The MLRS is a great system but wouldn't fit in w/the MAGTF's speed or Maneuver Doctrine; the system would need to be Air Mobile.
We do make use of the much lighter truck mounted version of MLRS (HIMARS) but you'd never see it in an Expeditionary maneuver.
Why not?
HIMARs carries the ATACMS and MLRS families of munitions and is C130 transportable.
ETA: The M777 does have some limitations. There is a need to traverse, but that is hardly slow.
The key advantage that it offers is reliability. An SPH that suffers a mobility breakdown is out of action. A towed piece can be pulled behind another prime mover.
Last edited by SethB; 08-30-2010 at 12:45 AM.
What your not taking into account is nobody fights in Artillery Duels anymore.Originally Posted by Fuchs
The M777 is a system of systems that play their particular role to make up the Fire Support backbone of the MAGTF. The defining role of the MAGTF is to use Speed & Dispersion to rapidly mass fires at the time & place most advantageous to the MAGTF.
There's a reason why I'm not comparing the M777 to or against Self-Props. B/c against a Maneuvering Combined-Arms Enemy S-P's are sitting ducks. And operating within a Maneuvering C-A Unit an S-P would be out paced.
S-P's serve a purpose, sure in its realm its a Beast, especially some of the newer Euro models.. but in an Army. In a Static Conflict, a well matured battlefield w/well established lines, or slowly moving forward behind steady advancing lines, sure.
But in a fast moving Expeditionary Setting against a C-A enemy, it'd get ground up.
With that said, an S-P has no place in a MAGTF, so no need to add it to the discussion, convo triage.
For the V-22.The only good thing about it is the low weight, but I don't get why this was kept so low because CH-53 can easily lift much more over useful distances and the H-60 can't do under adverse weather conditions (hot) over good distances.
Last edited by COMMAR; 08-30-2010 at 01:43 AM.
It can't be slung. As described above, anything that can't be slung will hamper a Maneuver Force, 110mph vs 45mph.
The CH-53K, coming in the next 5 or so yrs, will have the lift capability; but I don't know if it will be something that they'll want to do.
The ATACMS is a reeaal beast. If you can put that thing on a truck I can't see why you can't fire it off an LCS?
Last edited by COMMAR; 08-30-2010 at 01:16 AM.
(I)
Oh, really? I tell you artillery duels might become as much the centre of arty thinking as they were in the 80's once a Western force faces a true threat instead of beating up some almost defenceless remote country. The sensor and communication technologies have improved and might sense and track hostile artillery quite Star Trek-like.
Why did you mention" stand-off" ad compared with the range of other guns if you didn't think of an arty vs. arty threat??
(II)
"system of systems". You seriously drunk that Kool-Aid. It's a gun made of expensive metals.
"mass fires". Seriously, you cannot "mass fires" with a single arty battery. That term has already a defined meaning, and everybody with understanding of military doctrine and military history should think of something entirely different when he reads "mass fires" than the MAGTF is capable of.
Besides; how does this "mass fires" fit to your earlier focus on Excalibur???
"The defining role of the MAGTF is to (...) mass fires at the time & place most advantageous to the MAGTF."
The snake bites its tail.
(III)
SPHs are sitting ducks compared to a towed howitzer? I've never heard a greater defiance of reality. The M777 can leave its firing position in no less than a minute or two, while SPHs do so in seconds after their last shot.
The M777 is less off-road capable and slower when towed than a SPH and utterly dependent on aerial transportation (and a air situation that allows for the use of rotor aviation!) for any fast movement.
The M777 is the sitting duck.
(IV)
You sure don't understand the potential or history of SPHs. Hint: They were first developed for and deployed by armoured divisions. They were meant for mobile warfare, not for anything associated with slowness. That were the towed guns.
(V)
"Fast-Moving Expeditionary Setting"? Seriously, there has never been an expeditionary setting that beats the operational or advance speed of conventional warfare. The advance to Baghdad in 2003 was about as slow as some of Napoleon's campaigns, for example - a far cry from feats like 300 km in four days as they were achieved against multiple hostile divisions with tanks of 40 km/h top speed and trucks of 60 km/h top speed along only two roads.
I don't see why SPHs which are mobile on their own should have any problems in high-speed ops if well-maintained. Meanwhile, I can easily imagine how a M777 battery waits for helicopters and doesn't get that kind of transportation because of the threats and competing demands (or takes away this rare asset from very important competing demands).
(VI)
Oh, really? MAGTFs have tanks, right? I see absolutely no problem with a self-propelled system in an MAGTF. They're incapable of facing first rate forces without their heavy vehicles in any mission but defence on closed terrain anyway, lacking combined arms qualities. Therefore they could limit themselves to mortars on 100% airborne missions.
