The Clausewitz Collection (merged thread)

[Taiko]

A question for all the CvC experts. Supposedly War is war and there are many differant types of Warfare. If this is true, then how come CvC said there are 2 types of Wars? One to destroy the enemy and the other to grab some of his territory and either keep it or use it to trade for a peace agreement.

CvC was building on his proposition that war is a continuation of politics by other means through an observational account of the historical transition from 'cabinet wars' (territorial) to 'Nepoleonic wars' (destroy the standing army). It is important to note the correlation in the shifting of policy and the shift in the type of warfare that was being fought to gain the political objectives in both periods, and how this relates to wars of annihiliation and wars of attrition. There are some very interesting insites embedded in these passages which deal with the relationship between generals and policy-makers that have been misinterpreted over the years. From my reading, when CvC talks about the two types of war he is referring to the variation in political objectives a state can achieve through the use of violence.

In making this observation CvC was taking into account the level and intensity of violence required to meet the political objectives set out by policy in both periods. A very rough present day example:

Ireal/Palistinian conflict's political objective is a 'terrirotial one', hence the level and intenisty of violence is only enough to take and hold territory

The initial phase of the Iraq war involved the political objective of overturning a regime, hence the level and intensity of violence was enough to annihilate the standing army and, in theory, the state of Iraq's ability to resist the political objective of the Coalition.

[jmm99]

Delbrück's concepts of Niederwerfungsstrategie (the "strategy of annihilation") and Ermattungsstrategie (the "strategy of exhaustion or attrition") are similar (though more generalized) and extrapolated from CvC.

Two different strategies based on different policy choices.

Regards

Mike

[Fuchs]

(CvC) was clearly a perfectionist and we have no indications as to any major shortcomings.

...save for the worst grammar of all German classic literature and a terribly wrong understanding of Newtonian Physics.

[William F. Owen]

....because Strategy in the end is targeting....who you gonna kill and what are you gonna blow up in order to achieve the political objective. And there are two primary Target categories, type one are military and type two are civilian.

OK, now that IS an interesting point, but probably simplistic view, BUT I'll have to go and drink some coffee on the balcony to think about that. Thank you.

[Taiko]

Strategy in the end is targeting....who you gonna kill and what are you gonna blow up in order to achieve the political objective.

Strategy is the bridge between policy and operations.

[M.L.]

I take it you don't believe in Strategic Targets ?

Why would you say that? Strategy includes targeting, but includes much more as well.

[M.L.]

Strategy is the bridge between policy and operations.

Very good, although I would say this is what strategy does more than what strategy is.

[slapout9]

Targeting is an operational and tactical concept.

M.L., because you said this. A General MUST decide what to attack in order to accomplish his Mission. Picking the proper targets is the most fundemantal act of Strategy there is. How to attack the targets the fundemental act of Tactics.

[slapout9]

OK, now that IS an interesting point, but probably simplistic view, BUT I'll have to go and drink some coffee on the balcony to think about that. Thank you.

Clausewitz is simple! He had a problem with what my English teacher would call the "run on sentence" On another thread about CvC I wrote that the title for his book should have been "Thoughts On War." What we know is CvC wrote every thought On War he had that could be committed to paper. And then in his final notice he clearly stated that his intention was to revise and clarify his thinking. So my thinking is if he had lived he would taken a lot of his wordage out of the final book or at least condensed it down to the very essence of his thinking On War.

Also, I have never read a book that more clearly identifies how criminals think in my life! On War usually makes the top 10 list of books read by inmates in prison. "The Prince" by Machiavelli is usually number one.

But I still say picking the right targets to attack is the essential problem for a General. Criminals do with ease everyday, they very quickly figure out who to hurt or kidnap or what to destroy or steal in order to accomplish their objective. So do good Generals IMO.

[Taiko]

M.L., because you said this. A General MUST decide what to attack in order to accomplish his Mission. Picking the proper targets is the most fundemantal act of Strategy there is. How to attack the targets the fundemental act of Tactics.

And so the superior military cuts down strategy.
Its inferior cuts down alliances.
Its inferior cuts down the military.
The worst attack walled cities.

[slapout9]

And so the superior military cuts down strategy.
Its inferior cuts down alliances.
Its inferior cuts down the military.
The worst attack walled cities.

Thats the other great military thinker isn't it?

[M.L.]

M.L., because you said this. A General MUST decide what to attack in order to accomplish his Mission. Picking the proper targets is the most fundemantal act of Strategy there is. How to attack the targets the fundemental act of Tactics.

Picking targets is an operational function, not a strategic one. I defy you to produce a national strategy document which contains specific targets.

Strategic objectives are not the same as targets. A strategic objective may be to destroy the national leadership of an enemy country (say, the president and supreme council of Iran). This strategic objective is then translated at the operational level into either operational targets or tactical objectives.

A strategic target is a target which, if destroyed/defeated, will produce strategic effects. However, this isn't "strategic targeting."

