitment, are prepared to take a limited risk with it. All the other side has to do is recognise that and match or better our limited commitment.

There are a myriad of reasons why ISAF are engaging in limited war,

in means yes, but also in terms of moral commitment. We do not seem to be in this to win.

but I would not have any reservation in stating that US forces are both willing and able to unleash violence of action if called upon to do so (you may have a different vantage from the UK).

As are UK forces, who are still routinely engaged in heavy combat. It is not the level of combat that takes place or the amount of force brought to bear, but how we go about doing so and what that says about us.

Nor should we abandon the necessity of close combat as it would be our ultimate undoing as a military profession and 'managers of violence.'

I violently agree!



I think that the character of any given conflict is the product of the societies involved in that conflict. In cases where the nature of the societies are so very different (such as AFG and the West) the 'how' we fight is important. If we are fighting 2 different types of war neither side may recognise or accept that the other is winning, possibly in a physical sense and certainly in a moral sense.

[JMA]

And do we still need to do it?

As a young infantry officer I was trained that my job was the focused application of violence in order to impose my will on the enemy. That would involve a number of things, including, ultimately, the prospect of close combat - including the use of the bayonet if necessary. I was taught this because ultimately in order to impose my will on the enemy, the enemy needed to feel that I was better than him and that I could, man for man, beat him. It might not be a fair fight, but it would be a fairish fight. It was was about moral superiority not in the sense of the justness of the cause, but moral superiority in that there was no wriggle room to escape the fact that one had been beaten.

IMHO your training was absolutely correct. The role of the infantry is to close with and kill the enemy. At some point this may involve CQB and even hand-to-hand fighting. If your attack has been properly planned and gone off without a hitch the infantry should arrive on the objective as soon as possible as the fire support has lifted so as to get at the enemy physically before they they are able to recover from the "shock and awe" and violence of the fire support. While a bullet will do nicely there just maybe occasion where in the absence of a bayonet you may have to stick the muzzle of your weapon in his eye.

So yes the enemy need to know you are going to do them. That the air strike or artillery is merely the beginning of what is going to be a very bad day for them which will end when some raving maniacs will arrive to administer the coup de grâce.

Yes and the message to the enemy is that when the Brit paras arrive in their area or the US marines or the US airborne or whoever they need to start to make their peace with whichever god they worship.

I would add this.

This training is as much aimed at providing soldiers with the skills to deal with this final and most physically violent and courage testing phase of the attack (which we used to call fighting through the objective) as it is to prepare the men emotionally for this possible ordeal sometime in the future. I'm not sure that there is anything that focuses the mind of a infantry soldier more than when he receives the command "fix bayonets". For this he needs to both physically and mentally prepared.

History often shows that when the other side does not feel itself beaten then it comes back again (the Germans were defeated in WW1, but did not feel that they had been beaten in the field for instance). The Afghans have never felt themselves bested.

In my war they kept feeding the cannon fodder over the borders because they had not been beaten and did not know that their comrades where being killed like flies. Later when the external camp attacks became the norm they were happier to be pushed over the border as they believed that their chances of survival were higher in small groups internally than concentrated in large camps externally.

So what I saying is that those who were not in an action where they were defeated would probably believe that they could do better than those who were. Like I'm sure there were many Japanese troops who wondered why they had to surrender when they and their unit had not been defeated in any battle. I'm sure some Germans felt the same. There is no doubt that in the case of Afghanistan there is a case of selective memory.

The massacre of Elphinstone's Army achieved through treachery having first promised safe passage in early 1842 was followed up later that year by comprehensive defeats being inflicted upon the Afghans by the British as reprisals.

Two lessons should have been learned from this by the British. One, never trust the word of an Afghan ruler/politician and when dealing with tribal people when you defeat them you need to do it in a style like they did to Elphinstone's Army, showing no mercy.

So with typical selective memory the Afghans choose to remember only the massacre of Elphinstone's Army and not their subsequent comprehensive defeats at the hands of Generals Nott and Pollock.

The western way of war now appears, certainly from the reports I hear from Afghanistan, to be risk averse, casualty intolerant and reliant on firepower - often of the PGM type. We no longer seem to be willing or able to get close to the enemy.

I agree, but believe it is more due to the fact that the West does not know how to fight the sort of warfare needed to inflict a comprehensive defeat on the Taliban (for whatever reason). Its all a bit like bring a frog to the boil, where had the Brits been told that they would suffer 600 odd casualties in Afghanistan on the period of the intervention they would have taken the whole thing more seriously that they did. (We have been through this in other threads where the whole tiresome Afghan tour thing had to be fitted in between the serious business of guarding palaces, trooping the colour and doing training in Canada or Kenya.)

Th current situation has arisen from a start of "without firing a shot".

I maintain that had the Brits gone into this knowing that they were to take casualties on this scale they would have extracted digit and done the business (as they have proved they can time and again in the past). Of this i have no doubt.

