Its all a little like asking when does delegation become abdication.
As to 'Tell them what to do but not how'. I suggest the more conventional the type of operation or if the level of experience the subordinate commander has generally or in the specific theatre is low then the more "guidance" required.
In a COIN setting it is sometimes difficult to know what tasked units are actually doing. This gets worse when circumstances, or the lack of will, prevent senior commanders visiting their 'forward' units and sub-units.
During the time when I was a young troop commander (dealing harshly with dissidents) my OC was a Sandhurst Sword-of-Honour. He would brief me and then say I should go away and make my plan and then come back and let him know what I proposed to do. This worked two ways. It gave him the chance to steer me (and no doubt the others) if needed and it allowed him to mark the Ops map with routes, emergency RVs and the like in case a situation developed. Debriefs were pretty solid too with going maps and the like marked up and passed on where necessary.
Also I believe if the type of tasking is "routine" there is understandably less interest from higher commanders as to what is going on all the time. We have discussed this elsewhere and (I say again) patrolling for the sake of patrolling is a sole destroying form of soldiering. Of course the whole situation gets worse when forces are widely dispersed to the extent where even more control is lost.
So it is indeed a delicate balancing act. As a commander I used to deploy with the troops if the op involved two thirds of my force (is this not still the rule of thumb?). Either attach my self to a call sign of take three men and go and command the op from on top of a nearby hill.
We need to remember the aim. As the commander I have to ensure that my command achieves the mission given to me. I then need to make sure my men do what is necessary so we succeed. I can't sit back and let subordinates just get on with it.
Interesting bit of history for you on this the CO of 1RAR (Rhodesian African Rifles) - from a WW2 Gurkha Regiment and then Malaya - fired three of his company commanders after the first big insurgency op "for not having what it takes". (Man did he knock that battalion into shape.)
So one does not need to micro-manage but one has to command in battle. And for those who don't know the difference should be put on a plane back home without delay.
This process will become clear as it develops no doubt.There is a bit of a clear out happening at the moment and lots of these practices are being sorted - people being shown the error of their ways!
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