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Thread: Defining Insurgency

  1. #41
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default A tremendous number of insurgencies have occurred and likely

    will in future occur not due to poor governance but simply to replace whatever governance exists -- good, bad or as most are, indifferent -- with 'OUR governance.'

    Government is not a terribly natural thing. It is needed but it is rarely truly good -- people intrude and screw it up -- I can think of no nation that has a truly 'totally satisfied with the government' population. I can think of a great many that have political parties or grouping that do not like the current milieu and wish to change it. The drive to do that violently often comes from the "poor governane" aspect -- it also comes from the 'we want OUR governance' crowd.

    As Steve Metz said:
    The unspoken assumption is that insurgencies occur because states don't adequately follow the Western-defined path, and will be defeated if states do.
    That's true and the western construct can lead one down a primrose path...

    Seems to me that Insurgency thus can be -- most often is -- a strategy. If adopted as a strategy by the Insurgents, their issue then becomes the degree or intensity for the insurgency, i.e, what techniques or methods will be used to implement the strategy.

    Or, to quote Slapout9:
    Insurgency is a Method....used by a Motivated individual(s).....to exploit any available Opportunity.
    Yep and IMO, that makes it a Strategery to use that method to exploit sumpn...

  2. #42
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    Default Common sense versus American Liberalism

    Ken, as you well know I strongly agree with your view,

    will in future occur not due to poor governance but simply to replace whatever governance exists -- good, bad or as most are, indifferent -- with 'OUR governance.'
    Legitimacy is concept that we in the West approach with great bias based on American liberalism (and usually promoted by our lawyers), yet it has little to do with real reasons people fight. In the simpliest and truest terms insurgency is a violent struggle for power. The victor whether insurgent or the current regime will never be viewed as legitimate by all in the vast majority of countries. America and some nations are unique in that we established a functional melting pot, but that is not a model we can impose on other nations. Of course that didn't happen overnight, and it can be argued we didn't achieve internal stability until 100 years after the Civil War.

    Posted by John T.

    Sir Robert Thompson said, in his book Defeating Communist Insurgency, "If the [revolutionary] organization is already established, well-trained, and disciplined., it will not be defeated by reforms designed to eliminate the cause. It will only be defeated by establishing a superior organization and applying measures to break the revolutionary organization." (For revolutionary organization we can substitute the insurgents or insurgent organization.)
    This is a fact that has been demonstrated again and again throughout history. At this point it is no longer really about politics, but more about basic pychology and sociology principles that influence people's behavior. Too many people confuse the underlying causes that led insurgencies to oust the illegitimate colonialists after WWII with all cases of insurgency. Insurgency in 2010 is not about throwing out colonial governments and replacing them with even worse governments, but a struggle for power that has little to do with legitimacy and much more to do with greed and hatred.

    Finally injecting UW into the insurgency debate simply muddies the waters. UW is an American definition for a means that other nations and non-state organizations have used for centuries. For the regime still being challenged it is a State sponsored insurgency. It is still an insurgency. Iran may use the strategy of insurgency to pursue its goals in Lebanon for example. This is the risk of falling in love with our definitions, we'll end up describing and responding to the conflict in a way that conforms to our pre-determined definitions and doctrine.

  3. #43
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    Default Strategy

    as I understand it, requires a desired end, a way of getting to that end, and the means (resources) to accomplish it. A strategy of insurgency would require all three - insurgency, as Slap suggests, is in these terms a method (way), ie part of a strategy. So, unless strategy is redefined to be a method, then to call insurgency a strategy one would have to define it in ends, ways, and means terms. (Is that how you are defining insrgency, Steve?) Unless insurgency is defined in strategic terms, I will continue to prefer Bob's defining it as a condition.

    Regarding the culture boundedness of such concepts as legitimacy, I will fall back on the points I was making earlier along with Bob's articulation.

    As to the causes of insurgency and its identification with a struggle for power: we are back to Hans Moregnthau's statement in all editions of his Politics Amongnations going back to 1948, "International politics, LIKE ALL POLITICS, is a struggle for power." (emphasis added) This, in turn, harks back to St. Carl aka CvC. In practical terms, however, if there is no more reason for you to support me than my group wants power over the guys that already have it, then that insurgency is very likely to fail. Unless the method of the insurgents is a coup d'etat, there are damn few resources available for the insurgents to overturn the government. As you are all well aware, most insurgencies fail, dying in their infancy, never really posing a threat to the survival of the governments they seek to overthrow. An American case in point that was very ideological is that of the Weather Underground and its leader Bill Ayers.

