The Clausewitz Collection (merged thread)

[Taiko]

Back from an extended vacation ?; or

were you lost in the Outback doing anthropology ?; or

did you become engrossed in studying this device:



which has something to do with trinities (IIRC) ?

Agree, of course, with your four points re: studying CvC.

Regards

Mike

I wish it was option three, unfortunately no more scholarship = no more thesis, thus, joining the real world of customer service I miss my strategic theory...

[jmm99]

so you will adapt, improvise and overcome - of that, I've no doubt.

Regards

Mike

[William F. Owen]

Some helpful tips for reading CvC:
....................

Good luck with unraveling the mind of the best western militery theorists of all time.

I generally agree (as I would!) BUT - beware! 90% of what is useful about Clausewitz can be explained in a quite a brief way. Also 90% of the discussion and argument about Clausewitz is concentrated on about 20-30% of his writing. Books 4,5,6 and 7 are rarely.... if ever discussed or commented on.

Given deep understanding, a lot of what Clausewitz said, IS quite simple and thus accessible. What most folks here need to avoid is the "Literary Criticism" school of thought, that strays far from practical application.

To apply Clausewitz in a useful and practical way, you don't even have to know how to spell "Kant."

[Taiko]

I generally agree (as I would!) BUT - beware! 90% of what is useful about Clausewitz can be explained in a quite a brief way. Also 90% of the discussion and argument about Clausewitz is concentrated on about 20-30% of his writing. Books 4,5,6 and 7 are rarely.... if ever discussed or commented on.

Given deep understanding, a lot of what Clausewitz said, IS quite simple and thus accessible. What most folks here need to avoid is the "Literary Criticism" school of thought, that strays far from practical application.

To apply Clausewitz in a useful and practical way, you don't even have to know how to spell "Kant."

True, I should have qualified the reading of Kant to theoretical methodology only rather than his works on ethics. Understanding CvC methodological framework helps to avoid mistaking his proposition of the ideal of war, "war on paper", to war in reality. While Book 1's framework, which he considered finished, is fairly straight forward in understanding CvC's interposition of reality with ideal. Some of the nuance in the rest of the Books can be lost if you make the mistake of misinterpreting the ideal with the reality.

But I agree, it is very easy to get bogged down in a purely methodological argument of CvC's work and miss the forest for the trees. Unfortunately, the critics of CvC miss this basic point and end up with a reading of CvC that is totally out of context.

Case in point:

As an example, I don't think CvC helps arrive at an understanding of the Anbar Awakening. The Prince, on the other hand, helps a great deal.

CvC's paradoxical trinity is a far superior theoretical explanation of the Anbar Awakening than Machiavelli's Prince. The application of Clausewitz’s paradoxical trinity is pivotal in explaining the role of cause and effect in determining the nature of a war and understanding the changes in the level and intensity of violence between and within wars. It effectively captures the whole relationship of policy and violence in terms of the push and pull inherent in the laws of cause and effect and its regulating principles which policy must accommodate in conducting a war (Echevarria II 2009). The validity of the paradoxical trinity, and its utility, as a useful theoretical framework can be seen in understanding the origins and application of the ‘surge’ in Iraq.

The ‘surge’ in Iraq, otherwise known as the “Joint Campaign Plan 2007-2008” that began in 2007, was driven primarily by the American military as a “shift in operational methods” in response to the various insurgency’s strategies of 2003-2006 (Kilcullen 2009: 133, Metz 2008: 185, Molan 2008: 345). Applying Clausewitz’s trinity to explain the ‘surge’, the role of the regulating principles can be seen as:

US: (Violence) chance and probability, purpose, hostile feelings/intensions -Policy- (Politics) military, people, government

Iraq: (Violence) hostile feelings/intensions, chance and probability, purpose- Policy- (Politics) people, military, government

In identifying the political cause that set the ‘surge’ in motion all three of the regulating principles play a role, with the military at the lead. Its origins can be attributed to General David Petraeus who assembled a team of twenty-four military, governmental and civil experts who were to make up the Joint Strategic Assessment Team that was tasked with developing an integrated civil-military plan to address the level and intensity of violence used by the insurgencies in Iraq (Kilcullen 2009: 133). The result of this meeting of minds was a new American doctrine for counterinsurgency (COIN) titled Field Manual 3-24 (FM 3-24). In conjunction with pressure from the American people and Congress, who both wanted to see an end to the war, this new doctrine lead to a change in policy of the Bush administration (Metz 2008: 185, Ricks 2009: 155).