How many guns are required to mass fires and which nations doctrine are you using to define the term?
Massing fires is about focussing the fires of more than one unit (battery).
Interestingly, MC doctrine (FMs) is rarely if ever mentioning "mass fires".
So in what doctrinal publication will you find mention of massed fires?
In the FM 6-50 I can find references to the best way to mass a PLTs firepower. That is 3-4 cannons.
Staying in that nation, FM 6-30 clearly shows that massing fires is about one battalion of arty or more, in 1-3. A single Bty is shown as non-massed fire example.
(16 July 91 version of FM 6-30)
A battery is the basic firing unit. Splitting up batteries in demibatteries was known for centuries, but a battery is still the basic unit. A basic unit's fire is hardly "massing fires".
Last edited by Fuchs; 08-30-2010 at 08:31 PM.
Because every unguided ammunition would require a high degree of three-axis stabilization that's not existing for HIMARS and because HIMARS has no salt water hardening and MLRS/HIMARS' reloading procedure would not work properly on a ship at medium sea states.
The USN has done preliminary studies and came up with a prohibitively expensive approach for a navalized MLRS.
The German navy and industry recently installed a PzH2000 turret on a warship for testing purposes (keyword "MONARC") and was reminded of the enormous challenges of navalization. The idea was dropped.
You have doctrinal references to massing the fires of PLTs and two ships (which is 2-4 guns depending on which ships) and you still want to argue the point?
Massing fires means delivering rounds from more than one gun at the same time, as in a TOT or AMC mission.
What do you write about?
The FM6-30 says
Someone who claims that a battery on its own is able to "mass fires" is illegitimately mis-using a "positive" term by applying it inappropriately.(2) Massed Fires. Massing all available fires normally
enables us to inflict maximum effect on a target with a
minimum expenditure of ammunition. It also reduces our
vulnerability to enemy target acquisition (TA) devices.
Failure to mass fires gives the enemy time to react and
seek protection. Figure 1-3 compares massed fire and
successive volley ammunition expenditures to get
equivalent effect. Massed fires of three battalions fining one
round are more effective against soft targets than one
battalion firing the same total number of rounds in
successive volleys. This is because of the minimum time lag
between volley impacts. Massed fires ensure maximum
effect in attacking targets that can easily change their
posture category for example, a soft target (personnel in
the open) can easily become a hard target (personnel with
overhead cover).
A firing battery of slow-firing howitzers (and M777 is slow-firing in comparison to SPHs of the last 30 years) - even in conjunction with a mortar battery - is not "massing fires".
That's the "normal" amount of fires.
We don't talk about "massing artillery fires" before we've got at least a battalion of artillery ready & in range.
I don't like it at all when people hijack terms to already hype overhyped hardware with inappropriate application of said term. An MEU has a battery of 6 M777. You cannot "mass fires" with that.
Fined terms should not be watered down by inflationary use.
Russian artillery officers would have a potentially fatal laughing attack if they heard this hype about M777s in MC and Airborne service.
It's a low-performance gun, badly crippled by its weight limit and hardly capable of outperforming 30 year old guns coupled with civilian software and PDAs.
I could program a full system of artillery fire control for a whole division based on Visual Basic and IP-capable in a matter of a few weeks or months with my personal programming skills. I know programmers who could do it in a matter of days. It's delusional to become enthusiastic about fire control equipment as 90% solutions are so easily available.
Most importantly, it cannot compensate for the huge shortcomings of the basic gun. That gun is 100% obsolete by modern conventional warfare standards. It's a mere fig leaf in comparison to what's in production for mechanised brigades these days.
Even the mainland Chinese have a SPH that outclasses the M777 so much it's not funny.
It does also outclass the Paladin, Braveheart and GCT.
The DFCS of the M777A2 has two primary advantages. It outclasses the GDU that was previously used to transmit digital fire commands.
It also lays itself. When the fire commands come down (digitally) the gunner simply turns the gun until the screen says laid. Then the weapon is ready to fire.
Thus there is no need for a survey section, aiming circle, collimator, or a GLPS.
Of course, some SPHs do the same. But to suggest that a conventionally sighted weapon is capable of the same speed in occupation or displacement is pure fantasy.
As for massing fires, I've searched through several of the most significant artillery FMs for relevant US doctrine. There are indeed references to Platoon and Battery massed fires.
In fact, the common thread in massing fires is the simultaneous nature of impact and/or function.
Artillery doesn't have to mass fires. Each gun could be allowed to fire as the section chief is able to fire. The downside is that this would provide the target a chance to harden himself, by getting inside a vehicle or into a hole.
The end result is that an FDO can order the battery to fire at his command. Which means each chief will inform him when they are loaded and set on the proper quadrant and deflection/azimuth. Then the FDO orders the PLT/BTRY to fire and all the rounds arrive near simultaneously.
