Defining Insurgency

[Dayuhan]

Dayuhan frequently points out that there is no insurgency in Saudi Arabia. Certainly that word is not used there. However:
- by some accounts upwards of 9,000 Saudis have been detained by the government indefinitely on terrorism charges since 2003. Closed trials began in 2008 and with some 300 convictions as of July.

This is true. What matters, though, is the reaction of the general populace. For example, when the Shah of Iran cracked down on Islamic militants, the populace took to the streets and the resistance snowballed, because the militants were just the tip of the iceberg: they had real popular support. That hasn't happened in Saudi Arabia, because the popular support just isn't there. That does not mean the populace loves their government, it means they don't see what the AQ types are peddling as a viable alternative. AQ has made converts, but they have not converted the populace; far from it.

- Most of the 9/11 attackers were Saudis
- Most of the foreign fighters for AQ in Iraq were Saudis.

We're talking about how many people here? Not a populace, that's for sure.

But this goes back to my definition. Insurgency is not the presence of some named organization actively operating within a country conducting illegal violence to take down the state. Insurgency is a condition that exists within the populace. It is a condition created by the government measured as perceived by the populace.

I think at some point you have to distinguish between the condition, which exists largely as a function of our western-conditioned perception, and the translation of that amorphous and immeasurable condition into action. It is only when there is action that we can begin to observe the extent to which the populace actually perceives what we think they perceive, or the extent to which they are willing to act on their perceptions.

Most Saudis want reasonable changes. My understanding is that many feel that the Royals have drifted from their religious path. Not enough Church and State is a big concern for the citizens. Others would like reforms of Justice, a judiciary that is not under total control of the Royals. All of this is exacerbated by declining incomes, greater gaps between the governed and those who govern. etc Is there hope in Saudi Arabia? Not if hope is defined as having trusted, certain, legal means to affect change.

How do we know what "most Saudis" want? Aren't there some assumptions involved there?

I think you'd find that lots of people want lots of things, many of them contradictory. Certainly there are those who feel that the government is insufficiently religious, but that's not by any means all, and many of those still don't buy the AQ line. Even among the conservative religious hierarchy AQ is often viewed as a loose cannon and as a potential competitor for influence among the flock. We cannot put simple interpretations or assumptions on these matters, because they're a long way from simple.

If you look at recent data I think you'll find that Saudi incomes have increased quite dramatically in the last 6-7 years. The oil glut was a hard time in the Kingdom, but for better or worse the price surge brought a major reprieve. Many hundreds of billions got poured out; they're still pouring and the effect is very real. For better or for worse, the spending has had a major blunting effect on the translation of anti-government sentiment into action, as it is wont to do. It's a buyoff and how long it will last remains to be seen, but the money looks to keep flowing for some time. As with China, I doubt that there will be enough popular impetus to generate significant political change until there's a significant economic dislocation.

So, is there no insurgency in Saudi Arabia, or is there no insurgency based on our current definitions that focus on the insurgent rather than the conditions within the populace?

How do you measure "conditions within the populace"? Are you talking about conditions within the populace, or about our perceptions of those conditions, or our assumptions about those conditions?

A few simple, reasonable adjustments of governance would reduce the conditions in Saudi Arabia to well within phase 0... Better to ease it back now than to allow it to explode to a level where it finally meets our definition of [I]insurgency[I]

That may be true, but we cannot adjust the conditions of Saudi governance. We can't ease it back to anything, and we can't allow it to do anything. It is not within our control, and attempting to control it would only blow up in our faces. We are not controlling or sustaining the Saudi government; they do what they want. We've defended them against outside aggression, and we would do so again, but that's a completely different matter. The relations between that government and that populace are not our business, they are wholly outside our control, and there is no reasonable way for us to usefully intervene.