All matters MRAP JLTV (merged thread)

[Ken White]

where I was an ROTC instructor (thankfully very briefly) and was charged with instructing gentlemen cadets inculcated the value of nuance -- and clean language...

[TAH]

ken:

Got your points about branches and centers and stuff Oh My!

Much if it I agree with.

However, our LOCs are now and will most likely remain in the future one of our Achilles Heels. Even after peeling out all the FOB/quality-of-stuff, units will still require daily to every-other-day re-supply.

If the routes are not patroled/secured and/or the convoys are not escorted, the supplies will not get thru. After 2-3 days without fuel re-supply an M1 becomes a really heavy-stationary Anti-tank gun/bunker.

JLTV is still a concept/in development, M-ATVs are smaller because of the terrain requirements in A-stan. As a result carry fews troops.

Pretty sure, if given the choice is MRAP or up-armored HMMWV or nothing, folks will opt for MRAP. May be a short-term solution. But think it gets us over the hump.

Agree in spades with your comment about ATGMs versus convoys.

A bettter solution maybe to get away from the idea of fixed MSRs and more MSR-on-fly. When your enemy does not know what road, trail, cart path ect your are going to take next/today, laying IEDs and setting up complex ambushes gets harder.

Even in Iraq (at least in 2004) there were/are plenty of farm-to-market type dirt roads that could handle convoys.

So, unless the future Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) runs on sailboat fuel we are stuck with ground re-supply.

TAH

[Ken White]

Originally Posted by TAH

However, our LOCs are now and will most likely remain in the future one of our Achilles Heels. Even after peeling out all the FOB/quality-of-stuff, units will still require daily to every-other-day re-supply.

True. That was the case 45 years ago. What's been done to fix it? The current convoy sims and other goodies as well as the MRAP attack the symptom, not the problem...

If the routes are not patroled/secured and/or the convoys are not escorted, the supplies will not get thru.

Why? Because we've always done it that way? Because we're not smart enough to fix an obvious problem?.. Not picking on you, your statement is correct but the situation it refers to is inexcusable IMO.

I also intensely dislike the FOB concept. It is poor tactical employment that is almost -- almost but not quite -- necessitated by inadequate training and tactical competence. Units should be flexible enough to operate in the field. I fully realize that WW II was different but we didn't win it with a bunch of FOBs. Units went to the field and lived there day in and day out, moving constantly. The FOB is a stationary MRAP...

After 2-3 days without fuel re-supply an M1 becomes a really heavy-stationary Anti-tank gun/bunker.

Yeah, stuff like that happens when you buy a known fuel guzzler not because it was better than the competitor but mostly to keep a failing auto maker afloat.

JLTV is still a concept/in development, M-ATVs are smaller because of the terrain requirements in A-stan. As a result carry fews troops.

The JLTV is a bit more than a concept vehicle, it will appear. The M-ATV was purchased to address the shortfalls in MRAP. That it carries fewer people is of course true but immaterial, it is not an ideal vehicle on many counts but it will go places semi cross country that no MRAP will go. Most of our vehicles are too big, inadequately agile and are heavy (and have shorter range) due to added armor. Armor can lull you into a false sense of security, it cannot protect you from everything. Flexibility and agility do more to protect the force than does Armor.

Pretty sure, if given the choice is MRAP or up-armored HMMWV or nothing, folks will opt for MRAP.

I'm sure you're correct. If you ask across the board, the whole Army. OTOH, if you ask Infantry units, I bet you'd get a different answer.

May be a short-term solution. But think it gets us over the hump.

What hump? You seem to be trying to invent a need. I see no hump out there where those monsters provide a solution. Acknowledging the need for a few for Engineer route clearing ops -- and there are better solutions for that -- you might find sensible employment for a couple of hundred. We have thousands...

A bettter solution maybe to get away from the idea of fixed MSRs and more MSR-on-fly. When your enemy does not know what road, trail, cart path ect your are going to take next/today, laying IEDs and setting up complex ambushes gets harder.

That option is not always available, sometimes terrain or politics forces a route or two. A better solution is to avoid them altogether. If we'd spent half the money we've spent on heavy armor on developing tactical agility, we'd have equipment that would negate a lot of the need for MSRs. Insisting on a 1,000 mile operating would lighten the load but MSRs would still be required. tjhe object should br to eliminate Ol' Ach's Heel.