Guess what they are doing.
You can say what you like about Russian artillery. Based on conversations with people that have used it, they are not nearly as advanced as American systems, particularly in fire direction.
May I ask what major artillery school you have graduated from?
Massing fires means getting 2 or more firing units to attack the same target.
These firing units are generally batteries or platoons, but I have "massed" 2 demi-platoons- in Afghanistan, we split each firing battery into 3 2-gun "platoons".
The thing that makes it tricky is that, by being in 2 separate locations, you increase the # of variables- massing is an exercise in mathematical elimination of error- getting everyone on a common database. There is not magic to it, just mastery of gunnery.
When I was a LT in the late 90s, we practiced it extensively- massing the BN every time we went to the field (battery based organization, with only 3 firing units, made it not much of a challenge), and practiced passing tactical control of the BN from the BN FDC to the BTRY FDCs, so all 3 of us learned how to control the massing of the BN.
The cannon units did it when I was in Korea (01-03), and my BN at Bragg did it exactly once (OCT 03) that I know of. Of course, with the demise of DIVARTY and the focus on distributed operations (if you're doing FA stuff at all) made massing a BN less of a priority. When I was in command in A-stan in 05-06, I had the only two platoons (one wasn't even from my BTRY) that had overlapping range fans- and we massed them. It took some rehearsing, but it wasn't that difficult. I imagine that, as long as two firing units have overlapping range fans, it is still being practiced. It would be if I were running things.
I must have missed the Memo...
Uh, you do know that we're not really that concerned about conventional warfare in the near term, that the thinking is that the mobility of the 777 compensates for capability shortfalls in the roles envisioned for the near term, right? And that we're working on Son of Paladin? That, if necessary, we could even buy or license build some PzH 2000s or rapidly resurrect the Crusader or -- more likely -- FCS NLOS-C?
All of which have their own problems...
There is no perfect weapon, all are compromises and each accepts certain shortfalls as payment for certain capabilities. The 777 offers mobility for adequate capability in the fire support role for some units. There is no intent for US heavy guys to give up their SPs and there's an upgrade working. LINK. At least we aren't contemplating buying Caesars...
However, the fact that you disagree with the UK, US and Canada on the 777 is noted.
I'd buy the Archer personally but then, I'm not an Artillerist. Nor do I have to move in assaults from the sea nowadays -- or be supported by a 75mm pack howitzer. Life is better...
Pack 75s
The retired colonel who had once been the chief of Army Medical Department logistics told me that during the 1970s the medical post Fort Detrick, Maryland had to cancel a visit by the U.S. Army Parachute Team, the "Golden Knights," due to a scheduling conflict. He said the next day when the Pack 75mm howitzer in front of the flagpole at post headquarters was fired during the flag-lowering ceremony at Retreat white feathers filled the air and settled slowly to the ground ...
I'll ask some of the gunners I know, but I don't think any of them see the M777 as inferior to other systems they've used (M-119, C1, C3, LG-1).
As for the definition of "massed fires" I dug back into some Canadian History where Canadian gunners ruled the roost. A "Mike" target called for a regimental shoot (about 18 guns). An "Uncle" shoot called for the entire Divisional Artillery to engage a target. A "Victor" target was a Corps level shoot and a "William" target an Army shoot. This was topped off by a "Yoke" target, which was an Army Group Royal Artillery shoot. The latter two shoots were, by the end of the war, seeing over 1,000 guns engage a target area.
Now that's massed fires.
I read somewhere (probably in the Field Artillery Journal) that the last DIVARTY TOT in combat was in 1944.
If we did that now we would have to use a lot fewer guns to deliver the same amount of firepower. DPICM is about 12 times as effective as HE (or so I am told) and each M30 MLRS contains 404 submunitions, the same amount as 4.5 155 rounds. Oh, and it is GPS guided.
So you may be losing something in sheer amount of firepower, but we still have options, and our forefathers would probably be proud.
As for the superiority of the M777, the only extant towed gun that can come close is probably the Denel G7. Thanks to Ken for pointing that one out. Imagine a M777 but in 105, with a longer range.
Just my 10 Shekels.
a.) All good armies need good artillery and lots of it. This is not going to change. Massed fires and counter-battery skills are and always will be required.
b.) Like HIMARS, Truck mounted guns are extremely capable. BAE Archer is one example. Israel has put a 52 cal 155 on a HEMTT 8x8. Works very well.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Ken, with all due respect - the U.S.Army has been working on the son of the M109 for a generation. The latest attempt (FCS NLOS-C) included a 39cal barrel, a huge dosage of hype and thoroughly substandard actual performance of the gun.
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