Re-structuring the BCT

[B.Smitty]

The Piranha class of vehicles has uses, no question. It's a good, even great, vehicle for Paramilitary use. My dislike of the vehicle revolves around it's lack of capability for major combat -- and the fact that, as I remarked to SJPO'Neill above; if you have a piece of equipment, the pressure to use it is significant.

I don't believe the thought ever was to use them in an MCO without augmentation. Attach a tank battalion to an SBCT to soak up the ATGM hits while the Strykers deploy infantry. Or dole out Stryker battalions to heavy units to augment their dismount capability.

Certainly they still have tactical mobility limits, but so do M1s. OTOH, they have theater and strategic mobility advantages over heavy units. An SBCT certainly isn't a speed bump in the same way as a light infantry unit. Each infantry squad has a Javelin at its disposal, IIRC. That's a lot of AT firepower.

[TAH]

I don't believe the thought ever was to use them in an MCO without augmentation. Attach a tank battalion to an SBCT to soak up the ATGM hits while the Strykers deploy infantry. Or dole out Stryker battalions to heavy units to augment their dismount capability.

Certainly they still have tactical mobility limits, but so do M1s. OTOH, they have theater and strategic mobility advantages over heavy units. An SBCT certainly isn't a speed bump in the same way as a light infantry unit. Each infantry squad has a Javelin at its disposal, IIRC. That's a lot of AT firepower.

As I understand it, the dismounted infantry squad is the center-piece of both the IBCT and the SBCT.

Strykers are there to carry the squad, their stuff, provide the digital comms, protect them from small arms, indirect-fire and get the squad to the right place to dismount and go fight. The Stryker is very much an APC NOT and IFV. OBTW, a full nine-man squad gets off the stryker vice 5-6-7 Soldiers from a BFV. To a large degree the same situation applies to any APC versus IFV comparison.

BTW, seperate Tank Bns longer exist in the US Army. You could re-org a HBCT CAB into a Tank Bn and a Mech Bn but then are robbing Peter to pay Paul. Not sure anyone did that even with all the detailed intra-BCT re-orgs that happened in Iraq.

Pretty sure we don't need/want to go back to a force structure of just heavy (HBCTs) and Light (IBCTs). SBCTs are the Medium/middleweight force that take less strat lift and less time to deploy vice heavy and provide a degree of mobility and protection once they get there.

Awhile back in this thread, I posted a fairly detailed description of a re-org'ed HBCT. The end state would provide the CDR with three viable maneuver Bn/Sqdrns with NO additional expenditures in either personnel or equipment. In fact there were sufficient savings to create a "new" company fof escort and security troops to assist in rear area operations.

So, yes most of my input has been short-term band-aides but they worked.

[Rifleman]

Attach a tank battalion to an SBCT to soak up the ATGM hits while the Strykers deploy infantry. Or dole out Stryker battalions to heavy units to augment their dismount capability.

Your proposal reminds me that the Army experimented with a so-called TRICAP division after Vietnam. It had an armor brigade, airmobile brigade, and air cavalry combat brigade. I guess it was not what was needed for the cold war.

Does something like the TRICAP concept deserve another look at brigade/regiment level? Maybe a cavalry regiment with squadrons of air, armor, and Stryker?

[Ken White]

However, anyone who really thinks decently trained Infantry is a speed bump is in for a rude awakening. There's a reason knowledgeable Tanker insist on Infantry accompaniment. So too is thinking three Javelins for a Platoon can always trump two likely to be dangerous...

I'm aware of the Stryker procurement rationales (there were several, which in itself is a clue to sloppy thinking at DA), I just do not agree with it / them. Don't have to, nor, obviously does anyone have to agree with me. I think it is a decent vehicle that has it uses. I do not think the US Army has any real use for it that would not be better met by other means. I also think the LAV 25 makes sense for the Marines. Ponder that...

My belief is that the IFV concept was a non-starter and should never have been pursued (as it was for the Bradley initially, yet another of its compromises *). APCs make sense and two flavors are needed. A heavy to accompany armor and a light for utility -- and not in direct MIC/HIC but for police/FID and similar action -- uses. IOW, had it been me making the decision, I'd have upgraded all the 113s to A3 Plus and six roadwheels with Soucy Tracks. It wasn't my decision, so that's that.