So, unless the future Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) runs on sailboat fuel we are stuck with ground re-supply.

Perhaps. Or maybe we shouldn't pursue a future GCV...

[Cole]

Excuse my attempt to roll TAH's comments about BCT reorganization into this thread because believe they are related.

Believe TAH has the right idea that going from two Armor companies per CAB to one larger one would save personnel in a zero sum gain force structure. But instead of diverting all the extra tanks to the Reconnaissance squadron, wonder if it would make more sense to use the personnel billpayer to add a stability ops, air-deployment, and counter-IED capability by including M-ATV in the CAB and Recon Squadron force structures. The result might look like this:

Combined Arms Battalion (CAB)
1 Armor Co: 4 platoons with 4 M1A2 tanks for 16 tanks + 2 in Co HQ (per TAH suggestion)
2 Infantry Co: 3 platoons with 3 GCVs (vs. 4 M2A3) AND 3 M-ATV each (leave 3 GCVs and 3 M-ATV in Co HQ for the Cdr, XO, and 1SG in case their GCV are required to back-up platoons with broke vehicles)

Reconnaissance Squadron
2 Recon Troops: Each with 1 M1A2, 3 M3A3, 4 M-ATV with LRAS3 on elevated masts

The M-ATV would add more organic equipment lift, fire team carry, and resupply capability to CABs in a more survivable vehicle than the LRAS3 HMMWVs. With one less GCV in the platoon and 3 extra M-ATVs, the platoon would be capable of splitting up fire teams between GCV amd M-ATV, or could carry additional light infantry. There would be additional maneuverable crew-served weapons in the M-ATVs with less fuel consumption than 4 GCVs despite 6 vehicles. For early air deployment, commanders/planners could always choose to deploy 5 M-ATV instead of 2 GCVs to increase vehicle coverage of an airfield perimeter overwatching light troops, either sea-deploying GCVs or sending them later in the TPFDL.

In noncontiguous distributed operations, it would help to use organic M-ATV to pick-up and deliver supplies to combat elements, or carry additional fuel and ammunition to extend time between resupply. M-ATV cargo beds also could carry small UAS and unmanned ground vehicles, unattended sensors, mast-mounted sensors, light mortars, and smoke generation/grenades, as well as IED jamming and detection gear to lead expensive GCVs and tanks.

Consider that the probability is far higher that our forces will encounter IEDs and normal RPGs that are more affordable to typical foes with lesser defense budgets. Heavily armored advance guards, while helpful on open terrain against Cold War era threats, are less likely to be as beneficial in future tight urban areas or on forested/mountainous trails limited to one (or none) lane traffic with little ability to traverse turrets or cross 3rd world bridges. Boulevards and 4-lane highways are the exception, not the rule in most urban areas.

Finally the resulting force structure would use less fuel than current CABs to enable support of longer lines of communication that Israelis don’t deal with and that expose logisticians to stay behind and guerilla elements. Believe there is insufficient armored threat (and many other assets can find/kill armor) justifying tank-like armor for GCVs and more tanks in recon squadrons. The fuel burden is too high. As "On Point" cited in Chapter 6 in its history of OIF 1:

"To understand the scale of this effort, CFLCC expected to consume 40 million gallons of fuel by D+20, or about 10 April. By comparison, the Allies in WW I consumed 40 million gallons of gasoline during the four years of the war, a war that Winston Churchill described as having been won "on a sea of oil." By contrast, during World War II, the Allied fuel reserves in Normandy reached 7.5 million gallons only on D+21."

So we want to go from a 2 mpg Bradley to a 2 gallon per mile Abrams fuel consumption for the entire HBCT maneuver fleet?

[jcustis]

Does anyone have experience with the various up-armor kits for MTVRs and FMTVs? How do they compare with dedicated MRAPs in terms of protection and mobility? The MTVR APK was supposed to handle detonations of 12lbs of Comp B (threshold), 16lbs (objective) and 7.62mm all around. I imagine this could be taken further with a custom cab and cargo bed designed to accept armor kits.

