The 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War (catch all)

[KingsofWar]

Good call William. I'll concentrate more on interviews.

Also, to what extent was the Second Lebanon War a proxy war between Iran and the United States?

How did the war effect Hezbollah's relationship with Syria and Iran? Israel's relationship with the United States?

[Rex Brynen]

Israel and Israelis actually care very little about what other people think. It's very obvious to anyone who lives amongst them. The supposed PR is mostly irrelevant. The IDF cares about what Israelis think, and no one else.

I'm not fully convinced of this--it rather depends on the issue and the context.

I concur that the 2006 war left Hizbullah much more deterred than it had ever been. This was not the general view in Israel (or even in much of the Israeli government) at the end of the war, when the view that it had been a "loss" was quite widespread. Since then, as the northern border has stayed quiet, the view that it was a deterrent success after all has certainly grown.

The general regional perception that Israel lost is important. It strengthened Hizbullah significantly, and since 2006 the organization has (in terms of capabilities) become much more of a threat to Israel than ever before. The image of Hizbullah triumphing against Israel (whatever actually happened in unit-on-unit engagements) has spurred recruitment by Hizbullah and Sunni Islamists alike, in the Middle East and further afield. Hizbullah is also actively searching for ways of getting at Israel that don't involve military conflict on the border.

More likely OPSEC. Why correct the world's (and Hizballah's) misperceptions and thereby reveal your TTPs/playbook? Better to have Hizballah "course correct" to a false heading than allow them to improve, plan and resource for another punch-up having thoroughly analysed and digested all of Israel's weaknesses. Maskirovka on a strategic scale.

It's more due to bad analysis of what happened on the ground, as Wilf has noted in previous discussions. I do think that Hizbullah performed well above average for an irregular armed force, and not just because it was lavishly equipped with ATGMs. I also think Hizbullah has a reasonable understanding of what went right and wrong--to date, I've seen no evidence that they've either become overconfident, or that they've lost their flexibility and inventiveness.

Theer are several threads on this on SWJ (perhaps one of the mods wants to make up a Hizbullah catch-all thread sometime?)

http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=1034
http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=4188
http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=1109
http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=1012

[William F. Owen]

I'm not fully convinced of this--it rather depends on the issue and the context.

Of course context is critical but, as a people, they are surprisingly impervious to criticism. The Government may have diplomatic issues to contend with, but the people, and the IDF are peculiarly immune to that consideration.

[Rex Brynen]

Of course context is critical but, as a people, they are surprisingly impervious to criticism. The Government may have diplomatic issues to contend with, but the people, and the IDF are peculiarly immune to that consideration.

That's a really interesting question, actually--I can see evidence for it in both directions (which may say something about the complexities of Israeli society!)

On the one hand, Israelis certainly do what they think is necessary for national survival. (This is far from a unique trait, however.)

They do tend to devalue external criticism (often as being motivated by anti-Semitism, whether or not it is), and press ahead doing things (the Gaza siege, settlement, the occupation) that almost the entire world disagrees with.

On the other hand, Israel is enormously sensitive to criticism in other ways. There is no government that I've ever interacted with that gets so upset at outsider comments that are critical of current policy--even when those criticisms are expressed daily in the Israeli press. US government officials, for example, are far, far less sensitive to criticism, in public and in private.

Criticism of Israel is also often perceived by Israelis as somehow aimed at delegitimizing the very state, even when it clearly isn't.

I can see also sorts of complex, intertwined explanations for why this might be: the perception of grave external threat and a dangerous neighbourhood, the legacies of European anti-Semitism and the Holocaust, the tough pioneer nation that also wants to be seen as a member of the Western democratic world, etc.


Now, back to the 2006 war....

[Jesse9252]

b.) Anyone who has studied the conflict is very aware that there was no real strategic objectives set by Israel, and that presented real operational problems in terms of formulating military action.

Okay, I'm confused here. I recognize that the war was executed without much logical coherence, but I thought (based on English-language research only) that the goals were pretty clearly articulated on the Israeli side. Cordesman lists them as:
1) Destroy the Iranian Western Command before Iran could go nuclear.
2) Restore the credibility of Israeli deterrence after the unilateral withdrawals from Lebanon in 2000 and Gaza in 2005, and countering the image that Israel was weak and forced to leave.
3) Force Lebanon to become and act as an accountable state, and end the status of Hezbollah as a state within a state.
4) Damage or cripple Hezbollah, with the understanding that it could not be destroyed as a military force and would continue to be a major political actor in Lebanon.
5) Bring the two soldiers the Hezbollah had captured back alive without major trades in prisoners held by Israel—not the thousands demanded by Nasrallah and the Hezbollah.

