Supply routes to Afghanistan

[huskerguy7]

A somewhat recent issue of PBS's Frontline touches on how the Taliban and their allies are trying allocate more resources to the north to counter this shift in convoys.

Link: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontl...banlines/view/

Afghan journalist Najibullah Quraishi journeys deep into the insurgents' territory as they attempt to sabotage an important new American supply route and open up a dangerous new front in the north.

[davidbfpo]

The headline is 'Militants attack convoy of Nato tankers in Pakistan', which after recent allegations and history may come as no surprise, read on as there is a surprise.

Gunmen in Southern Pakistan have torched tankers carrying fuel destined for Nato troops in Afghanistan, one day after Pakistani authorities stopped supply convoys in protest at a cross-border air strike that killed three soldiers....which were parked in Shikarpur just before dawn....

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...ghanistan.html

Never having heard of this district I checked with Google etc; it is in Sindh Province and where two national highways crossover. Coordinates: 28.00°N 68.40°E and on the route to Quetta northwards:http://maps.google.com/maps?ll=28,68...r,%20Pakistan)

This is the furthest south I can recall such an attack.

[davidbfpo]

Behind the headlines that Pakistan has opened the Afghan crossing points to NATO truck movements an unusual mention of the option few talk about - using Iran.

A commentary on the opening and Pakistan's use of the valve:http://www.opendemocracy.net/opensec...-10-12%2005:30

The commentary that refers to using Iran:http://www.opendemocracy.net/neil-pa...ghan-stability

Two paragraphs:

Today the Afghan campaign is reliant on Pakistan’s transit routes, which are subject to repeated attack, and the US allegedly has “no alternatives” to dealing with the anti-ISAF forces in Pakistan on their own terms. A transport link through Iran would reduce this western vulnerability, giving ISAF a freer hand to hold Pakistan accountable, while easing Islamabad’s own security burden and forcing the Pakistani military to take serious action.

Greater coordination with Tehran would also help bring the western Afghan warlords in Iran’s sphere of influence into the political process, counter Sunni extremists like the Taliban, manage Afghan opium cultivation (of which Iran is the greatest victim), and open up a secure trade and transport route to Central Asia – not to mention stabilize Iraq and the Gulf. Though Washington sees Iran through the lens of Israel, Tehran may be a lynchpin to a stable Afghanistan, a prospect that’s otherwise looking bleak.

Many links within the article - which I have not followed.

I suspect that some European NATO members already use the Iranian route, which IIRC has a rail link to the city near Herat.

[Danny]

Davidbfpo,

I appreciate your following this issue. Like me, you have been interested in it for a while.

But the commentary is flawed. Of course we have alternatives. Easy? No. It would require work. Cheap? No. It would require financing. Serenely safe? Probably not. It would require some amount of guarding. But of course, these issues aren't so troublesome now that they can be compared to the same thing through Pakistan.

Bold? Sure. It would be right in the Russian's back yard. And maybe this would be one advantage of it, along with saving Georgia from the next Russian invasion (to get to their bases in Armenia).

http://www.captainsjournal.com/2009/...-the-caucasus/

If only we had started this process 18 months ago like I recommended, and if only they had listened to me 2.5 years ago when I told them exactly what the enemy strategy would be (attacking international and local lines of logistics).

http://www.captainsjournal.com/2008/...d-afghanistan/

I don't mean to preen, but it's all out in front of them. All of the warnings were issued. It's too late for them to complain about it now. It could have been different but they chose the current course.

[davidbfpo]

Danny,

What I do not understand is how politicians, diplomats and many others got to this position before a single lorry moved. I vividly recall commenting an open meeting in Whitehall 'We cannot wage any campaign in Afghanistan without Pakistani logistic support' and the looks of surprise that the issue was raised were amazing.

Straying away from the logistic theme for a moment. In strategic terms how have we ended up with such a large, heavy commitment in Afghanistan, pursuing aims that history and culture strongly indicate will not work?

Add logistic vulnerability and you just gasp. Akin to Nelson at Copenhagen, not watching the signals.

[Fuchs]

"Evolution of Petroleum Support in the U.S. Central Command Area of Responsibility" Army Sustainment Sept/Oct 2010


I didn't check for it, maybe someone else already mentioned this article.

[davidbfpo]

Fuchs,

Some of the information has appeared before, but the article has a lot more detail and IIRC the first time the date when a switch to the north was agreed upon. So thank you.