It seems like, if you have the option to up-armor your standard trucks to near MRAP protection, while retaining a significant degree of off-road performance, you can buy one vehicle and tailor your protection level to meet the METT-TC.

The MTVR in up-armored config is a beast. It has a higher center of gravity and that has posed challenges with tip-overs as a result of blasts, but that machine can just go and go and go, and it can take bad hits as well, but then again it was already fairly resistant in its basic configuration. I have also been riding in the current M-ATV, and the improved ISS upgraded suspention MRAPs.

The ISS upgrade is a night and day improvement over the old rigid suspension, but still does not approach the mobility of the M-ATV. Serious shortfall remain with both platforms in terms of trafficability, visibility, and any ability to actually fight from it as well as conduct dismounted action.

The M-ATV does has a kick ass communications suite that can be employed and almost puts it on par with LAV-C2 variants. M-ATVs have been able to low-gear themselves out of sand that would swallow any other vehicle, and makes me wish I had bought stock in Oshkosh.

[TAH]

Ken:

BLUF, keep the counter-points coming. Healthly debate is good for the soul.

I agree with your points regarding manuever units and FOBs, but the Loggies got to live/operate from someplace. No reason a maneuver unit could/should not operate off-base for days/weeks at a time, depending on re-supply. Lots of infantry/armor/cav units in Viet Nam spent nights off their base in Night Defense Positions. Seems like we have lost that capability....

I see the issue here being the ability to conduct re-supply in the "non-linear, asymetric battlefield" of today/tomorrow. Our future opponents are watching. They will continue to attack this weakness until its no longer a weakness.

We can secure the LOCs, secure the convoys or try to do both. I like the navy's solution of secure the convoy, understanding that a certain amount of that effort will have to go into securing/clearing a ground route immediately in front of the convoy. If we can get use to flexible MSRs, and the terrain allows for it, then all we need is the unit organized, equipped, manned and trained to run the route ahead of the convoy and provide close-in defense. We could leave that all to the CSS units, but will create a higher degree of risk. What I am trying to do is create a force for Lines-of-Commuinication (LOC) security. The Combat Battalion in an MEB appears to be a good first choice for this. Don't need/want a tank/Bradley Combined Arms Battalion. Would love Stryker Infantry Battalion, if someone is buying more Strykers. Above the ones needed to transform the 3rd ACR and 1st BCT/1AD. A dismounted Infantry Bn does great securing fixed sites and clearing urban areas. Really lousy when they try to keep up with that moving convoy. So, why not create an Infantry Bn (LOC) equipped with MRAPs/JLTVs/M-ATVs?

Agree about a fuel guzzling tank, but until/if we get a new engine its the one we have. I have tried to get the CSS-types to take up this topic, not interested.

Wonder what a 1000 mile operating range for a tank, or APC or IFV would be. At the end, you will still need fuel, only 3 times more then from 300 miles. (bad at math, I know)

I'm pretty sure that most infantry types would prefer to traverl in a Bradley of Stryker, but I see these as over-kill of the MSR-Security/Convoy Escort role. I think we can all generally agree to get rid of add-on/up-armored HMWWVs ASAP. In all of their roles. bad idea for a vehicle that started life with a plastic fuel tank, a fiber glass hood and an aluminim frame.

Cole:

Not sure I understand your Recon Sqdrn. Is it Company Size or a Battalion? Are your Troops Company or platoon sized?

1 M1A1 is very bad Ju Ju.

Is you intent to re-create combined arms/CAV platoons? Personaly like combined arms Co/Troops better. Pushes the requirement to understand more complex operations to the more experinced CPT level vice the newbe LT. It also enables the ability to still task org based off the situation.

While your solution of foward delivery of supplies by M-ATV might be feasible, the MSRs run all the way back to an APOD or SPOD. Vulnerability starts a soon as any convoy departs that location.

[Cole]

Originally Posted by TAH

I agree with your points regarding manuever units and FOBs, but the Loggies got to live/operate from someplace. No reason a maneuver unit could/should not operate off-base for days/weeks at a time, depending on re-supply. Lots of infantry/armor/cav units in Viet Nam spent nights off their base in Night Defense Positions. Seems like we have lost that capability....

