120's comment about DoS: Obviously, not every DoS PRT was worth the effort to ship them in in the first place--especially in Afghanistan. My buds there tell me they are basically just in lock-down, so it doesn't surprise me that the main batch there are just the types collecting pay.

Even within DoS, the in-fighting was merciless, and very few groups were tapped into what was going on, versus what they were doing as a bureaucratic mission. Just goes to show---if you put enough bureaucracy on the ground anywhere, it will do what it does best---spin around itself.

We had our own list of contacts---everybody crossed the Palace---but, like in the civilian world, most of the best information sharing occurred at the pool or the Off-Site. The good stuff seldom found its way into the internal reports.

I do have to disagree with Spar, though.

I went as part of the batch of senior civs in late 2007. All of us responded ASAP to a call by Amb. Crocker to come and help. It was a very different recruiting pool for a very unique call for our expertises applicable to Iraq matters. Most of the actual experts went back home to do what we do.

I joined up with a new MND-N staff that damned sure had their heads screwed on. Between us, the Iraqis, and them, there was a constant and effective effort to drill for change---get us out of the way and let them find the route. Granted, we were running against a very embedded pattern to the contrary.

Hate to ruin the myth created by years of very poor history, but the military I was working with was exceptional.

Even with that, our MND-N counterparts understood that there were parts the civs were more appropriate for, and parts that they were more appropriate for. LTG Hertling had it down with helicopter diplomacy (bringing ministers to sites in the North) and regional conferences, and that gave us access to the ministers, senior staffs and contacts. And we had cover and contacts from the Green Zone to Al Faw.

When you put Iraqi technical managers together with US ones, the expertises, problems and solutions are all common, and they really graved what we could make available to them (especially through DivEng, mobility, etc...). That created an entirely different value to the relationships and information flows than if you just send a bunch of folks to bother them.

Like 120 in Afghanistan, I never felt any constraints about movement or access to anything I wanted to see or anybody I needed to meet with, and we always found enough venues and side-contacts to get the full story. I had my full body armor stowed at Speicher for trips in the North, and lightweight DoS vests to go under suits when we undercovered through Baghdad in the old beat-up Buicks.

Only time we ever had movement trouble was in September 2008. A minister called and said he was surprised that he had managed to get several key ministers together to meet next week (scheduling was always a bear). So we jumped at the chance.

On the morning of, we got alarming calls that security had descended on the ministry and wanted to do the full dogs and shake-downs of everybody.

Then, when we went out the door at the Palace, instead of our usual low-key convoy, there was a driveway full of big stuff. We forgot that it was 9/11, so the ministers were available because nobody else had scheduled, but the security on our side was too much to allow the meeting with us. So, instead, they all got together, which was, as we found out later, a very productive session (without us). I count that as a win.

G: The folks I travelled with were mostly Syrians, Iraqi-Americans, Iraqis, and UN's international experts, etc... and very good at interpreting what was going on. They wrote the books that the academics were reading.

Not everybody in Iraq was blind, deaf and dumb all the time.

Last week, Foreign Policy had an article bemoaning the fact that the census was cancelled (again). Anybody who actually understands Iraq's Ottoman bureaucratic past, and its actual census system and capabilities would know that they have always known exactly how many Iraqis are where. Just because they don't say, doesn't mean they don't know. (Hint: Food rations are as accurate as any census would every be.)

But I can assure you that HTS didn't have a clue. Populations, settlement patterns, tribal. ethnic, religious. Wasn't that a key factor?