"Deep Strategic"?!?! Come on? really? I just returned from Mongolia without a visa. I could have walked out of Bejing Airport without papers. I could have taken a motorcycle ride into Russia.Originally Posted by Ken White
Exotic in SOCOM = "direct action". That is why SOCOM will never be successful in LRS missions.
LRS is mentally challenging for NCOs during planning (72hr planning cycle) because they have to plan for every contingency for a 48 or 72 hr mission.
During the mission, the TL may report back, via HF on di-pole or inverted V or a long whip that "the weather is sunny but no vehicle traffic". This is not "sexy" but it is important! SOCOM hates this report but it is GREAT in LRS!
LRS is dying because OCS schools dont teach that the NCOs can plan as well as lead.
If you are my officer, you still have to plan and lead better than me.
"Deep Strategic"?!?! Come on? really? I just returned from Mongolia without a visa. I could have walked out of Bejing Airport without papers. I could have taken a motorcycle ride into Russia.
My bad on the HBCT. I thought that's what was going to happen based on what they did with the two Guard ACRs. But 2nd went SBCT a while back.
Agree with all of your comments on the BFSB.
But....
The concept of seperate battalions in a division is now gone.
Prior to modularization/transformation, we had "type" divisions: light, airborne, air assault, mechanized and armored (we will set aside 2 ID).
While each type was different, they did share a common set of units (battalions and companies) organic to the "Division Base". Those were: an ADA Bn, an Engineer Bn, an MI Bn, a Signal Bn, MP and NBC companies and a Cavalry Sqdrn. All gone now. Re-orged into either a BCT or a modular Support Brigade.
So, the discussion of adding an additional Bn to the division is moot. Sorry.
Hooray for you.
Civilians can do all sorts of things guys in uniform cannot. However, that has absolutely nothing to do with the fact that SOCOM has worldwide responsibility while the combatant commands all have geographic limitations. The to-be LRS Companies in the BfSBs can do deep strategic recon but will be constrained to their Theater; SOCOM has no to few Theater limitations (personality dependent). Nor does that have much to do in an era of relative international peace with the way those borders and nations would be in a state of war...
That's true. That's partly due to a very flawed personnel system that says a TF 160 aviator, a C-141 driver or a SEAL can be the BBMFIC. All Generals are not equal. It can also be attributed to the 'ability' of the "Kill 'em all and let God sort 'em out" Shooter mentality to too often acquire a nominal peacetime advantage or lead over more thoughtful but possibly less openly agressive SF -- and LRS -- types. Very different mindsets. Neither is wrong but they are different...Exotic in SOCOM = "direct action". That is why SOCOM will never be successful in LRS missions.It isn't.Why is it a bad thing that a LRS team leader has been to additional schooling for leadership/planning?I don't entirely disagree but I do wish Ranger School did a better job of teaching leadership and combat operations and put a little less emphasis on the mind games showing people they can take more stress than they may have thought they might. Being old enough to have two Infantry / Recon combat tours before there was a Ranger School plus a few more afterwards, I'm not one, didn't miss it a bit (I'm lazy...). One son was an RI, so we're an equal opportunity family.(Note my Bias: I believe EVERY leader would benefit from at least attempting Ranger/Light Leaders training.)
Nothing wrong with being a Ranger. There's a great deal wrong with believing that so being makes one smarter, stronger, better in any and/or all aspects than those who are not (or that an LRS guy will necessarily be better if he has a G suffix...). Actually, it isn't really wrong -- but it can be dangerous...
Ah, but where is your sense of adventure? We’ll just attach the DivCav Squadrons to the... uh, “whatever” brigades. After all, the DivCav *was* part of the Air Combat Aviation Brigade in the old Division86/Army of Excellence designs – and we *do* still have one ACAB per division…My bad on the HBCT. I thought that's what was going to happen based on what they did with the two Guard ACRs. But 2nd went SBCT a while back.
