How Close is 'Close Combat'?

[jcustis]

...by fire and maneuver. That way is through ensuring you put him on the horns of a dilemma. Call it using combined arms to "fix" him, but the result is the same. You force him to make a choice. Often it is a choice between staying and dying under the effects of HE (40mm, 60mm, 120mm, JDAM, etc.), or fleeing and facing the effects of effective and accurate direct fires.

Take away one ingredient of that recipe, and you cannot maneuver effectively, in the Afghanistan context. There is too much deadspace and terrain (to include the human terrain) that allows the enemy to move along after contact is broken.

Now, this business of close combat also involves the task of deciding if you believe it is important enough to send a troop through the door of a dark, musty mud hut, when you can exercise tactical patience, sit back, and call those knuckleheads out to you because you have them surrounded.

I've used the point made by a former Ranger on another board here before. There is nothing that important, besides an American captive, that justifies assaulting a hut/building over here. Nothing at all.

[GI Zhou]

Intersting topic having done a lot of research on Fairbairn, Sykes, Biddle and others. Thank you.

I watched a documentary on Second World War wartime cameramen, and from memory, the only film taken by US Cameramen of an enemy soldier in combat was at Tarawa. The Japnese soldier darted past the an open doorway and turned his face towards the cameraman by instinct perhaps. I did some training with the police for it when in the military, but have never done real life CQB. Police forces understandably see more of it than the military, even perhaps including Afghanistan, as that is the nature of the job.

[jcustis]

I have seen a clip that I think you are talking about. On Tarawa...but it was a small group for two-three Japanese soldiers dashing past a blockhouse, and fired upon by a group of Marines who appeared to miss.

[AdamG]

In May 2004, approximately 20 British troops in Basra were ambushed and forced out of their vehicles by about 100 Shiite militia fighters. When ammunition ran low, the British troops fixed bayonets and charged the enemy. About 20 militiamen were killed in the assault without any British deaths.

https://www.us.army.mil/suite/collab...?doid=14903470
(requires AKO login)

The attack was sudden and unexpected. Patrolling a notoriously dangerous area of Afghanistan, Bradley Malone and his fellow Royal Marines were caught in a fierce ambush by insurgents.

But, in a remarkable show of calm under extreme pressure, Corporal Malone led his unit in a devastating counter-attack that pitched his men into a close- combat assault.

He ordered his men to fix bayonets, and they charged their attackers in a determined, courageous onslaught that brought them into eye-to-eye contact with the Taleban. In the face of such heroism, the enemy broke and fled for their lives.

http://www.hmforces.co.uk/news/artic...-bravery-award

October 2008 : Lieutenant James 'Jim' Adamson, 24, then a platoon commander, led a bayonet charge against enemy forces that saved the lives of fellow troops while on tour in Afghanistan.
http://news.stv.tv/scotland/122673-s...nst-the-enemy/

Jus' sayin'.

[GI Zhou]

I have seen a clip that I think you are talking about. On Tarawa...but it was a small group for two-three Japanese soldiers dashing past a blockhouse, and fired upon by a group of Marines who appeared to miss.

Thanks you. I rememeber it wasn't jungle and one was running with his left hand holding the rifle along him.

[William F. Owen]

In May 2004, approximately 20 British troops in Basra were ambushed and forced out of their vehicles by about 100 Shiite militia fighters. When ammunition ran low, the British troops fixed bayonets and charged the enemy. About 20 militiamen were killed in the assault without any British deaths.

There are a number of reasons to doubt the veracity of this story. At best it simply did not happen.- based on the account presented in the British Army Review and others who were there.
Since 2005, one weapons in four in a UK Rifle platoon fireteam can have a bayonet attached to it, so giving the order "fix bayonets" just means the one man with the bayonet does something.

Based on a few years of research, I have found very few truthful accounts of men actually using bayonets in combat.

[JMA]

...by fire and maneuver. That way is through ensuring you put him on the horns of a dilemma. Call it using combined arms to "fix" him, but the result is the same. You force him to make a choice. Often it is a choice between staying and dying under the effects of HE (40mm, 60mm, 120mm, JDAM, etc.), or fleeing and facing the effects of effective and accurate direct fires.

Agree mostly. However, I believe it is better/safer/more advantageous to push him over his emotional tipping point and get him to withdraw/flee where he can become food for gunships and troops deployed in static cut-off positions. Having to winkle out enemy remnants who have decided to fight to the death can become hugely stressful and downright dangerous.

We are back to that old concept (from where I come from) where you find them, encircle them, flush them, pursue them and then kill them.

Take away one ingredient of that recipe, and you cannot maneuver effectively, in the Afghanistan context. There is too much deadspace and terrain (to include the human terrain) that allows the enemy to move along after contact is broken.