The original policy of the Bush administration was centered on a ‘top-down approach’ that focused on regime change and the introduction of a democratic government at the national level (Bush 2005: 1). FM 3-24 shifted this policy to a bottom-up approach “based on confidence building measures and improved security” for the population of Iraq at the local level (Kilcullen 2009: 133). In identifying the effect of this policy and the subsequent reduction in violence in Iraq, all three of the regulating principles set out by Clausewitz play a role, with chance and probability at the lead. The chance of the “Anbar Awakening” and the Sunni Arab populations rejection of al Qa’ ida in Iraq was an important turning point for the war (Kilcullen 2009: 141, Metz 2008: 185). This occurrence was further exploited by the probability of success used in the development of FM 3-24 and the introduction the new COIN doctrine in addressing the insurgency’s strategy in Iraq. The purpose of FM 3-24 was to “give the Iraqi political leaders breathing space to address the root causes of the conflict” (Metz 2008: 185). This, in theory, would eventually reduce the level of hostile feeling and intentions direct towards the American forces on the ground, and between Sunni Arabs and Shiites. With a subsequent reduction in violence the political objective that set the war in motion can be realised.

In applying Clausewitz’s paradoxical trinity to the ‘surge’ the validity of his propositions on the nature of war are still apparent. As has been shown, Clausewitz’s regulating principles on the cause and effect of the level and intensity of violence in war provide a powerful explanatory conceptual framework from which to understand the nature of the war being fought and critically analyse the conduct being undertaken in a war. The ‘surge’ provides compelling evidence of Clausewitz’s proposition that while politics exerts a subordinating influence over war for the purpose of realising its goals, its influence runs up against, and is in turn reduced or elevated by, the play of chance and probability, and the force of hostile feelings and intensions. It also explains the interrelationship between the regulating principles of violence and political power in relation to the government, the military and the people in Iraq and America and its effect on policy. By applying the trinitarian definition of war to the broader case studies of Iraq and Afghanistan it will show how these regulating principles can be used to understand the various phases of both wars and critically analyse how they have been and are being conducted.

(Back to flipping burgers )

[Taiko]

The answer the OP’s question: does Clausewitz have too much influence?

Short answer is no.

Why you may ask? I’ll start from the beginning and try to cut down on the academic jargon. In CvC’s book On War he seeks to answer one question: Why does the level and intensity of violence change within the life time of a war and between different wars in different time periods?

CvC arrived at his answer rather late in his life. CvC reasoned that the intensity and level of violence within and between wars is determined by the ‘policies’ that set a conflict in motion. By arguing that war is a continuation of politics by other means CvC sets up a causal relationship:

Policy (cause) Violence (effect)

However, CvC does not stop there. In order to test his answer he goes on to develop a theorem (yardstick for measuring the intensity and level of violence within and between wars), which he called the paradoxical trinity. In setting out the paradoxical trinity CvC identified a number of primary and secondary regulating principles (dependent, independent, intervening variables), that can be used to measure and explain the intensity of violence within and between wars, the main primary regualting principles are:

Policy (the main regulating principle that determines the level and intensity of violence in the life time of a war, it also influences politics, and, is in turn influenced by politics and violence during the various phases of a war)

Politics (primary regulating principle that influences policy)

Violence (primary regulating principle that influences policy)

The reason CvC called this trinity a paradox is because while policy determines the level and intensity of violence in war, policy is itself influenced by the level and intensity of violence and politics of the time. The relationship is not a static one, but rather a dynamic one that can change during the course of a war and between different wars. In some cases violence itself is the dominate regulating principle that determines the level and intensity of violence, in others policy or politics will be dominant while the others are subordinate regulating principles.

CvC introduces an additional number of secondary regulating principles (intervening variables) into this dynamic relationship to explain why in the course of a war the level and intensity of violence can rise and fall.