It's all about METT-TC and today's fight may not be tomorrows. The Bandaids ® are applied to the immediate wound and thus may not prepare one for other, perhaps far larger wounds that may require an air impermeable pad, lots of adhesive tape, a Large Battle Dressing and a bunch of Quik Clot. Nothing wrong with Bandaids ®, they have their uses -- and as I said, that's the Army way because substantive change is hard -- not impossible, just hard. I've watched those things applied all over the Army corpus for about 70 years and most have worked. They also, as I said, have put us where we are. So, yeah, they can work -- they can also obscure more dangerous conditions or lead to a false diagnosis.

I question if where we are is where we want to be or, more importantly, should be. IMO, so should everyone else be asking questions instead of defending the status quo or rearranging deck chairs...


* A reminder that designing future structure or equipment based on current fads may not be a good idea. IFVs were a fad; wheeled combat vehicles are a fad...

[Rifleman]

I question if where we are is where we want to be or, more importantly, should be. IMO, so should everyone else be asking questions instead of defending the status quo or rearranging deck chairs...


* A reminder that designing future structure or equipment based on current fads may not be a good idea. IFVs were a fad; wheeled combat vehicles are a fad...

...so will re-arranging some deck chairs enable us to get more out of our fads? If neither the Bradley or Stryker is a good option for intented role would combining them at lower levels enable the strengths of one to make up for the weaknesses of the other until we have something better? That was my point when asking if considering something like a TRICAP brigade or cavalry regiment was worthwhile.

[Fuchs]

The original IFV concept (Schützenpanzer) made sense for a short period - in 1944-1945 when infantry AT had ranges smaller than rifle range.

[Ken White]

The original IFV concept (Schützenpanzer) made sense for a short period - in 1944-1945 when infantry AT had ranges smaller than rifle range.

Yes, and that remained true until the very late 50s. Because of the length of equipment development cycles, the majority of IFVs hit the ground in the early 70s (80s for the Bradley -- we're somehwat slow...) -- AFTER the things that made them less necessary if not undesirable, the effective ATGM and better tank fire control, were fielded. Armies do not think ahead at all well...

Rifleman:

If neither the Bradley or Stryker is a good option for intented role would combining them at lower levels enable the strengths of one to make up for the weaknesses of the other until we have something better?

Two different things IMO. The Bradley is what you say. With the Stryker, I question what, precisely, the 'role' is...

In any event, we're stuck with both for the forseeable future so they'll have balance each other in a sense. The Bradley has been improved to the point where it is almost acceptable for its role and it'll do okay until a big war comes and we can then get a batter vehicle. Same for the Stryker which will disappear from the inventory earlier. Partly because the role will possibly if not probably evaporate.

We may possibly do better. Armored warfare requires systems; the Tank and the Infantry carrier -- if not combined into one vehicle (with humungous advantages) should at least be a complimentary, rationalized and almost interchangeable pair of packages. The movement of Armor and Infantry to the 'Combined Arms Center of Excellence' may truly get some coherent and non-parochial thinking going. We can do better. We need to do so.

That was my point when asking if considering something like a TRICAP brigade or cavalry regiment was worthwhile.

Tri Cap was a Division concept, two heavy Bdes and an Air Cav Bde (which included Hoptiflopter lift for a Bn worth of Mech Inf). 1st Cav Tested it in the early 70s and, as you note, it didn't proved adequate MASSS in the eyes of some for Cold War purposes. My vote for the Div would be no because the air Cav Bde is not an effective full substitute for a third ground maneuver Bde.

However, IMO it would work as you describe. For a Bde as you described, my vote would be an emphatic yes -- with two caveats. First, such an organization would be limited so 'organizing' some units like that would create another case of 'it's there, use it.' You'd only be able to use it fairly benign scenarios (birds are delicate...). However, the Army should be able to task organize such a Force as and when required. It could do that today but that gets us to the second caveat.

The Commanders in the chain of such organizations would have to be intuitive, flexible and innovative. We have such people -- but the pipeline doesn't always provide them.

Thus, yet again, I fear a really good idea would probably flounder because our terrible personnel system and our not the best in the world training added to our terribly inefficient and bureaucratic equipment procurement system couldn't or wouldn't provide what was needed to make a good concept work.

I also believe I should note that the three big problem areas I cited are not solely the fault of the Army -- Congress almost forces most of those failures with a slew of laws that mean well but have terrible unintended consequences.

Still, to develop and use such an organization would mean very different ways of doing business. Not a bad thing at all...

