The Army: A Profession of Arms

[Chris Case]

Ken,

Again, thanks for the comments. I have not taken the least bit of umbrage at having a discussion. Do not infer from me trying to be clear about what I am saying and what other people are saying in response as some sort of offense or annoyance. I argue all the time and don't see it as a bad thing. It is certainly not something that annoys me. If it did I would need to find another job. I don't see how engaging in argument to get clear about what we are talking about equates to a chip on shoulder, but if that is how you take it, okay. A few last chips to flick and I will stop trying.

You assumed he could mean 'preventive war,' used that as an interrogative subject line and then went into a discussion of that topic.

I did not assume anything in the part of my claim that has apparently been so offensive and I did assume something in the part that no one has yet pointed to as showing a lack of civility. I quoted a description and made a claim that, on its face, it was a definition of preventive war. That is all. No assumption needed about what he meant for this part of my claim. I then did assume that he did not mean to endorse anything illegal, to wit, preventive war. He came back and clarified that my assumption about what he meant was correct. Fine. We are now clear and can move on to a further discussion. However, other people felt a need to jump to his defense and muddy the water with what I take to be poor reasoning. Fine as well, but if the idea is that, in order to be civil, I really should make no effort to be clear about what I said or didn't say, then I see no point in my continuing any further discussion in such a civil place.

[jmm99]

you want to pick up your ruck and move to greener pastures, then do so. It's not my role to push you out or pull you back.

Gentlemen, let's try to get back to the point of the thread.

Regards

Mike

[jmm99]

some of the many questions you propound (e.g.):

from Chris Case

A few more questions:

Does this mean that the Army needs to consider something like selective conscientious objection for a professionalized force? Or does being a "professional" remove the ability to choose not to fight?

Is the military professional the sort of professional who does not have the autonomy to exercise their own expert judgment in refraining from doing harm?

Unless, of course, you have no opinion re: the answers to them. Somehow, I doubt that is the case.

Regards

Mike

[Ken White]

I can take a shot at both.

Re: question 1. Once someone volunteers for that professional force and signs the contract without coercion, they lose all right to object to being told to do what they voluntarily took on. I think that means if you sign on, you're stuck. Don't want to be stuck -- seek other employment. Because it's a job, it's a trade, not a profession. Did I mention that entrance is not mandatory? Since it's not, the old saw 'be careful what you want, you may get it' applies.

Yes, draft or conscription changes that rule and conscientious objection is permissable -- probably should be encouraged...

On question 2, those engaged in the trade of soldiering have taken someone's Shilling, as it were, therefor they have an obligation to do what they're told. It as they say, goes with the territory. They do have the autonomy -- and IMO an obligation -- to exercise their own expert judgment in refraining from doing harm to an extent in executing the missions given as they see fit. They do not have the right to decline missions but have a responsibility to attempt to structure missions to best accomplish them at the lowest possible cost to own nation and force. If given a mission they do not believe is lawful or that is consistent with their values they may resign if possible or take the punishment prescribed for failure to follow orders or violation of their contract. Hopefully without whining about it in either case.

One always has choices.

[Old Eagle]

Have we blitzed by the classical approaches to this question on purpose?

Why not begin with Janowitz, Huntington, or similar, then propose modifications based on substantive changes that make their arguments invalid or at least not as strong as they were back in the day?

[Ken White]

Have we blitzed by the classical approaches to this question on purpose?

Others may not...

[jmm99]

and a good evening to everyone else.

I'm not a great fan of DoDD 3000.05 et seq. - believing that the political struggle should largely be handled by civilian agencies (which would require a substantial shift in resources) in co-ordination with the military effort. As such, I've a bias and shouldn't be answering my own questions about who makes policy.

I'd like to see a more conservative presentation, updating Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations, (1957), and Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (1960). Since Janowitz at least floated the concept of "constabulary forces", he might not be that far off re: some of the present doctrine.

I can think of no better person to educate us than you.

