Are snipers and recon still valid in infantry battalions?

[TAH]

It will convert to an SBCT sometime next year (or maybe FY 12)


Right.



The Recon SQDN in the the BFSB is an emasculated organization- besides the LRS, it only has 4 x 6 truck scout platoons, in two troops. The LRS is bigger than the 2 recon troops combined. What a crock.

The recon in the BCT is too big- better a large (4 platoon) troop in the BSTB, with a couple more troops (a big mounted troop, and a LRS) in the DIV HHB.

I guess I come down on the side of DIV CAV AND a Recon BN, like the USMC, is a good idea.

My bad on the HBCT. I thought that's what was going to happen based on what they did with the two Guard ACRs. But 2nd went SBCT a while back.

Agree with all of your comments on the BFSB.

But....

The concept of seperate battalions in a division is now gone.

Prior to modularization/transformation, we had "type" divisions: light, airborne, air assault, mechanized and armored (we will set aside 2 ID).

While each type was different, they did share a common set of units (battalions and companies) organic to the "Division Base". Those were: an ADA Bn, an Engineer Bn, an MI Bn, a Signal Bn, MP and NBC companies and a Cavalry Sqdrn. All gone now. Re-orged into either a BCT or a modular Support Brigade.

So, the discussion of adding an additional Bn to the division is moot. Sorry.

[Sabre]

My bad on the HBCT. I thought that's what was going to happen based on what they did with the two Guard ACRs. But 2nd went SBCT a while back.

Agree with all of your comments on the BFSB.

But....

The concept of separate battalions in a division is now gone.

Prior to modularization/transformation, we had "type" divisions: light, airborne, air assault, mechanized and armored (we will set aside 2 ID).

While each type was different, they did share a common set of units (battalions and companies) organic to the "Division Base". Those were: an ADA Bn, an Engineer Bn, an MI Bn, a Signal Bn, MP and NBC companies and a Cavalry Sqdrn. All gone now. Re-orged into either a BCT or a modular Support Brigade.

So, the discussion of adding an additional Bn to the division is moot. Sorry.

Ah, but where is your sense of adventure? We’ll just attach the DivCav Squadrons to the... uh, “whatever” brigades. After all, the DivCav *was* part of the Air Combat Aviation Brigade in the old Division86/Army of Excellence designs – and we *do* still have one ACAB per division…

Back in the days of 2nd ACR (Light), we called two dozen Humvees out on recon missions a “light cav troop”. Now two dozen Humvees, a company of grunts, and an unnecessarily larger grouping of MI weenies calls itself a “brigade”. (…and only 4 UAVs! A single platoon, added almost as an after-thought) Delusions of grandeur…
Seriously, more MI personnel does not equal more actionable, accurate intelligence.

In the first moment that I saw the new BCT organization, just a glance, I saw two combat battalions and a cav squadron. I reflexively assumed that the cav squadron was similar to the old DivCav, and thought “Huh, that could work. A cav unit for economy of force, to hold everywhere else, and two battalions for a one-two punch.”

Sadly, of course, that turned out not to be the case. The cav/scouts organizations look like the pieces that they had left over, after shattering the old MTOEs. Can’t really fight, can’t /won’t be allowed to /don’t want to do recon, either. Recall that 3/7 Cav, a DivCav organization with 3 ground troops, 41 Bradleys and 27 M1 tanks, led the way deep into Iraq, quite successfully. It’s quite ironic that the DivCav, and now, finally, the last of the Heavy ACR’s, is being totally dismantled despite proven combat effectiveness, despite being the most modular organizations in the entire Army for *decades*, dismantled in the name of modularity. Absurd. (And don’t complain about a heavy ACR didn’t fit into ArForGen and RIP-TOA, etc. Thinking that every problem on the battlefield happens to be exactly two combat battalions big at all times is a fantasy.)

(BIG CAVEAT – everything below is NOT referring LRS, but to heavy Cav units)

Seeing enough of the Army, staring at enough MTOEs, and reading enough history, and I am convinced that, at the end of the day, you’d better have some organizations that can fight. That, and perhaps we are trying to “push a noodle uphill” with regards to recon. (I agree with the "Scouts Out" paper - Cav units are used to fight, because that is what commanders need the most - so let's dispense with the facade.)