If accordingly the enemy feels that man for man he is stronger, braver and better then us - can we ever hope to win?

So, how close is 'close combat' nowadays and how important is that we should get closer?

Not only is it necessary to close with and kill the enemy but also critical to pursue those who escape with single minded intent. The kill rate is critical. (We have also been through this before elsewhere when talking about body counts and verifying the actual kills that there is not even the desire to sweep through the area after an air strike to count the dead and collect weapons of war.)

So yes half of the trick in this type of warfare is to close with and kill the enemy while the other half is to hunt down and kill the survivors. Soldiers who don't have the stomach for this type of work should rather join the police force. (with respect to the many fine men serving in police forces all over the world)

[JMA]

I disagree. What is at issue is not the level or extent of violence brought to bear here, more how that violence is brought to bear and what that says about us. Warfare is a human endeavour involving passions and emotions, it is not merely a technical affair about what technical systems we use or not. It is not an issue of ROE, it is perhaps an issue of limited v unlimited (war) in how much political risk a government is prepared to accept vis a vis casualty rates. My gut feel remains that in small wars especially, there is a moral element where you have to demonstrate conclusively that it is impossible for the other side to win militarily. At the micro level that involves bringing the fight to the enemy in a way that the enemy recognises and respects; bringing the fight to the enemy and beating him.

It does link into limited versus unlimited warfare in that we are fighting a limited war where we are not only limiting the means we bring to bear, but also the risk we are prepared to take. I think there is a powerful message we are sending by not physically allowing our troops to close with the enemy(either because we weight them down with so much kit, constrain them with TTPs or make commanders casualty intolerant). IMHO we are saying that we are prepared to fight, but not fully. We are saying that we have a limited moral commitment, are prepared to take a limited risk with it. All the other side has to do is recognise that and match or better our limited commitment.

I am a little concerned that concepts like limited and unlimited war are being applied to company, platoon and section level activities. How does one limit the violence of a company or a platoon attack?

Is it like what we saw in the TV series "Ross Kemp in Afghanistan" where contact is made, the troops pull back, wait for an air strike, return to base after the air strike claiming victory?

If you have not got the political will or the bottle for the war casualty risk then rather stay inside the FOBs and hardly ever venture out (much like the Germans are doing). If you keep pushing your troops out into harms way then at least don't tie their one hand behind their back.

It seems the Brit army has nothing to fear except their own politicians and general staff.

I often wonder whether it is appreciated how much harm has been done to the reputation of the British soldier and the British Army through the Basra debacle and the current goings on in Afghanistan? Its an absolute disgrace.

I think that the character of any given conflict is the product of the societies involved in that conflict. In cases where the nature of the societies are so very different (such as AFG and the West) the 'how' we fight is important. If we are fighting 2 different types of war neither side may recognise or accept that the other is winning, possibly in a physical sense and certainly in a moral sense.

There is one unequivocal answer to all this and that is the kill rate per contact. If for every 20 Taliban who take on ISAF only 3 or four survive then very soon they will run out of recruits other than the crazies who want to be suicide bombers or just plain commit suicide.

"How" ISAF fights must be based on what it will take to break the spirit and will of the Taliban and the population supplying their recruits. Get into their heads. I just don't think it will be possible given the current western mindset.

[Ken White]

Red Rat:

"What is at issue is not the level or extent of violence brought to bear here, more how that violence is brought to bear and what that says about us...At the micro level that involves bringing the fight to the enemy in a way that the enemy recognises and respects; bringing the fight to the enemy and beating him."

and:

"We are saying that we have a limited moral commitment, are prepared to take a limited risk with it. All the other side has to do is recognise that and match or better our limited commitment."

Yes...

JMA

"...I agree, but believe it is more due to the fact that the West does not know how to fight the sort of warfare needed to inflict a comprehensive defeat on the Taliban (for whatever reason)."

Possibly correct, However, I'm inclined to believe that the west knows how, it is simply unwilling to do what is necessary for various reasons -- most of which I believe to be misguided...

Not only is it necessary to close with and kill the enemy but also critical to pursue those who escape with single minded intent. The kill rate is critical...So yes half of the trick in this type of warfare is to close with and kill the enemy while the other half is to hunt down and kill the survivors. Soldiers who don't have the stomach for this type of work should rather join the police force...

Agree totally with the first statement.

On the second statement, I know there are some Soldiers (of all ranks) who do not wish for various reasons to do just that, not all stomach related. However, it has been my observation that most western soldiers are more than willing to do that -- they are simply not allowed to do so.

I couched that above as "risk aversion" -- which is present in excessive quantities. However, the reluctance seen today to engage in close combat in the harshest sense of the word is more complex than that alone. It is part tactical desire to restrain own casualties and part a "lack of stomach" on the part of some senior leaders and policy makers who wish to be seen as 'civilized.' A vastly overrated trait IMO...

The relative morality of 'turn the other cheek' and 'proportionality' may be generally acknowledged in the west. Others think them foolish constructs and see weakness and an invitation . I believe the numbers accrue to the latter group...