Is this incorrect?

[Rex Brynen]

1) Destroy the Iranian Western Command before Iran could go nuclear.

I'm not even sure what this means--but no, I don't think the IDF ever dreamed it could "destroy" Hizbullah. If they did, they would have gone for a war plan and ground commitment that looked like 1982. Degrade longer-range and potential non-conventional missile capabilities? Yes (and not achieved in any meaningful, lasting sense).

2) Restore the credibility of Israeli deterrence after the unilateral withdrawals from Lebanon in 2000 and Gaza in 2005, and countering the image that Israel was weak and forced to leave.

Yep.

3) Force Lebanon to become and act as an accountable state, and end the status of Hezbollah as a state within a state.

Maybe, although one would have to be pretty silly to imagine that "Lebanon" could do that.

4) Damage or cripple Hezbollah, with the understanding that it could not be destroyed as a military force and would continue to be a major political actor in Lebanon.

Damage, yes.. I doubt they were as ambitious as "cripple."

5) Bring the two soldiers the Hezbollah had captured back alive without major trades in prisoners held by Israel—not the thousands demanded by Nasrallah and the Hezbollah.

Yes.

[William F. Owen]

Rex Brynen, as usual has it right enough.

However one of the things that gets missed is that Israel had a plan for a war with Hezbollah. The incredible thing is, that when the shooting started, they simply did not stick to the plan. This is very well documented in Israel, but almost nowhere else.

What got done it it's place had almost no strategic rationale. - and not helped by the fact that aspects of equipment, training and logistics, critical to the plan, had not been implemented or implemented well enough.

[KingsofWar]

So William, Rex and others, which side more generally do you believe achieved a military victory immediately after the war? How about a political victory?

And did this scorecard change in the following four years?

[William F. Owen]

So William, Rex and others, which side more generally do you believe achieved a military victory immediately after the war? How about a political victory?

And did this scorecard change in the following four years?

Huh??? With respect, "Kings of War," these are not questions I would expect an MA student to be asking. They are simplistic.

Why is the condition "immediately after the war" less relevant than that "soon after the war?" Why are you separating "political" and "military." Who taught you Clausewitz at Kings?

I'll kick back the question I keep having to put to UK/US officers visiting Israel, which is:
"Do you think the IDF would have launched Operation Cast Lead, if they were worried about Hezbollah's rocket forces in the North?"

[Rex Brynen]

So William, Rex and others, which side more generally do you believe achieved a military victory immediately after the war? How about a political victory?

And did this scorecard change in the following four years?

I can see what you are getting at here, but you might want to think through your concepts and terminology.

The only meaningful "military victory" is a political one, since war is an instrument of policy. That being said, you can separate out an assessment of "military performance" in an operational sense from the political-strategic outcomes of the war.

I realize that Wilf doesn''t much like the notion of a changing scorecard, but I think it does reflect the perceptions of the parties. In 2006, Hizbullah and broader regional audience would have regarded it as a Hizbullah win, while many Israelis would have regarded it as a losing draw.

Today, the Hizbullah/regional assessment hasn't much changed, but the Israeli assessment (after 4 years of deterrence) has.

The Middle East, by the way, is full of wars with unclear winners. Who won in 1973, Israel or Egypt? The IDF certainly won on the battlefield, surrounding the Egyptian Third Army. However, Sadat (unlike Assad) didn't launch the war to defeat Israel, but to break the diplomatic logjam--which it did, culminating in the 1979 peace treat and full recovery of occupied Egyptian territory. This is the reason why the war is still the subject of annual commemoration in Egypt.

Who won in 1982? The IDF certainly devastated the PLO, and forced it from Lebanon--but at the cost of creating a far more dangerous opponent, Hizbullah. Moreover, there is ample evidence that Sharon had a broader ambition to marginalize the PLO... yet, the war forced the PLO to become even more pragmatic, thereby enhancing its effective pursuit of the two-state solution that Sharon opposed. I would regard this as positive for Israel too, but I'm doubtful that the Israeli (Likud) leadership of the day would have regarded it as such.

