We are missing a variety of things, but to get at them we need to gain a better perspective of both ourselves and the threats we face. In short "know our enemy and know ourself"

So, as a paradigm shift, if I want "know my enemy" in a tactical way, I ask the Intel guys. If I want to "know my enemy" in a strategic way, I need to tell the Intel guys to take a knee and go talk to my strategy guys instead.

As powerful nations transition from building Empires to holding Empires, their military capacity shifts from one designed, trained, organized and equipped for warfighting to one that is designed, trained, organized and equipped for maintaining control of the populaces and governments within that empire. I, for one, see a lot of that going on in the Pentagon in the post-Cold War era.

One factor that blinds us is the position that the US is not an Imperial power. Perhaps, but we sure act like one.

The challenges of Somalia, the Balkans, the OEFs and OIF, hell - even much of residual Cold War positions; are all rooted in this sustaining of a sphere of security and economic influence. That is a whole lot like sustaining an Empire.

What happens to these countries is that someone tends come along, or more often multiple someones team-up and come along, with a military designed specifically to defeat the Empire's Empire-sustaining military capability.

I would suggest to the Army:
1. Stop agonizing so much over how to build an Empire-sustaining army.
2. Stop being so Intel-Driven, and become more Strategy-Driven.
3. Make the focus of the military the capabilities needed to deter and defeat major threats to the US (A capability and intent to blow up an Embassy or a ship is not a major threat to the US, these are largely law enforcement matters).
4. Re-prioritize FID and other support to Department of State activities as a supporting activity.
5. Down-size the Intel community back to pre-9/11 levels
6. Begin identifying, training and employing strategists before the current Intro to Strategy that is given at the War College. Strategy is not just for Colonels and above, and frankly, those old dogs are not very good at picking up new tricks at that point.
7. Send the COS and the SECArmy into the SECDEF's office and demand that we stop calling Afghanistan and Iraq "Wars."
8. Submit a proposal at the same time that reduces General Officer billets by 50% and publicly challenge the other services to match that commitment and to implement it when they do. (Make it a 80% reduction for the Marine Corps as they are totally out of control in that regard).

Bill this list could go on and on, but the first 4 points are critical, the rest are important, but would naturally follow getting the first part right.