The Taliban collection (2006 onwards)

[Entropy]

Frontline came out with a new episode on the "Taliban" (actually they are mostly HiG) which is quite good. An afghan reporter "embeds" with the insurgents in Baglan province and follows and films them on a mission to ambush coalition forces with IED's, RPG's etc. Provides some valuable insight on fighter TTP and motivation. All in all, well worth the time to watch.

[davidbfpo]

An Afghan journalist's (Najibullah Quraishi) extraordinary 10 days living and filming with an insurgent cell allied with Al Qaeda to sabotage a key U.S./NATO supply route...

Quraishi manages to interview the man in charge of some 4,000 Hezb-i-Islami fighters in the north. His name is Cmdr. Mirwais, a former millionaire businessman who turned to jihad after the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan. "Jihad has become a duty for all the Afghan nation because the foreign and non-believer countries have attacked us," Mirwais says. "They're getting rid of our religious and cultural values in Afghanistan. They've increased obscenity and want to force Western democracy on our country."

In a telling scene near the end of the film, the local Afghan police seem not to appreciate -- or even to acknowledge -- the extent of the insurgent threat in the north. "Everything's fine," the police chief says. "There's no problem. They've caused some problems, but everything's fine in this area near the main road. It's not a problem."

The film is not available in the UK.

[Kiwigrunt]

The film is not available in the UK.

Nor down-under.

[Entropy]

Can you guys get this on youtube?

[tequila]

Haven't watched it yet, but the interview with the journalist at the website is quite fascinating. The clear divide between the local groups and the "Central Group" under the HiG commander Mirwais represents a real opportunity. The tight links between HiG and al-Qaeda, Pakistani, and IMU fighters is also made clear.

[davidbfpo]

Can you guys get this on youtube?

Yes, comrade - can be viewed in the UK and will try to watch another day.

[OfTheTroops]

Its pretty good. It paints a more realistic picture of the insurgent. I love how they fire the RPG so they can get out of the field ( they have to wait until opportunity presents) and then make the false report to their hq that they had killed them all.

Press "d" it doesnt work ....nearing blows "i should kill you"........press "d" .......oh "d" boom

[davidbfpo]

A very critical review of this new book 'My Life with the Taliban':

In his foreword to Mullah Abdul Salam Zaeef’s book, Professor Barnett Rubin of New York University sets the stage for the launch, ostensibly, of a refreshingly authentic work of this inaccurate and revisionist take on contemporary Afghan history.

My Life with the Taliban, written by the former Taliban ambassador to Pakistan, has been praised across the board by the media ‘Afghanologists’ such as Ahmed Rashid and Peter Bergen to academics like Antonio Giustozzi of the London School of Economics, without any critical evaluation....

To those of us who grew up in the NWFP or Afghanistan at the height of US-Saudi-Pakistani anti-Soviet war, the crude lies presented in the account are all too apparent from the get-go, as is the translators-cum-editors’ shallow understanding of the local languages and culture...

(And ends with)My life with the Taliban is a poor narrative by a tainted and poor historian (raavi-e-zaeef). The glorification of the book by authors of repute, impugns their credibility too.

Link:http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default...5-3-2010_pg3_6

[davidbfpo]

Hat tip to Jihadica. This report 'The Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan – organization, leadership and worldview' comes from the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, 86 pgs and only skimmed so far.

Link:http://www.mil.no/multimedia/archive...59_136353a.pdf

The opening paragraph in the summary:

The aim of this report is to get a better understanding of the Taliban movement and its role in the Afghan insurgency post-2001. The approach to this is three-fold: First, the report discusses the nature of the Afghan insurgency as described in existing literature. The second part looks at the organizational characteristics of the largest and most well-known insurgent group in Afghanistan: the Taliban movement (or Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, IEA) led by Mullah Omar. The third and most extensive part of the report analyses the Taliban leadership’s ideology and worldview, based on the official statements of its organization and leaders.

Or shorter:

The primary aim of this report is to examine the Taliban’s official publications and statements in order to get a better understanding of who the “Taliban” are, seen from the insurgents’ own perspective.

The last paragraph concludes:

Lastly, the report discussed the IEA’s attitudes towards negotiations and power-sharing. For the time being, it looks like any attempt to negotiate with the IEA’s leaders directly would serve to strengthen the insurgent movement, rather than putting an end to the violent campaign in Afghanistan. A more realistic approach is probably to try to weaken the IEA’s coherence through negotiating with low-level commanders and tribal leaders inside Afghanistan. The insurgent movement consists of a wide variety of actors, which may be seen as proof of its strength – but it could also constitute weakness if properly and systematically exploited.

[JMA]

Korangal Outpost.