In short, wars are messy things, with all sorts of complicated and unanticipated second- and third- order effects.

Policymakers, take note!

[Tukhachevskii]

Who taught you Clausewitz at Kings?

Obviously not the same people who taught me!!! Standards have really dropped (they even have Vivien Jabri teaching there now) WHOA!!! Scratch that I see, Jan Willem Honig is still there. (Can't blame the teachers for their student's laziness I suppose!)

[William F. Owen]

Huh??? With respect, "Kings of War," these are not questions I would expect an MA student to be asking. They are simplistic.

Apologies if I came on a bit strong here. Not my intent to deter you from your endeavour. Keep at me, but people like me are an everyday hazard in this business..... or should be!

[KingsofWar]

You'll have to pardon my terribly worded question. I of course have read Clausewitz and understand that war is an extension of politics by other means. I'm happy to say that Kings professors remain top notch. Ahron Bregman and Sue Onslow were fantastic, although I can't say the same about Julian Reid and his obsession with biopolitics.

What I meant to ask was ... 'Have the realities on the ground in Lebanon and Israel since the war's end slowly chipped away at the argument that Hezbollah defeated Israel? When taking into account Hezbollah's mobility restrictions, infrastructural losses, domestic political opposition, 4 years of enhanced deterrence, to name a few, can it be said that neither side achieved victory? Even when considering Hezbollah's even larger weapons stockpiles?

Rex touched on a bit of this...

[40below]

What I meant to ask was ... 'Have the realities on the ground in Lebanon and Israel since the war's end slowly chipped away at the argument that Hezbollah defeated Israel?

You're asking questions that don't have meaningful answers, no offence. You won't find anyone on the eponymous Arab Street that thinks the Hezzie victory was diminished by what has happened in the years since (might not find too many takers for that view in Israel, either, but I'll leave that to the subject matter specialists here.)

But let enough time pass and the impact of war becomes less important in light of political and economic developments after the hostilities and I don't know how you can frame that argument in a meaningful way. It's like comparing the sales of Mercedes and BMW in 2009 versus Chevy and GM and arguing the US lost WWII. Or that you guys to the south won the War of 1812, when you didn't.

[William F. Owen]

You'll have to pardon my terribly worded question. I of course have read Clausewitz and understand that war is an extension of politics by other means.

You may have read Clausewitz, but understanding him is a "whole other thing." - Clausewitz is widely discussed here on SWJ.

What I meant to ask was ... 'Have the realities on the ground in Lebanon and Israel since the war's end slowly chipped away at the argument that Hezbollah defeated Israel? When taking into account Hezbollah's mobility restrictions, infrastructural losses, domestic political opposition, 4 years of enhanced deterrence, to name a few, can it be said that neither side achieved victory? Even when considering Hezbollah's even larger weapons stockpiles?

OK, so now you just have to do the research!
Considering that an accurate English language account of what actually happened, in 2006 has not yet been written and what does exist is extremely poor, you have an excellent opportunity. Happy to help.

[unmo300]

Certainly, a interesting topic. Unfortunately, I got in late in this discussion, but here are some suggestion from my point of view.

These questions could be answered in three chapters,
1)Buildup to war from 2000-2006, including unilateral withdrawal from southern Lebanon, Intifada, Gaza, change in Israeli leadership etc...
2)Hezbollah's guerrilla tactics during the war. Israel's mistakes and weaknesses.
3)Post Bellum. The war's local, regional, and international implications.

1. The buildup started 1982, with the creation of Hizbollah. A resistance movement, but also a militia during the civil war. The civil war finished 1990, all militias were disbanded except Hizbollah, who could continue as a resistance movement (with the blessing of the international community). And do not call it an unilateral withdrawal, Israel pull out because it was to costly. For some reason Israel kept Sheeba Farms, giving Hizbollah a reason to continue as a restistance movement.
2. Which I had more knowledge about tactics, maybe a visit to Hizbollah theme park could help (see article in todays The Independent). Israeli mistakes, most have been very bad intelligence. Maybe bigger network of spies today, anyhow a lot of spies are being caught in Lebanon.
3. Will only comment on local implications. Lebanon has been on the brink of civil war several times since 2006.

