Mech Platoon: CAB or ACR

[TAH]

Originally Posted by 82redleg

I'll have to check out Storr's argument, but I'm inclined to disagree. I like big, robust units. It allows commanders to rotate units out and have a flexibility to keep a reserve, guard a base camp, a LOC, detach a unit for a special mission, etc, without breaking a sub unit. If you send a company from a 2 company BN, that BN is now broken. If you send a CO from a 4 company BN, that BN is simply slightly less flexible, especially if it has 4 + a weapons/CSC, not 4 including a weapons/CSC.

Large units also inhibit staffs from micromanaging- a BCT staff will be more involved with the operations of its subordinates if there are only 2 than if there are 4.

Maximinze platoons/companies, minimize HQs (numbers and size)

A unit of 16 Companies in 4 Bns of 4 companies (16 total) will most likely be more agile/effective then a unit of 6 Bns of 3 companies (18 total).

A briagde of 6 Bns of 4 companies (24 total) should out-perform the same number of companies spread across 8 Bns (3 companies each) in two Brigades.

[Fuchs]

Originally Posted by TAH

A briagde of 6 Bns of 4 companies (24 total) should out-perform the same number of companies spread across 8 Bns (3 companies each) in two Brigades.

Now this is strange.
I understand your assertion in the context of "blue 1x6 Bde moves east and two red 2x3 Bdes move west", as you've got unity of command advantage for blue in such a scenario.

Yet, modify this into a pincer scenario or let blue face some smarter red behaviour and you end up seeing an inferior blue unless it divides itself into dissimilarly behaving components. At that point, the advantage of blue is all but gone.


Now keep in mind the experience from WW2; namely that smaller formations are handy and practical, whereas large ones are clumsy until they fragment- and are very difficult to command when fragmented.


The practical experience seems to suggest that small is beautiful while theory cannot convince me that big is beautiful.

[TAH]

Originally Posted by Fuchs

Now this is strange.
I understand your assertion in the context of "blue 1x6 Bde moves east and two red 2x3 Bdes move west", as you've got unity of command advantage for blue in such a scenario.

Yet, modify this into a pincer scenario or let blue face some smarter red behaviour and you end up seeing an inferior blue unless it divides itself into dissimilarly behaving components. At that point, the advantage of blue is all but gone.


Now keep in mind the experience from WW2; namely that smaller formations are handy and practical, whereas large ones are clumsy until they fragment- and are very difficult to command when fragmented.


The practical experience seems to suggest that small is beautiful while theory cannot convince me that big is beautiful.

A disadvantage of the 2 brigades of 4 Bns of 3 companies is who/what Hqs coordinates the actions of both of the brigades. You will normally defalt to a DIV HQs.

So the Brigade of 6 has a single (probably overall smaller) HQs while the Brigades of 4 will have three (2 BDE & 1 DIV). More people to direct and conctrol the actions/activities of the same number of units.

[Ken White]

Originally Posted by TAH

Ken, can you please expand on your definition of the "Cav Problem".

The problem is the excessively European focus based on 50 years of peace and misperceptions about the quality of the once potential cold war turning hot opponent and equipment procurement practices that are excessively bureaucratic, oriented toward pleasing various communities and NOT focused on combat realities. Short answer: Sixty plus years of mostly peace and no major requirement for reconnaissance or cavalry functions exacerbated by American impatience.

At the start of WWII, we had the same situation we had until recently, flawed doctrine that restricted Mechinized Cavalry units to recon only. Found in North Africa it didn't work. Open terrain, impoper training, out-gunned etc.

Agreed, though I would say the situation that we still have to an extent...

The problem you cite and that the author of your last link notes well was simply a very conservative Army, unwilling to change and adapt and tootling off to war -- only to get the shock of their lives and then having to adapt -- which they did and did pretty well. By the end of that war, we had the principles down pretty well. The "problem" ensued when we abandoned those principles.

I would ask anyone interested in some of the roots of the CAV/Recon to read the following...

I've read and digested the first three over the years. The first was the result of three hard years of combat experience and was the catalyst that effectively put Cav on the right track for the 50s and 60s. It was and is a good primer for what's needed in a European or similar terrain scenario. It does NOT well address desert, mountain or jungle operations -- a problem for an Army that theoretically has a worldwide deployment and operational focus.

The second illustrates the two major flaws in the use of Cavalry by the US Army. In order, those are excessive impatience with concomitant pressure for speed of movement and information acquisition; and poor training -- In a good many years and literally knowing or seeing hundreds of commanders operate in combat or on exercises, I can count on one hand the number of Commanders I met or saw who truly knew how to use their reconnaissance or cavalry. Most Infantry and many Armor commanders are not good at using those units...

