It's an issue I wrestled with for years. However, two initial items based on my observation of the phenomena you mention:
I've seen Planning Cells as a major problem for over 40 years. Three points on that:
- The information explosion of the last 20 plus years has provided headquarters at all levels with more 'data' than they can absorb or process and the Army has failed miserably at providing effective filters for that. Filters must insure information is sent where it is needed as opposed to where the capability allows it to be sent.
- As we got effectively over-Officered (with respect to the Leader:Led ratio) during Viet Nam when restrictions were lifted and then hung onto those extra spaces post VN and even post 1989 (as a mobilization hedge -- needed but there are better ways to do that), the Army had to find something for these not fully employed, smart, able and energetic folks to do -- so it increased the size of Staffs across the board, needed or not. Most combat echelons now have Staff numbers virtually double their WW II -pre 1975 numbers. I very strongly doubt efficiency or effectiveness have doubled. Staff size should be reduced.
- Planning Cells may be worthwhile at Theater level but I doubt it. They can be worthwhile at Corps level, mission dependent. They are almost never beneficial at Div and lower levels. A far better process is to have two Operational Cells which rotate in a Planning / Preparation phase and an Execution phase. The guys and gals that plan Operation Wednesday take charge and execute it while the other crowd reverts to planning for the next opn or time period. I've seen that work in large and small Hq, in peace and in war. You planned, you know the ins and outs and you know you have to execute it -- so you planned sensibly and you know the Plan. There should be no plans cell, merely alternating operations teams or cells.
Then there's this:That too is a forty year old and increasingly bad problem. It is a chimera and one would think that the last few years would have shown senior folks that theory just does not work. In addition to removing decision makers from direct contact and thus adversely impacting their SA, it is a terribly bad impactor on the morale and attitude of the troops -- not to mention its adverse effects on retention. Unless the US Army adopts AND ENFORCES a 'one-two up, one-two down rule' wherein Commanders must talk to their immediate higher and lower headquarters only, with ability to go up or down one more echelon in an emergency, the problem will exacerbate, initiative at lower echelons will be stifled and the Army will continue to drive out really good people who see the terrible flaws in overly centralized control.As distant commanders believe they have more influence on the real-time fight because of “enhanced situational awareness and decision making tools,” boundaries of behavior for those actually in the fight are likely to become more narrow. In other words, ROE will likely become even more restrictive. Decision cycles, as a result, are going to grow so that commanders can pursue perfect information in order to make perfect decisions…as if this were ever possible. Lower-level initiative is going to be stifled just at the time it’s needed the most.
The trend developed after the lines stabilized in Korea when the Flag Officers found they had little to do so they developed the habit of interference as opposed to trust and delegation. Viet Nam, better radios and Helicopters only made that worse and thirty plus years of peace and generally poor training have elevated it to the point of, IMO, military embarrassment. The situation exists as a result of mediocre training and long peacetime service causing many commanders to have little faith in the ability or judgment of their subordinates. There are too many of them (that Leader:Led ratio again) and they're smart aggressive guys who have been trained to do something even if it's wrong. Only firm positive action, policies and enforcement from the top will preclude excessive centralization over control.
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