But in Vietnam, there weren't lots of M1A2s burning 500 gallons every 8+ hours whether moving or not.

We can secure the LOCs, secure the convoys or try to do both. I like the navy's solution of secure the convoy, understanding that a certain amount of that effort will have to go into securing/clearing a ground route immediately in front of the convoy.

Isn't IED route clearance at really slow speeds? If engineers do it multiple hours prior to the convoy, there is time to emplace new IEDs. If it is done immediately forward of the convoy, the entire convoy is reduced to a crawl and is vulnerable to ambush. Does that create a requirement for something to patrol the road behind the engineers and provide them security?

If a tank is involved in securing the convoy, it is generating a high logistical requirement for itself, is tearing up the road and tank without a HET, and may limit the convoy to roads with strong bridges. There are other manned and unmanned aircraft solutions that may be better than a tank escort.

If we can get use to flexible MSRs, and the terrain allows for it, then all we need is the unit organized, equipped, manned and trained to run the route ahead of the convoy and provide close-in defense. We could leave that all to the CSS units, but will create a higher degree of risk. What I am trying to do is create a force for Lines-of-Commuinication (LOC) security....Don't need/want a tank/Bradley Combined Arms Battalion. Would love Stryker Infantry Battalion, if someone is buying more Strykers.

Wonder if after early Stryker air deployment for deterrence, SBCTs will have less of a forward combat mission once sea-deployed HBCTs arrive. They can be task-organized with HBCTs to provide convoy escort, secure the engineer IED clearance teams and roads behind them, and can support AOs along convoy routes to provide full-time patrolling security and stationary surveillance.

A dismounted Infantry Bn does great securing fixed sites and clearing urban areas. Really lousy when they try to keep up with that moving convoy. So, why not create an Infantry Bn (LOC) equipped with MRAPs/JLTVs/M-ATVs?

101st and 82nd already had a LOC security mission during OIF I and secured bypassed cities. So perhaps let the early deployed light guys do it again in their JLTV/M-ATVs and the Strykers/ASVs perform the mobile escort.

Wonder what a 1000 mile operating range for a tank, or APC or IFV would be. At the end, you will still need fuel, only 3 times more then from 300 miles. (bad at math, I know)

About 2,000 gallons per Abrams (roughly one HEMTT tanker per tank) every 1,000 miles. Probably 1,000 gallons per 130K lbs diesel GCV or 600 gallons per 80,000 lb GCV every 1,000 miles. (I'm not too bad in math )

Cole:

Not sure I understand your Recon Sqdn. Is it Company Size or a Battalion? Are your Troops Company or platoon sized?

1 M1A1 is very bad Ju Ju.

I realized that was messed up last night but waited for other input. Left out the word "platoon" with 1 tank, 3 M3A3, and 4 M-ATVs...basically substituting a tank and 4 M-ATV for the current 5 HMMWVs. So the net addition of 4 tanks to the Recon Squadron could occur as a separate platoon, as well, realizing they would probably be task-organized all the time with other troops.

While your solution of foward delivery of supplies by M-ATV might be feasible, the MSRs run all the way back to an APOD or SPOD. Vulnerability starts a soon as any convoy departs that location.

Tractor trailers and commercial vehicles will bring many supplies most of the way. Forward Support Company HEMTT PLS trucks can cover the remaining distance but lack the off-road mobility of a M-ATV and are a bigger target close to dangerous AOs.

Guess you must push BSB HEMTT tankers all the way forward, but with fewer tanks you could get by with fewer HEMTT tankers. A more fuel-efficient infantry platoon with 3 GCVs/3 M-ATVs also reduces fuel requirements. You also could potentially carry 100 gallons (notional 750 lb of fuel + square rubber fuel drum) in the cargo bed of the M-ATV to resupply half of a 80K GCVs 200 gallon fuel tank. If it is a 140K pound GCV, you are probably only carrying 1/4th of a 400 gallon GCV tankful.

Let Strykers, Armored Security Vehicles, and M-ATV escort the HEMTT tankers and PLS racks forward and secure the dropped racks and fuel trucks until the CAB is ready to resupply.