So while I think Patrick R. Jennings has a point:

"Thus I don't think western powers have shifted away from close combat rather they have never really embraced it. Soldiers in a democracy are expensive and the bill for close combat is too high so naturally we lean toward other means."

I also believe that the bill is seen as high -- no sense in placing a platoon at a roadblock when it can be covered by fire from several hundred meters away -- but perhaps more pointedly, western society today is, by some, seen as repelled by the nominal 'brutality' necessary to do as JMA suggests. I believe that (badly mistaken IMO) view is more responsible for restrictive ROE than is the bill for own casualties or the tactical advantage of avoidance of close combat.

This allows me to employ my favorite quote:

"War means fighting. The business of the soldier is to fight. Armies are not called out to dig trenches, to live in camps, but to find the enemy and strike him; to invade his country, and do him all possible damage in the shortest possible time. This will involve great destruction of life and property while it lasts; but such a war will of necessity be of brief continuance, and so would be an economy of life and property in the end."

Thomas J. Jackson quoted by G. F. R. Henderson

Failure to engage closely may provide a false sense of civilized behavior but it is just that -- false. War is not civilized and nothing is going to make it so. As old Curtis LeMay said, in war to do less than your very best is immoral. I'd paraphrase that by saying that in small wars to do less than your best for any reason is immoral -- and provides tacit encourgement to the opponent to keep slogging. Practically speaking, avoiding close combat lengthens any war, causes more casualties of all types and more damage in the end than would short sharp engagements. Creating a perception, however false, that one is avoiding or just lackadaisical in seeking out and destroying enemy fighters is an invitation to lengthy nickel and dime casualty accrual. Nickels can really add up over time, better to spend a few dollars and get it over with...

It is also wise to recall that just as a drop of water into a bucket of it can cause ripples, so can and will tactical actions affect strategic issues...

[Pete]

I believe risk aversion is another legacy of the Vietnam war, based upon the belief that public support in America for involvement in optional conflicts would rapidly decline once the casualties begin piling up. It mystifies me how infantrymen can do their job wearing all that body armor, but the decision not to wear it would also have its consequences, and someone would be keeping score.

[CloseDanger]

After a fight, if your counts are up and you have time and you have hot shots on the beat, and you have support, it may be a good idea to let them persue the last standing.
Proximity is not an issue.

Mix it up a little and you will find much more deterrence.

[Pete]

Good Lord, we've even got Field Manual 100-14, Risk Management, to guide us in our decision-making process. If we had had that manual 60 years ago this week when the North Koreans crossed the 38th Parallel I wonder whether Harry Truman would have done an assessment before we got involved.

[JMA]

After a fight, if your counts are up and you have time and you have hot shots on the beat, and you have support, it may be a good idea to let them persue the last standing.
Proximity is not an issue.

Mix it up a little and you will find much more deterrence.

I'm not sure I follow the terminology here. What does "if your counts are up" mean?

Why allow them to break contact and melt away (only to attack you another day)?

So proximity is an issue. One should strive to maintain contact and pursue the enemy killing as many as you can along the way. After all that is why you are there, yes?

The support and reserves should come from a QRF and be led by tenacious officers who will not just give up the chase so that the troops can return to base for a hot meal and a cold drink.

Why you should aggressively seek to maximise the kill rate per contact is to do what you should be doing anyway and that is to close with and destroy the enemy and secondly to prevent the enemy from building up their combat experience.

What could be mixed up a little is not whether to pursue the enemy but variations on how that pursuit would take place.

[John M]

Red Rat,

To clarify, by limited war I am refering to "a war whose objective is less than the total defeat of the enemy" and not a definition linked to resources applied. So I agree with your assesment that risk aversion plays a critical role in how today's conflict are being waged.

Red Rat:

I think that the character of any given conflict is the product of the societies involved in that conflict.

Agree; as Clausewitz stated:

...the aims a beligerant adopts, and the resources he employs, must be governed by the particular characteristics of his own position; but they will also confrom to the spirit ofthe age and to its general character.

JMA:

I am a little concerned that concepts like limited and unlimited war are being applied to company, platoon and section level activities. How does one limit the violence of a company or a platoon attack?

Again, we need to differentiate between war and warfare. A limited war will have an impact on military operations and actions at the tactical level. One needs to look no further than the current conflict.

[JMA]

JMA:

Again, we need to differentiate between war and warfare. A limited war will have an impact on military operations and actions at the tactical level. One needs to look no further than the current conflict.

Once in contact with the enemy how does the type of warfare the politicians have imposed affect the tactical options available at company, platoon and section level?

[Pete]

... 60 years ago this week when the North Koreans crossed the 38th Parallel ...

Whoops, it was on 25 June 1950, not 25 July of that year, when the Korean War began. Oh well, when I was in the artillery they taught us to run out of the FDC shouting, "Stop those rounds" when we realized we'd made a mistake.