I would also in fairness note that the pressure for speed often comes not from Commanders but from their Staffs...

From Fight for Information:
""In 2009, the Army Reconnaissance Course remained a work in progress. A pilot course in the early spring built on the lessons learned from work done the previous 2 years...after 6 years of combat operations in Iraq to an acknowledgment of the value of more robust reconnaissance organizations capable of fighting for information. Ironically, this acceptance did not prevent the abolition of armored cavalry, though it did generate efforts to create a more versatile BFSB. If the past is prologue, future operations by the US Army will require the capabilities of both stealthy and fighting reconnaissance organizations.""(emphasis added / kw)

Reconnaissance will always be a work in progress because the vagaries of METT-TC force rapid adaptation. EVERY war is different; to build based on any one war or theater is a major error (and that was the major shortfall and problem in the 1975-2005 period...). Cavalry or robust recon organizations that are reasonably decently equipped and moderately well trained can perform stealthy recon and / or fight for information -- they can always do that. They can do it quite successfully provided their employing command knows how to use them.

The Thesis is interesting but really adds little that is new.

While there are others, these give good background/backup info on how we got here.

Yes -- provided they're read with a critical eye and given some thought...

[82redleg]

Originally Posted by Fuchs

Now this is strange.
I understand your assertion in the context of "blue 1x6 Bde moves east and two red 2x3 Bdes move west", as you've got unity of command advantage for blue in such a scenario.

Yet, modify this into a pincer scenario or let blue face some smarter red behaviour and you end up seeing an inferior blue unless it divides itself into dissimilarly behaving components. At that point, the advantage of blue is all but gone.


Now keep in mind the experience from WW2; namely that smaller formations are handy and practical, whereas large ones are clumsy until they fragment- and are very difficult to command when fragmented.


The practical experience seems to suggest that small is beautiful while theory cannot convince me that big is beautiful.

The C2 capability of a WW2 division is less than what exists in a BN today. Simply put, a given staff today can exercise C2 across much larger footprint than their WW2 counterpart.

Current experience indicates that our current BCT staffs can supervise the operations of a much larger organization than they have organically.

[Fuchs]

That's no argument, for you can simply adjust the HQ to an optimal size, no matter what's the Bde TO&E.


The previous "less staffs" argument has its limits as well, for otherwise we could concentrate on one HQ for an entire army. Pointing out a factor that's pro larger Bdes alone doesn't make the case for a larger Bde, for there are many other reasons.
Among these other reasons are the advantages of smaller, more agile Bdes.

A large Bde can also be agile, of course - IF the really relevant level is the battalion level, IF battalion (battlegroups) are the real manoeuvring forces.
The HQ argument loses relevance in this case because the Bde/Div HQs could be really tiny then.

[TAH]

Originally Posted by Fuchs

That's no argument, for you can simply adjust the HQ to an optimal size, no matter what's the Bde TO&E.


The previous "less staffs" argument has its limits as well, for otherwise we could concentrate on one HQ for an entire army. Pointing out a factor that's pro larger Bdes alone doesn't make the case for a larger Bde, for there are many other reasons.
Among these other reasons are the advantages of smaller, more agile Bdes.

A large Bde can also be agile, of course - IF the really relevant level is the battalion level, IF battalion (battlegroups) are the real manoeuvring forces.
The HQ argument loses relevance in this case because the Bde/Div HQs could be really tiny then.

My comments were intended to be for a force of 18 to 24 companies.

Within that, you could have a Brigade as "small" as 4 Bns of 4 companies (OK only 16 ) or a division as "large" as 8 Bns of 3 companies each. A Bde Hqs and staff should be able to handle 16 or even 18 maneuver companies. Eight Bns would be too many for a single Bde to handle, six might be too many as well.

To me alot of its about how much HQs "overhead" do you want/need.

TAH

[gute]

Now keep in mind the experience from WW2; namely that smaller formations are handy and practical, whereas large ones are clumsy until they fragment- and are very difficult to command when fragmented.



That was Storr's argument or justification for smaller divisions. I don't know if his book has been the subject of a thread on this site - if not, it should be because I am curious what you guys think after reading his well thought out arguments.

[82redleg]

Originally Posted by Fuchs

That's no argument, for you can simply adjust the HQ to an optimal size, no matter what's the Bde TO&E.


The previous "less staffs" argument has its limits as well, for otherwise we could concentrate on one HQ for an entire army. Pointing out a factor that's pro larger Bdes alone doesn't make the case for a larger Bde, for there are many other reasons.
Among these other reasons are the advantages of smaller, more agile Bdes.

A large Bde can also be agile, of course - IF the really relevant level is the battalion level, IF battalion (battlegroups) are the real manoeuvring forces.
The HQ argument loses relevance in this case because the Bde/Div HQs could be really tiny then.

