Winning the War in Afghanistan

[davidbfpo]

Originally Posted by JMA:

With respect the brush is too broad here.
What happened in the Oman? A lot of "outsiders" used there. Does the same theory apply?

Which Red Rat replied to:

Hmm, I look on Oman as a campaign where things were got right. We supported the in-place government, when that looked to be ineffective in meeting our interests we supported the coup against the government. And we did Loan Service. But I do not see Oman as a COIN campaign waged by UK plc, it was a COIN campaign conducted by the Omani government supported by the UK government. It was also (significantly) not a Coalition effort.

JMA is right the Oman campaign (1970-1976), mainly in the border province, Dhofar, with then South Yemen, involved a lot of "outsiders" and it was a coalition effort ( RR is wrong). I am not familiar with how the Omani government, the Sultan, asserted national control or oversight, but present on the ground were: UK SAS, a large brigade-sized Imperial Iranian force, a Jordanian contingent, mercenary Baluchis from Pakistan made up a good part of the Omani Army and in the air were the RAF, Iranian AF and an Omani AF with a good number of Brits and Rhodesians on contracts.

From 1958-1978 a UK officer was the Omani Armed Forces No.2, a Brigadier Colin Maxwell and a UK loan officer was the Dhofar Brigadier, John Akehurst (who wrote a book 'We Won the War:The campaign in Oman 1965-1975). 'SAS Operation Oman' by Tony Jeapes is another book.

[Red Rat]

Originally Posted by JMA:

Which Red Rat replied to:

JMA is right the Oman campaign (1970-1976), mainly in the border province, Dhofar, with then South Yemen, involved a lot of "outsiders" and it was a coalition effort ( RR is wrong).

I stand corrected!

My understanding is that the other elements were under Operational Control (OPCON) the Omani Armed Forces. I do not recall there being a Coalition structure per se, it was all under a unified chain of command crossing both political and miltary spheres. The UK No 2, Brigadier Colin Maxwell, certainly started off as a contract officer with the Omani armed forces which until the early 1970s (for the rank and file) consisted largely of Baluchis (circa 70% and arabs (30%), a ratio which was reversed over the 1970s.

I wait for someone to enlighten me on the pol/mil command arrangements for the Iranian contingent (who manned the so called 'Red Line') and others.

We seemed to be much more pragmatic about command arrangements then. The equivalent now would be to make an American 4 star general Afghan Minister of Defence, an American Ambassador as the Minister of Interior (the UK dominated the Ministry of the Interior in the 1950s and 1960s as well) and double hat the Minister of Defence as COMISAF. While we are at it we officer the ANP and ANA with contract officers on attractive salaries and run similar schemes in the civil service for 10-15 years until the locals can take over.

[JMA]

Originally Posted by JMA:

Which Red Rat replied to:

JMA is right the Oman campaign (1970-1976), mainly in the border province, Dhofar, with then South Yemen, involved a lot of "outsiders" and it was a coalition effort ( RR is wrong). I am not familiar with how the Omani government, the Sultan, asserted national control or oversight, but present on the ground were: UK SAS, a large brigade-sized Imperial Iranian force, a Jordanian contingent, mercenary Baluchis from Pakistan made up a good part of the Omani Army and in the air were the RAF, Iranian AF and an Omani AF with a good number of Brits and Rhodesians on contracts.

From 1958-1978 a UK officer was the Omani Armed Forces No.2, a Brigadier Colin Maxwell and a UK loan officer was the Dhofar Brigadier, John Akehurst (who wrote a book 'We Won the War:The campaign in Oman 1965-1975). 'SAS Operation Oman' by Tony Jeapes is another book.

From a strategic view I recall that what was decisive in the "hearts and minds" part of the Dhofar rebellion was that they used "turned" insurgents (Firqat units) in the main to work among the locals as they were kith and kin.

Surely that must be a lesson for Afghanistan?

Don't use Uzbeks to police Pashtun areas. Understand and exploit the tribal/ethnic diversity to best advantage.

[huskerguy7]

Don't use Uzbeks to police Pashtun areas. Understand and exploit the tribal/ethnic diversity to best advantage.

I remember this assertion (which I concur with) when reading a report discussing suggestions for the ANP. Scenarios like the one quoted are really happening. To be specific, there has been a significant amount of cases where Tajiks are deployed to police in Pashtun areas. This results with some ethnic friction.

Some ask "How is the ANP/ISAF so stupid in this scenario?" Are they thinking clearly? Answer: Yes, their actions can be supported by a legitimate argument.

