Except that to do the job of a BDE (or whatever level) HQs entails a certain amount of overhead- I've seen no convincing argument (I've requested Storr's book inter-library) for failing to maximize that capability. Without maximizing the capability, you end up with micromanagement.
When drawing comparisons from WW2, you have to remember 3 things:
1- (already mentioned) is the exponential increase in C2 capabilities since then
2- the relatively unlimited nature of the force structure. In WW2, we had lots of separate BDEs, regiments, groups, battalions, etc, that could do all the little tasks that tend to come up. Now, we don't. So we take it out of hide, from subordinate units. The problem comes when we make these subordinates so small that detaching a subordinate effectively emasculates them. My BCT detached a IN BN shortly before our own deployment to Iraq- long story. A BCT of only one IN BN left us scrambling for combat power- we eventually made up for it, and ended up with 4 battalions attached in theater (total of 9 BNs in the BCT), but we were in-effective without the plus up, and effectively only a rump BCT.
3- in WW2, we were an amateur army. Most of the BN CDRs and even many RGT commanders had very little time in service, and those that did have time in service had little experience with large units. Our BCT commanders today have much more and better preparation to command at that level than their WW2 counterparts, and the difference at BN level is even greater. Most WW2 company commanders were shake and bakes with only a couple of years service and almost no professional education. This lead to a need to micromanage, from DIV CG on down, which effectively decreased the size of units that can be controlled.
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