Hey, let's just call them idiots...

[Bob's World]

I believe I said it is "the path to defeat" not "it is defeat." That may seem a nuance to some, but it is the nuance of COIN engagement that separates success from failure.

As to my views on warfighting, they are pretty much in line with everyone else. Where I differ is that I do not believe that insurgency is best countered through warfare; and should not be considered as such.

Certainly insurgency as we define it is a violent challenge to the existing government, but even though a segment of the populace feels compelled to resort to violence as their best option for driving political change, it does not mean that the best course for the government is to in turn wage warfare against its own populace.

Violence is a choice by the insurgent, it is not the insurgency. The insurgent is the overt actor, but he too is not the insurgency. By casting insurgency in the light of warfare one drives themselves to an approach that inevitably becomes one of meeting violence with greater violence, and defeating the insurgent rather than addressing the insurgency.

Insurgency is , more accurately I believe, a political challenge to the government by illegal means. The majority of successful insurgencies are actually non-violent; though often a movement may have attempted a violent approach and when counterinsurgent operations are successful against them, come back with a non-violent approach and achieved the ends that violence could not.

Governments do not do themselves a service by casting themselves in the role of victim, and by setting out to wage war against those members of their populace who feel compelled to challenge them in such ways. Better to see insurgency as a civil emergency, that granted is often quite violent, and then being pragmatic and honest in assessing what failures on the part of government have led to this situation.

Often one finds that institutional and cultural biases have led to the insurgent segment of the society being treated with a disrespect that limits their ability to fully participate in legitimate society, so they resort to illegitimate means to act out against this situation.

Other times governments feel no need to give the populace legal venues to affect change of governance, leaving them no choice but to take illegal approaches when they come to believe that change is required. (Many of the gulf oil states do not tax their populace, and the ruling class joke that while a populace may complain about "taxation without representation," that where there is no taxation, no representation is therefore required. This is a joke that is wearing thin in many of these populaces IMO).

Other times the rule of law as applied to either all or just some segment of a society is not perceived as just and fair in its application.

Many times the populace does not recognize the power or process that produced or sustains their government in power over them.

One or many, or all of these causal conditions are in play when segments of a society feel compelled to act out illegally, and either peacefully or violently, to produce political change. All of these factors are within the power of the government to address; but once one has declared war on their own populace it is difficult to make these changes without feeling like one is somehow "losing" or "appeasing" the enemy. A society loses when it allows itself to devolve into such violence, and meeting the reasonable demands of the people is not appeasement, it is the primary function of government.

So, no, I do not have odd views on warfare. What I find odd is that so many are so quick to cast all violence as warfare. This simply is not the case. Just all populace violence is not insurgency, sometimes it is motivated by profit or power in a small group; or the actions of some isolated sect that is as out of touch with the society they emerge from as they are with the government they challenge. Dumping all of these distinct situations into one bucket and applying a universal solution of "warfare" is as illogical as it is ineffective.

[Global Scout]

Some people consider Ghandi's movement an insurgency, and perhaps it was, but the vast majority of insurgencies are actually armed (violent) struggles for power, not for good government.

This is only my opinion, but I would like to see historical examples that counter it, not politically correct assumptions. Insurgencies are a struggle for power, who is going to rule (whether the entire state, or a portion of the state). Once the contest elevates to the level of an armed conflict, you will not take the wind out of the oppenent's sails by acquiesing to their demands, which are nothing more than propaganda most of the time anyway. In Afghanistan, the Taliban was an externally sponsored insurgency group (UW), and Pakistan's objective was to establish control/influence over Afghanistan. If the communist state of Afghanistan simply focused on governing better instead of fighting, the Taliban would have won sooner. It wasn't a hearts and minds struggle, it was a power struggle, and the HAM approach only augments the power struggle, it isn't what the power struggle is about. If the combatants don't need the popular support to win, they'll disregard this effort. The Taliban doesn't popular support to win, they just need to intimitate the populace (which we're doing a very poor job of protecting), and support from Pakistan to maintain their effort.

Every insurgency is different, and has you have stated many times it is critical we understand what that means. In Sri Lanka, it didn't matter how well the Sri Lankan government ruled to the LTTE, their leader wanted control of the Tamil region, and he killed off his Tamil competition in the pursuit of it. This wasn't a fight over hearts and minds.

North Vietnam couldn't win through their hearts and minds approach, so instead they had to launch a conventional invasion and only when the tanks rolled into Saigon did they win. To ensure their victory they implemented draconian population control measures that included mass murder and re-education camps.