We are supposed to defer to the judgment of the commander on the ground.
Recon and cavalry organizations often end up in direct fire combat. Sometimes it’s because that it what the commander wants. Commanders have made a very CLEAR and CONSISTENT choice to either explicitly task or tacitly allow Cav organizations to fight. Sometimes it works, sometimes it doesn’t… sometimes it is merely necessary - but that is just like any other military endeavor. Perhaps it’s time to admit that there may be a good reason for this. Perhaps we should admit that we only think that we need way more intelligence than we will ever actually be able to get in real life, or that we’d change what we were doing in the face of that perfect intelligence if we ever did somehow get it.

I know, I know, with brigades/battalions at NTC, if the scouts got decisively engaged they got destroyed, and if the scouts got destroyed, then the whole unit did as well. (Looking back at the numbers, I don’t recall the ones where the scouts actually lived doing so hot, either.) Well, what did we expect? 6 Bradleys just got swallowed up so fast (just a few mechanical breakdowns, and you are at 50%). 10 Humvees can easily get eaten alive just as quick on real-world battlefields that are far “messier” than the battlefields of simulations or even the NTC.

I’d say the real problem was that, IF we really wanted to do recon, then we didn’t have enough scouts – which admittedly, the current BCT does finally have. Notably, scouts can also fight better than the ever-increasing numbers of MI people that turn up in every tiny tweak to the TOEs. I think that MI branch has actually managed to grow from the numbers it had back in the 80’s, when Army end-strength was vicinity 800,000 (and now it is down to what, 547,000-ish).

In the end, in a US Army that expects to fight outnumbered, why wouldn't we want formations to have an good, solid economy-of-force Cav outfit that can fight? (Even more so, given only two combat battalions per brigade...)

[TAH]

In the end, in a US Army that expects to fight outnumbered, why wouldn't we want formations to have an good, solid economy-of-force Cav outfit that can fight? (Even more so, given only two combat battalions per brigade...)

Could not agree with this conclusion more.

However, adding anything to the current organization means a corresponding subtraction somewhere else.

My thoughts over on the BCT threat about a Re-structured HBCT Cav Sqdrn is a zero sum game. I "re-arranged the deck chairs" with the end result being two "Heavy" Cav Troops (13 CFVs and 9 tanks) and one Light/wheeled troop in the Cav Sqdrn. Much more combat capability then the current. The price was the substution/reduction in the CABs to a six-HMMWV platoon of limited/restricted capability.

Too much time, effort, resources ($$s) was tied up in the "Quality of Firsts, See 1st, understand 1st, act 1st, finish 1st" Blah, blah blah. We also had too many folks for too long who could not see recon as a mission vice a unit type. The doctrine changed back in March 2010. Now Recon Sqdrns are "allowed" for fight for information. However, the equipment and organizations remain the same

The Billpayers to field the HBCT Recon Sqdrns were: the Brigade recon Troops, The Division Cavalry Sqdns, and the ADA Bns (strangly enough). The piece/parts available to transform/modularize were armored HMMWVs and CFVs and a handful of tanks. The tought of tanks in recon was bad. (What do you need those for? You'll just get into a fight and get distracted from your real purpose...) Same over in the SBCTs, no MGS in the recon just the line battalions.

[gute]

If the primary job of the ARS is to conduct reconnaissance and not look for a fight why not replace it with a SBCT RSTA squadron/model? The CAB scout teams have six M3 vehicles instead of 2-3 and M114s?

Now, this is based on the HBCT receiving a third CAB.

Secondly, is a squadron necessary or should one large troop be capable of doing the job (again, this is based on a 3-CAB HBCT)?

[TAH]

If the primary job of the ARS is to conduct reconnaissance and not look for a fight why not replace it with a SBCT RSTA squadron/model? The CAB scout teams have six M3 vehicles instead of 2-3 and M114s?

Now, this is based on the HBCT receiving a third CAB.

Secondly, is a squadron necessary or should one large troop be capable of doing the job (again, this is based on a 3-CAB HBCT)?