Kiitos ennakollisesti

Mike

[Bob Underwood]

For moving this discussion quickly beyond a theological exposition of Huntington et al. I don't want to suggest that there's nothing useful there, but we need to get a sense of what our problem is before we go looking for answers.

But, your answers seem curious to me for a couple reasons:
First, you say that:

Once someone volunteers for that professional force and signs the contract without coercion, they lose all right to object to being told to do what they voluntarily took on. I think that means if you sign on, you're stuck. Don't want to be stuck -- seek other employment. Because it's a job, it's a trade, not a profession. Did I mention that entrance is not mandatory? Since it's not, the old saw 'be careful what you want, you may get it' applies.

There might be a few problems here. For one, no one has a right to volunteer for or be obligated to do something that is morally wrong in the first place. On the other side of this, no one has a right to contract another person to do something morally wrong as well. Basically, this means that a contract for murder, rape, robbing, beating kids etc. has no obligatory force on either party. If we are going to take on the problem of selective contentious objection(SCO) as a profession, we need something better than this. The SCO's objection will be a moral claim so we need to be able to tell them why the action is moral - otherwise, we should not be surprised that the contract fails to motivate them.

Your second observation seems better to me.

If given a mission they do not believe is lawful or that is consistent with their values they may resign if possible or take the punishment prescribed for failure to follow orders or violation of their contract. Hopefully without whining about it in either case.

One always has choices.

However, I don't see the choices as quite so freeing. What do we think should be the prescribed punishments for someone doing what they think is, ex hypothesi, moral? According to the case at hand, they are choosing the harder right over the easier wrong. Also, the problem above still looms. How can I be in violation of a contract that has no moral or legal grounds?

Regards,
Bob

[jmm99]

We might want to define what each of us means by "selective conscientious objection". I'll start by reference to Conscientious objector - Wiki and its sub-topic, Selective conscientious objection - Wiki.

To keep things simpler, I'll posit an all-volunteer force and that the service person was not hussled (a great legal term) into the contract and had no firm conscientious objections when he or she entered into the contract.

I'd present three examples (all post-entry "conversions" to eliminate issues of fraud by the service member):

1. Conversion to complete pacifism - joins the American Friends Service Committee and wouldn't raise a finger in violence to defend himself or others from great bodily harm.

2. Conversion to pacifism re: a particular war - this is the situation presented in the Wiki subtopic re: "Selective conscientious objection" (basically, "hell no, I won't go [there].")

3. Conversion to pacifism re: a particular form of warfare - e.g., service member willingly participates in air operations involving conventional ordinances; but refuses an order to perform the preliminary arming sequence on a nuclear device.

Leaving aside the strict legalisms for the moment, should all of these cases be treated the same ?

Regards

Mike

[Ken White]

For one, no one has a right to volunteer for or be obligated to do something that is morally wrong in the first place.

That's a rather sweeping statement and it raises several questions. Says who? Who enforces that? Who determines what is 'right?' My version of morals say that they are very much an individual construct and I have no right to impose mine on you nor do you have a right to impose yours on me.

Thus if the governmental system says the issue is legal and moral and one disagrees, that is ones right. However, that disagreement does not automatically contravene the legality (or the morality in the eyes of that government) of the law that established the contract.

On the other side of this, no one has a right to contract another person to do something morally wrong as well.

The same questions apply.

Basically, this means that a contract for murder, rape, robbing, beating kids etc. has no obligatory force on either party.

It may have no legally binding obligatory force but it could have a morally (or immorally, dependent upon how one views such concepts as honor) binding force.

That not withstanding, the issue is not generally acknowledged criminal actions, it is the legal right granted by the People to the State to use force. That has been adjudged over the years by the majority of people in most nations and certainly including this one to be moral and, with some contraints, legal. Assuming those constraints are properly addressed and / or negated, then the contract in service of that usage is legal, period. Whether or not it is moral is an individual determination. The preponderance of evidence in this country today is is that most people assess it and the recruiting or selection of people willing -- not forced -- to accept those terms as morally acceptable (I'll insert a reminder here that a draft or conscription totally changes the rules...).