[Ken White]

not cater to the other guy's capability to do that so we can predictably respond...

Originally Posted by TAH

Seems like we have lost that capability...

True and it is a potentially costly mistake to have allowed that to happen. We had better get busy rebuilding the capability and the desire to stay away from FOB like locations.

I see the issue here being the ability to conduct re-supply in the "non-linear, asymetric battlefield" of today/tomorrow. Our future opponents are watching. They will continue to attack this weakness until its no longer a weakness.

In reverse order; True -- that's why we should be trying to get a step or two ahead of them. Not to be too critical but it seems you're proposing we keep doing the same thing and hope it can be done better...

Yep, they're watching. If I were them and read on a web site the US was doing what you propose, I'd be wringing my hands in glee; 'No sweat, they're still going to do convoys...'

Uh, today's battlefield may be 'asymmetric' but only because we ALLOWED it to be. As for tomorrow's, I'm reminded of Omar Bradley's October 1949 comment, "We'll never have any more amphibious operations." Boy, did Inchon screw that up...

Or Niels Bohr's "Prediction is very difficult, especially about the future." Unfortunately, the US Army has to be prepared for everything from MCO to humanitarian intervention and all that worldwide. Thus maximum flexibility in unit organization and training is required, the number of one job specialty elements has to be kept low.

We can secure the LOCs, secure the convoys or try to do both.

Or do without both...

What I am trying to do is create a force for Lines-of-Commuinication (LOC) security...The Combat Battalion in an MEB appears to be a good first choice for this... So, why not create an Infantry Bn (LOC) equipped with MRAPs/JLTVs/M-ATVs?

In order; Isn't LOC security an old MP function, augmented as required? The MEBs have been given the mission but other than in the ArNG, they theoretically do not have a "Combat Battalion." Rather they are assigned troop units as need for the task(s) assigned. Said Troops should be heavy on MPs with ASV or Strykers and should not include combined arms units unless they are REALLY needed (Really as in necessary, not desired by a vocal Commander). Your proposal of such a Battalion almost sounds like fishing for spaces and using MRAPS to ease the cost of standup...

Create an 'Inf Bn (LOC)' and you will have created a major morale problem for all the 11Bs in the world who would do back flips to avoid such an assignment. Trust me on that one. To get assigned as an Inf Bn to such duty temporarily is one thing, for an individual to be assigned to such a unit is quite another. Plus, you are creating a purpose designed outfit, predicting that the next war will resemble this one. History says that's not a good bet. Harsh reality says that MRAP are best as history...

I have tried to get the CSS-types to take up this topic, not interested.

Of course they aren't, that would be harmful to job security...

Wonder what a 1000 mile operating range for a tank, or APC or IFV would be. At the end, you will still need fuel, only 3 times more then from 300 miles.

Not necessarily, one could have fewer, lighter vehicles with better mileage. Even better, one could launch the vehicles for a 1 or 200 mile trip out, a few hours of combat and a 1 or 200 mile return to their start point...

I'm pretty sure that most infantry types would prefer to traverl in a Bradley of Stryker, but I see these as over-kill of the MSR-Security/Convoy Escort role. I think we can all generally agree to get rid of add-on/up-armored HMWWVs ASAP. In all of their roles. bad idea for a vehicle that started life with a plastic fuel tank, a fiber glass hood and an aluminim frame.

They might be overkill, OTOH, in some scenarios, they might be inadequate. In any case, I'm a Slim fan -- a standard infantry battalion, properly trained and equipped can do almost all combat tasks (though I'm not a Stryker fan, I doubt that it's overkill for much of anything).

Agree on the HMMWV, it was a poor idea for a military vehicle in the first place. Too big and too heavy for the utlity role, too large and damage sensitive for a scout vehicle. Bad idea all 'round...

So's the MRAP.

And on this:

Pushes the requirement to understand more complex operations to the more experinced CPT level vice the newbe LT. It also enables the ability to still task org based off the situation.

I strongly agree that, almost criminally, we do not adequately train our Lieutenants and that we do not adequately trust our NCOs.

[Rex Brynen]

Originally Posted by Ken White

Agree on the HMMWV, it was a poor idea for a military vehicle in the first place. Too big and too heavy for the utlity role, too large and damage sensitive for a scout vehicle. Bad idea all 'round...

