Define please,
the bolded part of this:
regardless of what is is about, and as a starting point, whom do you include in the western world and whom do you include in the Muslim world. In short, define and ID the opposing sides.from motorfirebox
Islam is a religion, and people are prone to interpret religious texts however they damn well please. The struggle between the western and "Muslim" worlds is not about religion, it's about economics. Religion at best shapes the threat--it doesn't create it.
That having been done, please go back to your substantive points and draw me a word picture of what that struggle looks like.
Regards
Mike
Clearly defining what the sides are, in terms larger than specific campaigns, is a tall order (hell, even in the specific context of, say, Iraq or Afghanistan, it's not always easy). I'm not actually sure that such a thing is possible. But it is possible--and important--to clarify who the enemy isn't. Defining the other side of this conflict as Islam is a bad mistake that I wish were less prevalent.
I'd suggest,
simply on grounds of logic, that if you cannot define who is the enemy, you cannot define who is not the enemy.
Not that defining membership in violent non-state actors is easy. I stick with the 2001 AUMF and follow the DC Circuit decisions. The result is that I see a armed conflict between the US and AQ (together with its associated groups). In terms of the type of conflict, AQ is waging unconventional warfare against the US - often via local insurgencies it supports in the hope we will get sucked in.
Most of our coalition partners do not see it that way, but regard AQ as a criminal group to be handled pursuant to civilian criminal law. E.g., no drone strikes and direct actions permitted.
I don't see a present, generalized struggle (in the sense of a jihad) between the western world (basically the EU, prob. Russia, the Anzacs and the Americas) and the Muslim world (shown on the map I posted).
Iran also wages unconventional warfare via proxies (not so much directly vs the US to date, but vs Israel and less directly vs Saudi Arabia).
Europe may have issues with specific Muslim population groups. I can't pontificate on that. So far, we (US) have not had problems with our Muslim population generally - as opposed to problems with individuals or small groups linked to AQ ideologically.
Regards
Mike
Of course you can define who the enemy isn't. We're pretty sure the enemy isn't moon men from Venus, after all. It's certainly within the capability of logic to rule things out.
I think I may have been unclear. When I said the west was engaged in a struggle with the "Muslim" world, I put the quotes in because I was being facetious. I don't think defining the conflict was west vs Islam (or, god forbid, Christian vs Islam) is accurate or helpful, which is why I was arguing against the concept Tukhachevskii put forward--he stated that Islam is inherently a religion which conflicts with western interest, and I disagreed. To the extent that it's anti-western, so is Christianity and almost any other religion you could name.
Given that many of those we are incontrovertibly in conflict with--as evidenced by the fact that they're shooting at us and trying to blow us up--are Muslim, though, it's useful to clarify that the conflict doesn't (despite their claims, as well as the claims of certain western blowhards) spring from the fact that they're Muslim and we're not. If we don't make that division clear, we'll end up fighting half the planet. And quite possibly losing.
What we're in conflict with is a socioeconomic class. They're poor enough to be angry, but close enough to our fantastic wealth to be able to use certain features of it--our communication and transportation networks--against us to great effect. People don't like to think of themselves as jealous or greedy, so yeah, they wrap their conflict in their religion to make their anger more palatable to themselves (just as many in the west choose to view the conflict in terms of ideology in order to escape having to acknowledge the role their own wealth plays). But it's about haves and have-nots doing their usual dance.
Thanks for the clarification,
especially your last paragraph:
If this be true (relative "have nots" vice the US "haves"), we would still be dealing with a very large percentage of the World's population. I don't see where this concept is any more helpful (to even generate a definition of the problem) than the concept of throwing all Muslims into the same basket.from motorfirebox
What we're in conflict with is a socioeconomic class. They're poor enough to be angry, but close enough to our fantastic wealth to be able to use certain features of it--our communication and transportation networks--against us to great effect. People don't like to think of themselves as jealous or greedy, so yeah, they wrap their conflict in their religion to make their anger more palatable to themselves (just as many in the west choose to view the conflict in terms of ideology in order to escape having to acknowledge the role their own wealth plays). But it's about haves and have-nots doing their usual dance.