Gen Stanley McChrystal orders the Korangal Outpost abandoned. Re-positioning he calls it. Is anyone buying that this withdrawal is anything but a defeat?

http://atwar.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/...y-the-taliban/

[davidbfpo]

Worth checking the lengthy review of Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop by Antonio Giustiozzi on:http://zenpundit.com/?p=3471

The last sentence sums it up:

What the reader will get from Giustozzi is a grasp of who the Neo-Taliban are as a fighting force and the convoluted, granular, social complexity of Afghan political life in which the US is attempting to wage a COIN war.

I suppose I better read it now!

[40below]

Worth checking the lengthy review of Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop by Antonio Giustiozzi on:http://zenpundit.com/?p=3471

The last sentence sums it up:

I suppose I better read it now!

Well, it's not just you guys who are doing it.

[davidbfpo]

Not sure if previous papers in this series have been posted here.

The latest paper 'The Taliban Beyond the Pashtuns' by Antonio Giustozzi and the Abstract states:

Although the Taliban remain a largely Pashtun movement in terms of their composition, they have started making significant inroads among other ethnic groups. In many cases, the Taliban have co-opted, in addition to bandits, disgruntled militia commanders previously linked to other organizations, and the relationship between them is far from solid. There is also, however, emerging evidence of grassroots recruitment of small groups of ideologically committed Uzbek, Turkmen and Tajik Taliban. While even in northern Afghanistan the bulk of the insurgency is still Pashtun, the emerging trend should not be underestimated.

Link:http://www.cigionline.org/sites/defa...an_Paper_5.pdf

Previous papers are on:http://www.cigionline.org/publications/paper-series/234

[davidbfpo]

A UK Channel 4 TV commentary on a freelance reporter being embedded and later kidnapped by the Taliban:

Channel 4 News has obtained rare film of Taliban fighters on the Afghanistan frontline, including footage of their attacks on US forces. Channel 4 News Chief Correspondent Alex Thomson looks at what the film tells us about the insurgents and their tactics.

The video alas is not working at the moment and yes, often refuses to play abroad.

Link:http://www.channel4.com/news/article...ntline/3734447

[davidbfpo]

Ahmed Rashid, the respected journalist and author of:

Ahmed Rashid, whose book Descent into Chaos is the definitive work on the Afghan war

spoke at IISS (London) on 21st July 2010, on:

addressed the problems associated with talking to the Taliban, regional tensions, the roles played by Afghanistan and Pakistan, the capacity of the Karzai government to win over the non-Pashtun ethnic groups and the problems that can occur with power sharing agreements.

Link:http://www.iiss.org/programmes/afgha...-and-portents/

This is a video of the talk and Q&A.

In a follow-up in The Spectator under the headline 'Pakistan's double game in Afghanistan':

A few months ago Hamid Karzai would have been thrilled to have confirmation that American officers are speaking openly about how divisions of Pakistani intelligence are helping the Taleban. But after spending eight years criticising the ISI, he recently decided to cosy up to them. This change is crucial to understanding what is really happening in Afghanistan.

Karzai seems to have given up on the ability of the Americans, the Brits and Nato either to defeat the Taleban or even to talk to them. This is why he has turned to Pakistan and Iran: his own freelance attempt to try to broker a ceasefire with the Taleban which would involve a power-sharing deal.

I like the last sentence, yes pithy:

The mess in Afghanistan has just got messier.

Link to article:http://www.spectator.co.uk/essays/al...pakistan.thtml

[davidbfpo]

Hat tip to Circling the Lion's Den, who have found this article on Jamestown Terrorism Monitor, with the full title: 'Former Egyptian jihadist predicts Taliban victory' by:

Dr Fadl (real name Sayyid Imam Abdulaziz al-Sharif) was a leading member of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, along with al-Qaeda No2 Dr Ayman al-Zawahiri, but recanted his beliefs while serving a life sentence in prison in Egypt. He later criticised the 9/11 attacks as both immoral and counterproductive..

Link:http://circlingthelionsden.blogspot....-predicts.html

....12 reasons why the Taliban will win:
1. A successful jihad must be accompanied by a religious reform movement. The religious motivation of the Taliban (as opposed to tribal loyalties or the pursuit of wealth) meets this criterion.
2. The Taliban cause is just, as it seeks to repel foreign occupation.
3. Cross-border tribal bonds with Pakistani Pashtun tribesmen are vital to the jihad’s success; “Loyalty of the Pashtu in Pakistan to the Pashtu in Afghanistan is stronger than their loyalty to their government in Islamabad.”
4. Jihad has popular support from the people of Afghanistan, who provide fighters with support, shelter and intelligence.
5. The nature of the terrain in Afghanistan and the inaccessibility of Taliban refugees make it eminently suitable for guerrilla warfare; “He who fights geography is a loser.”
6. The backwardness of Afghanistan favours the success of jihad. The Soviet experience proved that even a scorched earth policy has little effect on people who are tolerant, patient and have little to lose in the first place. There is little in the way of cultural establishments to be destroyed – Afghanistan’s monuments are its mountains and “even atomic bombs do not affect them.”
7. As the battlefield widens beyond the Taliban strongholds in the south, occupation forces must face increasing financial and personnel losses.
8. Both time and the capacity to endure losses are on the side of the Taliban, who “do not have a ceiling to their losses, especially with regard to lives…”
9. Suicide operations make up for the shortage of modern weapons.
10. After three decades of nearly continuous warfare, Taliban fighters and leaders have the necessary experience to prevail against the occupation.
11. History is also on the Taliban’s side. Despite being world powers, both the British Empire and the Soviet Union failed to conquer Afghanistan.
12. Pakistan’s support of the Taliban provides the necessary third-party refuge and supplies to any successful guerrilla struggle.

