Hacksaw --

Target hit.

Chip --

TRADOC and HRC (along with their co-defendants on the Army Staff) need to try to find a way to address this. There is currently no way to identify and use the great tacticians (and reward them for their talents) and to identify and use great strategists AND to identify and use those rare few who can do it all at the gold medal level.

I did a study once for a very high ranking officer that basically identified the problem as this (Readers Digest version): Among the embedded study questions from the general were 1) where do CAT IV generals come from? 2) why do the other Services hand us our butts at the strategic level? and 3) should there be a mechanism to identify and promote "late bloomers", big idea guys, and others who could fill critical GO positions even if you wouldn't want them commanding divisions and corps.

All the key senior positions and promotions go to former battalion commanders (affectionately known as FBCs back in the day.) This is particularly true in the combat arms.

AARs from bn cmd selection boards reported that the overwhelmingly most important selection criterion for bn cmd was success in company command. That was followed by completion , of what I think you now call a KD position at the field grade level.

Therefore, the senior leadership of the Army were great company commanders. Their ability to succeed at GO levels didn't always pan out, sometimes with embarrassing or even tragic consequences.

The study was obviously much deeper and broader than I have portrayed here, but we keep seeing similar problems everyday. I found other ramifications, too, such as "distributing" KD positions "fairly" rather than based on past performance or impact on the units involved. There was a proliferation of bn cmd equivalencies, not to reward good officers, but to produce more FBCs for the personnel mill. And on it went.

For my efforts, I got handed my backside, and Big Green just keeps rollin' along.