Everyone can agree with the fact that the ANP are quite corrupt and don't always carry out the law. The thinking behind this deployment was that if people from the outside, who aren't familiar with the area, then they're going to be less prone to corruption. But, as we have noticed, ethnic friction can occur.

So, what do you guys think? Should "outsiders" (not ISAF soldiers) be sent to these villages, or should we try to rely on local forces?

[JMA]

I remember this assertion (which I concur with) when reading a report discussing suggestions for the ANP. Scenarios like the one quoted are really happening. To be specific, there has been a significant amount of cases where Tajiks are deployed to police in Pashtun areas. This results with some ethnic friction.

Some ask "How is the ANP/ISAF so stupid in this scenario?" Are they thinking clearly? Answer: Yes, their actions can be supported by a legitimate argument.

Everyone can agree with the fact that the ANP are quite corrupt and don't always carry out the law. The thinking behind this deployment was that if people from the outside, who aren't familiar with the area, then they're going to be less prone to corruption. But, as we have noticed, ethnic friction can occur.

So, what do you guys think? Should "outsiders" (not ISAF soldiers) be sent to these villages, or should we try to rely on local forces?

To follow on with my line of thinking...

There has been and continues to be a lot of denial about the role of tribalism in Africa. Yet at the heart of nearly every conflict in Africa there has been the tribal or to a much lesser extent the Muslim/Christian issue.

If you want resentment put a traditional enemy in charge or in a position of authority over another. As long as the colonial master was there to force the situation through things held together but the moment that control was removed things fell apart.

There is a historical record of tribal/ethnic rivalries in Afghanistan.

To bring an Uzbek in to prevent corruption among the Pashtuns is just throwing more salt into old wounds. Then that the US bring in their old enemies the Uzbeks to control them turns the Pashtuns even more against the US. The friend of my enemy is also my enemy.

I suggest that you see outsiders in Pashtun areas as other Pashtuns who don't have a specific "family" connection in that specific area that can be used to subvert their integrity. Under no circumstances bring in outsiders as in Uzbek or Tajik.

Surely you can dig up examples from your own US history in dealing with the various indigenous tribal nations? Playing one off against the other, exploiting differences and old tribal animosities? If you understand the phenomenon you can play it in other areas... or avoid the pitfalls.

Added later: I believe the decisions made in this regard should not be on the basis of what "makes sense" or "sounds logical" to someone out of London or New York City but rather based on an understanding of the Afghan tribal dynamics as they stand. Nobody is going to change these dynamics. Ignore them at your peril.

[Bob's World]

There are a variety of reasons that have combined to both the ANA and ANP being largely recruited and trained in the north, which is more Tajik th an Pashtun.

First this is where the training was set up, so this was the available recruiting base.

Second, the northern populace has in general been more willing to recognize and accept the legitimacy of the Karzai government, so more willing to work for it.

Third, Pashtuns make terrible "defensive" security forces, but are equally terrific "offensive" security forces. They have no interest in manning checkpoints, guarding things, etc; they want to get out and move to contact. Tajiks in general are more accepting of police work.

Fourth is this perspective on rather local or imported police are less corrupt. I suppose the best answer is "it depends." Local ties can actually make the police more accountable to the populace and reduce corruption. Local control by a police chief who owes his position to a local power broker can be bad. "Corruption" is not a one dimensional issue, and the local vs "foreign" (someone from the next valley is often considered foreign) police is just one aspect. I've seen both work well, and both work poorly in just my short experience there.

Personally I would shift the focus from the birthplace of the policemen themselves, and instead focus on the leadership. The ANP has a culture of corruption, and the leaders are beholding to others, and these are seen as money making positions for that very culture, and payments are expected up the chain. I'd recommend looking at how to disrupt that chain that runs all the way back to Kabul that keeps pressure on the police to shake down the populace. Better the shakedown only brings money to the local officials and stays in the region, than be funneled up to Kabul and then out to the UAE.

The Village Stability Operations that so many pundits are trying to portray as SF building private militias are no more than local police, recruited by the local council and leaders, trained locally, and employed locally. They receive less training, and therefore less pay, and have a more narrow mission (no offensive operations, no arrest authority) than other ANSF, but are on a tashkil and are part of the ANP. These forces then snap in with full ANP and ANA (and coalition forces) working in their AORs. This helps fuse local legitimacy up to the official ANSF sent down from Kabul, and provides a check on corruption, a source of more effective humint, and also "humanizes" the local populace more in the eyes of the imported ANP from up north.