Regards
Mike
Fair point. My own bias is showing; I tend to view almost everything through the filter of wealth and wealth gaps, these days. Regardless, my main purpose in posting was to kick the legs out from under the idea that a religious text is the first, inevitable, and continuing cause for conflict.
Agreed that ....
we have to look at all relevant and material factors - or we end up fighting a "war" which we perceive as something that it is not.
Cheers
Mike
pt. 1
Originally Posted by SteveMetz
I (would) like to think that the older I get the thicker my skin has become and I’ve got more of a handle on my temper. But try as I might, even though I tried counted beyond ten, I just couldn’t let these comments pass coming as they do from someone ordinarily described as an academic (which was always a dirty word where I was taught...by scholars); especially from someone who sought to put me in my place by quoting the sales blurb rather than actually reading the book I suggested he consult (academics!). Those quoted below (of which there were many more but I didn’t want to bore you), apart from Akbar (who is a journalist, I think) and Nafzinger (a military historian usually of the Napoleonic era), are reputable SME’s...I don’t acquire knowledge from twats like Robert Spencer (in case you were wondering).
DJIHAD etymologically signifies an effort directed towards a determined objective. (Cf. idjtihdd: the work of the scholar-jurists in seeking the solution of legal problems; mudjdhada or, again, djihdd: an effort directed upon oneself for the attainment of moral and religious perfection. Certain writers, particularly among those of ####e persuasion, qualify this djihdd as "spiritual djihdd" and as "the greater djihdd", in opposition to the djihdd which is our present concern and which is called "physical djihdd" or "the lesser djihdd". It is, however, very much more usual for the term djihdd to denote this latter form of "effort"). In law, according to general doctrine and in historical tradition, the djihdd consists of military action with the object of the expansion of Islam and, if need be, of its defence. The notion stems from the fundamental principle of the universality of Islam: this religion, along with the temporal power which it implies, ought to embrace to whole universe, if necessary by force. The principle, however, must be partially combined with another which tolerates the existence, within the Islamic community itself, of the adherents of "the religions with holy books", i.e., Christians, Jews and Madjus [q.v.]. As far as these latter are concerned the djihdd ceases as soon as they agree to submit to the political authority of Islam and to pay the poll tax (djizya [q.v.]) and the land tax (kharddi [q.v.]). As long as the question could still, in fact, be posed, a controversy existed—generally resolved by a negative answer—on the question as to whether the Christians and Jews of the Arabian peninsula were entitled to such treatment as of right. To the nonscriptuaries, in particular the idolaters, this half measure has no application according to the opinion of the majority: their conversion to Islam is obligatory under pain of being put to death or reduced into slavery. In principle, the djihdd is the one form of war which is permissible in Islam, for, in theory, Islam must constitute a single community organized under a single authority and any armed conflict between Muslims is prohibited. Following, however, the disintegration of Muslim unity and the appearance, beginning in the middle of the 2nd/8th century, of an ever increasing number of independent States, the question arose as to how the wars which sprang up between them were to be classified. They were never included within the strict notion of djihdd—even in the case of wars between states of different religious persuasion—at least according to the general Sunni doctrine; and it is only by an abuse of language that this term is sometimes applied to them, while those authors who seek for a precise terminology label them only as kitdl or mukdtala (conflict, war). There is even hesitation in referring to the struggle against the renegade groups in Islam as djihdd. The viewpoint of ####e doctrine is not the same, for, according to the ####e, a refusal to subscribe to their teaching is equivalent to unbelief (kufr). The same holds good, a fortiori, for the Kharidiite doctrine [see further TAKFIR]. The djihdd is a duty. This precept is laid down in all the sources. It is true that there are to be found in the Kurgan divergent, and even contradictory, texts. These are classified by the doctrine, apart from certain variations of detail, into four successive categories: those which enjoin pardon for offences and encourage the invitation to Islam by peaceful persuasion; those which enjoin fighting to ward off aggression; those which enjoin the initiative in attack, provided it is not within the four sacred months; and those which enjoin the initiative in attack absolutely, at all times and in all places. In sum, these differences correspond to the stages in the development of Muhammad's thought and to the modifications of policy resulting from particular circumstances; the Meccan period during which Muhammad, in general, confines himself to moral and religious teaching, and the Medina period