[Pete]

When I used to write technical proposals at one of the consulting firms I worked for there would usually be an organizational chart showing how we'd task-organize ourselves to perform the work and what our chain of command would be. The owner of one these firms would invariably jack with the organizational charts I'd put in my draft documents. I eventually learned to leave that part of the proposal blank until I put the final finishing touches on the draft proposal -- otherwise the company owner would keep having me redo the chart about a dozen times until it was to his satisfaction. My point is that everyone, soldiers included, loves to diddle with organizational charts.

[Fuchs]

My point is that everyone, soldiers included, loves to diddle with organizational charts.

Well, there's the petty fantasizing (or 'to diddle', finally a new word for my vocabulary), the professional messing up of organizations and finally a form of drawing TOE as a thought experiment in a long chain of theoretical conceptual work that began at strategic or operational level and broke down requirements to unit level.


The very sad fact is that formation-level TOE are often a function of politics, ego and budget, not of a thorough optimization process incl. a red team. Many layman TOE designs make more sense than certain actually realized brigade designs. There are some brigades which have no better indirect fire weapon than 40mm UBGLs...

-----------

@Ken; as you certainly know, the very original SPz concept required a frontal hardening against AT guns. This can be understood as a protection requirement against at the very least the ubiquitous, proven and crew-movable 76.2mm ZIS-3 gun (in 1944-1945); ~82mm RHAeq. This protection requirement evolved with the introduction of more recoilless guns; the SPG-82 and the increasing presence of 85mm guns probably made the SPz concept obsolete by the early 50's, if not already in the immediate post-War years.
The much-increased penetration of these weapons was to much for the concept, we would probably have seen the beginning of the age of HAPCs if there had been many modern mechanized campaigns in the 50's.
It's probably no mere coincidence tat the Israelis never adopted the IFV/SPz idea.

[Tukhachevskii]

Modern i.e. COTS motorcycles have been used in militaries for at least the last 30 years with considerable success and relatively few problems. My question relates not to whether motorcycles can be used for military purposes (they can) but specifically to their employment as a capability that is carried until needed as opposed to their use as a platform that is ridden all the time...

That was essentially my train of thought. It was triggered as much by wondering if it would be of use in deep reconnaissance situations (a la LRDG with a few ATMPs for log support) as it was reading a Russian land weapons brochure which stated that the Metis-K ATGM was suitable for motorcycle applications....which got me thinking after having read some reports of the use of motorcycles in Afghanistan and Iraq by dickers, mobile ambush teams, etc. It seems to me modern motorcycles 9esp. off road variants) have some useful niche capabilites.

[B.Smitty]

With the Stryker, I question what, precisely, the 'role' is...

I don't see a problem with the Stryker's role. It provides protected mobility for infantry in a package that's lighter, has a lower logistics footprint, and has much higher on-road mobility than the Bradley. It provides greater protection (esp. vs underbelly attacks) and a lower logistics footprint than the M113. It fills the niche between unarmored trucks and heavy units.

Future Strykers are getting a double v-shaped hull to further improve underbelly protection (up to "MRAP 2" levels).

Estimates put fuel usage of an SBCT at almost a third of that of an HBCT (~100 tonnes/day and ~300 tonnes/day, respectively). (source: http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2007/RAND_MG649.pdf)

Yes, the Stryker vehicle itself does sacrifice some off-road mobility to do so.

IIRC, light infantry platoons don't have any organic Javelins right? They all come from the company. Maybe I'm misremembering.

[Ken White]

I don't see a problem with the Stryker's role... It fills the niche between unarmored trucks and heavy units.

Filling the niche in low intensity combat is beneficial. Filling the niche in peace time can lead to low intensity combat due to a capability being extant. The niche has limited value in other types of combat but if it exists, it will be used even if inappropriate. It's sort of the case my Mother warned me of; 'Be careful what you want, you might get it...'

That limited utility leads to follow on questions; should the US Army be involved in paramilitary efforts? If so, is the Stryker the best vehicle or is it excessively expensive and over armored and gunned for the role while offering inadequate mobility and protection for even low intensity combat against a moderately equipped force?

Future Strykers are getting a double v-shaped hull to further improve underbelly protection (up to "MRAP 2" levels).

Yes, I know, making them more expensive and heavier thus using more fuel and developing more mechanical problems while being even more roadbound and simply encouraging the bad guys to use more explosive...

Armor has benefits. It also has disadvantages. Two are weight and cocooning -- the protection offered leads to both a false sense of security and a reluctance to dismount (the antithesis of getting out among the populace in FID / COIN-like efforts... ). The weight impact impedes mobility and increases resupply needs and maintenance thus inducing tactical constraints.