Agree with all of your comments on the BFSB.
But....
The concept of separate battalions in a division is now gone.
Prior to modularization/transformation, we had "type" divisions: light, airborne, air assault, mechanized and armored (we will set aside 2 ID).
While each type was different, they did share a common set of units (battalions and companies) organic to the "Division Base". Those were: an ADA Bn, an Engineer Bn, an MI Bn, a Signal Bn, MP and NBC companies and a Cavalry Sqdrn. All gone now. Re-orged into either a BCT or a modular Support Brigade.
So, the discussion of adding an additional Bn to the division is moot. Sorry.
Back in the days of 2nd ACR (Light), we called two dozen Humvees out on recon missions a “light cav troop”. Now two dozen Humvees, a company of grunts, and an unnecessarily larger grouping of MI weenies calls itself a “brigade”. (…and only 4 UAVs! A single platoon, added almost as an after-thought) Delusions of grandeur…
Seriously, more MI personnel does not equal more actionable, accurate intelligence.
In the first moment that I saw the new BCT organization, just a glance, I saw two combat battalions and a cav squadron. I reflexively assumed that the cav squadron was similar to the old DivCav, and thought “Huh, that could work. A cav unit for economy of force, to hold everywhere else, and two battalions for a one-two punch.”
Sadly, of course, that turned out not to be the case. The cav/scouts organizations look like the pieces that they had left over, after shattering the old MTOEs. Can’t really fight, can’t /won’t be allowed to /don’t want to do recon, either. Recall that 3/7 Cav, a DivCav organization with 3 ground troops, 41 Bradleys and 27 M1 tanks, led the way deep into Iraq, quite successfully. It’s quite ironic that the DivCav, and now, finally, the last of the Heavy ACR’s, is being totally dismantled despite proven combat effectiveness, despite being the most modular organizations in the entire Army for *decades*, dismantled in the name of modularity. Absurd. (And don’t complain about a heavy ACR didn’t fit into ArForGen and RIP-TOA, etc. Thinking that every problem on the battlefield happens to be exactly two combat battalions big at all times is a fantasy.)
(BIG CAVEAT – everything below is NOT referring LRS, but to heavy Cav units)
Seeing enough of the Army, staring at enough MTOEs, and reading enough history, and I am convinced that, at the end of the day, you’d better have some organizations that can fight. That, and perhaps we are trying to “push a noodle uphill” with regards to recon. (I agree with the "Scouts Out" paper - Cav units are used to fight, because that is what commanders need the most - so let's dispense with the facade.)
We are supposed to defer to the judgment of the commander on the ground.
Recon and cavalry organizations often end up in direct fire combat. Sometimes it’s because that it what the commander wants. Commanders have made a very CLEAR and CONSISTENT choice to either explicitly task or tacitly allow Cav organizations to fight. Sometimes it works, sometimes it doesn’t… sometimes it is merely necessary - but that is just like any other military endeavor. Perhaps it’s time to admit that there may be a good reason for this. Perhaps we should admit that we only think that we need way more intelligence than we will ever actually be able to get in real life, or that we’d change what we were doing in the face of that perfect intelligence if we ever did somehow get it.
I know, I know, with brigades/battalions at NTC, if the scouts got decisively engaged they got destroyed, and if the scouts got destroyed, then the whole unit did as well. (Looking back at the numbers, I don’t recall the ones where the scouts actually lived doing so hot, either.) Well, what did we expect? 6 Bradleys just got swallowed up so fast (just a few mechanical breakdowns, and you are at 50%). 10 Humvees can easily get eaten alive just as quick on real-world battlefields that are far “messier” than the battlefields of simulations or even the NTC.
I’d say the real problem was that, IF we really wanted to do recon, then we didn’t have enough scouts – which admittedly, the current BCT does finally have. Notably, scouts can also fight better than the ever-increasing numbers of MI people that turn up in every tiny tweak to the TOEs. I think that MI branch has actually managed to grow from the numbers it had back in the 80’s, when Army end-strength was vicinity 800,000 (and now it is down to what, 547,000-ish).
