I am curious that this pressure on You Tube to remove some content took place now, even if the videos feature the feared cleric al-Awlaki.
In neither the Home Secretary's in London or her junior Security Minister's speech in Washington DC, were the videos explicitly referred to (speeches:http://www.rusi.org/news/ref:N4CD17AFA05486/ and http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Fil...y_strategy.pdf
Yes, the impact of such videos featured in the radicalisation of a woman who stabbed a MP:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-london-11682732
An "easy win" and some helpful headlines I fear. Almost reminiscent of the action taken to stop Irish republican speakers during 'The Troubles', with their voices silenced and dubbed over. A policy that didn't last that long, long enough to be cited decades later.
Maybe it is all politics; this article offers an explanation:http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisf...terrorism-laws
Where is the counter-offensive in Info Ops? Yes, some of it will be covert, IMHO not much sign of activity in the open. One drawback is that those who wish to view such material may already be far too far along the radicalisation process, or the "snakes & ladders" model (espoused by NYPD's study) to listen to the counter-narrative.
Is the counter-offensive principally aimed at the vast "silent" majority, retaining their loyalty or at a minimum neutrality; the "vulnerable" to radicalisation even those already radicalised?
Erich - there is an earlier thread 'Countering online radicalisation: Is government censorship effective?' and link:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=7528
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