when, having become the leader of a politico-religious community, he is able to undertake, spontaneously, the struggle against those who do not wish to join this community or submit to his authority. The doctrine holds that the later texts abrogate the former contradictory texts (the theory of naskh [q.v.]), to such effect that only those of the last category remain indubitably valid; and, accordingly, the rule on the subject may be formulated in these absolute terms: "the fight (djihdd) is obligatory even when they (the unbelievers) have not themselves started it". In two isolated opinions, however, attempts were made to temper the rule in same respects. According to one of these views, attributed to ‘Ata (d. ii4/732-3), the ancient prohibition against fighting during the sacred months remains valid; while according to the other, attributed to Sufyan al- Thawrl (born 97/715), the djihdd is obligatory only in defence; it is simply recommended (li 'l-nad-b) in attack. According to a view held by modern orientalist scholarship, Muhammad's conception of the djihdd as attack applied only in relation to the peoples of Arabia; its general application was the result of the idimd (general consensus of opinion) of the immediately succeeding generations. At root, of course, this involves the problem as to whether Muhammad had conceived of Islam as universal or not. The opinion of al-Thawrl appears to have been adopted by al-Djahiz. The heterodox movement of the Ahmadiyya [q.v.], beginning towards the end of the 19th century, would go further than al-Thawri inasmuch as it refuses to recognize the legitimacy of the djihdd even as a recommended activity. Cf., in the same sense, the doctrine of Babism (see BAB).
According to the general doctrine of the Shi’a. due account taken of their dogma concerning "the absence of the Imam", who alone has the necessary competence to order war, the practice of the djihdd is necessarily suspended until the re-appearance of the Imam or the ad hoc appointment of a vicar designated by him for this task. The Zaydi sect, however, which does not recognize this dogma, follows the same teaching as that of the SunnI doctrine. Characteristics of the duty of djihdd. The djihdd is not an end in itself but a means which, in itself, is an evil (fasdd), but which becomes legitimate and necessary by reason of the objective towards which it is directed: to rid the world of a greater evil; it is "good" from the fact that its purpose is "good" (hasan li-husn ghayrih).
pt. 2
The Encyclopaedia of Islam, Vol. 2 (C-G), pp. 538-540A religious duty. The djihdd has the effect of extending the sway of the faith; it is prescribed by God and his Prophet; the Muslim dedicates himself to the djihdd in- the same way that, in Christianity, the monk dedicates himself to the service of God; in the same vein it is said in different hadiths that "the djihdd is the monasticism of Islam"; the djihdd is "an act of pure devotion"; it is "one of the gates to Paradise"; rich heavenly rewards are guaranteed for those who devote themselves to it; those who fall in the djihdd are the martyrs of the faith, etc. A substantial part of the doctrine reckons the djihdd among the very "pillars" (arkan) of the religion, along with prayer and fasting etc. It is a duty which falls upon every Muslim who is male, free and able bodied. It is generally considered that non-Muslims may be called upon to assist the Muslims in the djihdd. A "collective" obligation (fard kifdya) in contrast to fard ‘ayn. The fard kifdya is that duty which is imposed upon the community considered as a whole and which only becomes obligatory for each individual in particular to the extent that his intervention is necessary for the realization of the purpose envisaged by the law. Thus, as soon as there exists a group of Muslims whose number is sufficient to fulfil the needs of a particular conflict, the obligation of the djihdd no longer rests on the others. The general teaching is that the duty of djihdd falls, in the first place, individually as a fard 'ayn, upon those who live in the territory nearest to the enemy, and that the same holds good in the case of the inhabitants of a town which is besieged. In the organized State, however, the appreciation of the precise moment at which the djihdd is transformed into an 'ayn obligation is a matter for the discretion of the sovereign; so that, in the case of general mobilization, the djihdd loses, for all the members of the community, its character of fard kifaya, and becomes, instead, fard cayn. All this implies, however, that for those who hold the reins of authority and, in particular, the sovereign, the djihdd is always an individual duty, since their own personal action is necessary in every case. Where there are several independent Muslim states, the duty will fall upon the ruler of the state which is nearest to the enemy. Further, the duty of the djihdd is relative and contingent in this dual sense that, on the one hand, it only comes into being when the circumstances are favourable and of such a nature as to offer some hope of a victorious outcome, and, on the other hand, the fulfilment of the duty may be renounced in consideration of the payment by the enemy of goods reaching a certain value, if such policy appears to be in conformity with the interests of the moment.