[slapout9]

Picking targets is an operational function, not a strategic one. I defy you to produce a national strategy document which contains specific targets.

Strategic objectives are not the same as targets. A strategic objective may be to destroy the national leadership of an enemy country (say, the president and supreme council of Iran). This strategic objective is then translated at the operational level into either operational targets or tactical objectives.

A strategic target is a target which, if destroyed/defeated, will produce strategic effects. However, this isn't "strategic targeting."

M.L.,it's gonna be alright man I am not arguing what is actually taught today as official methodology, I am arguing about what I believe Clausewitz meant in On War. See the differance? So lets not start defying each other about who can produce what because the guy (CvC) is dead and nobody can really prove anything except the quotes from the book and even those are subject to translational debate.

[Taiko]

Colin Gray's Maxim 12:

"The strategist is in the business of currency conversion, in a context that lacks a stable rate of exchange. He or she must determine what kind of military threat or action, on what scale, should generate strategic effect necessary to achieve political objectives. Strategy is exceptionally difficult because its has dimensions that embrace every aspect of war preparation and warmaking. "

However,

"No battle plan ever survives contact with the enemy." Helmuth von Moltke the Elder

"Strategy is not, however, the final arbiter in war. The battle-field decides." Charles E. Callwell

Finally,

"Strategy is the use of engagements for the object of the war." CvC

[slapout9]

"Strategy is the use of engagements for the object of the war." CvC

Yes, and to me that is picking targets.

[slapout9]

This is pretty good Strategic Attack USAF Doctine Document 2-1.

http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/ser...s/afd2_1_2.pdf

[M.L.]

M.L., because you said this. A General MUST decide what to attack in order to accomplish his Mission. Picking the proper targets is the most fundemantal act of Strategy there is. How to attack the targets the fundemental act of Tactics.

Wrong. Deciding what objectives and conditions must be achieved (end state) is the most fundamental act of strategy. Balancing ways and means to achieve those objectives is second.

Strategy built solely on targeting is poor strategy. That kind of thinking is what went wrong in Iraq. CENTCOM focused on what to attack (Iraqi Army, Hussein Regime), rather than focusing on strategic objectives.

[slapout9]

Wrong. Deciding what objectives and conditions must be achieved (end state) is the most fundamental act of strategy. Balancing ways and means to achieve those objectives is second.

Strategy built solely on targeting is poor strategy. That kind of thinking is what went wrong in Iraq. CENTCOM focused on what to attack (Iraqi Army, Hussein Regime), rather than focusing on strategic objectives.

1- An Objective is a person, place, or thing according to CvC is it not? That is also what a target is it not?

2-CENTCOM focused on attacking the wrong targets...which is very bad Startegy. There was far better plan by General Wayne Downing (who new how to target to achieve the polictical objective) that was rejected and he pretty said what would happen because of that and it did.



From Clausewtiz himself( Book 4)...Strategic targeting all laid out nice and neat.

"Destruction of the enemy's military forces is in reality the object of all combats; but other objects maybe joined to that, and these other objects may be at the same time predominant; we must therefore draw a distinction between those in which the destruction of the enemy's forces is the principal object, and those in which it is more the means. Besides the destruction of the enemy's force, the possession of a place or the possession of some object may be the general motive for a combat, and it may be either one of these alone or several together, in which case still usually one is the principal motive. Now the two principal forms of War, the offensive and defensive, of which we shall shortly speak, do not modify the first of these motives, but they certainly do modify the other two, and therefore if we arrange them in a scheme they would appear thus:—"

Offensive. Defensive.

1. Destruction of enemy's force. 1. Destruction of enemy's force.

2. Conquest of a place. 2. Defence of a place.

3. Conquest of some object. 3. Defence of some object.

[William F. Owen]

Wrong. Deciding what objectives and conditions must be achieved (end state) is the most fundamental act of strategy. Balancing ways and means to achieve those objectives is second.

So what you are saying is the the formulation of Policy is the most fundamental act of strategy?
Policy stand separate from strategy, so I suggest the most fundamental act of strategy is to apply the Ways (Strategy) and Means (Tactics) to gain the Ends (Policy).
The point is your Policy may well be in place before it is opposed and thus require a strategy. Policy is usually the cause of war, thus exists before the strategy is necessary, BUT the Policy will usually have alter to be achievable in Ways and Means. Is this what you meant?

[slapout9]

so I suggest the most fundamental act of strategy is to apply the Ways (Strategy) and Means (Tactics) to gain the Ends (Policy).

Which is just a fancy way of saying.... who you gonna kill or what are you gonna blow up.... is it not? My theory is normal people don't like talking about things like that so they come up with all this JabberWacky talk to make them feel better about what they are really doing or going to do.

Look at the Taliban they have no Military Academies, no War College, no Command and Staff School....but they know who they are going to kill and what they are going to blow up.

Didn't CvC say something to the effect that being an intellectual giant is NOT a requirement of Generalship. It's in the book somewhere.