In the end, in a US Army that expects to fight outnumbered, why wouldn't we want formations to have an good, solid economy-of-force Cav outfit that can fight? (Even more so, given only two combat battalions per brigade...)
Could not agree with this conclusion more.
However, adding anything to the current organization means a corresponding subtraction somewhere else.
My thoughts over on the BCT threat about a Re-structured HBCT Cav Sqdrn is a zero sum game. I "re-arranged the deck chairs" with the end result being two "Heavy" Cav Troops (13 CFVs and 9 tanks) and one Light/wheeled troop in the Cav Sqdrn. Much more combat capability then the current. The price was the substution/reduction in the CABs to a six-HMMWV platoon of limited/restricted capability.
Too much time, effort, resources ($$s) was tied up in the "Quality of Firsts, See 1st, understand 1st, act 1st, finish 1st"Blah, blah blah. We also had too many folks for too long who could not see recon as a mission vice a unit type. The doctrine changed back in March 2010. Now Recon Sqdrns are "allowed" for fight for information. However, the equipment and organizations remain the same
The Billpayers to field the HBCT Recon Sqdrns were: the Brigade recon Troops, The Division Cavalry Sqdns, and the ADA Bns (strangly enough). The piece/parts available to transform/modularize were armored HMMWVs and CFVs and a handful of tanks. The tought of tanks in recon was bad. (What do you need those for? You'll just get into a fight and get distracted from your real purpose...) Same over in the SBCTs, no MGS in the recon just the line battalions.
If the primary job of the ARS is to conduct reconnaissance and not look for a fight why not replace it with a SBCT RSTA squadron/model? The CAB scout teams have six M3 vehicles instead of 2-3 and M114s?
Now, this is based on the HBCT receiving a third CAB.
Secondly, is a squadron necessary or should one large troop be capable of doing the job (again, this is based on a 3-CAB HBCT)?
We also lack aviation assets. This is a big deal. No aviation, limited LRS capability, period.
Reed
Oh come on. Army aviation is the luxury version of LRS insertion and LRS exfiltration.
Competent and motivated LRS can their job do without such support, even if that means that the losses rise by a few per cent.
Army aviation wouldn't be of much use for LRS in face of well-equipped opponents any way.
Btw, can I quote your assertion that the U.S. lacks army aviation assets? It'll be good for many laughs with friends all over the world.
No, you may not. What I assert is that BfSB has no organic aviation assets, making LRS mission planning difficult. Especially in a NG BfSB. Yes we do other insertion methods, including stay behinds (one of the better ones), vehicle, boat and walking. However, useful time on station for Rucking in 75 or so klicks is pretty limited, unless your waiting for a friendly advance to catch up to you.
Reed
Concur, Reed. This has been an issue going back to Vietnam. Note that Reed says organic air assets...things the commander controls and "owns."
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
Have a look at any given scenario, compare the area and the forces involved. In most scenarios you could infiltrate and exfiltrate in a Lada Niva without unacceptable risk.
You're too much accustomed to the high end luxury solution.
LRS teams of a few men would not need and not get a helicopter QRF in a major conventional war. That's peacetime nonsense. Corps commanders must not care about a sub-squad sized team when they're facing full brigades. There are always better uses for a MilSpec helicopter on a full war battlefield than waiting on a helipad for an emergency call or facing hostile air defences for the mere insertion of two surveillance teams.
LRS would also not exfiltrate just because rations are depleted. They would organise some food and relocate by a few kilometres. The hostiles will likely not have the personnel to execute sweeps anyway.
One more shocker: LRS in wartime (challenging, major conflict) would quickly become 90-95% quickly retrained personnel, not some elite force. The present LRS strengths suffice barely for maintaining enough experts for wartime trainer needs.