And on that issue:

Senior U.S. commander restricts Humvee use in Afghanistan
By Barbara Starr, CNN Pentagon Correspondent
July 1, 2010 11:33 a.m. EDT

Washington (CNN) -- The once-ubiquitous Humvee may become a rare sight in some parts of Afghanistan following a decision by the senior U.S. commander in eastern Afghanistan to restrict the use of the vehicles in the field.

Maj. Gen. John Campbell, commander of Joint Task Force-101, ordered this week that the use of Humvee vehicles outside a military base would have to specifically be approved by a colonel -- one of the most senior field grade positions in the military.

Prior to this, the use of High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV, or Humvee) had to be approved by a lower-ranking officer, according to Task Force spokesman Maj. Patrick Seiber.

...

[William F. Owen]

Originally Posted by Ken White

In any case, I'm a Slim fan -- a standard infantry battalion, properly trained and equipped can do almost all combat tasks (though I'm not a Stryker fan, I doubt that it's overkill for much of anything).

I'm you're brother on that one Ken. One of most able, yet under-rated Officers the Empire ever produced. In May 1939, he was a Lieutenant Colonel, aged 37 - By March 42, he was a Corps Commander!

[Infanteer]

Originally Posted by William F. Owen

I'm you're brother on that one Ken. One of most able, yet under-rated Officers the Empire ever produced. In May 1939, he was a Lieutenant Colonel, aged 37 - By March 42, he was a Corps Commander!

I'll second that! Defeat into Victory is probably 1 of 5 books that I would say all leaders should read. For a book about an Army on operations, there are useful lessons for leaders at all level.

[Ken White]

(so far as I can recall) who never forgot the importance of the basics of the trade (Soldiering is a trade, not a profession...), his roots or what was really important -- as opposed to the many who spend much time on the seemingly important. Infanteer is right, IMO. Everyone who serves should at least read it. Owning a copy of "Defeat into Victory" is better, it merits re-reading from time to time...

Back to the thread. As he also wrote, you need specially trained folks for very long range strategic reconnaissance -- for everything else, a suitably trained and equipped Infantry Battalion can do the job. I would emphasize trained, equipage is important but good units can make do...

In more years than I care to recall, I've seen many varieties of infantry units from over a dozen nations in combat. Most of the 'specialized' units were not really successful.

[Infanteer]

Originally Posted by Ken White

In more years than I care to recall, I've seen many varieties of infantry units from over a dozen nations in combat. Most of the 'specialized' units were not really successful.

But they tend to have real neat hats....

[Tukhachevskii]

Apologies if already mentioned. New MRAP, Ranger, with 30mm remote turret. Looks very Mad Max (esp. in 8x8 version)

[jcustis]

Originally Posted by jcustis

The MTVR in up-armored config is a beast. It has a higher center of gravity and that has posed challenges with tip-overs as a result of blasts, but that machine can just go and go and go, and it can take bad hits as well, but then again it was already fairly resistant in its basic configuration. I have also been riding in the current M-ATV, and the improved ISS upgraded suspention MRAPs.

The ISS upgrade is a night and day improvement over the old rigid suspension, but still does not approach the mobility of the M-ATV. Serious shortfall remain with both platforms in terms of trafficability, visibility, and any ability to actually fight from it as well as conduct dismounted action.

The M-ATV does has a kick ass communications suite that can be employed and almost puts it on par with LAV-C2 variants. M-ATVs have been able to low-gear themselves out of sand that would swallow any other vehicle, and makes me wish I had bought stock in Oshkosh.

After operating in them almost exclusively for the past four months (to my chagrin since I so do miss an LAV), I have gained a greater appreciation for the M-ATV, but also higher frustration with the procurement program.

Here are some issues I have with the platform:

-Visibility forward of the driver and vehicle commander sucks because of the size, and angle of the thick windows. The side windows are even worse, and only allow a passenger to peek out and see what is directly abreast of the vehicle. No way to conduct a "5 and 25" check of the ground without opening the suicide door. I know this limitation has to do with the blast resistance, but c'mon, can the engineering design take into account some functionality requirements too?

