Now wait a minute. You seem to assume a single fill up and its resulting range is all that is important. Isn't that synonymous with President Bush's "Mission Accomplished" when we reached Baghdad? What about the other 7+ years and required stability ops? What about initial heavy fuel consumption every few hours over hundreds of miles whether moving or not to power the electronics and sensors?
As for fuel under armor to achieve range, divide 500 gals x 7.4805 to calculate how many cubic feet of fuel tank under thick armor is required. It's about 67 cubic feet requiring armor.
Deployment sorties and fuel consumption of two alternative combat equipment partial packages for early air-deployment:
First option (current CAB maneuver cross-section with 53-ton GCV):
2 Armor companies with 14 tanks each + 1 for CAB Cdr = 29 tanks
2 Infantry companies with 14 each 53-ton GCV = 28 GCV
2 M-ATV in each Infantry company = 4 M-ATV
11 HEMTT fuel tankers
29 M1A2 x 500 gals = 14,500 gals
28 53-ton GCVs x 300 gals = 8,400 gals
4 M-ATV x 40 gals = 160 gals
Total = 23,060 gals every 8 hours?
11 HEMTT fuel tankers carrying 2250 gals = 24,750 gals carried
63 C-17 sorties required
2nd Option (air-deployable smaller CAB with 40-ton GCV)
One Armor company with 4 platoons (16 tanks) + 3 in Co HQ (1 for CAB Cdr) = 19 tanks
Two Infantry companies with 11 each 40-ton GCV + 11 each M-ATV = 28 GCV + 22 M-ATV
7 HEMTT fuel tankers
19 M1A2 x 500 gals = 9,500 gals
22 40-ton GCV x 240 gals = 5,280 gals
22 M-ATV x 40 gals = 880 gals
Total = 15,660 gals every 8 hours
7 HEMTT fuel tankers carrying 2250 gals = 15,750 gals carried
39 C-17 sorties required
Note the substantial difference between 39 and 63 C-17 sorties meaning ample supporting equipment/supplies could augment the 2nd alternative before reaching a 63 sortie total approximating that at Bashur over 5 nights in northern Iraq during the 173rd ABCT airdrop and airland.
Note the addition of far more M-ATV in the Infantry companies of the smaller air-deployed task force to assist in securing perimeters, moving light troops of the heavy-light task force, conducting patrols and stability ops, and providing for sustainment using inbound C-17s as the supply source.
In Iraq, then LTC Marconi, the lead armor TF commander for the 3rd ID advance on Baghdad had problems at bridge locations at two separate locations. Marines had problems at An Nasiriyah with tracked AAVs getting stuck in mud on the far side of a bridge when trying to avoid taking big vehicles through a narrow city road. They eventually had to assault through the city street and were fortunate to make it through fierce fighting...and those were lighter but still quite long and wide AAV.Most WW2 bridges in Europe were limited to 26 tons - even a T-34 faced bridge troubles. Most rivers weren't as tamed as they are today and had offered the alternative of fording in some places.
Recovery of heavy tanks was a problem, but this was obviously overcompensated with battle performance, from the total loss ratios (tanks lost vs. tanks killed) were still great, even superior to 25 ton tanks while taking into account per unit costs.
Unless fuel trucks have the same mobility and speed over terrain as the combat vehicles they are supporting, there is a potential problem during the first and subsequent refuelings, i.e. horses and lesser armored trucks trying to support tanks and IFVs moving cross-country at speed. Few U.S. advances involve just a single refueling and short capitulation which is why the lessons of other countries involving shorter lines of communications and no intertheater deployment do not apply to U.S. GCV requirements, IMHO.Heavy tanks always had their issues, but both the positive and negative myth-spinning around the German ones of WW2 was very distorting.
Threats tend to get exaggerated relative to U.S. and allied capabilities. Hezbollah is not a typical threat having years to prepare covert defenses and infiltration of weapons. The U.S. generally gets involved defending other nations that have been invaded. That gives the enemy less chance to prepare his defenses in a newly secured location if we can air-deploy credible forces within 100 miles of the enemy within days rather than months. With sufficient warning, we can airland forces prior to any threat border or amphibious crossing thus precluding any need for forcible entry. In other scenarios, ABC/CBS/CNN/FoxNews/NBC could be showing C-17s on the ground at Guam, Hawaii, and Alaska carrying both Strykers and heavy-light task forces ready to roll down the runway within minutes. That could be new doctrine...a joint Army and Air Force contribution to AirSea Battle perhaps, IMHO.Not the historical record, but today's technology, threats, mission profiles and operational doctrine decide on the optimum weight range of combat vehicles. I say everything from 40 to 70 metric tons is debatable, and I personally prefer 40-50 metric tons for many reasons.
Good point about allied and Karzai resistance, but was not talking about roads. Maybe the mountainous portions of the border. Maybe adjacent to a concrete wall built around Kandahar with concertina and signs warning civilians.The use of mines to secure roads would immediately kill the war effort politically, it's therefore a self-defeating idea.
I've noted far fewer civilian suicide attacks and problems of Palestinians infiltrating into Israeli areas since the wall was constructed in the West Bank and around Gaza. Similar lessons were learned in Baghdad...until the walls started coming down.
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