1. While the job of the ARS remains unchanged, there is now general concurrence that mounted reconnaissance will often require figthing for information. The current 3X5 platoon lacks the combat power to do that when deployed as sections (one HMMWV + 1 CFV).

2. The CAB scout platoon share the same 3X5 task organization.

3. The SBCT ARS Troops have three platoons of 4 vehicles each vice two platoons of eight in the HBCT. Part of the issue is the lack of standard platoon and troop organizations are overly complicting training.

4. Force struture remains a "zero-sum" issue. Add a 3rd CAB means somethinf like 50% fewer HBCT. There are currently 25 HBCT split between the active army and national guard. That means 50 CABs. Putting a third CAB into each HBCT would most likely result in 16/17 HBCT, a nearly 1/3 reduction in the number of HBCTs. This does not count the recent announcement to convert 2 or three HBCTs.

5. Large troop versus squadron depends on what you mean by large and the loss of the squadron staff for inter-facing with the Bde. The current HBCT ARS has a total of 20 CFVs, 30 armored HMMWVs and 6 120mm mortars. Really little more the two troops (one tracked and one wheeled) already.

[82redleg]

Proposition:
Standardize ALL mounted recon platoons at 10 x vehicles.

IBCT Recon SQDN mounted troops utilize HMMWVs.

SBCT RSTA SQDN uses 1 x M1127 troop (3 x 10) plus 2 x HMMWV troops.

SBCT IN BN uses 1 x M1127 platoon.

HBCT ARS (not really an ARS anymore, but anyway) uses 3 x M1127 troops (3 x 10).

HBCT CAB uses 1 x M3 platoon.

Alternatively, we can go back to the mixed troops from the ACR, LCR and DIV CAV- each recon troop has 2 x recon PLTs (10 vehicles now, instead of 6) and 2 platoons of tanks/MGS/TOW HMMWV. The organization of all troops (and platoons) is the same. The difference is the system.

Rough math (I'm sure TAH will correct me) tells me that we can get the force structure personnel (not sure about the systems, but that should be doable, too) from the overhead (HHCs, CO HQs) of the HBCTs we have to reduce to put 3 CABs in each HBCT, with requisite CS/CSS elements (FA Btrys, EN PLTs, FSCs, etc).

[TAH]

Proposition:
Standardize ALL mounted recon platoons at 10 x vehicles.

IBCT Recon SQDN mounted troops utilize HMMWVs.

SBCT RSTA SQDN uses 1 x M1127 troop (3 x 10) plus 2 x HMMWV troops.

SBCT IN BN uses 1 x M1127 platoon.

HBCT ARS (not really an ARS anymore, but anyway) uses 3 x M1127 troops (3 x 10).

HBCT CAB uses 1 x M3 platoon.

Alternatively, we can go back to the mixed troops from the ACR, LCR and DIV CAV- each recon troop has 2 x recon PLTs (10 vehicles now, instead of 6) and 2 platoons of tanks/MGS/TOW HMMWV. The organization of all troops (and platoons) is the same. The difference is the system.

Rough math (I'm sure TAH will correct me) tells me that we can get the force structure personnel (not sure about the systems, but that should be doable, too) from the overhead (HHCs, CO HQs) of the HBCTs we have to reduce to put 3 CABs in each HBCT, with requisite CS/CSS elements (FA Btrys, EN PLTs, FSCs, etc).

So now I get to be the "Math Nazi"

The math does got two ways personnel and vehicles.

A 10-vehicle platoon would need as a minimum 30 Soldiers (pretty much the recent standard) I am more inclined to standarize at 6 vehicle platoons.

Knox was/is pushing 36-man scout/recon platoons.

6 CFVs = 6 fully manned vehicles + 18 dismounts spread across two or three sections.

6 M1127 RVs = 6 fully manned vehicles + 18-24 dismounts spread across two-three sections.

6 HMMWVs (or JLTV in the future) = 6 fully manned vehicles + 12 dismounts and 6 extras as there is no more room in the HMMWV (four inside and one up top).

I favor the single function platoon inside a mixed troop so 2 scout platoons = 2 "gun" platoons works for me.

By adding the "Gun" platform you get addiotional capability as opposed to just more of the same.

