The Clausewitz Collection (merged thread)

[Fergieis]

No, he was Corsican. And in various ways, I think you've offended three different groups.

Only three? I'm sorry couldn't have been more equitable to everyone.
Seriously though, all meant in good fun- no offense meant.

Napoleon was Corsican. An independent Corsica just prior to his birth had been under the influence of an Italian city state. They spoke Italian. Napoleon was ridiculed for his "non-French" origins early in his military career. The name Corsica itself is Italian. So was N.'s given name, which he changed do sound more French.

As far as lineage, I yield to the obviously better informed jmm99

they traced their ancestry to the Buonaparte family of Sarzana, Italy, ...

[Cavguy]

The essay cited at (http://www.tomdispatch.com/archive/175208/) channels my CGSC tactics instructor's latest book The Clausewitz Delusion in asking several pertinent questions:

1) Why abandon traditional American way of war in the 1980s for Clausewitz, when we soundly defeated the German armies based on his writings twice

2) Centers of gravity - highly educated generals are constantly quoted as "misjudging" the CoG. If it's such a great concept, why do smart people have such trouble finding it, and even when they do, it seems to not have the desired effect.

I recommend Mr. Melton's book for a thought provoking read - he covers a lot of ground, some better than others, but the nuances of his arguments are worthwhile. He isn't so much criticizing Clausewitz himself, more the U.S. Army's implementation of doctrine based on CvC.

I was considering writing a review on the blog, but since I am entangled with the author for another few months it wouldn't be fully unbiased.

[Fuchs]

2) Centers of gravity - highly educated generals are constantly quoted as "misjudging" the CoG. If it's such a great concept, why do smart people have such trouble finding it, and even when they do, it seems to not have the desired effect.

Because Americans don't talk about Clausewitz' Schwerpunkt when they say "CoG". Most U.S. generals have no clue about Schwerpunkt because they learned CoG instead and attribute it falsely to CvC.

There is no need to "find" a Schwerpunkt. You simply set it. You order it. You create it.
A Schwerpunkt is the own concentration of strength to overwhelm at one place or it's one intent that gets as much effort to achieve it as possible without collapsing elsewhere.


A CoG is a critical vulnerability. It describes the enemy, while a Schwerpunkt describes the own activities.

The USMC acknowledged this in its FMFM-1 "Warfighting" field manual (1989):

(...) Sometimes known as the center of gravity. However, there is a danger in using this term. Introducing the term into the theory of war Clausewitz wrote (p.485): "A center of gravity is always found where the mass is concentrated the most densely. It presents the most effective target for a blow; furthermore, the heaviest blow is that struck by the center of gravity." Clearly, Clausewitz was advocating a climatic test of strength against strength "by daring all to will all" (p. 596). This approach is consistent with Clausewitz' historical perspective. But we have since come to prefer pitting strength against weakness. Applying the term to modern warfare, we must make it clear that by the enemy's center of gravity we do not mean a source of strength, but rather a critical vulnerability.

in a footnote that was in reference to

Therefore, we should focus our efforts against a critical enemy vulnerability. Obviously, the more critical and vulnerable, the better.

[Firn]

I remember the post concerning his book, but as I haven't read it, I can't comment on it. I just want add that first question is a valid one, but which begs a lot of questions. What is the traditional American way of war? Having far more resources on might (simplistically) quip. Was the German armies really based on Clausewitz? A very complex topic and his simplistic statement is certainly wrong. And last but not least, how and why was Nazi Germany defeated? Certainly not because the allied armies were so much more skilled than the German (and Axis) ones.

Ironically the first question seems to be based on a very fractured vision of reality, something which CvC heavily criticized or even ridiculed. When you analyze things you have to dissect, but you should be still aware of the (political, economical, strategic, social ...) context. Without doing so, you could call the the Battle of Wavre a great victory for Marshal Grouchy.


Perhaps you should blog this topic, or perhaps I really should buy that book.


Firn

[Firn]

I felt angry refusing to lose a war that had taken so much of my twenties and resolved not to let those that came before me down. It was time to adjust.

v/r

Mike

This is a burden of many a soldier in war. When comrades get killed and wounded, when friends and relatives suffer and oneself has also spent much it is important and hard to try to no let you and others down.

I sincerly hope that Iraq becomes a less troubled state with the gift of peace.


Firn

[John Grenier]

It sounds like he is making the typical misinterpretation of the trinity. The trinity is composed of three principal tendencies or forces: hostility, chance, and purpose. These are universal to war and human nature. The "secondary" trinity (military, governement, and people) is often mistaken for what Uncle Carl was actually talking about and may not be applicable to all situations today. Tell him to go back to the pond.

Klugzilla, paleez!

[Pete]

Well where I am, we have entire groups of learned men, who just study the Torah and many other sacred texts - and argue all day and for many years.

Were Wilf one of those scholars of arcane texts he'd probably have his very own thread in the Trigger Puller forum on the efficacy of the Jawbone of an Ass as a weapon of war. His thread would include discusssion on the proposed basis of issue of the Jawbone, Ass within the standard infantry company, as well as the recommended MOS to repair the Jawbone, Ass at the direct and general support levels of maintenance.