Yes, the Afghanistan context. You got to do what you have to to prevent them from making a clean break. How you do it there depends on a number of factors.

Now, this business of close combat also involves the task of deciding if you believe it is important enough to send a troop through the door of a dark, musty mud hut, when you can exercise tactical patience, sit back, and call those knuckleheads out to you because you have them surrounded.

I've used the point made by a former Ranger on another board here before. There is nothing that important, besides an American captive, that justifies assaulting a hut/building over here. Nothing at all.

I suppose this is an example of how warfare in Afghanistan is of a limited nature?

You must help me here Jon. Why is it so dangerous for a troop to follow the explosion of a bunker bomb through a door of a "musty old hut"? I would suggest that the biggest risk in so doing is that the building may collapse on him.

(Note: As I think I have stated somewhere here before why don't you fly in a flamethrower team when faced with this situation? Do you still have them somewhere? Man we could have done with those things in the cave situations we faced.)

Even if you do one or two rooms as an example eventually some troop is going to have to go into each room to ensure that everyone who was in there has in fact surrendered, yes?

Further we note that the Taliban are pretty smart at adapting their tactics to exploit the ROE and other restrictions ISAF self impose. They want to keep civvies around them knowing that ISAF don't want to add to the civvie body count. They send kids to do things knowing that they either won't be shot or will have the critical advantage when facing ISAF forces (who correctly) would not knowingly kill a child. Now can we add hiding out in huts knowing that troops will not ordinarily go in after them?

[William F. Owen]

We are back to that old concept (from where I come from) where you find them, encircle them, flush them, pursue them and then kill them.

Where everyone comes from, or should - FIND, FIX, STRIKE, EXPLOIT. - Core Functions. Explicitly written down by Ferdinand Foch in about 1911, as a guide to campaign planning, but actually applicable at all levels.

IMO, core functions are the most under used and misunderstood conceptual tool for tactics ever to exist.

[JMA]

There are a number of reasons to doubt the veracity of this story. At best it simply did not happen.- based on the account presented in the British Army Review and others who were there.
Since 2005, one weapons in four in a UK Rifle platoon fireteam can have a bayonet attached to it, so giving the order "fix bayonets" just means the one man with the bayonet does something.

Based on a few years of research, I have found very few truthful accounts of men actually using bayonets in combat.

I don't see it as being whether you carry bayonets or actually fix them and use them in battle. It is the final assault on the enemy position that requires training to cater for the physical eventualities and also and equally important the psychological preparation.

[jps2]

IMO, close combat training and skills are more psychological training than physical training. It is very important for soldiers to be prepared to hand, knive, or bayonet fights.

For many reasons including proportional response to aggression, assaulting an enemy position, searching/reco, these skills are important regarding self confidence.

[jcustis]

You must help me here Jon. Why is it so dangerous for a troop to follow the explosion of a bunker bomb through a door of a "musty old hut"? I would suggest that the biggest risk in so doing is that the building may collapse on him.

(Note: As I think I have stated somewhere here before why don't you fly in a flamethrower team when faced with this situation? Do you still have them somewhere? Man we could have done with those things in the cave situations we faced.)

Even if you do one or two rooms as an example eventually some troop is going to have to go into each room to ensure that everyone who was in there has in fact surrendered, yes?

You most absolutely can use corkscrew tactics to obliterate the enemy, but the point is that there is simply nothing worth throwing a troop through the door, unaided. To be more clear, that comment made by that former Ranger was used to highlight that we also need to train less for Battle Drill Six (I can't recall the thread where we beat that to death, but learned some useful stuff in the process) during workups, and focus on other discrete tasks, no matter how easy and rewarding it may be to lay engineer tape out on the deck to simulate the outline of a house.

[William F. Owen]

It is the final assault on the enemy position that requires training to cater for the physical eventualities and also and equally important the psychological preparation.

What would characterise the idea of a "final assault" in your mind? Assault is deliberately a word I do no use.

[AdamG]

Since 2005, one weapons in four in a UK Rifle platoon fireteam can have a bayonet attached to it, so giving the order "fix bayonets" just means the one man with the bayonet does something. .

What was the scale of issue of the SA80 bayonet in the British Army fireteam in the first half of 2004? That's when the incident happened.

Based on a few years of research, I have found very few truthful accounts of men actually using bayonets in combat.

What's your criteria to determine if it's BS or not? My Battalion (infantry) didn't even issue/bring bayonets to Iraq and at this point in my life, I really don't have a dog in this fight.

However, I've read enough smatterings of casual accounts (see more below)
to suggest that this is a worthy topic of formal research - at what range has combat occurred in Iraq & Afghanistan? I'd hazard that you'd find far more "room-range" incidents from Ramadi and Fallujah than the hills of Afghanistan, but I do remember reading about near face-to-face incidents in A-stan.