[Sabre]

However, adding anything to the current organization means a corresponding subtraction somewhere else.

My thoughts over on the BCT thread about a Re-structured HBCT Cav Sqdrn is a zero sum game. I "re-arranged the deck chairs" with the end result being two "Heavy" Cav Troops (13 CFVs and 9 tanks) and one Light/wheeled troop in the Cav Sqdrn. Much more combat capability then the current. The price was the substitution/reduction in the CABs to a six-HMMWV platoon of limited/restricted capability.

Too much time, effort, resources ($$s) was tied up in the "Quality of Firsts, See 1st, understand 1st, act 1st, finish 1st" Blah, blah blah. We also had too many folks for too long who could not see recon as a mission vice a unit type. The doctrine changed back in March 2010. Now Recon Sqdrns are "allowed" for fight for information. However, the equipment and organizations remain the same

The Billpayers to field the HBCT Recon Sqdrns were: the Brigade recon Troops, The Division Cavalry Sqdns, and the ADA Bns (strangely enough). The piece/parts available to transform/modularize were armored HMMWVs and CFVs and a handful of tanks. The thought of tanks in recon was (considered) bad. (What do you need those for? You'll just get into a fight and get distracted from your real purpose...) Same over in the SBCTs, no MGS in the recon just the line battalions.

I rather like your particular rearrangement of deck chairs.

What I find interesting about the ADA cuts was that, de facto, "Gun" ADA units often provided convoy security and extra firepower in general. Perhaps it's often overlooked, but it still was a constant historically. Of course, no one believes that the USAF will ever do anything less than a perfect job of clearing the skies of enemy airpower. (Do any potential enemies have attack helicopters? I forget.)
Of course, my worry is that this combat power wasn't really replaced (and that's in addition to all of the Heavy Cav that got a lot lighter.)

On a similar subject, as best I can tell, the Cav units were a big bill-payer for the MI battalions, when those were first conjured up in Division 86 (as the CEWI). I can recall an article by a general complaining that the new CEWI battalions weren't adding sufficient value, and on top of that he had now had less Cav. (Back when DivCav was two ground troops of 19 Bradleys each, and two AirCav troops.)

Of course, that general was complaining back in the 80's.
Back when the US Army was much larger, and MI branch was actually smaller than it is now.

But yes, your plan would give a Brigade commander two economy of force heavy troops, and one light one for sneaking around - probably the best we could hope for, given the current constraints.

[TAH]

I rather like your particular rearrangement of deck chairs.

What I find interesting about the ADA cuts was that, de facto, "Gun" ADA units often provided convoy security and extra firepower in general. Perhaps it's often overlooked, but it still was a constant historically. Of course, no one believes that the USAF will ever do anything less than a perfect job of clearing the skies of enemy airpower. (Do any potential enemies have attack helicopters? I forget.)
Of course, my worry is that this combat power wasn't really replaced (and that's in addition to all of the Heavy Cav that got a lot lighter.)

On a similar subject, as best I can tell, the Cav units were a big bill-payer for the MI battalions, when those were first conjured up in Division 86 (as the CEWI). I can recall an article by a general complaining that the new CEWI battalions weren't adding sufficient value, and on top of that he had now had less Cav. (Back when DivCav was two ground troops of 19 Bradleys each, and two AirCav troops.)

Of course, that general was complaining back in the 80's.
Back when the US Army was much larger, and MI branch was actually smaller than it is now.

But yes, your plan would give a Brigade commander two economy of force heavy troops, and one light one for sneaking around - probably the best we could hope for, given the current constraints.

I appreciate the vote of confidence and concur with your overall assesment.

An interesting aside is the use of ADA/AAA units for missions other then shooting things out of the sky. It started back in Korea and continued in Viet Nam. During OIF, it was the best use of the resources as opposed to letting them sit idle. The gate guard / perimeter security mission at the FOB I was on in Iraq was done by the Brigade ADA Battery. When the 41st Division went in 2005 it was not initally given and ADA Bn (No mission) but I think it was given back for just such roles as above.

The only things left for the ADA guys to shot at are TBM, UAVs and cruise missiles. All viable threats. Oh and mortar rounds and rockets before the hit a FOB.