The question seems to me to be whether we want to produce an army of occupation. British colonial forces spilled (and shed) a lot of blood, but they couldn't keep the empire together forever.

The underlying assumption here, seems to be that we must be ready to step into third world countries and play hide and seek with GWOT personalities. Going double or nothing on a strategy that, in over five years of application, has yet to bag Osama or shut down the Taliban doesn't seem like the smartest move.

The Army could certainly use a lot more infantry - and they could stand with getting a lot lighter. But the fact is that this problem is both bigger and smaller than the Army. The real question should be a matter of national strategy, which includes all elements of American power, relating to how we deal with the threat of terrorism. Restructuring the Army won't win the GWOT, it won't even win Iraq. Focusing the efforts of the State Department, the intelligence community, our trade and lending practices, AND the Army might get us somewhere. Restructuring the Army before we figure out precisely WHY we want to be chasing around Africa and Asia and WHAT we expect to achieve while we're there is putting the cart before the horse.