Policy

Violence: chance and probability, hostile feelings/intensions, purpose

Politics: people, government, military

It is very important to take into account that both the primary and secondary regulating principles are dynamic and subject to change within and between wars. Up until his death CvC was in the process of determining how the different regulating principles influenced the level and intensity of violence within and between wars. This work still remains to be done! However, the framework of the paradoxical trinity is in place and is one of the best explanatory tools that can be used to explain, for example: why the Cold War did not get hot, why the level and intensity of violence in small wars can and does fluctuate, and why the level and intensity in both World Wars came close to absolute.

In addition, I would argue that the paradoxical trinity can also be used as a strategic framework that can shape the conflict environment and dictate the level and intensity of violence used within both large and small wars. The goal being to achieve zero levels of violence and a cessation of the conflict through the application of the paradoxical trinity. The regulating principles can be just as easily applied to COIN and counter-terrorism. This is why CvC does not have too much influence.

So, if you want to understand war read CvC, if you want to understand warfare read Sun Tzu. But that is a story for another day.

[jmm99]

We have the politics (the political process - one meaning of Politik) that leads to the policy (another meaning of Politik) which drives "war" as Politik's continuation via other means. As you say, we have more or less violence depending on how these factors interact and feed on each other. That concept applies to the military struggle (a wrestling match).

Moving beyond CvC's main focus on the military, we also have the political struggle (not entirely non-violent and scarcely electoral politics in one's favorite riding). While this may be also called "politics", it is not the same "politics" as in the political process (Politik1) that leads to the "policy" (Politik2). What is called "politics" in the political struggle is also not exactly the same as the "policy" (Politik2), of which the political struggle is another continuation.

That difference is demonstrated by the manipulation of slogans (and programs) during the political struggle - e.g., the political struggle slogan of land reform via individual peasant ownership, where the long-range policy (Politik2) calls for collective farms as a (not publicized) end result.

Similarly, the political process (Politik1) - e.g., a "United Front for Liberation" which does not reflect a long-range policy (Politik2) of One Party Rule as a (not publicized) end result.

Of course, it is possible for all these "politics" to be the same or at least not conflicting.

My take is that the various "politics" involved (which should be distinguished) are more complicated than the military aspects (obviously well covered by CvC).

Regards

Mike

[Taiko]

All true Mike, but I think this is why CvC includes the secondary regulating principles. So in understanding the casual effect of politics on policy and violence we need to take account of the relationship between the government, people and military before and during the various phases of a war. To understand the political climate before and during conflict CvC provides a form of measurement via the secondary pricinples.

So, we ask who is in control of power (politics) that will be in a position to influence policy and the level and intesity of violence, is it the military, the people or the government? And, how does who is in control of power (politics) effect the policy/politics/level and intensity of violence in the various phases of war.

Specifically, when CvC is looking at secondary regulating principles of politics my reading of it is that he is looking at the power relationship between the people, the government and military. Who holds the power to determine the policy of the political group as a whole, and how does this effect the level and intensity of violence in the various phases of a war.

The primary and secondary regulating principles are the basic framework from which you can identify the centre of gravity in a war. It is useful in understanding how dynamic the centre of gravity is, and can be, and why there can be a variation in the level and intensity of violence during a war. For example, you can use the regulating pricinples to understand how A'Q/UBL go about planning for attacks in different regions of the world. The countries they are operating in all have very different centres of gravity, the regulating principles are different for both violence and politics, and they need to plan operations accordingly otherwise they run the risk of creating an Anbar Awakening.

[William F. Owen]

We should not confuse "Politics" with being just what Politicians do. This would be incorrect. Politics is "Power over People (thus land and resources.)"

War is essentially the actions to alter the distribution of power via violence. Non-violence is thus politics. That may include legal and illegal means, but it ain't "War."

...and additionally, Clausewitz doesn't need to be defended, or even really explained. What really needs doing is to teach what he sought to taught, in an accessible way.

[slapout9]

The primary and secondary regulating principles are the basic framework from which you can identify the centre of gravity in a war. It is useful in understanding how dynamic the centre of gravity is, and can be, and why there can be a variation in the level and intensity of violence during a war. For example, you can use the regulating pricinples to understand how A'Q/UBL go about planning for attacks in different regions of the world. The countries they are operating in all have very different centres of gravity, the regulating principles are different for both violence and politics, and they need to plan operations accordingly otherwise they run the risk of creating an Anbar Awakening.