Its subsidiary character. Since the djihdd is nothing more than a means to effect conversion to Islam or submission to its authority, there is only occasion to undertake it in circumstances where the people against whom it is directed have first been invited to join Islam. Discussion turned on the question as to whether it was necessary, on this ground, to address a formal invitation to the enemy. The general doctrine holds that since Islam is sufficiently widespread in the world, all peoples are presumed to know that they have been invited to join it. It is observed, however, that it would be desirable to repeat the invitation, except in cases where there is ground for apprehension that the enemy, thus forewarned, would profit from such a delay by better organizing his defences and, in this way, compromising the successful outcome of the djihdd. Its perpetual character. The duty of the djihdd exists as long as the universal domination of Islam has not been attained. "Until the day of the resurrection", and "until the end of the world" say the maxims. Peace with non-Muslim nations is, therefore, a provisional state of affairs only; the chance of circumstances alone can justify it temporarily. Furthermore there can be no question of genuine peace treaties with these nations; only truces, whose duration ought not, in principle, to exceed ten years, are authorized. But even such truces are precarious, inasmuch as they can, before they expire, be repudiated unilaterally should it appear more profitable for Islam to resume the conflict. It is, however, recognized that such repudiation should be brought to the notice of the infidel party, and that he should be afforded sufficient opportunity to be able to disseminate the news of it throughout the whole of his territory [see SULH].
Its defensive as well as offensive character. The djihdd has principally an offensive character; but it is equally a djihdd when it is a case of defending Islam against aggression. This indeed, is the essential purpose of the ribdt [q.v.] undertaken by isolated groups or individuals settled on the frontiers of Islam. The ribdt is a particularly meritorious act. Finally, there is at the present time a thesis, of a wholly apologetic character, according to which Islam relies for its expansion exclusively upon persuasion and other peaceful means, and the djihdd is only authorized in cases of "self defence" and of "support owed to a defenceless ally or brother". Disregarding entirely the previous doctrine and historical tradition, as well as the texts of the Kur'an and the sunna on the basis of which it was formulated, but claiming, even so, to remain within the bounds of strict orthodoxy, this thesis takes into account only those early texts which state the contrary (v. supra).
Last edited by Tukhachevskii; 02-10-2011 at 01:11 PM.