    Cheers

    JohnT

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    Default Jt

    I like your opening paragraph.

    Steve, how does that impact on your definition?

    Given some time, I might be able to expand insurgency beyond "means" to include all elements of strategy. Just not now.

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    Default ??

    Posted by John T.
    as I understand it, requires a desired end, a way of getting to that end, and the means (resources) to accomplish it. A strategy of insurgency would require all three - insurgency, as Slap suggests, is in these terms a method (way), ie part of a strategy. So, unless strategy is redefined to be a method, then to call insurgency a strategy one would have to define it in ends, ways, and means terms. (Is that how you are defining insrgency, Steve?) Unless insurgency is defined in strategic terms, I will continue to prefer Bob's defining it as a condition.
    John, I don't understand your argument in this case. I agree that insurgency is also a condition as Bob stated (we may differ on why it exists), but I think insurgency is clearly a strategy.

    The insurgent organization generally has a desired goal (ends), the means and ways are somewhat blended in my view and can consist of forming militia groups to conduct small to large scale attacks, employing terrorists, employing propaganda, economic sabotage, etc., but all of these must support the overarching strategy. I realize I'm back tracking on my first post, but if insurgency is the only means/ways they have to over throw a regime then I think it is the strategy. On the other hand if it is a State sponsored insurgency for the sponsoring State it is a way to achieve its ends, but for the insurgents it is still their strategy. Thoughts?

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    Default Bill, the insurgent clearly has a choice of ways and means

    as well as ends. Unsually, the ends are the overthrow of the recognized (or at least constituted) government. But, if he has control of such means as key parts of the military he can choose a coup d'etat has his method (way). If, on the other hand, he has half the army (means), he can fight a conventional war (way). If he has neither and limited political organization, he can use his few resources to conduct terrorist attacks in the hope of using that to gain the resources (militias, more terrorists, front groups) to mount a classic revolutionary campaign.

    Anyway, that's what I mean.

    Cheers

    JohnT

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    Council Member SteveMetz's Avatar
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    Default

    I wanted to follow up on my earlier point about Americans, in particularly, using a consummately Western conceptualization.

    In social science, the way to test a hypothesis is to ask, "If this hypothesis is true, what would I expect to observe?"

    If the hypothesis is "'good governance' and 'legitimacy' defined as per U.S. doctrine are vital to or crucial to defeating in insurgency," then we'd expect to see counterinsurgency campaigns that do those things successful and those which do not unsuccessful.

    I'll admit I haven't compiled the data and could be wrong, but I'd be willing to bet Dave Dilegge's last dollar that the historical data doesn't show that. I believe Americans cling to that notion less because it reflects reality than because it reflects our preconceptions, viz. that other people share our priorities, preferences, and perceptions.

    I think the notion that insurgency arises when regimes do not reflect Western notions of good governance and legitimacy, and insurgencies are defeated when regimes do reflects the attitudes which drove European colonialism. This idea has become ingrained in American counterinsurgency thinking because this thinking was derived from European colonialists like Thompson and Galula.

  8. #48
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    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by John T. Fishel View Post
    Steve, Bob's definitions are carefully crafted in the sense that they are not uniquely Western. Indeed, each of them relies on local interpretation and perception.

    As an example that would fall within Bob's definition of legitimacy let me offer one indicator (variable) from Manwaring's original SSI study - "lack of perceived corruption." Corruption is commonly understood as the missuse of public position for personal gain and exists in all cultures. What is unique in each culture is their definition of missuse. So many things that a Westerner would see as corruption are perfectly acceptable in Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, or Panama. I would also note that what is perceived as corrupt behavior also changes over time so something that was perfectly acceptable 20 years ago no longer is today. Still, there is a core to the notion of corruption that transcends culture. I believe that Bob has caught this kind of core in his definitions.

    Cheers

    JohnT
    I often wonder about the notion of corruption and insurgency. Have we simply ingrained the connection because Thompson told us it was important, or has someone actually run the data to find out if there is a real, demonstrable correlation between corruption and insurgency. Was El Salvador less corrupt when the insurgency was broken than at the beginning? Colombia? The UK in Northern Ireland? Peru? Iraq?

    Again, I don't have the data myself but my gut tells me that it wouldn't support the hypothesis.