Consider also that you can only add so much Armor and you thus confer an advantage to the feared IED user. In combat, agility almost always beats armor.

Estimates put fuel usage of an SBCT at almost a third of that of an HBCT (~100 tonnes/day and ~300 tonnes/day, respectively). (source: http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2007/RAND_MG649.pdf)

That's a benefit, no question and I agree that it's important -- I also again state that you get what you pay for -- and you always pay, one way or another.

Yes, the Stryker vehicle itself does sacrifice some off-road mobility to do so

Thus providing opponents with a greater ability to predict what the force equipped with it might do, where they might appear and what will impede their actions...

It's a paramilitary vehicle with limited combat utility. It is good at what it does. For the US Army, the question remains is it what it does required or even beneficial. I'd vote no on both. YMMV.

IIRC, light infantry platoons don't have any organic Javelins right? They all come from the company. Maybe I'm misremembering.

Old light with the worthless Dragon, yeah, Co level. Today, Javelin, two per Platoon in the Light Inf Bns. Specifically to avoid being speed bumps. The light folks are also heavy on the TOWs and the kids are willing to get close to put an M4 up a tailpipe.

[Eden]

Yes, I know, making them more expensive and heavier thus using more fuel and developing more mechanical problems while being even more roadbound and simply encouraging the bad guys to use more explosive...

I was in at the birth of the Stryker - I remember at the time thinking that no organization or weapon system ever characterized as 'medium' had ever lasted very long. The irresistable urge to make it better by adding armor or lightening it up inevitably push it toward one end of the spectrum or the other.

[B.Smitty]

Filling the niche in low intensity combat is beneficial. Filling the niche in peace time can lead to low intensity combat due to a capability being extant. The niche has limited value in other types of combat but if it exists, it will be used even if inappropriate. It's sort of the case my Mother warned me of; 'Be careful what you want, you might get it...'

Don't know if I buy the notion that "Filling the niche in peace time can lead to low intensity combat due to a capability being extant".

We didn't have a medium-weight units in Kosovo, but we still went in anyway. Heavy units took way to long to get there. Light units weren't enough of a deterrence.

We need them because our nation has shown a consistent desire to intervene in LIC/COIN/paramilitary efforts. The Army can argue it should or shouldn't get involved efforts, but if the President says "go", the Army will go.

That limited utility leads to follow on questions; should the US Army be involved in paramilitary efforts? If so, is the Stryker the best vehicle or is it excessively expensive and over armored and gunned for the role while offering inadequate mobility and protection for even low intensity combat against a moderately equipped force?Yes, I know, making them more expensive and heavier thus using more fuel and developing more mechanical problems while being even more roadbound and simply encouraging the bad guys to use more explosive...

I don't see this "limited utility". SBCTs have all the MCO utility of an infantry unit, but with far greater mobility, protection and firepower than light infantry.

As an infantry company commander, you not only have your soldier's weapons, you also have 3 x MGSs, 2 x 120mm mortar vehicles, and a .50 cal or 40mm on every Stryker.

If you need to perform pure dismounted ops, you have full 3x9+7 rifle platoons, a sniper team, 60mm mortars, and a FIST to call upon.

A heavy mech inf company in the same situation has, at best, smaller 3x9 platoons, no mortars, no snipers, no fire support team.

The Stryker upgrades will include a more powerful engine (450hp vs 350hp), larger tires and an improved suspension. It will also have a lower center of gravity to reduce rollover risks. So it may end up being a net mobility gain, even though it's roughly 1 ton heavier.

In combat, agility almost always beats armor.

I don't know if i agree with the "almost always" part. In Iraq, even with all of our whiz-bang ISR technology, most engagements resulted from movements to contact. So units have to absorb the initial volley before reacting. In fact, more agile HMMWV-mounted scouts were relegate to rear-area security duties because their commanders felt they were unsurvivable.

IMHO, if Stryker units had been available for OIF MCO, they would've performed well. They have just enough armor to defeat the Iraqi's primary anti-armor system (RPG-7), and have many more dismounts than heavy units.

Clearly if you're fighting Hezbollah on their home turf, movements to contact in a Stryker will result in a lot of dead Strykers. So you don't use them that way, in that situation. Let heavy forces lead the way. (and even they may not be heavy enough)

It's a paramilitary vehicle with limited combat utility. It is good at what it does. For the US Army, the question remains is it what it does required or even beneficial. I'd vote no on both. YMMV.