The rationale for Islamic thinking about war has its basis in the fundamental categorical structure of Islam itself. Because the world is divided between submission to God’s will and rebellion against God’s will, the fact of conflict is inevitable. (Note that I do not say between believers and unbelievers – that would be too Christian a categorization, and it would obscure the way that this conflict occurs even in the heart of the ordinary Muslim, as she or he struggles to be properly and fully submissive to God.) In this way, the fundamental logic of war is couched in theological terms of obedience to God. p.195
Those who still submit to God’s will must be prepared to fight to defend God ’ s order, and – when the requisite authorities deem it proper – to fight to expand the dominion of God across the whole globe. The ultimate aim and expectation is universal conquest; as one of the most historically significant verses in the Quran suggests, Muslims are enjoined to “ fight [the unbelievers] until there is no more persecution [or seduction] and worship [ din ] is devoted to God ” (Q. 2:193). p.195
War – literally, qital , or “ fighting ” – is simply the last step in the “ ladder of escalation ” in the effort to conduct jihad in the dar - al - harb ; it was the way in which Islam would be brought to non - Muslim lands, if those lands would not allow more peaceful means of bringing Islam. Jihad is in a way simply the reality of the tension and irresolvable conflict at the border separating the dar - al - Islam and the dar - al - Harb . p.196
Because the sword verses were revealed in Medina and later than the peace verses, which were revealed in Mecca, the sword verses are often taken to be normative, or even to have “abrogated ” (revoked) the peace verses. What is interesting, though, is how even in its more militaristic forms of the sword verses, the Islamic doctrine of jihad does not seem to have committed its faithful warriors to engage in wars of mass conversion. Historically, Islamic armies sought conquest but not conversion; in the early centuries especially, conversion seems to have been discouraged. Particularly with the other “ Peoples of the Book ” – that is, Jews and Christians – the economic benefits of taxing non - Muslims (the jizyah , tax on non - Muslims) meant that the early Islamic Caliphate stood to lose valuable streams of funding were too many of their subjects to convert to the religion of the Prophet. p.197,
C. Mathewes, Understanding Religious Ethics (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010)
Last edited by Tukhachevskii; 02-10-2011 at 01:11 PM.
D. Cook, Understanding Jihad (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 2005)One of the goals of jihad was to conquer and dominate non-Muslims. [...] In summarizing the teachings of the Quran with regard to the subject of jihad, it is important to emphasize that we have a very martial and well-developed teaching here. Although it is not an exhaustive treatment of jihad—many of the hadith and subsequent jurisprudence are devoted to annotating topics only adumbrated in the suras—the Quran nonetheless presents a well-developed religious justification for waging war against Islam’s enemies. p.10-11,
There is a redemptive aspect to jihad that is crucial to understanding its development. We have already noted Quran 9:111, where this salvific contract is spelled out. In ‘Abdallah b. al-Mubarak’s Kitab al-jihad we see similar attitudes. In the above hadith, “the sword wipes away sins” in a manner similar to the Christian tradition, which places redemption in the Cross: “Being killed in the path of Allah washes away impurity; killing is two things: atonement and rank [in heaven].” Fighters were encouraged to wear white so that the blood of their sacrifice would be apparent. p.15
Incitement and psychological fear are both important components of jihad, as is recognized in the Quran 3:151: “We will cast terror into the hearts of the unbelievers on account of their associating with Allah that for which He sent down no authority.” The Prophet Muhammad further amplified this idea by noting that God had helped him with a fear (ru‘b or mahaba) that He had sent before the Muslim armies to a distance of a month’s journey. According to this idea, all who lived at this distance from the Muslims would feel this fear and be defeated by it even before meeting the Muslims in battle. The psychological preparation for victory or defeat is also a theme of the hadith literature, in which we find a great many references to poetry, flags, and slogans intended to aid the fighters. Probably the most popular slogan— Allahu akbar! (God is greater!)—is usually said to precede Muslim advance into battle. p.17-18
One of the bases for this type of regulation was defining the manner in which war should be declared and what its limits were. The Messenger of Allah, when he would send a commander with a raid or an army would enjoin upon him the fear of Allah, especially with regard to himself, but also with regard to the Muslims, and say: When you meet your polytheist enemy, call to him [to choose] between three possibilities—accept whichever one they accept, and desist from them:
1. Call them to Islam; if they accept, then accept it from them and desist from them. Then [if they accept Islam] call them to move from their homes to the home of the muhajirun [immigrants]; if they do this, then they will have the rights and the responsibilities of the muhajirun. Ifthey refuse, then designate their home, and inform them that they will be like the Muslim Bedouin—Allah’s law, which is incumbent upon the believers, will be incumbent upon them, but they will not have any right to the movable or nonmovable spoils, except when they fight at the side of the Muslims.