  9. #49
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    Default Steve, you are asking the wrong question

    It is not whether El Sal (to keep my typing down) was less corrupt at the end of the war but whether it was perceived by Salvadorans as less corrupt. But even that is the wrong approach. Perceived corruption is one of a number of variables that we argue make up the Factor we called Legitimacy. So, the real question was whether Salvadorans perceived their government as more legitimate than it was when the insurgency began. The evidence certainly supports that case. One of the reasons that can be adduced is that in the 1988 and 89 elections the Salvadoran voters threw the Christain Democrats out - largely over perceived corruption. The fact that another party could take over the government peacefully was a factor in bringing the FMLN to an agreement. They, of course, won the most recent elections and now govern the country.

    Cheers

    JohnT

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    Ok, how about this for a definition:

    "Insurgency is a condition where a government's legitimacy among a distinct population of the governed declines to the point where that population organizes and is willing to use violence against the government. Insurgency is differentiated from other forms of internal conflict by the strategy insurgents use, which is driven by the insurgent's inability to openly challenge the government. Insurgent strategy utilizes subversion, limited violence and political action."

    So here's the idea, very simplistically:

    - Strong government / weak opposition = insurgency
    - Government and opposition roughly equal in terms of power = civil war
    - Weak government / strong opposition = coup or a quick revolution/revolt.

    In essence, I think Steve Metz and Col. Jones are both right, or at least their definitions don't have to be incompatible.
    Supporting "time-limited, scope limited military actions" for 20 years.

  11. #51
    Council Member Dayuhan's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by John T. Fishel View Post
    It is not whether El Sal (to keep my typing down) was less corrupt at the end of the war but whether it was perceived by Salvadorans as less corrupt. But even that is the wrong approach. Perceived corruption is one of a number of variables that we argue make up the Factor we called Legitimacy. So, the real question was whether Salvadorans perceived their government as more legitimate than it was when the insurgency began. The evidence certainly supports that case.
    It is true that the relationship between populace and government is driven by local perceptions of good governance, which may or may not have anything to do with Western standards.

    It is also true that our capacity to understand these conflicts, and our decisions on intervention, or on how we wish to position ourselves with respect to any real or imagined confrontation between populace and governance, are based not on local perceptions, but on our perceptions - and those are very heavily affected by our concept of good governance.

    When we discuss these matters in the abstract, of course we concede that it is local perception, not our perception, that matters. The moment we move to specific cases, and far more so when engagement is contemplated, our perceptions come into play. We often don't know the full range of perceptions prevailing in any given foreign populace, or how much of any given populace falls into what categories in that range of perception (speaking of "the perception" of "a populace", as if these were singular terms, is generally absurd). Rather than trying to find out, we often make assumptions based on our criteria... another good reason to think twice, thrice, and again before messing in anyone else's internal affairs.

  12. #52
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    One may want to consider that Sir Robert confused cause and effect. In that while he was working efforts to defeat the insurgent and separate him from the populace, other efforts were going on that vastly reduced the discrimination against the ethnic Chinese populace of Malaya, that restored to them legal means to influence and participate in government/politics, and removed the British High Commissioner out of the equation of exercising total British control of the government.

    These same programs of defeating insurgents and separating the populace were then carried by him to Share with the Americans to use to produce similar success in Vietnam. Except, while still good programs, they did not produce success in Vietnam. I would argue that while certainly the insurgent in Vietnam had an edge in that we had created a formal state of North Vietnam to provide them the ultimate sanctuary and staging base with all the full protections that state sovereignty provide (when you have a credible, nuclear-capable big brother backing you up as they did), along with the sanctuaries of Laos and Cambodia as well; that he missed the point of what actually worked in Malaya.

    That in fact, the efforts to defeat the insurgent and separate the populace were good, necessary supporting efforts, but that what actually ended "The Emergency" there was the addressing of the conditions of insurgency so that while the insurgents were still wanting to continue, they found that their base of support had melted beneath them.

    In Vietnam we took Sir Robert's recipe for success and applied it with no success. The difference? We took none of the steps taken in Malaya to reduce the conditions of insurgency. We too mistook the supporting effort for the main effort, we made it a war, we fought it like a war and we ignored the main effort of addressing the conditions of insurgency and ultimately lost the war. The insurgent never lost his base of support. One has to look at Vietnam as whole, and over the course of the entire era of French Colonialism and American intervention; without overly focusing on the line drawn on the map to separate the state into two parts as a compromise; and then what happened during the American tenure for the final 10 years of what was a multi-generational conflict for the people of the region. We were trying to roll back communism, but the people were merely employing communism to roll back colonialism. Then as now we put far too much emphasis on the nature of the ideology employed than on the nature of the conflict itself.