-There is no IR flood lamp on the vehicle. IR lamps have prooved indispensible on about every tactical vehicle we already use, because it facilitates the use of night vision devices, so why nothing on the M-ATV as a basic piece of equipment? The driver has a driver's viewer enhancer (DVE) that matches the thermal devices employed on tanks and LAVs to allow drivers to drive in all light conditions, but the vehicle commander does not have a similar capability. That means that under zero moonlight situations, it is very difficult to see through the thick windows, and try to guide a driver using a blackout drive light only.

-There are no AC electrical outlets in the vehicle. MRAPs have them, but the M-ATV is oddly left out. It is almost as if Oshkosh is saying, "well gents, we don't have that option on this model, but if you take the hallway past custromer service and go to our custom shop, you should be able to find that add-on." Huh? Was anyone at Oshkosh looking at how we employ massive amounts of devices (biometric, battery chargers, laptops, etc.) in the current environment?

It's like we went forward and back at the same time, and it is just so odd that these basic things are absent.

[Pete]

If I understand the situation correctly the MRAP procurement happened mainly because of the insistence of SecDef Gates as an emergency measure to help to prevent the casualties being caused by IEDs. The standard DoD R&D life cycle model was short-circuited at the highest level because of the perceived urgency of the need.

During peacetime one of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command schools, probably Infantry or Armor, would have served as the "combat developer," performing studies and analyses to define system "requirements." Once those desired characteristics had been defined in a "requirements document" approved by the proper level within DoD or the service, the program would have been turned over to a "materiel developer" (such as whatever the U.S. Army Tank-Automotive Command is called these days). They in turn would release an RFP, conduct source selection, and then develop a prototype. Then testing of the product takes place. The problem with this system is it usually takes 12 to 20 years to put a new item of equipment in the hands of troops.

How Army Ordnance ever developed the M1 Carbine so quickly in 1940-42 doesn't happen very often these days, mainly because our own DoD and service regulations for the development of new systems don't allow us to go from Point A to Point B without performing 35 steps in between. Often many of the documents produced during a developmet program have to be distributed to numerous DoD or service offices, any of which can non-concur and prevent forward movement in the program.

[Pete]

They say a picture is worth a thousand words, which is about how many there are on this diagram of the DoD acquisition life cycle model, courtesy of Defense Acquisition University.

Regarding the site certificate warning, DAU is a DoD organization and as such not likely to have dangerous stuff online.

[Geronimo53]

Future of the Army MRAP Force

The Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles have proven their worth in theater where they have obviously become an integral part of combat operations. And regardless of where US troops deploy in the future, the persistent threat of IEDs dictates the continued need for this type of vehicle.

But its not as easy as saying "MRAPs are good, the Army should have them."

How they should be incorporated into the operational Army structure is the question. Should every unit be issued MRAPs to replace 5-Ton trucks and Humvees - resulting in scores of them cruising around Ft Bragg and Ft Drum? Should they all be mothballed until we need them again? Maybe we should donate them to "friendly countries"? Obviously if I am taking the time to write this I must be advocating a different COA. In fact, I have done the COA analysis (not included in this entry!) and determined a balanced way that ensures proper training, availability, and utilization, while also reducing logistical costs. Surprisingly, as you’ll see, that means not integrating them directly into Army tactical units.

I propose that the future Army MRAP allocations be limited to:
1. CENTCOM Theater then into Army Preposition Stock (APS) locations
2. Specified active army installations (shared training asset)
3. National Guard/Reserve Mobilization Training sites
4. Combat Training Centers


There is no need to distribute MRAPs down to every Army BCT or even form specialized MRAP units within those BCTs. The MRAP after all is only a troop carrier - a very well armored truck. Yes, it sometimes used for route clearance missions but its main utility is transporting combat troops safely around the area of operations. Tactically speaking, riding in the back of a MRAP is not much different than riding in an old army Deuce and Half, unless of course that ride takes you over an IED. But it doesn’t require extensive day to day training for the passengers, just driver licensing/familiarization training.