If we are going to take on the problem of selective contentious objection(SCO) as a profession, we need something better than this. The SCO's objection will be a moral claim so we need to be able to tell them why the action is moral - otherwise, we should not be surprised that the contract fails to motivate them.

Again, morality is an individual construct. Nations do not, cannot, have morals -- if they are to act 'morally' then it is in the terms of the various beholders and thus, obviously, some may not agree with the presumed correct "morality" of an issue. If one accepts a "moral" norm (some people do, some do not...) then one would presume that nations laws were crafted in "moral" terms and should account for such contingencies.

The purpose of a contract is to obligate two parties to do certain things. Generally a quid pro quo situation exists. No contract of which I am aware is intended to "motivate" anyone -- motivation, like morality is an individual thing -- so whether a given contract motivates anyone should not be a question. Whether it is legal is a valid question. Whether, in a democratic society, it is morally acceptable to the majority of the people, is also valid. Whether it is moral to an individual or small group of them is immaterial.

However, I don't see the choices as quite so freeing. What do we think should be the prescribed punishments for someone doing what they think is, ex hypothesi, moral? According to the case at hand, they are choosing the harder right over the easier wrong. Also, the problem above still looms. How can I be in violation of a contract that has no moral or legal grounds?

What case at hand? To my knowledge, no exemplary case exists in this thread. If you're using the blanket SCO postion as an example, whether the "harder right" is in fact right or even exists is not a given.

IMO, if a "moral" objection to an assignment (combat or not) is raised and is proven valid on the merits and corroborative testimony, I'd just discharge the individual (with an obligation to collect any funds not recouped). If, OTOH, it was not proven then they'd have the option of complying or receiving punishment as the modified UCMJ and a Court Martial direct.

One can be in violation of a contract that one deems to have no moral or legal grounds to ones hearts content. However, if that contract is deemed moral and legal by the people, legislature and courts of a democratic society, I'm doubtful ones opinion will count for much.

If one signed that contract on own volition, regardless of one's perception of its contents, one has accepted an obligation to comply with its terms. If one decides later that those terms are onerous or that one does not wish to comply with any or all of those terms, one has options. One can do it anyway, protesting mightily; If allowed, one can resign forfeiting all future benefits and paying any contractual debt incurred and not met; One can refuse to comply and take the contractually stipulated penalty for so doing. Either way as I said, hopefully without whining.

It is not the job of the Armed Forces in this nation to tell anyone why a given action is "moral." That is the job of the elected civilian leadership (not that they won't try to sluff it ). That is dipping into the realm of strong personal opinions and that is no place for a large unwieldy bureaucracy to try to go. Particularly not one whose very existence is itself broadly immoral in the minds of a number of the citizens it serves...

I also suggest that we as a profession do NOT need to take on the issue of Conscientious Objection other than to determine and prescribe procedures for dealing with those who elect to so object. What constitutes that objection, and all the various ramifications surrounding it are matters of national political policy. They are not and should not be military policy. The comment in the paragraph just above applies; the 'military' solution will always be suspect in the eyes of many. Our penchant for messing around in the political milieu invariably brings big problems. We ought to quit doing that...

[Pete]

Speaking of the Profession of Arms, the Army-speak that has creeped into our doctrinal writings over the last 20 years drives me up the wall. Soldiers should be plain-speaking guys who say what they mean and mean what they say, without words like "optimizing, " "integrating," "leveraging," and so on. Strunk and White's Elements of Style should be our guide for effective writing. The cerebral bl*w job graphics that accompany Army-speak publications and PowerPoint presentations don't help at all, they only make things worse. Even before this Army-speak came along 20 years ago the overuse of acronyms had gotten way out of hand. We should communicate in a way thal allows the maximum number of people to understand what it is we're saying.