    Insurgent conflicts of today are not far different than the ones that followed WWI and the ones that followed WWII. While people took advantage of the power upheavals following those two conflicts to make large strides in throwing off colonialism; much of the governance, or certainly self-determination of governance remained heavily controlled/manipulated across the Middle East as part of our containment strategy on the Soviet Southern flank, denying them control of the Oil resources, warm water ports, and key maritime LOCs. Not colonialism, but certainly a denial of self-determination.
    Last edited by Bob's World; 10-11-2010 at 08:33 AM.
    Robert C. Jones
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    Default It is somewhat more complex...

    Bob, for a long time I thought as you do about the Strategic Hamlet Program in Vietnam. But then I read Rufus Phillips' memoir/analysis, Why Vietnam Matters, and greatly revised my thinking. I recommend it highly to one and all.

    Cheers

    JohnT

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    Quote Originally Posted by John T. Fishel View Post
    It is not whether El Sal (to keep my typing down) was less corrupt at the end of the war but whether it was perceived by Salvadorans as less corrupt. But even that is the wrong approach. Perceived corruption is one of a number of variables that we argue make up the Factor we called Legitimacy. So, the real question was whether Salvadorans perceived their government as more legitimate than it was when the insurgency began. The evidence certainly supports that case. One of the reasons that can be adduced is that in the 1988 and 89 elections the Salvadoran voters threw the Christain Democrats out - largely over perceived corruption. The fact that another party could take over the government peacefully was a factor in bringing the FMLN to an agreement. They, of course, won the most recent elections and now govern the country.

    Cheers

    JohnT

    Point taken. The Western notion of legitimacy largely functioned in El Salvador because it was of Western culture. My problem with legitimacy as it is used in Western counterinsurgency thinking is that it is a culturally Western perspective--the lingering of the colonial mindset. (And I've argued with Max over this because he believes there is a trans-cultural concept of legitimacy and I don't).

    But I'm still struggling with the idea that it doesn't matter whether corruption, repression, etc--all of the stuff we consider part of "good governance"--really has to change. But we just need to help "the people" be more accepting of it.

    Think of where that leads logically. Among Afghan males, the repression of women and pedophilia are perfectly acceptable. In some cultures, genocide against an "out" group is acceptable. So setting acceptability as the standard is, to say the least, problematic.

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    Quote Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post
    Insurgent conflicts of today are not far different than the ones that followed WWI and the ones that followed WWII.
    That's where we'll disagree. I think we want to believe that because we kind of figured out what to do about those kinds of insurgencies.

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    Default Steve, I'm witht Max on that

    but then, you knew I would be.

    Serously, take a look at the anthropological literature - which of course is clear as mud - but may provide some different ways of looking at the problem,

    Marct, where are you when we need your input????

    Cheers

    JohnT

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    Steve,

    Actually, I don't think we figured out what to do with those insurgencies very well at all. I think it is the belief that we have that causes us so much difficulty with the current crop. Certainly much study has taken place, yet we'll still list the Philippines or Algeria as multiple insurgencies, with a mix of failures and successes; rather than recognizing instead what looks to me like a long train of efforts by government to address the symptoms of a problem by suppressing the organizations that emerge from it; only to find what you are calling "resurgency."

    I too believe in resurgency, but we associate different factors to why it happens. I believe it happens because the root cause of insurgency is government. When government is out of touch with various segments of its populace in certain fundamental human nature (rather than Western nature) ways, conditions of insurgency exist that are easily exploited by external or internal actors. This continues until such time as those conditions are addressed.

    This is why when an insurgent "wins" it does not automatically end the "insurgency." The successful insurgent becomes immediately a struggling counterinsurgent until such time as the conditions of insurgency are addressed. Those who fail to address those conditions suffer the same fate that they dished out to their predecessor. Most insurgents have no interest in bringing good governance to the people, they merely take advantage of poor governance to put themselves into the power position. The American experience is unique in that regard. But for the moral stand of one man, America would likely have become a Kingdom and suffered an even rougher transition to stability than the one we took.

    The big difference in insurgency today are the tools of globalization. These do not change the nature of insurgency, IMO, but they do certainly change the impact of insurgency, the resilliance of insurgency and the TTPs that are apt to work.

