These early capitalist manufacturies were not comparable to General Dynamics or Boeing which would likely get a complex tank reworking contract.
That's why I'd call them manufacturies to avoid misleading about their nature.
The fuel consumption of a MBT (and there are much more fuel-efficient ones than Abrams) is operationally of lesser importance than the its practical range, which in turn depends on consumption+tank size. The practical road range can actually increase with weight if you change a design to accommodate greater fuel capacity.
Most WW2 bridges in Europe were limited to 26 tons - even a T-34 faced bridge troubles. Most rivers weren't as tamed as they are today and had offered the alternative of fording in some places.
Recovery of heavy tanks was a problem, but this was obviously overcompensated with battle performance, from the total loss ratios (tanks lost vs. tanks killed) were still great, even superior to 25 ton tanks while taking into account per unit costs.
Heavy tanks always had their issues, but both the positive and negative myth-spinning around the German ones of WW2 was very distorting.
Not the historical record, but today's technology, threats, mission profiles and operational doctrine decide on the optimum weight range of combat vehicles. I say everything from 40 to 70 metric tons is debatable, and I personally prefer 40-50 metric tons for many reasons.
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The use of mines to secure roads would immediately kill the war effort politically, it's therefore a self-defeating idea.
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