2. If they refuse, then call them to pay the jizya [poll tax]. If they accept, then accept it from them and desist from them.
3. If they refuse, then ask Allah for aid against them, and fight them. If you besiege the people of a fortress, and they desire to surrender unconditionally (‘ala hukm Allah), do not accept this from them, but let them surrender according to your judgment, and do with them what you wish afterwards. p. 19-20
The Prophet Muhammad is portrayed, as Patricia Crone has stated, as a doomsday prophet, sent just before the end of the world to warn those who would heed a warning and to punish those who would not. Here, the process of jihad, as in the traditions cited above, is one in which the hold of worldly things over the believer is diluted. Because of the impermanence of the soldier’s life, and the difficulties of establishing a stable family or gathering substantial possessions, many of the ties that bind people to this world are weakened or even dissolved entirely. When this is taken into consideration, the spiritual significance of jihad becomes even more pronounced. It is clear why the connection with the end of the world had to be maintained in the jihad literature. Without this final date in mind, it would have been difficult for Muslim fighters to summon up the necessary energy to achieve the conquests. p.23
Martyrdom in Islam has a much more active sense: the prospective martyr is called to seek out situations in which martyrdom might be achieved. p.26
For the true beginnings of the “greater jihad” we must go to the great theologian and Sufi al-Ghazali (d. 1111). It is to his formulations that we owe the success of this doctrine. In his great work Ihya _ulum al-din (Revival of the Religious Sciences), al-Ghazali presents the lusts and passions of the soul as an invading army trying to conquer the body and to keep it from following the path of mysticism. In an interesting reinterpretation, he strips a passage from Quran 4:95 from its context (indicated in bracketed text) to argue that Muslims must fight not by means of their possessions and “persons” (the word being the plural of nafs, soul), but against their possessions and their souls: [Those of the believers who stay at home while suffering from no injury are not equal to] those who fight in the cause of Allah with their possessions and persons. Allah has raised those who fight with their possessions and persons one degree (over those who stay at home; and to each Allah has promised the fairest good. Yet Allah has granted a great reward to those who fight and not to those who stay behind). This creative reinterpretation of the Qur‘anic verse turns the focus radically away from the original intent to concentrate on the battle against one’s lower passions, especially the soul. Al-Ghazali takes this argument further when he deals with the subject of exercising the soul. Throughout the Ihya, he uses military, and especially jihad, imagery to describe this battle. However, al-Ghazali nowhere indicates that he sees the jihad against the soul as a substitute for militant jihad (he in fact rarely deals with militant jihad in the Ihya). But in the section on enjoining the good and forbidding the evil (al-amr bi-lma _ruf wa-l-nahi _an al-munkar, one of the most fundamental principles of Islamic social law), al-Ghazali adduces the example of the jihad fighter who sacrifices himself for the greater good and leads a charge against a large number of the enemy in an attempt to cause them distress (this would later become the legal basis for the suicide attack or martyrdom operation of contemporary times). p.37
Others have fallen into this error as well [of assuming the division between greater and lesser Jihad is legal or actual- T]. They comprise two basic groups: Western scholars who want to present Islam in the most innocuous terms possible, and Muslim apologists, who rediscovered the internal jihad in the nineteenth century and have been emphasizing it ever since that time as the normative expression of jihad—in defiance of all the religious and historical evidence to the contrary. The motives of the first group are well intentioned, probably undertaken with the goal of furthering interreligious dialogue and skirting an issue that has long been used by polemicists as a vehicle for attacking Islam. p.40
In his more recent Unholy War, while discussing the many meanings of jihad, Esposito continues to avoid all historical context for his discussion and simply repeats what contemporary Muslim apologists say about this doctrine. Since he has already decided that radical Muslims are terrorists, Esposito is able to avoid dealing with the fact that they have extensive support in the central texts and doctrines of Islam. p. 42
From an outsider’s point of view, after surveying the evidence from classical until contemporary times, one
must conclude that today’s jihad movements are as legitimate as any that have ever existed in classical
Islam, with the exception of the fact that they disregard the necessity of established authority—that a legitimate authority such as a caliph or an imam could declare jihad. Other than this one major difference, contemporary jihad groups fall within the confines of classical definitions of jihad. That this is true can be seen by their careful regard for classical and contemporary law, their heavy emphasis on the spiritual rewards of jihad, and their frequently voiced claim to be fighting for the sake of Islam. p.164
Last edited by Tukhachevskii; 02-10-2011 at 01:12 PM.