That said, the Army must complete a performance review of the six existing MRAP variants in an effort to reduce the number of variants in the force to two, or at the most three. This will reduce both the overall logistical costs and field maintenance nightmares, and increase vehicle uniformity within the force. Criteria that should be considered are durability, soldier survivability, adaptability to different environments/terrain, and the costs of contractor supported logistical support.

CENTCOM Theater then into Army Preposition Stock (APS) locations
Given our current military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the distinct possibility that this will not be our last visit to the Middle East/SouthWest Asia, the Army should maintain eight BCT-sized allocations of MRAPs for combat and stability operations in the CENTCOM Theater to rotate among deployed BCTs. As US operations wind down and the MRAPs are no longer required on the ground they can be transitioned to CENTCOM APS locations.

Specified active army installations (shared training asset)
At the Army installation level, a battalion-sized allocation of MRAPs should be contractor maintained for use by divisional units in specific training areas on the base. This would allow for the development of specialized home station lane training (ex. MOUT, route clearance, etc) utilizing these troop transport vehicles, prior to deployment to a CTC or to combat/contingency operations. In this way they are a shared division level training asset that is used by BCTs when needed, not sitting unused in BCT motorpools for extended periods of time. Due to contractor maintenance costs, having the MRAPs available for units to train with as needed is preferable to completely incorporating them into the division force structure.

National Guard/Reserve Mobilization Training sites
As the current wars have shown, the National Guard and Reserves makes up a large part of this nation’s contingency force. Therefore they must not be left out of the MRAP training cycle. Prepositioned stocks of MRAPs, with all required logistical support included, should be available at National Guard Mobilization Training sites and Annual Training locations. Depending on location, this will coincide with the existing stocks used by the active duty units as stated above. This will provide the National Guard the same advantages that it provides the active duty forces – equipment that is there when they need it, without the persistent logistical maintenance costs.

Combat Training Centers
The MRAPs should be part of the prepositioned stock that rotational units draw for their training at the Combat Training Centers. NTC, JRTC, and JMRC are the primary pre-deployment training locations for deploying units. Deploying units could train on MRAPs, similar to the ones they’d soon be issued in theater, in realistic and immersive training environments. These training centers already issue rotational vehicles out of their preposition yards, so adding MRAPs and the contractor supported maintenance would not be something unmanageable.

Conclusion
The MRAPs have proven to be an excellent mission specific mobility asset in the CENTCOM Theater that will undoubtedly be utilized by the US in future combat and contingency operations around the world. Incorporating the MRAPs into the operational Army structure in the ways I described above maximizes this asset’s availability while reducing the high logistical cost burden that would prove untenable in the future.

[jcustis]

The Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles have proven their worth in theater where they have obviously become an integral part of combat operations. And regardless of where US troops deploy in the future, the persistent threat of IEDs dictates the continued need for this type of vehicle.

I have to play devil's advocate before this discussion gets too deep, when in fact a specific layer needs to be addressed.

MRAPs have become an integral part of operations, but can we truly say they have proven their worth?

[MAJ Chris Isgrig]

We will need something like the MRAP again, in fact we will need a better MRAP in the future. Giving the MRAP to "friendly nations" will only ensure that our future adversaries have a training set. The point is however moot since we will continue to need the MRAP and we will soon need a better MRAP.

There is an assumption that the MRAP is a COIN only vehicle. I believe that assumption is not true. The MRAP is a servicable vehicle for anywhere the opposition does not have tanks or APCs. It is a good vehicle for where ever the main threat are mines and artillery. As such its a pretty good vehicle for route control and so would be a good asset for MP units and some engineer units, the people who are tasked with mobility tasks and who would not be in direct contact with the forward edge of the battle area.

As for the Strykers and the other vehicles in the forward areas where they might engage enemy armor or mechanized units those too need to evolve into something more MRAP like.

The trend in Soviet armored vehicle design toward the end of the cold war was for low silhouette vehicles, but those vehicle have not faired well against our taller vehicles. So there is room to imagine that some future replacement for the Bradley or the Stryker might be taller and have a "V" shapped hull.

One think can be assumed to be a sure bet, the opposition TTPs in the COIN fight will evolve their own TTPs to counter the MRAP and so there will have to be an MRAP evolution. As such the current set of vehicles may not be as valuble in 10 years as we might wish.