I save this file under "encountered yet another quality exaggeration, zero casualty tolerance peacetime attitude".
Oh, the luxury of being Eurocentric...
At Baumholder (12 x15 km, 400m maximum elevation change), yes. At Fort Irwin (110X80km, 1,500m elevation changes) No. Even more so in Alaska where Reid11B is located and trains -- and where there are few road and a lot of boreal forest and squishy tundra, No. In Afghanistan, No. This:may work in Germany or much of Europe. It will not in the deserts of the ME or North Africa, in the Hindu Kush or in the Jungles of Africa, South America or South East Asia. It'll get you killed quickly in most scenarios outside Europe.In most scenarios you could infiltrate and exfiltrate in a Lada Niva without unacceptable risk.Losses aren't the major issue -- time and distance are the issues. Foot and Vehicle infil and exfil takes a lot of time...Competent and motivated LRS can their job do without such support, even if that means that the losses rise by a few per cent.Without going into any TTP, that is just flat incorrect. Both the Fernspählehrkompanie and a number of US LRSU use that method routinely in exercises and elsewhere agasinst some technologically advanced opponents.Army aviation wouldn't be of much use for LRS in face of well-equipped opponents any way.As he pointed out, that's not what he said. Having a desire to snipe is okay, doing that without understanding or noticing all that is said or written can cause one to have to have a foot surgically removed from ones mouth...Btw, can I quote your assertion that the U.S. lacks army aviation assets? It'll be good for many laughs with friends all over the world.
As Steve Blair mentioned, that lack of direct control of Aviation has been problematic since Viet Nam -- and it was in Desert Storm and has been currently. Unfortunately, there is no easy solution; the guys who are really good at contested flights don't like to haul the nut and bolt LRS guys...No one mentioned casualties other than you...I save this file under "encountered yet another quality exaggeration, zero casualty tolerance peacetime attitude".
You're going to file it there? Really? I filed it under the 'All Wars will be as I Wish Them Syndrome' heading; got a bunch of posts there from Americans and others who think all wars will go a certain way and that detailed knowledge of one war, one terrain set, one Army's peculiarities lend them omnipotent expertise. Those folks always forget there are other places and other ways of doing things...
Armies that operate worldwide have to make a lot of undesirable compromises. It would be great if they could program and train more narrowly and everything was more predictable -- but it never is so they cannot.
I mentioned casualties because the need for quick exfil was the very best explanation for why anyone would consider helicopters a necessity for LRS.
Speed and time are only critical if the conflict is very fast-moving (in that case the corps commander better gets his timing right to set up recce & surveillance before his decisive action) or if the LRS teams have problems with sustainment (food, hydration).
I do assert that they can get food and water from their area of operations (at the very least when leaving it for another), so the portable amount does not restrict their mission duration. The morale is the real limiting factor (unless something goes wrong on the mission).
Conflicts with a force density that prohibits infil and exfil on land will most likely not allow for risky helicopter flights with a useful depth. Helicopters are very vulnerable to all kinds of missiles (and the countermeasures only help against one kind) and at low altitude they would face even more threats.
The Fernspäher do a lot, including training with UH-1Ds which wouldn't be considered fit for duty in an actual LRS mission even if the company was very desperate. At least their unit name acknowledges that it's a training outfit. An army corps would rather need a battalion or more of LRS teams in actual war.
I struggle a bit with the idea how infil/exfil on vehicle could take a lot of time. You could easily attempt to reach your target position for 15 hrs/day. It may take a whole night to move for 10 km at maximum caution, but vehicles can use the element of surprise and speed for a completely different style. 100 km/day should easily be feasible in most terrains world-wide.
Few armies have enough troops to set up checkpoints and OPs everywhere. Most cannot even maintain a single proper picket line without disintegrating their combat brigades.