[William F. Owen]

Were Wilf one of those scholars of arcane texts he'd probably have his very own thread in the Trigger Puller forum on the efficacy of the Jawbone of an Ass as a weapon of war. His thread would include discusssion on the proposed basis of issue of the Jawbone, Ass within the standard infantry company, as well as the recommended MOS to repair the Jawbone, Ass at the direct and general support levels of maintenance.

Well you do need lots of Jawbones. I'll also take any Ass I can get!

[Michael C]

Last time I posted a thread on this forum, the response was fantastic. Though I asked a simple, yet innocuous question (who believes war is war) the responses were awesome and got into the issues of defining war, war's nature and the character of war/insurgency/civil wars etc.

Since I am continuing the series on my blog, I want to ask a corollary question. I have found time and again that the far and away master of military theory is Carl von Clausewitz. Many commentors on this forum love Clausewitz, I know that. My question is, does Clausewitz have too much influence?

Here are my two last posts on the "war is war" topic. The first is "War is War is Clausewitz" and the second is "Killing, Fighting, Death, Destruction War is War"

I also want to thank everyone who commented on the last post I put up. I am working on a personal definition of war, and many of the comments had new and original ideas I hadn't heard.

[Bob's World]

Michael, Michael, Michael...chumming the waters of the Small Wars Journal with your bloody questions!

Ok, as the first shark on the scene, let me just say "YES."

Clausewitz offers much for those who seek to understand warfare; where we get into trouble is when we determine that becuase we are good at Clauswitzian warfare to make every problem warfare and and wage it as such.

The proplem is not CvC, it is our over-application of his teachings to things that (while oft violent) have little to do with warfare at all. Consider this excerpt from a post a made a few minutes ago regarding COIN and Afghanistan.

http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/201...-here/#c014650

1. Why are soldiers rather than politicians having these conversations? Insurgency is politics, but it is the type of politics born of the failures of the current crop of politicians, so they pass the problem to the military to solve on their behalf, and the military then (not surprisingly) makes the problem one of war and warfare. Politicians leave warfare to soldiers. (Mission passed, mission solved…)

2. Why politicians remain on their hands: It’s a war now, with a General in charge. Once the General “wins” or “loses” either one, the politicians and diplomats will then be able to get back to doing what they do. This is a natural mindset, but it is equally a crippling one. COIN is a civil emergency for the host nation government; for the intervening government it is best seen little different than our approaches to an Indonesian tsunami or Bangladeshi flood. The military is a wonderful reserve of excess capability and capacity to help a civil government turn the corner on an overwhelming emergency. Last in, first out. Not our emergency and certainly not our “war.”


Best of luck with your blog!

Bob

[slapout9]

CvC was half right in his definition of War. I use the SBW definition. It is the use of Force or Fraud to achieve the objective. Fraud can be thought of as Subversion or Psychological Warfare combined with or substituted for Physical Warfare.

[J Wolfsberger]

My question is, does Clausewitz have too much influence?

Drop thermonuclear questions much?

I think both too much and not enough.

Too much in the sense that, as Bob points out, CvC wasn't addressing the elements of conflict that lie more in the area of political and social relationships and maneuvering. (For that, see Machiavelli.)

Not enough in the sense that the principles he was developing (remember that Vom Kriege was an incomplete first draft published after his death) haven't really changed.

As an example, I don't think CvC helps arrive at an understanding of the Anbar Awakening. The Prince, on the other hand, helps a great deal

[Firn]

Drop thermonuclear questions much?

I think both too much and not enough.

Too much in the sense that, as Bob points out, CvC wasn't addressing the elements of conflict that lie more in the area of political and social relationships and maneuvering. (For that, see Machiavelli.)

As an example, I don't think CvC helps arrive at an understanding of the Anbar Awakening. The Prince, on the other hand, helps a great deal

His most important point in this regard might indeed be that as war is the continuation of Politik (polity, politics, policy) with the inter-mixtion of other means one should also take a good hard look at that pesky Politik. Fighting a war does not mean politik stops and other means disappear. In this case a good reading of him should open minds and ways and not close them down. It is quite ironic that the man which blasted others for trying to ignore the political context of military problems should be a problem in this regard.

Given that the inner tendency of war tends to spiral out of control, as he observed, to heavy military means might not be in the interest of a country which wants to limit violence to be able to withdraw while reaching most of it's political objectives. As usual doing the right thing in this difficult context was the hard part. In Anbar it seemed to work.

Firn

[M.L.]

Michael C-

I posted this on your blog, but here are my thoughts:

Two points. You said on your blog:

"The most common definition of war--Clausewitz’ definition--is that war is the continuation of politics by other means. War has two parts: the political and the violent. His definition doesn’t specify which should be primary--the politics or the violence--but from what I understand, he views politics, or grand strategy, as the most important factor in war."

First, Clausewitz defined war as "an act of violence to compel the enemy to do our will" He also said that warfare has three elements, not two. Those elements are policy (or the nation), violence (or the military) and the people. He said these three elements were a "paradoxical trinity" and that a theory which ignores any of the three isn't much of a theory. Clausewitz said any one of them might be the most important at any given time, but that they all play a part.