Except that to do the job of a BDE (or whatever level) HQs entails a certain amount of overhead- I've seen no convincing argument (I've requested Storr's book inter-library) for failing to maximize that capability. Without maximizing the capability, you end up with micromanagement.

When drawing comparisons from WW2, you have to remember 3 things:
1- (already mentioned) is the exponential increase in C2 capabilities since then
2- the relatively unlimited nature of the force structure. In WW2, we had lots of separate BDEs, regiments, groups, battalions, etc, that could do all the little tasks that tend to come up. Now, we don't. So we take it out of hide, from subordinate units. The problem comes when we make these subordinates so small that detaching a subordinate effectively emasculates them. My BCT detached a IN BN shortly before our own deployment to Iraq- long story. A BCT of only one IN BN left us scrambling for combat power- we eventually made up for it, and ended up with 4 battalions attached in theater (total of 9 BNs in the BCT), but we were in-effective without the plus up, and effectively only a rump BCT.
3- in WW2, we were an amateur army. Most of the BN CDRs and even many RGT commanders had very little time in service, and those that did have time in service had little experience with large units. Our BCT commanders today have much more and better preparation to command at that level than their WW2 counterparts, and the difference at BN level is even greater. Most WW2 company commanders were shake and bakes with only a couple of years service and almost no professional education. This lead to a need to micromanage, from DIV CG on down, which effectively decreased the size of units that can be controlled.

[Ken White]

Originally Posted by 82redleg

Except that to do the job of a BDE (or whatever level) HQs entails a certain amount of overhead...

Very much agree, been in big strong Bdes and small weak Bdes -- the larger always worked better. Not least because they're less personality dependent and more error tolerant -- and IMO, less inclined to facilitate micromanagement. Size is an impediment to that trait; redundancy and strong capabilities render it unnecessary.

When drawing comparisons from WW2, you have to remember 3 things:
1-...2- ... A BCT of only one IN BN left us scrambling for combat power- we eventually made up for it, and ended up with 4 battalions attached in theater (total of 9 BNs in the BCT), but we were in-effective without the plus up, and effectively only a rump BCT.

Yep. Cautionary tale that -- ala TAH comment on the poor Cav performance early in WW II, inexperience causes people to attempt to 'economize' in all aspects. Doesn't work well, most warfare tends to be manpower intensive. In a given unit, I'd rather be understrength than overstrength (the latter allows, even encourages, slack habits at all levels) but I'd rather have too many units available than not enough, those not employed can always train. Hopefully we know that training is a constant, in combat and out...

3- in WW2, we were an amateur army...Most WW2 company commanders were shake and bakes with only a couple of years service and almost no professional education. This lead to a need to micromanage, from DIV CG on down, which effectively decreased the size of units that can be controlled.

All true, however the counter to the first portion of number 3 is that the cream (generally ) rose to the top and slackers got summarily fired -- that does not happen today, therefor the increased education and training * are countered by the luck of the draw on competence and drive. Not to mention that IIRC, it's two years to CPT today???

My experience with a slew of WW II Commanders in the immediate postwar era and in Korea was that they did NOT micromanage. That began to change in 1952 when the line stabilized in Korea and suddenly Regimental Commanders, GOs and worse, their Staffs, had little to do and being aggressive take-charge guys, learned to micromanage which essentially forced CPTs who knew better too do the same thing. That trend was severely exacerbated by Viet Nam when again the COLS and Generals really had little to do (as is often the case today...).

That trend migrated down to Bn level after 1969 when the third and fourth string LTCs got in country and found they had no CPTs and few senior NCOs but a bunch of 2LTs and SGTs (NCOC Grads, six months of service...) who would do anything you asked but who knew little and thus almost had to be micromanaged -- thus a generation of Generals learned to over micromanage everything. They made it a way of life...

I would also suggest while the the WW II guys may not have been as (book wise) tactically and technically competent as todays crop, those guys knew people. I sometimes wonder if that is not a lost skill in today's Army.

Thus, they knew what to watch out for and what to ignore. Given the spate of aberrant and senseless behavior by NCOs and Troops about which Commands seem to be clueless and the number of horror tales about uniformtiy, haircuts and such, that too seems a lost skill.