You mentioned that access to aviation assets has worsened after Vietnam. Do you realize that Vietnam was the extremum, the exception? No army has greater access to aviation support, all need to make do without much of it.
This means that better access to aviation support cannot be necessary for a greater LRS capability.
That's why I sniped at the dependency on luxuries.
Points to consider...
Apparently in your opinion. I'd be inclined to say that was a very poor reason. If the team is in a good and important location and is otherwise uncompromised, I'd leave the casualty(ies) there to take their chances in order to avoid compromising the team and thus the mission. Distance is the most likely reason to infiltrate by air, time next most likely. Exfiltration is a whole different bundle of contradictions and the Team may just be abandoned. War's tough on folks...Corps normally look 200km out; to infiltrate on foot, that's at least five days, add a day or two to select and occupy a hide. That time may or may not be available. Plus there are strategic Recon LRS tasks that entail 500-1,000 km inserts. METT-TC guides all. Including the local food and / or water; some places that can occur, other no. Morale in war time becomes almost a non-issue. Yes, the team may just get discouraged and give up. That's why they're isolated going in and no team knows where another is going. War is not for the uncommitted.Speed and time are only critical if the conflict is very fast-moving (in that case the corps commander better gets his timing right to set up recce & surveillance before his decisive action) or if the LRS teams have problems with sustainment (food, hydration)...I do assert that they can get food and water from their area of operations (at the very least when leaving it for another), so the portable amount does not restrict their mission duration. The morale is the real limiting factor (unless something goes wrong on the mission).All true -- and all not insurmountable. Not a topic for discussion.Conflicts with a force density that prohibits infil and exfil on land will most likely not allow for risky helicopter flights with a useful depth. Helicopters are very vulnerable to all kinds of missiles (and the countermeasures only help against one kind) and at low altitude they would face even more threats.War's occasionally get desperate. However, there are also the CH53Gs with rather more capability and we can offer and have provided various Schlangenfesser a ride in penetration aircraft (not just helicopters...)The Fernspäher do a lot, including training with UH-1Ds which wouldn't be considered fit for duty in an actual LRS mission even if the company was very desperate.Again, depends on the situation. Sometimes, a couple of days is acceptable, sometimes it may not be. You're also confronted with the 500 plus km strategic infil...I struggle a bit with the idea how infil/exfil on vehicle could take a lot of time..Number of aircraft isn't the issue; dedicated aircraft that the LRS unit can depend on having and that are capable of the rather dangerous infil and exfil missions is the missing element. There are work arounds and they get used but the basic point is that we have not put the right resources in the right places in all cases. The number of aircraft is good, where they are assigned is not so good. Divisions who do not need the number of aircraft assigned will not release their aircraft to go do a mission, particularly one where the Bird may be lost, for some Captain-commanded little Company of LRS folks. Tactical requirements immaterial.You mentioned that access to aviation assets has worsened after Vietnam...This means that better access to aviation support cannot be necessary for a greater LRS capability.Not dependency on luxuries, requirement for mission accomplishment in some -- not all -- cases. Again, it's not a raw numbers issue, rather an allocation problem and a METT-TC problem.That's why I sniped at the dependency on luxuries.
Infil for 500 km cannot be done with helicopters if the enemy is well-equipped. That's far too risky even over Southern Chinese mountain terrain. The helicopters would take four hours even if they were flying almost directly and few helicopters have the necessary flight radius at all (= some offshore service helicopters and CSAR/SF models).
A more reasonable approach is to infil the first 100-200 km as normal and then simply grab a civilian vehicle as a ride. The force density and threat of police checkpoints will be marginal that deep behind the battlefield.
A helicopter ride for 2x500 km is certainly neither necessary nor worth it.
Really? So you'd toss your recon guys back behind enemy lines and hope that they could find a civilian vehicle? And what happens once you leave Central Europe and the only available civilian vehicle is a donkey? Or a jinga truck? That tactic also ties you directly to improved roads (especially given the state of most civilian vehicles in many less-than-optimal countries in the world).