[unmo300]

KingsofWar cited:

Have the realities on the ground in Lebanon and Israel since the war's end slowly chipped away at the argument that Hezbollah defeated Israel? When taking into account Hezbollah's mobility restrictions, infrastructural losses, domestic political opposition, 4 years of enhanced deterrence, to name a few, can it be said that neither side achieved victory? Even when considering Hezbollah's even larger weapons stockpiles?

What I can recall, Hizbollah has not been involved in any exchange of fire with IDF, since 2006. The war was extremely costly for them and the rest of Lebanon, and Nasrallah does not want to repeat his mistake. Who achieved victory? If you ask an Egyptian who won the Yom Kippur war, he will say Egypt. After all they got Sinai desert back. Hizbollah, as an underdog, could stand up to IDF, which earned them a lot of respect.
"Hezbollah's even larger weapons stockpiles?" Is it true, perhaps, or someone is building up a case. http://news.sky.com/skynews/Home/Wor...15661569?f=rss

[unmo300]

Have the realities on the ground in Lebanon and Israel since the war's end slowly chipped away at the argument that Hezbollah defeated Israel? When taking into account Hezbollah's mobility restrictions, infrastructural losses, domestic political opposition, 4 years of enhanced deterrence, to name a few, can it be said that neither side achieved victory? Even when considering Hezbollah's even larger weapons stockpiles?

What I can recall, Hizbollah has not been involved in any exchange of fire with IDF, since 2006. The war was extremely costly for them and the rest of Lebanon, and Nasrallah does not want to repeat his mistake. Who achieved victory? If you ask an Egyptian who won the Yom Kippur war, he will say Egypt. After all they got Sinai desert back. Hizbollah, as an underdog, could stand up to IDF, which earned them a lot of respect.

Hezbollah's even larger weapons stockpiles?

Is it true, perhaps, or someone is building up a case. http://news.sky.com/skynews/Home/Wor...15661569?f=rss

[Bob's World]

Both parties still exist, so neither was "defeated." As to who "won", I guess the best measures are found in assessments of:

1. Relative changes in influence of the two parties, both with each other and with others globally; and

2. Interests of each party going in, and how effectively the operations either positively or negatively affected their pursuit of those interests.

As an aside, I believe that both parties have fascinating "Legitimacy" concerns.

While many focus on the religious aspect of the conflicts between Israel and her neighbors; I believe that much of the motivation for these challenges is that these same neighbors question the legitimacy of Israel's very right to have a state in this location. Certainly they have historic claims, but no greater than those of their challengers. It is the fact that Western powers have worked so hard to establish and sustain this state that I believe creates their greatest legitimacy issues. The fact may well be that Israel can stand on her own two feet; but it is the perception that matters, and I suspect that her neighbors rationalize Israel's existence and survival are primarily due to this outside support, so they do not recognize her legitimacy. I think that the less the West supports Israel, the greater her perceptions of legitimacy will become, and that this is the path to stability.

Hizbollah has very different legitimacy issues. Here is a quasi-state organization that stands with one foot in the official governance of a state, and another in the unofficial, illegal realm of terrorist organization. Between the two grows an expanding body of quasi-state capability and influence. In an age where "state" power is fading a bit, and "non-state" power is growing we don't know quite what to do with such organizations.

Did this conflict hurt or help Hizbollah in its requirement for greater "legitimacy"? Did it hurt or help Israel in its requirement for greater "legitimacy" (again, as assessed in the perceptions of the Muslim populaces that surround them)?

These are questions I would explore, and ones that I suspect CvC would find fascinating if he were around today as well. They really weren't questions that came up much back in his era.

[Abdul]

Hello everyone,

I realize this thread was debated upon nearly 4 months ago however I'm currently writing a BA thesis on a topic which itself was fathomed through the readings of this thread.

I want to start out by stating that my mastery of language will not be as articulate as most of the writers previously in this forum possess, but I'll attempt to respond and counteract posts as best I can.

My thesis will focus on Clausewitz and his philosophy on war, in retrospect to the 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War and the origins of the conflict and parties that led to it. I will attempt to conclude, based on Clausewitz, who the "victor" of the conflict truly was or if there was a "victor" at all.

I realize that my understanding of Clausewitz is limited and I only currently began to read his text. That being said, any help (i.e. opinions, references, analytical perspectives, factual evidence, etc.) in developing my ideas would be gratefully appreciated.