At the online edition of On War at the (calusewitz home page) COG's are also called Centers of Force and Centers of Power. Might be easier to understand using that description.

[Tom Odom]

At the online edition of On War at the (calusewitz home page) COG's are also called Centers of Force and Centers of Power. Might be easier to understand using that description.

You can download the Kindle version for free.

That way Wilf can put Carl under his pillow

[jmm99]

Here is my take in a graphic, where policy coordinates the political and military struggles.

In practice, we are looking at some variant of CvC's "war cabinet" - another "trinity", consisting of representatives from Policy (in charge), Political Struggle and Military Struggle:

CIMIC CvC.jpg

For CvC's views on the "war cabinet", see this post on another thread "The art of war in its highest point of view is policy" - long quote from Book 8, Ch 6 (1873 Graham trans), Influence of the Political Object on the Military Object.

---------------------
Wilf, the Political Struggle is part of a War (at times, the major part; at other times, not so significant); but agreed it is not "war" in the sense of organized violence by armed forces; nor, following its exclusion as "war", can it be called "warfare". That being said, the political and military struggles must be coordinated - a job for Policy, to ride herd on the political and military cats.

[slapout9]

You can download the Kindle version for free.

That way Wilf can put Carl under his pillow

Thanks Tom, I will put that on the back burner for awhile because best Intelligence indicates NO Kindle before Xmas

[slapout9]

A question for all the CvC experts. Supposedly War is war and there are many differant types of Warfare. If this is true, then how come CvC said there are 2 types of Wars? One to destroy the enemy and the other to grab some of his territory and either keep it or use it to trade for a peace agreement.

[M.L.]

A question for all the CvC experts. Supposedly War is war and there are many differant types of Warfare. If this is true, then how come CvC said there are 2 types of Wars? One to destroy the enemy and the other to grab some of his territory and either keep it or use it to trade for a peace agreement.

This is one of the concepts that CvC didn't get the opportunity to develop. In his author's note dated 10 JUL 1827 he writes:

I regard the first six books, which are already in a clean copy, merely as a rather formless mass that must be throughly reworked once more. The revision will bring out the two types of war with greater clarity at every point.

These two types of war, enemy focused vs. terrain focused, should not be confused with ideas of absolute war (war in its pure, unbounded form) vs. real war (in the real world, war is always restrained in some form).

The nature of war, on the other hand, is clearly defined as "an act of force to compel the enemy to do our will." Whether to surrender, retreat, let us have their land, or whatever, the nature of war does not change, while the character of war does change.

CvC is tough...I'm sure I'm not making it easier...hope this helps though.

[William F. Owen]

I regard the first six books, which are already in a clean copy, merely as a rather formless mass that must be throughly reworked once more. The revision will bring out the two types of war with greater clarity at every point.

Which is why the idea, rather then the expression of it, needs to be examined. The "purity of text" approach to Clausewitz can be counter productive.

These two types of war, enemy focused vs. terrain focused, should not be confused with ideas of absolute war (war in its pure, unbounded form) vs. real war (in the real world, war is always restrained in some form).

thus, for example we can see here he is talking about the conditions/Ends/Policy that armed force seeks to achieve. Of note, he does not stray off into any garbage about the "population."

The nature of war, on the other hand, is clearly defined as "an act of force to compel the enemy to do our will." Whether to surrender, retreat, let us have their land, or whatever, the nature of war does not change, while the character of war does change.

Again, common sense that drives a bull-dozer through a lot of modern doctrine.

CvC is tough...I'm sure I'm not making it easier...hope this helps though.

I find CvC very tough to read, but actually pretty easy to understand. What made that easy, was ditching most of what I have ever been taught by popular military history, which remains the major block to understanding.

[slapout9]

The following is CvC notice given about his unrevised book. Credit to Clausewitz.com on line version of On War which is where I copied it from.

