Well, as I say, I think it is a big mistake to see COIN as "warfare", so of course the critical issues are civil/policy. After all, the heart of my perspective is that insurgency is a condition that comes to exist within a populace when that same populace perceives conditions of poor governance to exist. These are conditions caused by action or inaction on the part of the government so it stands to reason that the majority of the fix is on the part of the government as well.

Just because the military focuses on applying violence to the violent aspects of the insurgent groups that arise from these conditions of insurgency; and just because civil governments are quick to dump the entire problem on the military once it goes violent, does not in turn somehow turn it into a military problem with a military solution.

The Army/Marine Corps manual on COIN goes off the rails sentence one, paragraph one, chapter one, where it states that "COIN is Warfare." That's like going out the door with your static line unhooked. One big mistake up front makes the rest of the operation a whole lot harder than it ought to be.