"We had moved into an area that had three times the fighting force that we did," said Staff Sgt. Brian Ivers of Colorado Springs, Colo. "We threw everything we had at them."

Still nursing bruised ribs from the al Gharraf battle, Ivers, 38, fell from a balcony and fractured his elbow. The image he remembers most from the Baghdad firefight is of a gunner shouting that he had fed his last belt of ammunition into his machine gun.

"I got a lump in my throat when I saw the Marines fixing their bayonets," he said of the moments before the third platoon caught up with his unit. "Rounds were skipping off in front of them and landing all over the place. They were out of ammunition but they weren't going anywhere."

http://www.guvwurld.org/cgi-bin/live...-%208-3-04.txt

I beleive it was 3/2 that fixed bayonets in An Nasariya. There was a small open field with some palm groves and big *** tall grass near the bank of the river and they were clearing the field, groves and grass. Since it was very close quarters (groves and grass) they fixed bayonets. I may be corrected on who it was..since I was on the move with 2nd LAR and only saw Marines doing it from the road (Mar 23, 03). But I knew 3/2 was there and I am assuming right now it was them.

http://forums.military.com/eve/forum.../7270091741001

[William F. Owen]

What was the scale of issue of the SA80 bayonet in the British Army fireteam in the first half of 2004? That's when the incident happened.

3 out of 4. They did fix bayonets, and they move into contact with the enemy, but most accounts suggest the enemy had already given up, when this happened

However, I've read enough smatterings of casual accounts (see more below) to suggest that this is a worthy topic of formal research - at what range has combat occurred in Iraq & Afghanistan?

It always comes back to folks trying to prove we still need to issue bayonets. Do men use bayonets to kill? Yes, but it is incredibly rare, and many accounts are simply false, - as are many claims made by men about their conduct in battle.
I'd strongly recommend "Not Mentioned in Dispatches" and "The Real Bravo-Two-Zero," as two books that showed how two popular accounts of battles or actions were largely invented.
...that may be a good subject for academic study!

[AdamG]

It always comes back to folks trying to prove we still need to issue bayonets. Do men use bayonets to kill? Yes, but it is incredibly rare, and many accounts are simply false, - as are many claims made by men about their conduct in battle.
I'd strongly recommend "Not Mentioned in Dispatches" and "The Real Bravo-Two-Zero," as two books that showed how two popular accounts of battles or actions were largely invented.

I've read other accounts of how history is re-written in memory and I'm intimately familiar with how Joe, whether he's a PFC or an LTC, can twist reality to suit his own purposes.

However, this is academic wool gathering, as the die has already been cast.

http://www.scrippsnews.com/node/55375
Fri, 07/23/2010 - 13:28

WASHINGTON - The U.S. Army says the last time it mounted a bayonet assault in combat was nearly 60 years ago during the Korean War.

Even so, ever since, hundreds of thousands of new soldiers in basic training have had to master wielding one on a rubber-tire course -- even as their rifles evolved to be incompatible with bayonets and the skill ceased to matter.

Now, after listening to troops share their battle insights after nearly a decade of war in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army has ordered the end to bayonet training, effective this month.

That's not the only training and battle-drill change the Army has made based on insights from the current wars and projections about future ones.

[JMA]

IMO, close combat training and skills are more psychological training than physical training. It is very important for soldiers to be prepared to hand, knive, or bayonet fights.

For many reasons including proportional response to aggression, assaulting an enemy position, searching/reco, these skills are important regarding self confidence.

I share this opinion.

[Ken White]

As did N (That's the Imperial N...), "The moral is to the physical as three is to one."

[Bob's World]

I believe it was some Russian General who said, in a discussion about how few casualties had come from the bayonet during the war with Japan; "Yes, but they were the decisive casualties."

Perhaps. Facing a bayonet charge must be a ballsy thing. But then again, so is executing one.

[slapout9]

I have a good deal of research on Rex Applegate (and the others)and thought that every soldier should be issued and know how to use a combat knife as a basic skill. He never was that found of the Bayonet EXCEPT in Civil Disturbance type situations.

[Pete]

Based on a few years of research, I have found very few truthful accounts of men actually using bayonets in combat.

This debate has been going on for years. Histories of the American Civil War mention many charges with bayonets, but paradoically casualty records of the U.S. Army Medical Department for that war list few casualties from edged weapons. The truth may be somewhere in between, with many assualts with the weapon but few guys hurt by it. I think the answer is that the main power of the bayonet is psychologcal--guys run away when faced with cold steel. I personally don't think the bayonet has much use in modern warfare, unless it's an all-purpose knife and bayonet, like the one for the old M1 Carbine.