Joint Force Quarterly # 59, due to be published next week, will contain an article by myself covering some of the same ground as Mr. Beehner's piece above - but with a very different take.

From my reading of events, Sri Lanka's victory had much, much more to do with the economic and physical isolation of the LTTE between 2001 and 2007 than the shift in tactics (brutality) emphasized in most of the literature and papers published thus far (including this one)

The LTTE’s collapse was the result of cumulative external and internal forces, not simply the employment of ruthless new tactics. Indeed, there is little beside the ability to disregard Western criticism that distinguishes Sri Lankan tactics or brutality post-2005 from earlier eras, as the conflict was already one of the most violent and ruthless in the world. Critical blows from internal defections, loss of external funding, a global antiterrorist mindset after 9/11, and second order effects of the 2004 tsunami crippled the LTTE. At the same time, foreign aid, domestic politics, and external political cover from China enabled the Sri Lankan government to resume its COIN campaign from a position of strength. The combination of these factors proved decisive in the defeat of the LTTE.

Hopefully I will be able to link the JFQ paper on SWJ in the next week.

Niel

(xposted from blog comments)