Sure, ground infil is quite possible, but in unfavorable terrain it takes a great deal of work to accomplish properly (and if you doubt that, go read up on some of the LRS-type activities during Operation Anaconda...your 10km distance estimates were wildly optimistic in that terrain). And in some situations it just isn't an option.
And Fuchs, you might just want to research the command and control of US aviation units in Vietnam before you toss out your statements. I'd direct your attention specifically to the 1st ID, the 23rd ID, and the 4th ID. These were NOT airmobile units, and the 23rd in particular faced some major challenges with their aviation assets. I mention the 1st because they were the first US unit to strip control of the air cavalry troop away from their divisional cavalry squadron and parcel it out to brigades. The air cav troop wasn't large, and had a major impact on operations when it was allowed to function as designed (and that includes lifting in recon elements).
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
You didn't get my "it's luxury" point.
Compare your Vietnam IDs with foreign IDs and you'll see that their army aviation support is anywhere from non-existing to much smaller.
Sure, army Aviation can do much - it better should, for it's very expensive and thirsty - but you can do without. No LRS establishment needs to atrophy only because there aren't enough helicopters.
Besides; speeds are only meaningful in relation. The slowness of high altitude combat affects both friend and foe. This relative slowness in comparison to other operations is ceteris paribus not matched by relative slowness in comparison to the enemy and thus not relevant here.
No, I saw it. But it felt more like a dodge than a serious point.
And the limiting factor in Operation Anaconda for ground infiltration wasn't as much the altitude as it was the terrain. You'll find the same limitation at lower elevations as well.
And I really think you're missing the point when it comes to distance. Ken's comments are spot on. You state that speed is relative in high altitude operations. You'll also find that distance is relative as well. It's one thing to look at the map and say you understand distance, but until you actually experience it and actually live someplace where "close" translates to 200-300 miles (and there are no towns or settlements within that "close" span) I would contend that you really don't understand distance. And since many of your LRS comments appear to be based on both a good road network and readily available civilian vehicles you're more likely to miss the point that such things are not all that common outside Europe.
Aviation is thirsty and a luxury, sure. But so is motorized transport depending on your location. And when speed's an issue, you can't depend on foot mobility when you're dealing with the sort of space I mentioned above.
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
We can disagree on all that...
In reverse order, METT-TC and you cannot say that as a certainty, only that it is true in your opinion.
I'm dazzled with the thought of five or six big, pale Gweilo scuffing a Lifan 620 and wandering around Guangdong and not arousing the populace to get on their cellphones and call the local Cops. Hopefully, they'll steal one with a full tank of fuel...
Depends on many factors. Again, you state an opinion, not a certainty. Not by any means and that's been proven.So? That's irrelevant. We should not use a capability we have because others do not have it? Conversely,, the fact that we have many more than most arbitrarily means it's a luxury? Weird logic...Compare your Vietnam IDs with foreign IDs and you'll see that their army aviation support is anywhere from non-existing to much smaller.No one is suggesting that is the case, though I still contend your Eurocentrism is showing. Worldwide terrain and combat demands introduce more variables than a land war in northwestern Europe might require.No LRS establishment needs to atrophy only because there aren't enough helicopters.Huh? I agree with the first sentence. The rest of it is diversionary. What is relevant here is the time factor, not speed. That time factor depends on ALL aspects of METT-TC, terrain is but one consideration. Distance affects that time factor as much or more than terrain. So to do does the attitude of civilians in the area, they are likely to be a greater concern than troops and checkpoints. Most of the deep LRS penetrations in Desert Storm and in both current wars that were compromised owed that to local civilians. There were bad results in a case or two. ..Besides; speeds are only meaningful in relation. The slowness of high altitude combat affects both friend and foe. This relative slowness in comparison to other operations is ceteris paribus not matched by relative slowness in comparison to the enemy and thus not relevant here.
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