Quote Originally Posted by 82redleg View Post
Except that to do the job of a BDE (or whatever level) HQs entails a certain amount of overhead...
Very much agree, been in big strong Bdes and small weak Bdes -- the larger always worked better. Not least because they're less personality dependent and more error tolerant -- and IMO, less inclined to facilitate micromanagement. Size is an impediment to that trait; redundancy and strong capabilities render it unnecessary.
When drawing comparisons from WW2, you have to remember 3 things:
1-...2- ... A BCT of only one IN BN left us scrambling for combat power- we eventually made up for it, and ended up with 4 battalions attached in theater (total of 9 BNs in the BCT), but we were in-effective without the plus up, and effectively only a rump BCT.
Yep. Cautionary tale that -- ala TAH comment on the poor Cav performance early in WW II, inexperience causes people to attempt to 'economize' in all aspects. Doesn't work well, most warfare tends to be manpower intensive. In a given unit, I'd rather be understrength than overstrength (the latter allows, even encourages, slack habits at all levels) but I'd rather have too many units available than not enough, those not employed can always train. Hopefully we know that training is a constant, in combat and out...
3- in WW2, we were an amateur army...Most WW2 company commanders were shake and bakes with only a couple of years service and almost no professional education. This lead to a need to micromanage, from DIV CG on down, which effectively decreased the size of units that can be controlled.
All true, however the counter to the first portion of number 3 is that the cream (generally ) rose to the top and slackers got summarily fired -- that does not happen today, therefor the increased education and training * are countered by the luck of the draw on competence and drive. Not to mention that IIRC, it's two years to CPT today???

My experience with a slew of WW II Commanders in the immediate postwar era and in Korea was that they did NOT micromanage. That began to change in 1952 when the line stabilized in Korea and suddenly Regimental Commanders, GOs and worse, their Staffs, had little to do and being aggressive take-charge guys, learned to micromanage which essentially forced CPTs who knew better too do the same thing. That trend was severely exacerbated by Viet Nam when again the COLS and Generals really had little to do (as is often the case today...).

That trend migrated down to Bn level after 1969 when the third and fourth string LTCs got in country and found they had no CPTs and few senior NCOs but a bunch of 2LTs and SGTs (NCOC Grads, six months of service...) who would do anything you asked but who knew little and thus almost had to be micromanaged -- thus a generation of Generals learned to over micromanage everything. They made it a way of life...

I would also suggest while the the WW II guys may not have been as (book wise) tactically and technically competent as todays crop, those guys knew people. I sometimes wonder if that is not a lost skill in today's Army.

Thus, they knew what to watch out for and what to ignore. Given the spate of aberrant and senseless behavior by NCOs and Troops about which Commands seem to be clueless and the number of horror tales about uniformtiy, haircuts and such, that too seems a lost skill.