Some people consider Ghandi's movement an insurgency, and perhaps it was, but the vast majority of insurgencies are actually armed (violent) struggles for power, not for good government.

This is only my opinion, but I would like to see historical examples that counter it, not politically correct assumptions. Insurgencies are a struggle for power, who is going to rule (whether the entire state, or a portion of the state). Once the contest elevates to the level of an armed conflict, you will not take the wind out of the oppenent's sails by acquiesing to their demands, which are nothing more than propaganda most of the time anyway. In Afghanistan, the Taliban was an externally sponsored insurgency group (UW), and Pakistan's objective was to establish control/influence over Afghanistan. If the communist state of Afghanistan simply focused on governing better instead of fighting, the Taliban would have won sooner. It wasn't a hearts and minds struggle, it was a power struggle, and the HAM approach only augments the power struggle, it isn't what the power struggle is about. If the combatants don't need the popular support to win, they'll disregard this effort. The Taliban doesn't popular support to win, they just need to intimitate the populace (which we're doing a very poor job of protecting), and support from Pakistan to maintain their effort.

Every insurgency is different, and has you have stated many times it is critical we understand what that means. In Sri Lanka, it didn't matter how well the Sri Lankan government ruled to the LTTE, their leader wanted control of the Tamil region, and he killed off his Tamil competition in the pursuit of it. This wasn't a fight over hearts and minds.

North Vietnam couldn't win through their hearts and minds approach, so instead they had to launch a conventional invasion and only when the tanks rolled into Saigon did they win. To ensure their victory they implemented draconian population control measures that included mass murder and re-education camps.

Our softball approach to dealing with insurgencies (assuming we should be involved in the first place) has failed us every time. Our so called COIN experts who promote this effort are a greater threat to our national interests than the enemy we fight.