Arthur Jeffery, The Political Importance of Islam, p. 386. All the more prescient for having been written in 1942.Efforts have been made in some circles in modern days to explain away all the Prophet's warlike expeditions as defensive wars or to interpret the doctrine of Jihad as merely a bloodless striving in missionary zeal for the spread of Islam. Much of this special pleading is the sheerest sophistry. The early Arabic sources quite plainly and frankly describe the expeditions as military expeditions, and it would never have occurred to anyone at that day to interpret them as anything else [.]
The necessity of the armed struggle against the unbelievers was clearly indicated in the Qurån, as in Qurån 22/39: “Permission is given to those [believers] who are fighting [the disbelievers] because they have been wronged. Surely God is able to give them victory!” Whether this was a defensive or offensive struggle mattered little because the resistance of people to Islam was often taken to be equivalent to an attack on Islam [it still is- T]. The final goal of jihåd must then be a world which has been brought under the control of Islam and is, by definition, peaceful.
Underlying the idea of jihåd is a unified Muslim community, the umma, which has the collective duty to expand Islam; this was to be done under the leadership or commission of the caliph. Expansionist wars were the responsibility of those who were charged with the task or those who chose to do so as a group; defending Islam, however, was a duty which fell on everyone who was capable. An expansionist war could not be undertaken without first issuing a call for the unbelievers to join Islam; should there be resistance to that call, then the war was justified. This notion of a unified community underlying the idea of jihåd is crucial because it emphasizes the political (as opposed to religious) significance of the doctrine, certainly as it evolved. A caliph who issued a call for jihåd was also asserting legitimacy in his position as caliph. (As we will see in medieval and modern times, in the absence of the caliph, the call for jihåd acts as an assertion of authentic Muslim identity.) pp.65-66
Underlying this presentation [the apologist’s case for jihad] is the common modernist approach to the issue of jihåd, here presented as only defensive and hedged by rules compatible with contemporary moral standards, in themselves superior to the practice (rather than the theory) of other modern nations. The centuries of Muslim discussion regarding jihåd and its obligations and flexible application are discarded and replaced by an invocation of modern liberal standards. p. 209
Andrew Rippin, Muslims: their religious beliefs and practices.