    One could contribute to suppressing an insurgency in the 1950s by "separating the insurgent from the populace," today such separation is virtually impossible. Not only are they connected to the populace, but they are connected to the world. In essence, government can no longer ignore the people and suppress their voice. Governments must actually answer to their people.

    This same factor has also rendered obsolete the tried and true policy TTP of "friendly dictators". Now these populace are able to reach out and touch the external parties that enable their governments to act with impunity. The US still has far too many friendly dictators on the books, and the fact that we are attacked most by the populaces of our allies rather than the populaces of our enemies is a powerful metric that we would be wise to quit ignoring. Attacking the foreign enabler government is often easier than attacking the domestic impune government. This makes AQ's UW efforts fairly easy. A shift in focus from helping governments suppress their populaces to one of helping populaces address their governments is more in line with our principles as a nation and would take away much of the impetus behind international acts of terrorism that exists today.

    Even the current administration is careful not to call out these allies when speaking about civil rights abuses. The hypocrisy is deafening in its silence.
    Robert C. Jones
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    "The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)

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    Default

    Point taken, but I'm still sensitive to the extent that the mentality of colonialism pervades our thinking about insurgency (again, because we learned from colonialists.) Viz the idea that the problem is elites which don't govern as per Western ideals. Maybe I'm jaded, but given that the systems that elites in conflict prone states have constructed benefits them personally, our counterinsurgency strategy calls on them to act against their own personal and family interests. I think that's a dead end.

    I do believe that it would work to totally re-engineer such societies, but I don't think that's going to happen by prodding elites with a vested interest in the existing system. It might work through a lengthy occupation. But that's not going to happen.
    Last edited by SteveMetz; 10-11-2010 at 04:56 PM.

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    Quote Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post
    Most insurgents have no interest in bringing good governance to the people, they merely take advantage of poor governance to put themselves into the power position. The American experience is unique in that regard.
    I'm not sure. If you define "good governance" as Western liberalism, perhaps. But if you don't use that as a universal model of "good," then perhaps not. Using non-Western value criteria, one could argue that the majority of the population was better off--at least initially--after insurgent victories in Uganda, Zimbabwe, South Africa, Namibia, Angola, Mozambique, China, Vietnam, Cuba.

    And in the American case, one could also argue that had the Revolution not succeeded, the political evolution of the U.S. would have mirrored that of Canada, meaning an earlier abolition of slavery and no Civil War.

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    Default Are we in agreement now?

    Posted by Bob's World
    Most insurgents have no interest in bringing good governance to the people, they merely take advantage of poor governance to put themselves into the power position. The American experience is unique in that regard.
    Bob, this has been my point from day one, insurgency is a power struggle (there are a whole host of reasons there be may be underlying conditions that lead to an insurgency to include, but definitely not limited to poor governance).

    My view is that lawyers and politicians put too much emphasis on governance as the cause and cure for insurgencies, and completely disregard underlying psychological and social factors that have a much greater influence on behavior. While none of your comments are simplistic, they do sound similiar to the argument that if you just produce more jobs in the inner city kids will leave the gangs. I suspect if Jose is a member of MS-13 belonging to the gang is very much part of his identity and life style. Getting a job at McDonalds won't replace that. That applies at least equally for many insurgent groups. You can't simply implement a few policy changes and expect the insurgents to turn their weapons into plows.

    You, like John Nagel, make completely irrelevant comparisons between the efforts in Vietnam and Malaysia. The only commonality between the two is that they're both located in SE Asia. The insurgents in Malaya were very much isolated, and they were aggressively pursued by security forces. After years of being on the receiving end of military defeat after defeat it is probably fair to say that the organization didn't appeal to new recruits, and those who weren't really commited in the first place, but the cadres were defeated militarily, which you simply disregard. Political policies were eventually put in place that addressed some of the underlying issues, but that was not the so called defeat mechanism. As we all know defeat or adequate suppression of an insurgency is due to a combination of efforts, and the security force actions is one of those efforts. In Malaya the security forces were very effective.

    I agree with Steve (maybe not for the same reasons) that we're dealing with post-colonial insurgencies now, and they're different. Government has less influence because its power has been diluted due to the spread of globalism and information technology (which equals the playing field in some regards). I'm not convinced we can't separate the insurgents from the populace (at least in some cases), but the techniques to do so are politically unacceptable in today's world. The challenge is finding a strategy that is effective and acceptable in the 21st century. The old school methods no longer seem to fit the bill.

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