Can anyone argue with his logic?

Yes, this could fit in a number of threads, but as OEF-Afghanistan is now really the 'Long War' it deserves exposure in its own thread.

[Rodin]

It is interesting to note how much western thought, both good and bad, pervades his points. Setting aside the overtly religious notions, were a western author to base a book on those arguments they might justly be accused of orientalism.

From this summary it apears 'Dr Fadl' may be re-imagining jihad as a kind of Islamic way of national resistance.

[davidbfpo]

I just find that the author, Dr Fadl, was being praised for his writings when countering AQ's version of the Jihad and one can hardly expect his views on the Taliban to be greeted enthusiastically, let alone given greater publicity.

[Global Scout]

1. What he refers to as a religious reform movement is actually religious based terrorism, where the Taliban are "imposing" their extremely cruel form of Sharia Law (IAW your local warlord who can't even freaking read, much less have a knowledgable grasp of Islamic law). Most importantly, most Afghans don't this form of Sharia law, but they do want the fighting to end, which they may believe a Taliban victory would provide.

2. Unfortunately I can't argue this point, and I bet the vast majority of Afghans see us a foreign occupation force, while we still see ourselves as the cowboy wearing the white hat. Just here to help you little people out. Jihad has a degree of popular support because we are seen as occupiers.

5. “He who fights geography is a loser.” All wars take place in terrain, and while the terrain is challenging, we're not fighting the terrain, we negotiating it. The enemy does enjoy some protection offered by the terrain, but also faces many of the same terrain challenges we do.

6.

The backwardness of Afghanistan favours the success of jihad.

Since we're not employing coercive strategy against the people of Afghanistan I'm not sure this is relevant. However, if our vision of victory is modern and stable state, then it is.

7.

As the battlefield widens beyond the Taliban strongholds in the south, occupation forces must face increasing financial and personnel losses

. What's new here, but we need to remember that the other side is also taking casualties and is financially strained.

8. Both time and the capacity to endure losses are on the side of the Taliban, who “

do not have a ceiling to their losses, especially with regard to lives

…” That is his opinion, but I think every group/nation has a breaking point where they lose the will to fight.

9.

Suicide operations make up for the shortage of modern weapons.

Suicide attacks make for good propaganda, but realistically from a military viewpoint just how effective are they? They do not "in military terms" make up for the shortage of modern weapons; however, they're an effective political/psychological weapon.

10.

After three decades of nearly continuous warfare, Taliban fighters and leaders have the necessary experience to prevail against the occupation.

Both sides are learning, so while important three decades of warfare doesn't equate to the "necessary" experience required for victory. More than experience is required.

11.

History is also on the Taliban’s side. Despite being world powers, both the British Empire and the Soviet Union failed to conquer Afghanistan

. The Taliban didn't defeat the Soviets or the British Empire. The Taliban are a Johnny come lately in Afghanistan history.

12.

Pakistan’s support of the Taliban provides the necessary third-party refuge and supplies to any successful guerrilla struggle.

Sadly this is true, but the winds "seem" to be changing in Pakistan ever so gradually. If Pakistan quits providing support to the Taliban, would the Taliban stand even a remote chance of winning? I see a lot of talk about strategy, seems to me that the strategic center of gravity isn't in Afghanistan, but Pakistan and if we get that right the Taliban will lose.

[Dayuhan]

Sadly this is true, but the winds "seem" to be changing in Pakistan ever so gradually. If Pakistan quits providing support to the Taliban, would the Taliban stand even a remote chance of winning? I see a lot of talk about strategy, seems to me that the strategic center of gravity isn't in Afghanistan, but Pakistan and if we get that right the Taliban will lose.

I think we lose sight of the real problem when we say that "Pakistan" supports the Taliban. If support for the Taliban were a policy of the Pakistani government, the possibility of changing that policy would be open. It might be more accurate, though, to say that portions of the Pakistani populace, the Pakistani military, the ISI, and other government entities support the Taliban, and the government lacks the capacity to control these portions or to compel them to stop supporting the Taliban. This is a bit more complicated: we may be able to pressure the Pakistani government into changing its policies, but if that government lacks the capacity to enforce its policies it really doesn't matter.