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M. Bonner, Jihad in Islam History: Doctrines and Practice. An excellent examination that refers to French scholarship unavailable in English.[On Jihad as a form of “good work” or divine charity undertaken in return for the blessings and favour of God- T]The deal between God and those who fight in his path is portrayed as a commercial transaction, either as a loan with interest (“Who is there who will make a fine loan to God, which God will then multiply many times over?”), or else as a profitable sale of the life of this world in return for the life of the next. How much one gains depends on what happens during the transaction: one obtains Paradise if slain in battle, or victory if one survives, either way a grand reward (ajran "aziman) and one of the two finest things (ihda al-husnayayni). Modern treatments of this commercial vocabulary in the Quran have commented, sometimes with an apologetic or patronizing tone, that Muhammad was, after all, a merchant and that commerce was second nature to the Meccans. What we stress here is that Quranic discourse includes, on the one hand, reciprocity and generosity, creating ever more solidarity among the community of believers in all their activities (in both war and peace), and on the other hand, an emphasis on reward and striving, giving the believers, as individuals, an unparalleled sense of confidence and entitlement. p.32
What emerges, from this and many other places in the hadith, is a central theme of the jihad, namely the propagation of the Faith through combat. Islam must be brought to the entire world, as when the Prophet says: “I have been sent to the human race in its entirety,” and “I have been commanded to fight the people (the unbelievers) until they testify: ‘There is no god but God, and Muhammad is the Messenger of God.’ ” This fighting and spreading of the faith will continue until the end of the world as we know it now. p.49
The Islamic Tradition, specifically the hadith, makes this connection and spells out the doctrine with abundant detail. Here, as in the Christian doctrine of the martyr, shahid signifies a person who, through suffering and death, has achieved high reward in the hereafter. Descriptions of the martyrs in the Tradition include their ability to intercede for the faithful on the Day of Resurrection, otherwise a prerogative reserved for the Prophet Muhammad himself. Their souls have the shape of white birds, feeding on the fruits of Paradise; or alternatively, they are held in the craws of green birds that feed in Paradise and drink from its rivers. These birds also nestle in golden lamps suspended underneath the divine throne. These traits, setting the martyrs apart from the rank and of the blessed, also occur in early Christian descriptions of the martyrs, and again point to a close connection between the two traditions. Indeed, the Arabic word shahid may plausibly be thought to derive from the Christian Syriac for “witness” and “martyr,” sa¯hda¯. Nonetheless, the underlying idea is different. No longer do we have the Christian insistence on passivity and nonviolence. Instead of metaphorical soldiers of God, we have fighters who literally take up arms and use them. The Muslim texts of Tradition and Law repeatedly affirm that the martyrs (shuhada') are those who die while fighting for the faith. Their sins are forgiven, though not their debts. They go immediately to Paradise, skipping the long wait for Resurrection and the “tortures of the grave” that others must undergo. p.75
Throughout this time and afterward, the jihad remained closely connected to that part of the original Islamic message that we usually, and somewhat misleadingly, refer to as “charity.” In the Quran, and also in the early narrative texts of sira and maghazi, fighting in the wars is a matter of identity and belonging. It is not something for which one receives payment (here, as in pre-Islamic Arabia, the notions of payment for service and wage often cannot be distinguished from the notions of corruption and bribe.) Meanwhile, however, soon after the death of the Prophet Muhammad, the victorious early Islamic state suddenly found itself inundated with all sorts of wealth. At the same time, it had to confront the large-scale problems that confront all great empires, including the recruiting, paying, and supplying of its armies. As the Umayyad and then the "Abbasid caliphal regimes tried various solutions to their fiscal and military problems, the juridical and theological doctrines of nascent Islam slowly emerged. The “school” (or perhaps merely the local trend) of Medina, in its relative isolation, continued, somewhat longer than the others, to construct solutions to these problems in more Quranic terms, that is to say, by thinking in terms of gifts to fighters rather than payments to soldiers. Elsewhere, however, other scholars began to think differently. Is military service a religious obligation incumbent on each individual? How can the central authority (in the jurists’ terms, the imam and his representatives) recruit large numbers of fighters and keep them supplied and equipped? [i.e., the success of jihad created problems that led to a need to temper its effects and appeal- T] p.168-9
Last edited by Tukhachevskii; 02-10-2011 at 01:15 PM.
Lewis said it best....
Bernard Lewis, Islam and the West, p. 195 n1 to Chapter 8The coincidence of views between Islamologists and Islamic “fundamentalists” is apparent, not real, and the reformers’ accusations of complicity in reaction arise from a failure to distinguish between descriptive and prescriptive statements. The scholarly student of slam – especially if he is not Muslim – studies Islam as a historical phenomenon, as a civilisation with a long and distinguished record of achievement. The evidence he uses is that provided by Muslims – what they have said, written and done in the course of centuries. That is, he is concerned with the past and with the ways it can be used to understand the present. It is not his task or his right to change the present or to try and shape the future. This task is for the Muslim – his right, his duty, his exclusive privilege.
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