Second point. Clausewitz first defined war (as stated above) within the context of "total war." In other words, what is the true, unconstrained nature of war? It is violence and death to the last man. However, he later defines war as a "a continuation of policy" as an acknowledgment that war always serves a political objective, and is therefore constrained. Clausewitz stated that defining the political objective was the first and most important question to be answered before starting a war, however, that doesn't mean that politics is the most important part of the "paradoxical trinity."

So, back to the central question, what is the nature of war? Its pure nature is violence and death to the last man. However, we constrain war to serve political objectives. Discussions of armed social science, ROE, et. al, are questions of how far we constrain war to meet political ends.

[Michael C]

I have gone away from using/reading forums, but one of the best parts of discussion boards like this is using them as a sounding board for one's ideas. So thanks again everyone for the comments.

@Bob-I'll agree that Clausewitz himself isn't the problem. Like all philosophies or dogmas that are overused, the founder is often not the problem so much as the disciples who put too much faith into one solution. And I agree that our political system way too often passes the buck to the military, then lets them fail in situations that are politically impossible, or at least really, really difficult.

@Slapout- I plan to use that definition of warfare in a future post on defining war(fare). I hadn't heard it before the last post, and I think it raises interesting problems and arguments.

@J Wolfsberger- I mentioned that On War was unfinished at CvC's death, and I think that fact is undermentioned when it comes to CvC.

@ML- I got your comment but haven't responded to it. As I cautioned in the CvC post, I am no expert on CvC. While I bemoan the simplification of CvC's ideas in the post, I also participate and simplify his ideas for our readership. Thanks for the clarification and I will try to incorporate that into anything I write on Clausewitz in the future.

[Global Scout]

I'm a big advocate for expanding our view and doctrine for conflict, but to be frank I have been very disappointed with all the new ideas since 9/11 that have gotten us no where (it takes a network to defeat a network, human terrain, you have to change their political system, we have to develop their economy, then they'll stop fighting, etc.). All of these views and many more have simply distracted us from our objective of defeating the enemy.

We tend to hold up several of these ideas as validated principles for COIN and small wars, even though we continue to suffer set back after set back when employing them. I don't alway agree with Wilf, but I do agree there have been very few great military theorists since Clausewitz.

[William F. Owen]

I don't alway agree with Wilf, but I do agree there have been very few great military theorists since Clausewitz.

If Wilf gave that impression, then he was having one of his less useful days....

Actually I would submit though CvC is the Gold Standard, there are others of notable merit, but you have to be pretty widely read to make an effective judgement.

What tends to set the high standard amongst most of the useful theorists, is that they all start from Clausewitz, or come back to him eventually. The test is when you have to translate the THEORY into PRACTICE. Clausewitz's guidance on critical analysis still provides one of the best routes to do that. - IMO.

[Firn]

@ML- I got your comment but haven't responded to it. As I cautioned in the CvC post, I am no expert on CvC. While I bemoan the simplification of CvC's ideas in the post, I also participate and simplify his ideas for our readership. Thanks for the clarification and I will try to incorporate that into anything I write on Clausewitz in the future.

After reading your first blog post I have to agree. M.L gave a pretty good quick primer. Perhaps you should go to the www.clausewitz.com page and read some of the introductionary stuff before going further.

"War is the continuation of Politik (polity, politics, policy) with [the inter-mixtion] of other means" is a very subtle description. Economy, Culture, Technology, Religion do all shape both politics and military matters in many many ways but only through political (and social) intercourse will the military means be organized and inter-mixed. War has especially due to those specific military means it's own ruleset or grammar, but not his own logic. That social and human logic permeates all human existence.

[Taiko]

Some helpful tips for reading CvC:

1. Understand that his work was unfinished. He had discovered the theory that war is a continuation of politics rather late in his life and was in the process of rewriting his thesis when he died.

2. Make a clear distinguishment between what CvC wrote about 'war' and 'warfare'. CvC's writing on 'war' is universal and still relevant today. CvC's writing on 'warfare' is context specific and subject to time and space. Hence, war never changes, but warfare constantly changes with time and space. If we do not learn to adapt to those changes then we will surely be at a disadvantage in shaping the conflict environment.

3. Be very weary of what 'commentators' say about CvC. He is subject to constant misinterpretation and can be taken grossly out of context. Detractors such as Martin Van Creveld are a classic example. CvC advocates are also guilty of taking what CvC wrote out of context with Helmuth von Moltke being another classic example.

4. As per usual, one reading of CvC is simply not enough to understand how he interposes an ideal of war and warfare with the reality of war and warfare. To fully appreciate CvC, and ensure that you do not misinterpret what he has writen, you will need to understand the theoretical methodology of the time. For this Kant is your best starting point.

Good luck with unraveling the mind of the best western militery theorists of all time.

[jmm99]

Back from an extended vacation ?; or

were you lost in the Outback doing anthropology ?; or

did you become engrossed in studying this device:



which has something to do with trinities (IIRC) ?

Agree, of course, with your four points re: studying CvC.

Regards

Mike