The Army: A Profession of Arms

[Ken White]

Right, "warfare it is not a profession"; but that is not what we are talking about. We are attempting to define the profession of arms, a group that specializes in the application of lethal force to achieve political ends... In these cases, where we require an organization that can build infrastructure while also providing secuirty and conduct combined arms maneuver or counterterrorism, in such cases only the profession of arms will do.

I respectfully submit that the trade of soldiering is what you mean but understand the desire to be a 'profession.' That carries a a far better cachet than 'trade.'

I would note the Talibs and others in South Asia are specializing in the application of lethal force and that they are not and do not aspire to be professionals.

I agree that armed force is necessary in many cases and there is much that cannot be done without it. That a requirement exists and that people fulfill it does not make those practitioners professional any more than a Plumber is a professional. A Profession requires a discrete vocabulary (we have that), dedication to its norms (we have that), a body of specialist knowledge (we have that), is trusted to be self regulating (not present) and self policing (also not present). Those items are listed in order of importance, least to greatest. The 'profession of arms' fails on the two most critical tests. Having said all that, I realize that too many are enamored with being accorded professional status in the fullest sense for me to turn the usage around and that's okay. I was a professional (small 'p') soldier for years. My son is one today -- but we both know we are or are practicing a trade and not a Profession.

If the occupation of soldiers was self regulating and self policing as are law and medicine, then it might be a profession. Since it is not those things -- and should not be if it is to serve the State -- then it doesn't really exist as a profession.

...rather than warfare as a profession, the profession is expertise in warfare.

Much as a 'professional' beach volleyball player is expert in volleyball?

The problem is how do we develop, cultivate, standardize, evaluate this expertise. If the military is to provide advice and advocacy to the political leaders, when and how do we learn to do this. Do we learn in any coherent manner or is this largely self taught?

Assuming that is not a rhetorical question, my answer based on a great many years of observation and participation would be a bit of both. All persons do not learn in a coherent manner, people differ. However most do learn when exposed to decent education -- and the US Army has that. Not great by a long shot, but decent and better than most. Still, an institution can only do such much and it is incumbent upon all who would be soldiers to learn a great deal on their own initiative. Therein lies the rub, as they say -- some people devote themselves to that learning and self development more than do others. Still other people have a natural talent for the trade. Thus every attempt to produce a number of square pegs that are identical will fail -- has failed -- and we are thus confronted with the fact that some folks make better advisers and / or better advocates (the two things are not synonomous) than others. Some in fact make better commanders or soldiers than others, yet they system makes no effort to place those people in positions where they can do the most good, it insists that all must take their turn in strange jobs and thus luck of the draw determines who is going to advise or advocate.

As an example, Tommy Franks was an exceptionally poor advocate, David Petreaus is better. Luck of the draw. One could wonder what might have happened in 2001-3 had Anthony Zinni still been CinCCent or Hugh Shelton CJCS...

If we are to be this profession of arms that is truely the expertise in warfare, how does the profession gain this expertise?

Not to be a smart aleck but true expertise is gained by practice in any field of endeavor. The US Army personnel system, aimed at producing generalists and with an 'up or out' promotion regimen is absolutely inimical to the development of expertise, all most can develop is competence -- and most do that; some few do better (in spite of the system) and actually develop expertise. Most do not.

The dichotomy is that a really good, proficient Army will spend most of its time at peace, terrible place to develop warfighting expertise. The real experts are those who learn very quickly once committed to combat. In a sense, that's bad but since each war is different, it has the saving grace of not having everyone in lock step for the wrong war at the wrong time -- as we saw in the movement of folks from Iraq to Afghanistan. Different wars require different TTP -- and approaches; the really good tradesmen will cope, the others will not. That effectively means that if we want the 'experts' in the right places (Command, policy Advisory, mission advocacy) we can simply place the best people in the positions instead of using today's shotgun and duty roster approach. I believe that's what a profession would do and it seems we are not doing that...

ADDENDUM: Specific answers to Bill Jakola's comment below, posted just after this one.

The system is broken, the personnel processes suitable for WW I (and adapted to WWII) and mass armies does not work for a smaller volunteer force. The PME process is fairly decent but most courses are far longer than needed to give Officers and senior NCOs (in particular) some 'down' and family time. There are better ways to do that.

Everyone should not be, can not be, a true generalist. Required for officers are two Command tacks and two Staff tracks, both divided into Unit and EAC segments. All start in the unit segment and then advance to the EAC segment based on proven performance attested by senior, peer and subordinate ratings.

The process of routing all officers through large staffs -- a subterfuge to keep officer end strength and spaces as opposed to any real military need is incredibly wasteful. That process and 'up or out' need to go.

In fairness, the Army's hands are tied to an extent by Congress, DOPMS, OPM 21 and a bunch of arcane and silly laws. Frankly, some are unlikely to be abolished. However, the Army will never know until it tries. The Army can go into the business as usual mode and tinker around the edges or they can truly fix a broken personnel system and an equally broken training process.