It's an APC with good enough tactical mobility for most situations.

SBCTs fill a whole in the capability matrix. Infantry-centric, but not foot mobile. Armored, but not "heavy".

Just MHO.

[Fuchs]

In Iraq, even with all of our whiz-bang ISR technology, most engagements resulted from movements to contact.

This is not robust logic. We may see a repair of the sad modern armoured reconnaissance which can prevent a repetition of this poor tactical performance.

[B.Smitty]

This is not robust logic. We may see a repair of the sad modern armoured reconnaissance which can prevent a repetition of this poor tactical performance.

IMHO, it isn't flawed logic. Ken asserted that "agility almost always beats armor". Frequent movements to contact, and relegation of unarmored forces to supporting roles in OIF, stand in opposition this. The OPTEMPO did not allow for more deliberate recc (where unarmored reconnaissance units could've use their stealth and agility).

In fact, to a point, armor enables battlefield agility under fire.

[Ken White]

Don't know if I buy the notion that "Filling the niche in peace time can lead to low intensity combat due to a capability being extant".

Well, I've been to several LIC efforts, all because we could do that and really for little more reason -- all at least marginally successful, all at a great cost for the benefit derived. If a capability exists it WILL be used, the system demands that it be...

We didn't have a medium-weight units in Kosovo, but we still went in anyway. Heavy units took way to long to get there. Light units weren't enough of a deterrence.

Oh? Better check your history. The Marines and 82 Abn elms that went in first were doing fine; SSGs were playing Village Mayor, LTs playing Disctrict Governors and they were getting things done -- until Do Do Bird Sanchez finally got there and delivered his first brilliant order "All Elements outside base camps will be accompanied by a field grade officer."

We need them because our nation has shown a consistent desire to intervene in LIC/COIN/paramilitary efforts. The Army can argue it should or shouldn't get involved efforts, but if the President says "go", the Army will go.

Not the Army's place to make that argument. It is the Army's job to provide capability to execute likely missions. ALL likely missions -- over emphasis on one sort of mission is as bad as denying the existence of mission sets.

I don't see this "limited utility"...

Okay.

...So it may end up being a net mobility gain, even though it's roughly 1 ton heavier.

We'll see. If I were a bettor...

I don't know if i agree with the "almost always" part...In fact, more agile HMMWV-mounted scouts were relegate to rear-area security duties because their commanders felt they were unsurvivable.

We all make judgements based on our experience. As for the HMMWVs, my son then in the 82d roamed all over Baghdad and Fallujah for a full tour with unarmored HMMWVs. Had a few IED hits but basically, went okay. Risk aversion is not a determinant of capability.

IMHO, if Stryker units had been available for OIF MCO, they would've performed well. They have just enough armor to defeat the Iraqi's primary anti-armor system (RPG-7), and have many more dismounts than heavy units.

Could be. Been interesting to watch.

[Fuchs]

My quote was too short.

In Iraq, even with all of our whiz-bang ISR technology, most engagements resulted from movements to contact. So units have to absorb the initial volley before reacting.

Here's the flawed logic; a failure in one example does not allow the conclusion that this is how it needs to be ("have" instead of "had").

[82redleg]

A heavy mech inf company in the same situation has, at best, smaller 3x9 platoons, no mortars, no snipers, no fire support team.

I agree with your point, but you're wrong in one detail.

Mech IN CO FIST is 4 man HQ (LT, SSG, SPC, PFC) and 3 x 2-man PLT FO parties (SGT, PFC).

SBCT IN CO FIST is 4 man HQ (LT, SSG, SPC, PFC) and 3 x 1-man PLT FOs (SGT).

The addition of an RTO to the PLT FO (making it an FO party) is of limited value in mounted operations, but a great enabler in dismounted operations, as we're discussing here.

[Pete]

As for the HMMWVs, my son then in the 82d roamed all over Baghdad and Fallujah for a full tour with unarmored HMMWVs. Had a few IED hits but basically, went okay. Risk aversion is not a determinant of capability.Could be. Been interesting to watch.

How did we ever make it through World Wars I and II, Korea, and Vietnam with thin-skinned wheeled vehicles? All of a sudden in 2003 and 2004 unarmored vehicles became a big deal, a major case of negligence on the part of the U.S. Army. Rumsfeld was right on that one, you go to war with the Army you have.