Our softball approach to dealing with insurgencies (assuming we should be involved in the first place) has failed us every time. Our so called COIN experts who promote this effort are a greater threat to our national interests than the enemy we fight.

[davidbfpo]

A "boots on the ground" response to The Atlantic article, yes it touches upon other issues too:http://freerangeinternational.com/blog/?p=3453

Of course that bring the real question to mind which is why aren’t we beating the snot out of them but I’m going to leave that alone for another post or two.

Plus another example of Taliban skill.

[Bob's World]

"North Vietnam couldn't win through their hearts and minds approach, so instead they had to launch a conventional invasion and only when the tanks rolled into Saigon did they win. "

You realize that this is exactly in accordance with classic Maoist insurgency that Ho modeled his campaign after, right? Phase III is to surge to conventional military operations to finish off the the counterinsurgent government and its forces. They tried to reach this level a few times, and had to back off when beaten up for surging too soon. This does not make it suddenly not an insurgency because they seek to rise to conventional combat, it just means it is a Maoist insurgency.

As to the stats on the number of successful non-violent insurgencies vice violent ones, they have been gathered, I have seen them, but don't have them handy. I'll see if I can get them to share here.

Lastly, "politically correct" is to hold to the current position that is shaped by current norms and deemed therefore acceptable...you may, Mr. Global Scout, want to check your bathroom mirror for the next target of this accusation. My positions are based upon what I believe will work best based upon my experience and research, no more and no less; but thanks for calling my politically correct, as that is, I believe a first.

I don't adhere to the "population-centric" success through development and protection of the populace that gentlemen like Dr. Nagl promotes; I see not historic basis for the position. Neither do I subscribe to the "COIN is war, just defeat the insurgent" school of thought, as similarly, I see not historic basis for that working either. I'm trying to sort out what works, and you can neither bribe nor kill your way out of insurgency, you actually have to assess where you are failing as a government and address those failures. Portions of both of the above mentioned approaches have a place within a successful strategy, but neither, IMO, is a successful strategy unto itself.

[Global Scout]

Going with your view it sounds like the opponents are never wrong. All fault at all times lies with the government. Insurgencies have nothing to do with hatred, greed, and grievance (or grievance is the only cause due to bad government).

The blood diamond conflict in W. Africa still exists, because some people actually involved in those conflicts thought the conflicts were over access to a commodity, not about good governance. Obviously that wasn't the case.

The Khmer Rouge arose because the Cambodian government failed its people? I'm sure if the Cambodian government quickly built some roads, schools, etc. the Khmer Rouge would have laid their weapons down, because again they really care about gaining power, they just wanted good governance.

Just because the USSR support communist insurgent/resistance groups in Europe, didn't mean that they then turned these resistance groups into insurgent groups to overthrow pro-western governments. They simply arose from the ground up because of bad government. I guess if the Greek government governed better the communist insurgents would just quit, because it wasn't about obtaining political power and joining the Soviet sphere of influence, the conflict was about good governance. Yet they were defeated militarily.

The list goes on and on. Insurgencies are a struggle for power, not about good governance.

[Dayuhan]

I'm trying to sort out what works, and you can neither bribe nor kill your way out of insurgency, you actually have to assess where you are failing as a government and address those failures.

When the US goes through this process, though, we are not assessing where we are failing as a government: we have no insurgencies. We're generally assessing where some other government is failing. That brings certain complications into the picture.

Our assessment of the failures of other governments is likely to be influenced by oir own preferences and our own assumptions about what constitutes good government and what other people ought to want. These assumptions may or may not be relevant to circumstances in another country.

Even when we have accurately assessed the failures or another government, we do not necessarily have the capacity to compel another government to address those failures. The government may not have the capacity to address the failures. It may have its own assessment of the situation, which may not be compatible with ours. Even when we think we are acting on behalf of the populace, both populace and government are likely to take a rather dim view of external meddling in domestic affairs.

[Presley Cannady]

I'm trying to sort out what works, and you can neither bribe nor kill your way out of insurgency, you actually have to assess where you are failing as a government and address those failures. Portions of both of the above mentioned approaches have a place within a successful strategy, but neither, IMO, is a successful strategy unto itself.

I assume you're conducting such an assessment when you've already capped the degree of brutality and bribery you're willing to apply to the historically anemic levels of the present day.