NOTICE

I LOOK upon the first six books, of which a fair copy has now been made, as only a mass which is still in a manner without form, and which has yet to be again revised. In this revision the two kinds of War will be everywhere kept more distinctly in view, by which all ideas will acquire a clearer meaning, a more precise direction, and a closer application. The two kinds of War are, first, those in which the object is the OVERTHROW OF THE ENEMY, whether it be that we aim at his destruction, politically, or merely at disarming him and forcing him to conclude peace on our terms; and next, those in which our object is MERELY TO MAKE SOME CONQUESTS ON THE FRONTIERS OF HIS COUNTRY, either for the purpose of retaining them permanently, or of turning them to account as matter of exchange in the settlement of a peace. Transition from one kind to the other must certainly continue to exist, but the completely different nature of the tendencies of the two must everywhere appear, and must separate from each other things which are incompatible. Besides establishing this real difference in Wars, another practically necessary point of view must at the same time be established, which is, that WAR IS ONLY A CONTINUATION OF STATE POLICY BY OTHER MEANS. This point of view being adhered to everywhere, will introduce much more unity into the consideration of the subject, and things will be more easily disentangled from each other. Although the chief application of this point of view does not commence until we get to the eighth book, still it must be completely developed in the first book, and also lend assistance throughout the revision of the first six books. Through such a revision the first six books will get rid of a good deal of dross, many rents and chasms will be closed up, and much that is of a general nature will be transformed into distinct conceptions and forms.

I have highlighted what I think are the important points and here is my interpretation of them.

1-He clearly meant to revise his book before final publication.

2-There are TWO kinds of War and which type of War you are going to fight is the Supreme question,the Strategic question to ask.

3-The POLITICAL objective was, is and always will be the ultimate guidance on the conduct the War. The POLITICAL objective defines what winning is, not the military objective.

[William F. Owen]

1-He clearly meant to revise his book before final publication.

Very true but what he left was and is fit for purpose. He was clearly a perfectionist and we have no indications as to any major shortcomings.

2-There are TWO kinds of War and which type of War you are going to fight is the Supreme question,the Strategic question to ask.

I don't agree. To me he is saying there will be two broad military objectives. Those are not "strategy," but the military contribution TO strategy. This is also largely irrelevant, as it would more pertain to "Operations." The mechanical linkage of Tactics to Strategy.

3-The POLITICAL objective was, is and always will be the ultimate guidance on the conduct the War. The POLITICAL objective defines what winning is, not the military objective.

Have a banana! Correct, BUT the military must have a task suited to military means, and 99% of the time that will be use violence in support of the Policy.

[slapout9]

Very true but what he left was and is fit for purpose. He was clearly a perfectionist and we have no indications as to any major shortcomings.

I don't agree. To me he is saying there will be two broad military objectives. Those are not "strategy," but the military contribution TO strategy. This is also largely irrelevant, as it would more pertain to "Operations." The mechanical linkage of Tactics to Strategy.

Have a banana! Correct, BUT the military must have a task suited to military means, and 99% of the time that will be use violence in support of the Policy.

1-What he left is certainly fit for purpose and I meant nothing other than the fact that he wasn't finished with everything he had to say.

2-I don't agree and I think it is very important because Strategy in the end is targeting....who you gonna kill and what are you gonna blow up in order to achieve the political objective. And there are two primary Target categories, type one are military and type two are civilian. What we call Terrorism is simply a Strategy of selecting type 2 targets. They avoid type 1 targets (usually) because they know that caint win with that type of Strategy. And the failure to understand this is why we are loosing the LWOT,GWOT,WOT or whatever we are calling it these days.

3-No banna but a steak dinerif Clauswitz were alive he would be splitting his book royalities with me because he would understand exactly what I mean when I say Strategy= Motive, Method and Opportunity. Just count how many times the word Motive appears in On War

[M.L.]

Strategy in the end is targeting....who you gonna kill and what are you gonna blow up in order to achieve the political objective.

Strategy is most certainly more than that. Targeting is an operational and tactical concept.

Strategy is the balancing of ends, ways, and means to accomplish a political objective. It extends far beyond simple acts of force.

[slapout9]

Strategy is most certainly more than that. Targeting is an operational and tactical concept.

I take it you don't believe in Strategic Targets ?