[ODB]

One cannot forget in today's technology driven warfare and over abundance of arm chair quarterbacks watching live feeds from the sky, of operations hundreds if not thousands of miles away; how many commanders will allow manned reconnaissance again? Knowing the military we will not increase the capabilities of manned reconnaissance, then we will end up in a jungle where unmanned reconnaissance cannot penetrate the canopy. Only then will someone wake and say "Hey we need to train reconnaissance elements." I know not necessarily the CAV's ideal terrain, but makes the point. Look at how commanders abuse unmanned reconnaissance currently, it will only get worse. Nothing worse than executing a target only to find out command put ISR on your target without your knowledge so the could see what was going on. The current operational environment has led to information overload and requirements than junior leaders have come to know as the norm and will expect it in the future. I miss the days of commo windows and short to the point SITREPS. Sorry, I digressed a bit from the subject at the end, but it needs to be taken into account. Especially, since all command has to do is look at the little blue dots on the screen and micro manage away. It will not matter the size of the element, one little blue dot wanders from where the commander thinks it should be and they will be calling that element direct wanting to know what is going on. Tactical patience has disappeared and become a lost art.

[TAH]

Originally Posted by ODB

One cannot forget in today's technology driven warfare and over abundance of arm chair quarterbacks watching live feeds from the sky, of operations hundreds if not thousands of miles away

Early in the fight in Afganistan I recall seeing a picture taken inside the the 10th Mountain Division HQs/TOC. It showed their CG (a two star) watching a live feed from a Predator UAV orbiting above a mission.

My thought is/was, excuse me sir, that's jot your job.

TAH

[Sparapet]

Originally Posted by TAH

Early in the fight in Afganistan I recall seeing a picture taken inside the the 10th Mountain Division HQs/TOC. It showed their CG (a two star) watching a live feed from a Predator UAV orbiting above a mission.

My thought is/was, excuse me sir, that's jot your job.

TAH

I can understand that if he was bored and wanted to relive his ground-pounder days. But the C2 micromanagement is truly becoming a problem. This seems especially true in occupation actions where going above the Company level is relatively rare, majority of work being done at the platoon level. As a scout platoon (+) in OIF I did maybe 90% of my missions unsupported by the rest of the troop or squadron. Net result is endless reporting to higher via FBCB2 of every turn or 5 minute stop I execute in a 10 hour patrol. I eventually had a TC dedicated to being the live feed to SQDN......even though technically they could see me move anywhere in country. The incessant ISR presence was also a bit annoying. Half the time I knew I was being watched, as I could hear the drone, but it wasn't my asset to task to support my mission. 2 to 3 echelons above are watching so mission wise it was only useful to me if the gods that be ordained to share real-time info.
Just some anecdotes. But more to the point, Auftragstaktik is not an approach readily valued in the maneuver force today. This may be due as much to the availability of information as patent paranoia for liability in certain operational environments.


Cav Cpt

[Cavguy]

Originally Posted by Ken White

That trend migrated down to Bn level after 1969 when the third and fourth string LTCs got in country and found they had no CPTs and few senior NCOs but a bunch of 2LTs and SGTs (NCOC Grads, six months of service...) who would do anything you asked but who knew little and thus almost had to be micromanaged -- thus a generation of Generals learned to over micromanage everything. They made it a way of life...

Ken,

Never thought I'd say this, but the cycle is there and now I'm potentially part of the problem ...

Cav Squadron XO life is great, but different than when I last was in a troop unit - we could count on 3-5 Captain's Course graduates in the staff, now we're lucky to have one. For you non-army types, they teach staff work at the Captain's course, which makes having a good density of grads a multiplier. So I find myself having to explain/teach a lot of basic things (staff skills) to the motivated but untrained 1LTs that comprise a good deal of the staff. No crisis but certainly slows things down.

I can see where some might choose/be forced to micromanage IOT ensure success. Fortunately I have enough time to teach what I need before we deploy, and they're a sharp bunch. Makes the learning curve steeper though.

[Ken White]

They've got a good teacher, they'll be okay. I know NOT micromanaging is far harder -- but IMO it's worth it.

Keep up the fire!

[82redleg]

Originally Posted by Cavguy

I can see where some might choose/be forced to micromanage IOT ensure success. Fortunately I have enough time to teach what I need before we deploy, and they're a sharp bunch. Makes the learning curve steeper though.

IMO, its not micromanaging to teach a subordinate the skills he needs to succeed in a position that he has not been trained for. Now, if you are still treating them the same way in a year, it might be a problem.

And enjoy your time in a BN- I've got another year and a half before I'll see a BN again.

[Pete]

By chance, did any of the old-time cavalrymen here ever serve with one Captain Nathan Brittles? There are a few guys here who are old enough to have been the ground guide for the Trojan Horse.

[Pete]

Oh well, in 1898 it was too late for my great-grandfather to have known Captain Brittles when he was in the U.S. Cavalry. Great-grandpa never made it closer to the Spanish than Camp Lewis, Washington during the war, but according to the stories he told afterwards the Greasers would have surrendered immediately if they had to deal with him. Grandma said he'd drive her mother nuts when he'd get out his Army Colt .45 revolver and fiddle with it after he'd been drinking.